THE END OF MEANING: THE EFFECT OF 'GAZE' AND LABELING ON SOCIAL RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT

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Vildan Özertürk Sofu

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All throughout the studies of identity politics, there has been a Subject -or the active agent, and an Object -or the passive affectant. The Subject has employed various ways to claim his/her individuality and subject-ness; like setting the rules that the Other is expected to obey, and constructing the dominant rhetoric. Yet, the most effective of all these ways has been 'labeling' the other individual with names and definitions so that s/he is reduced into an Object, who is *different* than the Subject, who is simply the Other. This dissertation, setting out from the thesis that all labeling starts with a *gaze,* aims to re-read/interpret the labeling theory over the theory of gaze and over a number of socio-political case studies mainly from, but not limited to, the context of Turkish society. Labeling is not one-sided, it does not end with the Subject's labeling the other. Rather, as this dissertation claims, it is two-sided as the object-other definitely *gazes back* at his/her labeler one way or another. This gaze back is more obvious if the labeled individual has been labeled based on a visible aspect of his/her identity; such as physical appearance, clothing, gender, race, and/or religious preference. The dissertation specifically focuses on the 'falsely-accused deviants' from the labeling theorist Howard S. Becker's types of deviant behavior chart. The 'falsely-accused deviants' are ones who are *assumed* to commit deviant acts based upon certain generalizations and stereotypical misconceptions. This dissertation studies the reactionary types of 'gaze back' behavior displayed by the gazed/labeled individual by formulating a four-category chart which employs reactions ranging from 'submitting to' or 'resisting against' the given label on one axis, and 'hiding' or 'exposing' the perceived difference on the other.

Keywords: labeling, gaze, gaze back, subject-object dichotomy, identity construction

ÖZ

ANLAMIN SONU: BAKIŞ VE ETİKETLEMENİN SOSYAL İLİŞKİYE ETKİSİ

Vildan Özertürk Sofu

Nisan, 2014

Kimlik politikaları çalışmalarının genelinde, aktif özne konumunda bir Süje ile pasif etkilenen konumunda bir Obje yer alır. Süje bireyselliğinin ve özneliğinin iddiasında, Öteki'nin uymasını beklediği kurallar koymak ya da baskın retoriği kurgulamak gibi çeşitli metotlar uygular. Bununla birlikte, bu metotların en etkili olanı, çeşitli isim ve tanımlarla diğer bireyi Süjeden *farklı* bir Objeye indirgeyerek Öteki yapan 'etiketleme' olmuştur. 'Her etiketleme bir *bakış*la başlar' tezinden hareketle, bu tez, etiketleme teorisini, bakış teorisi üzerinden yeniden okumayı/yorumlamayı hedeflemektedir. Bu okumada çoğunlukla Türk toplumundan bir dizi sosyo-politik vaka incelemesi ele alınacaktır. Etiketleme tek yönlü olmayıp, Süjenin diğerini etiketlemesi ile sona ermez. Aksine, bu çalışmanın da iddia ettiği üzere, süreç iki yönlü olup, ötekileştirilen Obje, etiketleyicisine bir şekilde geri bakmaktadır. Şayet etiketlenen birey fiziksel görünümü, kıyafeti, cinsiyeti, ırkı ve/veya dini tercihi gibi kimliğinin görünen bir yönü dolayısıyla etiketlenmişse, bu geri bakış daha da belirginleşmektedir. Bu tez, spesifik olarak, etiketleme teorisyeni Howard S. Becker'ın sapkın (deviant) davranış çeşitleri tablosunda yer alan 'hatalı-suçlanan sapkınlar' üzerine eğilmektedir. 'Hatalı-suçlanan sapkınlar,' belirli genellemeler ve sterotipik yanlış kanılara dayalı olarak, sapkın fiil ve davranışlarda bulundukları *var sayılan* bireylerdir. Bu tez, bir eksende, verilmiş olan etikete 'boyun eğme' ya da 'karşı çıkma', diğer bir eksende ise algılanan farklılığını 'saklama' ya da 'açığa vurma' şeklinde dört-kategorili olarak oluşturulan bir tablo üzerinden, bakılan/etiketlenen bireyin, bu etiketleme sonucunda, reaksiyoner 'geri bakış' davranış çeşitlerini incelemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: etiketleme, bakış, geri bakış, süje-obje ikiliği, kimlik yapılandırılması

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

vii

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of the Problem and Overview

Man, as a social being, is in constant interaction with his fellow human beings. Yet, this 'interaction' is not always two-sided, in a paradox to the meaning of the word. Born into a society and being already surrounded by a web of its preconceptions, or 'knowledge' as to the ones other than him, the individual already bears in mind certain 'information' about others both in and outside of his society based upon these preconceptions. Such 'knowledge' as to the other without any (or with partial) interaction whatsoever is driven from generalizing 'labels' which are the outcomes of the labeling process.

This dissertation aims to explore and understand the labeling phenomenon deeper by looking at it mainly from the standpoint of the labeled individual who is being labeled based on a visual characteristic of his/her; such as clothing, skin color, body features, and the like, as well as on his/her gender, language, ethnic background, religious beliefs and/or sexual preference. As Geof Wood writes, "we all label" (Moncrieffe & Eyben eds., 2007, 19), and likewise we are all labeled in some way or another. Put it differently, we are all victimized due to one (or more) specific part of our identities, and likewise we do victimize another based on one (or more) specific part of his/her identity. In the absence of the utmost opportunity of getting to know everyone, our information or 'knowledge' in relation to the other directs us in our interactions with them.

Labeling theory, as it was prominently formulated by Howard S. Becker (1963), is mainly interested in 'deviance', and basically draws a correlation between an act that is being labeled as *deviant* and further (and at times permanent) deviance created as a result of this labeling. Labeling theorists (Becker, 1963; Erikson, 1964; Lemert, 1951; Tannenbaum, 1938) see *deviance* not as an intrinsic feature of an act, but rather as a given based on the reactions of other people to a specific act. Borrowing

Edwin M. Schur's (1984) description "deviance is not simply a function of a person's problematic behavior; rather, it emerges as *other people define and react* to a behavior *as being* problematic" (187). The same labeling theorists theorize in parallel in the 'self-fulfilling' nature of labeling in evolving deviance into a career, as the term conceptualized by Robert Merton (1968) in his well-known work *Social Theory and Social Structure* (477). After the primary deviance, a second deviance occurs: one that is much more conscious and deliberate, which comes as a reaction directed by the public against the first deviance. In other words, the initial societal reaction and labeling the deviant as such, *causes* and secures the emergence of real deviance; i.e. the more deviant second behavior.

In his famous book, *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance* (1963), Howard S. Becker, constructs a set of categories as to different types of deviance (20) as:

	Obedient Behavior	**Rule-breaking Behavior**
Perceived as deviant	Falsely accused	Pure deviant
Not perceived as deviant	Conforming	Secret deviant

When one looks at analyses made by the majority of labeling theorists, it could be seen that the phenomenon of labeling has been primarily attended to in terms of its relation to *deviance*. Edwin M. Lemert's distinction between **primary and secondary deviance**, Everett C. Hughes' distinction between **master status and auxiliary status**, Becker's concept of **deviant careers**, and Edwin M. Schur's concept of **role engulfment** all contribute to the literature of deviance studies over an analysis of labeling. Yet, as Becker formulates in his types of deviant behavior chart, where he briefly discusses a category of '**falsely-accused**', not all labeling is about or initiated with deviance, but with a 'perception' thereof. Labeling may create deviance from no-deviance at all. Yet, it may prove quite the opposite, as well; by motivating the labeled individual into even further achievement than what would occur in the absence of labeling.

1.2   Significance of the Dissertation Topic

The main interest of this dissertation is the first category of Becker's classification, the **falsely accused type of deviance**, where the deviant-labeled individual is "seen by others as having committed an improper action, although in fact he has not done so" (Becker, 1963, 20). In the literature of labeling, generally the second act, after having been labeled as deviant the first time it has occurred, has been put under scrutiny. Labeling theorists did not give much attention to the primary deviance as they did not see it as an outcome of an inherent defect. Rather they focused on the reasons and adjacent meanings concerning the second deviance. Likewise, not much analysis has been made concerning this first group of falsely accused 'deviants'; i.e. the ones who have done nothing deviant at all, yet have been labeled so. Setting out from this less touched and discussed point, this dissertation will go deeper into this falsely accused deviants category, whose conscious (such as religious beliefs), or given characteristics (such as gender and race), become the cause of their being tagged with labels. Moreover, the analysis will not limit itself to individual actions which are labeled as deviant, but will rather focus on counter-reactions by the labeled within a number of discourses ranging from gender to race, and from religion to power.

Through this analysis of the 'falsely-accused deviants', the dissertation aims to explore and better understand the effects labeling creates on the labeled individual, as well as the psychology lying beneath the actions of a labeled individual which can be regarded as 'deviant' by the dominant groups. While dwelling upon the major theme of 'social labeling,' the dissertation will primarily make use of the concept and the theory of **'gaze'**, together with its historical analysis and application to the social setting. In terms of relations between the concept of 'gaze' and social theory, Margaret Olin writes in her article (1996) that "the term 'gaze' is useful for uniting formal and social theory, because unlike 'opticality,' it is a double-sided term. There must be someone to gaze and they may be someone to gaze back" (209). With a claim that 'every labeling starts with a *gaze*', the primary interest of this dissertation is to analyze the labeling reality and habit of modern society within its direct relation to 'gaze'.

My re-reading of the concept of *labeling* under the light of the concept of *gaze* is the main contribution of this study to the related literature as the two concepts are

closely inter-related. However, both concepts have not been studied on a mutual ground in labeling studies so far. Nevertheless, efforts of understanding reasons and outcomes of the 'gaze' together with the psychologies and motives of the gazer and the gazee may also contribute a lot to the understanding of labeling. The dissertation, therefore, before dealing with the concept of labeling, will present in details the theory of gaze in its first chapter. It basically puts forward the close relation between the gaze and the construction of identity together with the notion of *gaze back of the Object*. The latter further puts the gazer to self-questioning of his/her identity, which may lead to de-construction of this constructed identity. (Hegel, 1977; Lacan, 1981; Sartre, 1978)

In the history of thought, we come across the concept of 'gaze' relatively in greater detail in the story of Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980), 'the watcher in the park', in his book, *Being and Nothingness* (1978), where a man alone in the park, enjoying his solitude, starts to feel disturbed and uneasy upon the entrance of *another* into the park. He could no longer feel the same self-confidence that he has felt before the intrusion of the other when he, as the subject "[has resided] at the still point of the turning world, master of its prospects, sovereign surveyor of the scene" (Bryson, 1988, 88). The man, who has been the subject while gazing at the other, now feels the other's gaze on himself, as well --a gaze reducing his position as the subject into a mere object, namely objectifying him.

Jacques Lacan (1901-1981), in his *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis* (1981), further elaborates this concept of Sartre's gaze, which he thinks as "not a seen gaze, but [as] a gaze imagined by [him] in the field of the Other" (Lacan, 1981, 84), in his "mirror stage theory" where the infant, upon seeing his own image for the first time, constructs an "externalized image" (Olin, 1996, 214) and an ego identity for himself. Lacan gives another twist to the concept this time in his autobiographical story of the fishermen and the sardine can, where young Lacan, "being a young intellectual," goes fishing with a group of Breton fishermen in his early twenties wanting "desperately...to *see* something different". However, there comes a point in the story where young Lacan is addressed a weird question by one of the fishermen, called Petit-Jean, concerning a small drifting sardine can afar "[glittering] in the sun": -*You see that can? Do you see it? Well it does not see you* (Lacan, 1981, 95). Young Lacan feels greatly disturbed and uncomfortable

concerning this remark about not being seen, but at the same time, this experience triggers another realization that, in fact, it is *he* who cannot see the object glittering under the flashes of the light, and this discomfort "contributes to a self-centered anxiety about his [own] identity" (Krips, 2010, 93) as an all-mastering subject in the world of objects. Lacan later theorizes on this traumatic experience of his younger self-questioning his self-identity as well as that of the object, which, he imagines, has the potential of 'gazing back'.

The same gaze appears again in many other concepts such as the 'inspecting gaze' in Michel Foucault's (1977) *Panopticon*, 'the mastering male gaze' in the feminist reading of Lacanian film theory, 'the spectator gaze' in cinema and arts, 'the orientalist gaze' and 'the colonial gaze' in studies of race and ethnicity, and 'the white gaze' in the studies of identity and race. This list can further be elaborated under the heading of 'the othering gaze'.

In terms of secondary literature, the concept of 'gaze' has continued to occupy the minds of later theoreticians and thinkers, as well, especially via the concept's relation to power, epitomized within the 'vision-knowledge-power' triangle (Bryson, 1988; Middleton, 1992; Olin, 1996). Referring back to Hegel's master-slave dialectic, Norman Bryson (1988) deals with the 'gaze' in his article, 'The Gaze in the Expanded Field", in terms of the subject's fluctuating position in the face of another entering the scene. Bryson discusses the subject's awareness of the existence of another viewing him through the dichotomy of viewing point (the subject's initial status prior to the awareness of the other's gaze) and vanishing point (the subject's reduced status after this awareness) where he writes, after this awareness, the subject becomes the vanishing point instead of a viewing point, a tangent instead of a center, shortly a spectacle instead of a viewer (Bryson, 88-89). From the perspective of the gazed and objectified individual, both Norman Bryson as well as Peter Middleton (1992) and Margaret Olin (1996) regard the *gaze back* of the object an attempt to re-store the slave to the level of the master, and claim subjectivity once again.

Later, especially with the rise of film industry, and especially by woman scholars, the gaze directed at 'women' was put under scrutiny, where the concept of 'male gaze' was used to epitomize the power exerted on women by men as a way to victimize and objectify the latter (Hooks, 1992; Mulvey, 1999; Wegenstein, 2012). Both Mulvey and Hooks look critically at woman's place/portrayal within mainstream

narrative cinema, where, they claim, woman appears primarily as an object of pleasure -not as an agent, but rather as something nice to look at. The male-dominant film industry conditions not only the male actor and the male director, but also the audience to gaze at the woman character from the eyes of the male protagonist. Bernadette Wegenstein (2012) deals with the same issue in the modern times, and analyzes the portrayal of women in modern cinema in her work, *The Cosmetic Gaze: Body Modification and the Construction of Beauty*, where she discusses the continuing tendency of judging based on appearance in the coined concept of the *physiognomic gaze* (2012, 39). Bell Hooks (1992) in her influential work, *Black Looks: Race and Representation*, takes the issue at hand from the perspective of black spectatorship, and introduces a white director/black spectator dichotomy into Mulvey's critical analysis. She directs her criticisms both against the male gaze as well as the white gaze. Specifically, she discusses the roles given to black figures in the mainstream traditional cinema, which generally come as degrading the black population through its portrayal of the black either in funny/stupid characters or as maids/slaves. This tendency of judging based on appearance the *physiognomic gaze*.

1.3   Methodology and Chapter Summaries

Setting out from the theory of labeling and the studies of deviance, and aiming to give primary weight to the less-studied **falsely-accused 'deviants'**, this dissertation aims to analyze the labeling process over its direct relation with *the theory of gaze* - as all labeling starts with a 'gaze'. Through this re-reading of the labeling theory over the theory of gaze, it will attempt to formulate the possible reactions labeling triggers in the labeled-other. The analysis will be limited to those who are labeled with no committed deviance at all, who are 'falsely-accused' as Becker calls the category, and who are simply labeled based upon their appearance. In this respect, the basic research question of this dissertation will be **'How does the labeled individual react back to the gaze and the label?'** together with some other accompanying questions such as the following: 'How is *deviance* determined and defined? Who defines it, and who sets the *norm*? Who determines who is 'we' and who is 'the other'? Is it possible to objectively know the Other -or is every gaze innocent? What triggers the gaze? Is it ever possible to be able to get rid of the label once enacted? What can be some possible solutions to the tendency of labeling?'

Each of these questions are important as they contribute to the attempt to be able to understand modern man, and to be able to make sense of the existing human relations within the same society on the micro level, and of the interrelations of societies on the macro level. Since it is not possible to cure a disease without diagnosis first, it is, likewise, crucial to be able to understand, the causes of labeling, as well as the outcomes, in order to be able to suggest solutions so as to contribute to the well-being, and to increase the welfare of human existence. The more specific focus of the dissertation on the labeling of the falsely accused deviants will further contribute to the understanding of fellow beings, and give one the opportunity of self-reflexivity and of questioning of the deeply-settled and taken-for-granted preconceptions as to the Other.

In terms of its methodology, this dissertation is primarily a theoretical dissertation, and not an empirical/practical one, primarily due to the ample target audience of the subject matter; i.e. the phenomenon of labeling, which happens to be the whole society (not a single disadvantaged group within society.) In other words, this preference of methodology has been made both due to the difficulty of researching all the disadvantaged/labeled groups within society (labeled either in terms of gender, ethnicity, political or religious views, sexual preferences, and lifestyles, etc.), and due to the fact that the findings of a partial research would not be all-representative of all the labeled groups. Yet, this dissertation, all throughout the work, will stay within an elbow-touch with social occurrences, as the theory will be analysed over sample socio-political cases both within and outside of the Turkish context. In that manner, the dissertation at hand could be said to be an applied theoretical study.

There are of course some drawbacks as well as advantages of a theoretical-based dissertation. While a mutual analysis of labeling and gaze theories has enabled to better understand and evaluate social occurrences together with the rationale behind individual actions and common patterns of behavior, an actual field work and/or the producing of primary or secondary data would definitely contribute a lot to the literature. More specific reactions by the labeled individuals could be revealed through interviews and observation. However, as it has been stated in the previous paragraph, it has been left outside of the scope of the dissertation due to the ample target audience of the subject matter, and therefore due to the the difficulty of forming a fair sample group that would be representative for all disadvantaged

groups.

Following the Introduction, the first chapter, titled 'On The *Gaze*' goes over a number of different types of gazes (specifically the cinematic gaze, the traveler's gaze, the nationalist gaze and the virtual gaze) through a methodology of discourse analysis over sample socio-political cases in Turkish society, in an attempt to be able to better evaluate how deeply social labeling is instilled in society in spite of the increasing humanist and liberal claims and awareness of the millennium. In this analysis, the chapter will also look into the close relation between the concept of gaze and the identity construction adventure of the individual.

The second chapter of the dissertation, which is titled 'On Social Labeling' dwells into the main topic of the dissertation; i.e. on the case of the 'falsely-accused deviants', following a historical background analysis concerning the theory of labeling. The chapter deals with a number of concepts; such as 'social othering, self-identity, self-labeling and double-labeling,' while simultaneously questioning the politics of labeling, both in the political and social/interpersonal spheres over an analysis of case studies. It attempts to answer the questions of "which and whose labels prevail, and under what contextual conditions".

The third chapter, which is titled 'The Gaze Back of The *Other*', attempts mainly to categorize and explain the probable reactions of the gazee/labeled. This chapter also includes the thesis statement of the dissertation embodied in its proposed categorization of the labeled-other, and which also marks another contribution of the study to the studies of labeling, especially concerning the 'falsely-accused deviant' category of Becker. As its methodology, the chapter makes use of close textual analysis over a literary work; i.e. one of Elif Shafak's novels, *The Gaze* (*Mahrem*) as well as discourse analysis over a number of cases mainly from the Turkish socio-political context.

The conclusion will briefly highlight some of the observations made throughout the dissertation, together with the interpretation of findings, and how they relate to the broader theme of social labeling, and the possible suggestions as to how to weaken the effect of labeling while attempting to answer if it is at all, possible to completely erase it from the social setting.

Finally, since labeling occurs pretty fast, most of the time depriving the other individual of an opportunity to speak for himself/herself, it is crucial to understand, or be aware of how this process is initiated in the first place. The following chapter, which will dwell upon the concept of 'gaze', claims a direct relation between gaze and labeling, as all labeling starts with some kind of *gaze*, be it real, or virtual, or imaginary.

CHAPTER II
ON 'THE GAZE'

2.1 A Historical Analysis

Gaze has always been a part of human history: Greek mythology tells the story of Medusa's stone-converting gaze and Narcissus' self-destructive gaze to his own image as well as the concept of evil eye, *nazar*, profoundly found in eastern societies, which can put the gazee even to death. Yet, this concept finds more place in the setting of modern society than with pre-modern ones, due to modern man's more intricate relations with other individuals as well as with social institutions. The modern man has long abandoned the habit of looking in curiosity to be able to get to know what comes different to him. Rather he, now, sets his *gaze* on what comes different *from* him. People gaze, and then label others with names, turn them into definitions, cram them into groups and classifications, put them between brackets, depriving them of the right to talk for themselves in running sentences and instead cause them to be closed off with a spot (.) The 'look' is powerful, yet the 'gaze' is far more powerful. Maurice Blanchot artistically describes this powerful concept in his *The Gaze of Orpheus* which derives from the story of Orpheus and his beloved, Eurydice from Ovid's masterpiece, *The Metamorphoses*. Setting out from this famous Greek tragedy, the chapter draws an analogy between this 'gaze' of Orpheus and the labeling habit of modern society through 'gaze', as well as tracking down the development of the gaze theory through an analysis of the constant preoccupation with vision and visual culture of human society.

2.1.1 The Gaze of Orpheus

> *They called Eurydice, and there among*
> *The recent dead she came, still hurt and limping*
> *At their command. They gave him back his wife*
> *With this proviso: that as he led her up*
> *From where Avemus sank into a valley,*

He must not turn his head to look behind him.
They climbed a hill through clouds, pitch-dark
and gloomy,
And as they neared the surface of the Earth,
The poet, fearful that she'd lost her way,
Glanced backward with a look that spoke his
love-
Then saw her gliding into deeper darkness,
As he reached out to hold her, she was gone;
He had embraced a world of emptiness
This was her second death-and yet she could
not blame him
(Was not his greatest fault great love for her?)
She answered him with one last faint "Good-
bye,"
An echo of her voice from deep Avernus.
The Metamorphoses, Book X, p. 271, Ovid (1958)

His was a journey to the unknown, the unseen, the imagined -and at times the fantasized, namely the *Other*. He wanted to know the unknown, to familiarize with the marginal, to 'see' the difference in the face. Yet, it could not be possible. The moment he attempted to *define* the not-meant-to-be-defined—the essence, it slipped away from his grasp for good. He was too hasty to finalize the process -the process of getting to know, and he paid the price with an eternal loss.

The Greek myth of Orpheus tells the story of an artistically talented man, Orpheus, who loses a beloved wife, Eurydice, early in their marriage. He cannot bear this loss, and asks for permission from the gods to go down to Hades to fetch his wife up into daylight again. Impressed by the music of his lyre, and feeling sympathy for his loss and love, the gods let Orpheus go down while still living --only with one condition that he should never 'look back' until he reaches daylight, and daylight falls on the face of Eurydice. Orpheus gladly accepts, and begins his journey down into the darkness. He finds Eurydice, holds her firmly by hand, and hastens back up. Everything goes well until the very last moment when he reaches the daylight, but his beloved Eurydice is still in darkness. At that very moment, Orpheus feels the insurmountable urge to *look at* Eurydice in the face, to *see* her in her form that is forbidden to the mortal *gaze*. He wants to grasp the essence of death, to *define* the ultimate meaning. And he looks back, and that moment he loses the meaning forever,

with that "one faint word, 'Farewell.'"

Feeling wretched, Orpheus returns to the mortal world with a far greater loss than before his descent. Before, all he lost was his dear wife, but now he has also lost his self-confidence that he could grasp the ultimate meaning, *the* meaning. First, out of mere curiosity, he just wants to 'look' to see; however, eventually he cannot help but 'gaze' to define. This comes to him as a painful and dearly paid awakening from his long-delved illusion --the illusion of mastery, power, and superiority over the *other*.

2.1.2 Other Stories of 'Gaze' in Mythology

Greek mythology offers other stories like that of Orpheus concerning gaze. One of the most well-known is the tragedy of **Narcissus**, a boy of beauty who falls in love with his own image reflected on a pond. Being highly proud of his looks, Narcissus continually ignores the loves of those who love him, including Echo. Echo falls deeply in love with Narcissus, and having encountered the same coldness and despise from Narcissus, silently and eternally slips into the wilderness with only an echo of her love suspending. Having heard of this tragedy of Echo, and getting angry with the pride of Narcissus, Nemesis, the goddess of revenge, lures Narcissus to a pond where he comes across for the first time with his own image. Unaware of the fact that what he is facing is only an image, Narcissus falls in love with himself, and in the sorrow of not reaching his beloved, he ultimately becomes consumed in love. With his preoccupation only with himself, Narcissus's gaze becomes the symbol of excessive self-love and fascination with one's self.

Another piece of mythology tells the story of the stoning gaze of **Medusa**, one of the three Gorgon sisters. Like Narcissus, Medusa is proud of her looks and the locks of her hair. Her beauty attracts the attention of Poseidon, the lord of the seas, who rapes her in the temple of Athena. This violation of the sanctity of her temple enrages the goddess, and she turns the lovely locks of Medusa to living serpents. Her pretty face becomes so appalling that even a mere glance at it would turn the beholders to stone. Medusa's gaze would later come to symbolize female anger, and widely used by feminist discourse as well as in various works of art.

One other female gaze is mentioned with the mythical story of **Pandora**, the first woman created and sent to human world. Enraged after Prometheus' theft of fire that was to be handed to humanity, Zeus creates Pandora, endowed with seductive gifts

each given by different gods and goddesses, and sends her as a present to Epimetheus, Prometheus' brother. Pandora brings a locked jar with her down to the human world --a jar she has been told not to open. Falling victim to her curiosity, she disobeys, and unwittingly releases all kinds of evils fleeing into the mortal life of humanity. Alarmed by what she has done, she hastily puts the lid of the jar back to its place, locking one single element of the jar within, which happens to be Hope. Now, man has to suffer the evils of the world without any Hope of future relief and prosperity, and woman is to be always blamed for her curious gaze into the forbidden. As it can be seen in these different pieces from mythology, gaze in Ancient Greece came to be associated with powerful negativity, either in the form of self-destructive love, enraging punishment, or evil-breeding curiosity. In fact, at certain occasions, the absence of vision comes to mean wisdom as in the case of the blind 'seer', *Tiresias*.

2.1.3 Western Ocularcentrism from Plato to the Enlightenment

Martin Jay, in his book *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought* (1993), makes a historical analysis of *ocularcentrism* -the dominance of sight- which so deeply penetrated Western culture starting with the myths of the Ancient Greek civilization. Tagging sight as "the noblest of the senses" in the first chapter of his book (21) as he borrows the phrase from the Scottish philosopher, Thomas Reid, Jay starts his analysis with the ancient Greek's preoccupation with seeing and vision, with even their gods "visibly manifest to humankind, which was encouraged to depict them in plastic form...[and who were also] conceived as avid spectators of human actions" (23). Yet, they are visible to human gaze, being different from their mortal subjects only in terms of their immortality. And even in this very aspect, they may get jealous of humans as the latter enjoys the joys of life more profoundly, and the sorrows more temporarily in their mortal understanding of their lives. Ancient Greeks, believing in the perfection of human form and body as the highest and noblest creation of all, depicted their gods in the perfect human form which could well be taken as an attempt to idealize what is already *familiar* to them. Visibility, in a way, reduces omnipotence to a familiarly apprehensible level by turning the utmost Subject into an object set before human sight. Turning an idea/ideal into visibility definitely grants power -real or illusionary, in the form of knowledge. Looking is the door to achieving knowledge, and "knowledge (*eidenai*) is the state of having seen" as Bruno Snell writes in his

The Discovery of the Mind: The Greek Origins of European Thought (Jay, 1963, 24). This relation between looking and knowing (power) could further explain the constant race of claiming superiority between the Ancient Greek and the Greek gods.

It is possible to see the presence of sight in the teachings of Plato, as well. In his book *Timaeus*, Plato makes a distinction between sight, which he groups "with the creation of human intelligence and the soul", and other senses, grouped "with man's material being" (Jay, 1963, 26). In line with the power of gaze in mythology, an elevated status is given to sight by Plato over other senses though this time in the positive sense. Plato equates sight with intellect and soul, the agents which could lead the way of the imperfect mortal man to the perfect and permanent world of Ideas. However, it is important to note that, what Plato means, in his philosophy of the world of Ideas, by sight and vision is the "inner eye of the mind" (Jay, 1963, 27), and not necessarily the physical organ, which is only capable of material perception. For him, what is perceived within this world are just the shadows of their real forms in the world of Ideas. Plato designates his idea through his much celebrated myth of the cave, where man is chained backwards, facing the walls of a cave, and all he could 'see' are "fleeting and imperfect shadows cast on its wall" triggered by the light of a fire burn inside (27). In his ignorance of the presence of the source of light outside - the Sun, man fancies himself with the *illusion* of true knowledge that he acquires through his sense perception.

When it comes to the seventeenth-century, one sees Descartes comparing the eye to the camera obscura[1] in his *La Dioptrique* (1637) which he wrote on vision and the eye. In this work, Descartes says that the retina of the eye is very much like the screen of a camera, showing us the images of the external objects. Like Plato, in his analysis, Descartes uses 'idea' "to refer to an internal representation in human consciousness, [as] an image in the eye of the mind" (Jay, 1963, 84). To put it differently, the Cartesian philosophy places specific focus on seeing through the "steadfast mental gaze" of the mind (72). Descartes explicitly rejects the empiricist conception that "nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses," as it is the understanding and deductive reasoning which give meaning to sense perceptions, which would otherwise be mere random receptions of the senses.

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[1] A concept derived from early eighteenth-century, from Latin meaning 'dark chamber'. Oxford Dictionaries gives its meaning as 'a darkened box with a convex lensor aperture for projecting the image of an external object onto a screen inside, a forerunner of the modern camera.'

Deriving from Cartesian philosophy's emphasis on reason, the eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophers, the *Philosophes*, included 'observation' as equally important an element in acquiring knowledge as reasoning. As their name echoes, Enlightenment philosophers' preoccupation with vision comes in the form of lucidity and clarity, which could only be achieved through sight, rather than through any of the other senses. The scientist makes observations, and then comes up with rational propositions based on these observations, which then constitute the very essence of reality and true knowledge.

When one turns his/her gaze to the social life of the Renaissance period, though, gaze appears as an indicator of prestige and wealth. The court of Louis XIV (1638-1715), who is also known as the Apollonian Sun King with one of the longest reigns in European history, was famous for his court display of brilliance and luxury which was "bewildering to outsiders but legible to those who knew how to read its meaning" (Jay, 1963, 87). The meaning meant to be transmitted was the attribution of the King to a godly-origin as his name also hints, and the way to do so was to inspire awe and admiration, and a feeling of inaccessibility to the admired on the part of the viewers. In this setting, the more one was looked at, the more prestigious he was regarded, with *gaze* coming to mean the desire of the Other. This direct link between sight and prestige led the Renaissance courtiers to go to extremes in terms of their outer appearance visible to the immediate gaze of others -"here the more elaborate the costume, the higher the powdered wig, the more artificial the painted face, the greater, it often seemed, the prestige" (Jay, 1963, 87-88).

Yet, light -and at times that much light, does not always have positive connotation. Visibility -and at times that much visibility, also means the wane of privacy -the state of being under constant surveillance, the state that Sartre would later call *le regard absolu* -the absolute gaze (Jay, 1963, 89). After Sartre, Michel Foucault goes deeper into this link between light and surveillance in his concept of *Panopticism* in his well-celebrated book *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1977). In Jeremy Bentham's *Panopticon*[2] as well as in the plague-stricken town he mentions, "the gaze is alert everywhere" (1977, 195), where "full lighting and the eye of a supervisor capture better than darkness" (1977, 200).

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[2] English philosopher and social theorist, Jeremy Bentham's circular design with an 'inspection tower' at the center in the late eighteenth-century. Bentham conceived the basic plan as being equally applicable to hospitals, schools, sanatoriums, daycares, and asylums, but especially to prisons.

2.1.4 Ocularcentrism vs. Anti-Ocularcentrism: The Counter-Enlightenment Reactions

Leaving the Panopticon discussion to coming paragraphs, if we return to the Enlightenment thinking again, we come across two contradictory feelings as to the concept of visibility and gaze: on one side, there is the primal concern of the period on rationality and glory through clarity, lucidity and transparency -terms all related to *light* and *sight*. On the other hand, there is the feeling of resentment "in which being seen [is] less a mark of glory than of shame" (Jay, 1963, 89). A binary opposition constructs itself between visual serenity -the desire to be looked-at, and visual anxiety -the dread to be looked-at, or between ocularcentrism and anti-ocularcentrism.

Differing from his contemporaries, Jean-Jacques Rousseau stands on the latter side of this opposition: he, too, desired to achieve transparency in his search for truth and knowledge, yet his transparency is more related to his internal truth -seeing others through his *mental* gaze, and likewise targeting at the gaze of others to his *inner self*. His is a desire "to lift the veil of appearance" -which causes the condemning and alienating of the other, and instead to "reveal an essential truth beneath" which will enable a utopian state of "mutually beneficial surveillance without reprobation or repression" (Jay, 1963, 91-92). Rousseau's utopia which is constructed on the true understanding of one's own nature as well as those of his fellow beings is in a way similar to Plato's world of Ideas. In both, the eye of the mind, the steadfast mental gaze, is active; and truth is sought to be achieved by an attempt to understand the true nature of man divested of his appearances -the outer selves in Rousseau, and the shadows on the wall in Plato, which could threaten reality with a claim to take its place. Having Rousseau as an exception, the Enlightenment period with its over-emphasis on the visible can be labeled as ocularcentric. However, the later disillusionment concerning the late eighteenth-century post-Revolutionary period, as to its corruption based on sensual sight, would later turn the gaze again to the "third eye of inspired revelation" similar to the mental gaze, marking the Romantic neo-Platonic era. As M.H. Abrams makes a distinction between the mirror and the lamp, or between the mimetic and expressive outlook on phenomena, "if the Romantics abandoned the mirror, they did so in order to light the lamp of inner inspiration" (Jay, 1963, 108).

Likewise, the early nineteenth-century adopts a hermeneutic tradition in its apprehension of society and the world with a conscious preference of the ear to the eye, "placing its faith in the spoken word over the image" (Jay, 1963, 106). With its disillusionment with the Enlightenment and Revolution, this period chooses to stick to continuous interpretation, abstaining to put a final say in its relation to the other. Forming a final visual image of the other through visuality would create a *fixed* mental picture of the object in the mind of the subject, and this would definitely miss certain aspects from its reality, depriving it of any possibilities of change and fluidity, which are inseparable parts of human nature. Thus, the hermeneutics privileged word over image, relativity over essentialism, and continuity over the ultimate.

2.1.5 'GAZE' Re-visited: The Gaze Theory from Hegel to Foucault

a)   Hegel's Master-Slave Dialectic

Starting from the early times of human history up until the eighteenth-century, one sees gaze having been treated within the scope of sight and vision in line with its primary definition, not yet loaded with its modern meaning in relation to the negation between the Subject and the Object. With Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, a distinct gaze is directed towards this concept, and a distinct *theory of gaze* starts to come into being in the discipline of sociology.

Hegel's theory of gaze is at close interval with human consciousness and self-consciousness. Hegel, in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), describes the latter as "simple being-for- self, self-equal through the exclusion from itself of everything else" (Hegel, 1977, para. 186/ p.113), and claims that the path to man's self-consciousness necessarily passes through man's consciousness of the other's self-consciousness. The subject's self-consciousness cannot exist merely on its own, but "it exists only in being acknowledged" by the consciousness of the Object (Hegel, 1977, para. 178/ p.111). Without this acknowledgement, it is not possible for man to claim his subjectivity and selfhood, nor is it possible for the absolute knowledge, the *Spirit*, to come into being. Therefore, this acknowledgement has a twofold significance: The Subject needs to see himself through the eyes of the Object to acquire a sense of self-consciousness, and in doing so, he needs to be aware of the fact that the Object, too, is capable of becoming conscious of himself by seeing himself through the eyes of the Subject. As Hegel puts it (1977):

> The first [the Subject] does not have the object before it
> merely as it exists primarily for desire, but as something
> that has an independent existence of its own, which,
> therefore, it cannot utilize for its own purposes, if that
> object does not of its own accord do what the first does
> to it. Thus the movement is simply the double movement
> of the two self-consciousnesses. (para. 182/ p.112)

Man, Hegel believes, "becomes conscious of himself at the moment when -for the 'first' time- he says 'I', writes Peter Wollen (2007) in his article titled "On Gaze Theory" (92). This moment of self-consciousness comes for the Subject upon a *desire for recognition* of the Other, a *struggle for prestige* and through a *master-slave dialectic relationship*.

> From the conflict of the Master and the Slave, he [Hegel]
> deduced the entire subjective and objective progress of
> our history...The satisfaction of human desire is possible
> only when mediated by the desire and labor of the other.
> (Lacan, 1977, 26)

Hegel formulates his theory of gaze in his well-acknowledged **master-slave dialectic** in the "Independent and Dependent Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage" chapter of his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In this dialectic, the Subject and the Object negate one another until they are unified in the absolute knowledge, that being the *Spirit*. Hegel calls this negation the continuous "play of Forces" where [the Subject and the Object] recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another (Hegel, 1977, para. 184/ p.112). In the encounter of the two distinct consciousnesses, the participants consciously become aware of themselves as separate individual beings having the potential to claim power over the other. At this point, it is not possible to determine who is the Subject and who is the Object, who is the master and who is the slave. "Each is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, and therefore [Hegel concludes] its own self-cer-tainty still has no truth" (para. 186/ p.113). Upon such encounter, a struggle for prestige emerges, which could only be won through staking one's life to win his freedom. Hegel calls this encounter and the struggle for prestige between the two consciousnesses a 'life-and-death struggle' (para. 187/ p.114): one will risk his life for the sake of self-consciousness and freedom, while the other will not dare that much, and prefer the mastery of the other to secure his life at the expense of his freedom. And the Master and the Slave come into being in a dialectical relationship where the master recognizes himself via the

slave, and the slave via the master.

Hegel's master-slave dialectic is not a simple subordination of the Object to its superior Subject. There is more to the story as the dialectical understanding connotes -this will by no means be a static relationship, but a continuously changing one through a continuous negation process. The master's self-consciousness endures as long as it secures the recognition of the slave, who functions as the mediator between the master and his outer nature. The slave works in and with this nature, and serves his master through his labor. His labor makes him become more and more acquainted with nature, which, in turn, helps him build greater sophistication and *mastery* as to what he produces. In time, he realizes that his labor is his distinct power, and that the master is dependent on his labor to sustain his mastery. As a result, while the slave gradually comes to close the alienating gap between him and what he produces, the master becomes more and more *enslaved* by the labor of his slave. Such realization on the part of the slave as well on that of the master, in turn, triggers another struggle between the two, a struggle for prestige all again.

b)   Sartre's Notion of Shame and the Changing Roles

> *This woman whom I see coming toward me, this man who is passing by in the street, this beggar whom I hear calling before my window, all are for me objects - of that there is no doubt.*
> **Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p. 252**

Like Hegel, Jean Paul Sartre believes that the subject's consciousness is possible "only in and through the existence of the Other" (Sartre, 1978, 271). However, unlike Hegel, Sartre asserts that if the other's consciousness is acknowledged as a given by the subject, then it would no longer be possible for the other to claim his subject-ness as he would be *known* and tagged as an object, and likewise there would be no case for the subject to fall into an object-ness as he would be the one to know and to recognize, the one to look at the other.

Sartre formulates his theory of gaze around a story where he visualizes himself as sitting on a bench in a public park, watching another man passing by in the distance though not far away: *I see this man; I apprehend him as an object and at the same time as a man* (254). He starts closely looking at this 'object' within his scope of vision, apprehending his actions, his identity, his self and his totality. All goes well,

he feels content and confident sitting on his bench within the safety of a cosy distance enabling him to see, but not-be-seen by his object --"the subject resides at the still point of the turning world, master of its prospects, sovereign surveyor of the scene (Bryson, 1988, 88). Then out of nowhere, and to the subject's surprise, another object enters into the park. With the appearance of this second object, the subject feels, "everything is traversed by an invisible flight and fixed in the direction of a new object" (Sartre, 1978, 255). There is more to the story, this second appearance is not like the first object, unaware of his watcher, quite the contrary, the watcher, now, is in turn watched, and "the viewer becomes spectacle to another's sight" (Bryson, 1988, 89).

It is at this very moment that the subject realizes his subjectness turning into an object just like the first man he has previously set his gaze upon. The intruder sees what the subject sees, and also sees from his own self. Sartre summarizes this experience of 'being-seen-by-the-Other' as the "truth of 'seeing-the-Other'"(257). In a way, enjoying subjectivity brings alongside with itself the possibility and risk of turning into an object at any time. Referring back to Hegel's master-slave dialectic; the viewer, initially the master of the scene, the center where all visuality flows around, confidently conscious of his *freedom*, loses his privileged place as the viewing point upon the awareness of the existence of another viewing him. He, in turn, becomes the vanishing point instead of a viewing point, a tangent instead of a center, almost "a black hole pulling the scene away from the watcher self into an engulfing void" (Bryson, 1988, 88-89).

Sartre explains this realization of 'being-seen-by-another' with a feeling of *shame* through another anecdote where, this time, he visualizes himself bending over a keyhole, peeping into a room:

> *Here I am bent over the keyhole; suddenly I hear a footstep. I shudder as a wave of shame sweeps over me. Somebody has seen me. I straighten up. My eyes run over the deserted corridor. It was a false alarm. I breathe a sigh of relief. Do we not have here an experience which is self-destructive?* (277)

This shame, which the gazer feels upon the apprehension of being watched simultaneously as he peeps in secret, makes him turn his own gaze towards himself, and the watcher now sees himself from the outside. The shame that he feels does not

stem from his apprehension of somebody's having seen him, but rather he, himself, has come face to face with his own self:

> *What I apprehend immediately when I hear the branches crackling behind me is not that there is someone there; it is that I am vulnerable, that I have a body which can be hurt, that I occupy a place and that I cannot in any case escape from the space in which I am without defense --in short, that I am seen.* (259)

Now his consciousness is alert and ready to 'see' his true self: *I see myself because somebody sees me.* (260) Self is constructed through the eyes of the Other, and here, too, the subject moves away from himself, and looks at his own self at a distance, which enables him to get a fuller picture as to who he is. It is only the apprehension of somebody's presence, and for that presence to be looking at him which makes the subject doubt his subjectivity. Sartre notes, shame is "the recognition of the fact that [he is] indeed that object which the Other is looking at and judging. [He] can be ashamed only as [his] freedom escapes [him] in order to become a given object" (261). Similar to Hegel's master-slave (lordship-bondage) dialectic, Sartre, in his analysis of the gaze and the relation between the subject and the Other, talks in terms of the freedom of the subject, and the slavery of the object --with the Other's gaze, the subject is no longer "the master of the situation" (265), and with the accompanying judgment of the gazer concerning the gazee, the latter (the former subject) loses his freedom, and becomes enslaved under the label(s) given by the Other, since "a judgment is the transcendental act of a free being" (267). Just like Hegel's dialectic, Sartre's apprehension of subjectness and objectness is situated on a slippery ground, where the roles may change anytime upon the intrusion of another's look.

Sartre, in his book *Being and Nothingness* (1978), focuses his attention on the look of another intruding into the domain of an already gazing subject looking at at some other object. Just as the subject becomes engaged with the presence of this object, the Other gets engaged with the subject through his own presence. As Sartre analyses:

> *I am fixing the people whom I see into objects; I am in relation to them as the Other is in relation to me. In looking at them, I measure my power. But if the Other sees them and sees me, then my look loses its power; it cannot transform those people into objects for the*

Other since they are already the objects of his look. (266)

Both Hegel's and Sartre's analysis of looking at the Other are given within a power discourse: being a subject is to claim power over the object, and to claim such power is possible through labeling the Other as an object. This automatically places oneself into the category of a subject. The gaze is the initiator of this labeling process. The subject enjoys his subjectness, his mastery over the Other by defining it, and this process is to a great extent disturbed upon the intrusion of the Other into the visual field of the subject through his *gaze back*. Gaze back is what makes power relations settled on a slippery ground as mentioned earlier. It reverses the roles, and opens up new recognition for all included in the process at that very moment.

c)   Lacan's *objet petit a* and the Desire of the Other

Franz Kafka writes that "sight does not master the pictures, it is the pictures which master one's sight. They flood the consciousness" (Žižek, 2003, 166). Just like that, in Jacques Lacan, individuals try to make sense of numerous images so as to be able to derive a meaningful signified/meaning of their own making. This is the Mirror Stage, where the infant first comes across his own image in the mirror, and for the first time sees himself 'in his totality'. This period is marked by the illusion of unity/individuality: the individual assumes that he has utmost capability to realize himself, that he has power over the objects in his environment, and over meaning itself. Lacan calls this the "gaze", which he exemplifies in an autobiographical story, where the young Lacan goes on a boat trip with a number of fishermen:

> *I was in my early twenties...and at the time, of course, being a young intellectual, I wanted desperately to get away, see something different, throw myself into something practical....One day, I was on a small boat with a few people from a family of fishermen....as we were waiting for the moment to pull in the nets, an individual known as Petit-Jean...pointed out to me something floating on the surface of the waves. It was a small can, a sardine can...It glittered in the sun. And Petit-Jean said to me – You see that can? Do you see it? Well it doesn't see you* (Lacan, 1981, 95)

Young Lacan feels disturbed by this revelation. It is just a simple object, but he, himself, has no importance and/or meaning at all either for that tiny sardine can or

even for the fishermen who are busy with doing their job. He feels disturbed because as a subject, he does not feel to have control over an object. He recounts his own reaction: "The can did not see me...[but] it was looking at me all the same...and I am not speaking metaphorically...I, at the moment –as I appeared to these fellows who were earning their livings with great difficulty...looked like nothing on earth. In short, I was rather out of place in the picture" (Lacan, 1981, 95-96). This experience of young Lacan is similar to the experience of the individual once he gets out of the Mirror Stage to the Symbolic Stage. In the Symbolic stage, the individual wakes from his illusion, becomes aware of his constructed unity in his learning of the codes of society, and eventually grows more and more pessimistic about his subjectivity. Eventually, the subject continuously seeks to re-store that Ideal image that he has seen in the mirror stage through others, in a way he tries to see himself in others. For Lacan, the subject is the discourse of the other, he does not define himself, but is defined by the system which is pre-existing before the subject. The individual does not (or cannot) see, but seen, does not (or cannot) define, but defined.

Lacan refers to Freud and his psychoanalysis in his analysis of the Subject and the Other, and writes that "the unconscious is structured like a language" (Lacan, 1981, 203). Man is born into a system of signs, with its signifiers and signified, and learns to speak and think within this pre-established system. Similarly Bryson (1988) draws a parallel in his article "The Gaze in the Expanded Field" writing: *When I learn to see socially, that is, when I begin to articulate my retinal experience with the codes of recognition that come to me from my social milieu(s), I am inserted into systems of visual discourse that saw the world before I did, and will go on seeing after I see no longer* (92). Man's utterances as well as how he sees what he sees are all inscribed within a pre-constructed syntax, which Lacan calls is "in relation with the unconscious reserve" (68). Driving a relation between the pre-conscious and the unconscious, Lacan implies that man speaks and sees in line with what he, unconsciously, has stored in his unconscious. This is the difference between vision and visuality, as Bryson further points out in his article by referring to the constructedness to the latter: "Between the subject and the world is inserted the entire sum of discourses which make up visuality, that cultural construct, and make visuality different from vision" (Bryson, 1988, 91).

This network of signifiers that Bryson calls as cutting across and into his visual field (92) is described as *stain* by Lacan, which similarly "cuts across the space of sight and darkens it" (104). What the subject sees in his socially-constructed milieu can by no means be the full, *objective* view, but rather an objectifying view. As Žižek comments in his article "The Tickling Object" in his *The Parallax View* (2006), "the reality I see is never 'whole' -not because a large part of it eludes me, but because it contains a stain, a blind spot, which indicates my inclusion in it" (17). Going back to the story of the young Lacan, the disturbance that he feels upon *not-being-seen-by-the-other (object)* reveals yet another aspect of the analysis of the gaze; i.e. the desire of the Subject to be of the desire of the Other. Lacan writes, "at the scopic level, we are no longer at the level of demand, but of desire, of the desire of the Other" (Lacan, 1981, 104). The subject, no longer demands, but *desires* to be desired by the object as to his subjectivity in unity in a narcissistic endeavor inherited from his imaginary mirror stage.

> *In our relation to things, in so far as this relation is constituted by the way of vision, and ordered in the figures of representation, something slips, passes, is transmitted, from stage to stage, and is always to some degree eluded in it --that is what we call the gaze.* (1981, 73)

This is how Lacan defines the *gaze*. It is what causes the de-centering of the subject on the visual field of the other through the realization of a *lack* that the subject feels in himself, and seeks completion through the other. Through references from Sigmund Freud and the castration anxiety of the subject, Lacan makes a connection between the gaze and the *lack* that a subject may feel in him. Freud's castration anxiety is similar to the awareness of the subject concerning his lack --his ego-ideal image of the mirror stage. If his look makes him aware of his lack, then why does the subject insist on looking at the object? Lacan answers that "the subject depends on the signifier [in order to claim himself] and the signifier is first of all in the field of the Other" (Lacan, 1981, 205). As it has been written above, the unconscious of the subject is structured like a language, and the subject needs the mediation of signifiers in order to be able to come up with a meaningful signified. Through his relation to and look at the other, the subject desires to compensate that lack, yet the gaze back of the object confuses and dissolves the subject, making him pass from the symbolic to

the real, having long been in the search for the imaginary.

Young Lacan feels disturbed not only upon not being seen by an inanimate object on the surface, but also by the fishermen at the background. As a subject, he requires the desire of the Other in order to claim his subjectivity, and determine his stand in relation to others. As a subject, he desires to be seen in order to satisfy the gaze of the other. Yet, in the case of his not being seen, his status as the subject is reduced to being just another sight situated in the already constructed visual field, thus he drifts far from realizing his true identity, as "true identity itself, as a rule, forms itself through the identification with a foreign gaze which plays the role of the culture's Ego-Ideal" (Žižek, 2006, 377). This, Lacan calls in his *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, *objet petit a*. In his own definition:

> *The objet a is something from which the subject, in order to constitute itself, has separated itself off as organ. this serves as a symbol of the lack, that is to say, of the phallus, not as such, but in so far as it is lacking. It must, therefore, be an object that is, firstly, separable and , secondly, that has some relation to the lack.* (Lacan, 1981, 103)

Literally meaning 'the little other object' in French, *objet petit a*, corresponds to the desire of the subject in the other. It refers to his lack, and his endeavor to re-store his ideal image. It is what reminds him of his [castration] anxiety and yet what he narcissistically desires. Drawing a parallel between this *objet petit a* and the gaze, Lacan writes that "*the* object a *in the field of the visible is the gaze*" (Lacan, 1981, 105), which determines the subject. He visualizes the subject as a picture that is gazed from and is at the outside. According to this gaze, the subject is "*photo-graphed*" (106). The subject desires to be photographed in the image of his mirror stage, and thus he tends to see in the other what he wishes to see. This desire functions as a *stain* shadowing his true vision. And there appears a gap between the subject and *objet petit a*, his unattainable desire.

> *The relation between the gaze and what one wishes to see involves a lure. The subject is presented as other than he is, and what one shows him is not what he wishes to see. It is in this way that the eye may function as objet a, that is to say, at the level of the lack,* (Lacan, 1981, 104)

d)   Foucault's Panoptic Gaze and the Politics of Power

> *The [voyeuristic] pleasure that comes of exercising a power that questions, monitors, watches, spies, searches out, palpates, brings to light; and on the other hand, the [exhibitionistic pleasure] that kindles at having to evade this power, flee from it, fool it, or travesty it...These attractions, these evasions, these circular incitements have raced around bodies and sexes, not boundaries not to be crossed, but perpetual spirals of power and pleasure.* (Michel Foucault as cited in Krisp 2010: 98)

This is how Michel Foucault describes the panoptic gaze in his *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1* book. Different from the other thinkers covered so far, Foucault sees the 'gaze' predominantly within a discourse of power, comprising an 'all-seeing' inspecting gaze, and a not-seeing object-prisoner duality. The gaze, in Foucault, is there to observe, and to keep under constant surveillance and thus discipline, even in the absence of the observer. Setting out from the example of a plague-striken town and the state's a set of strict measures to administer such a fragile setting, Foucault tries to prove that such discipline through surveillance is present in every phase and setting of human life, and is present especially in "the psychiatric asylum, the penitentiary, the reformatory, the approved school, and the hospital" (Foucault, 1977, 199). Foucault calls this state "the utopia of the perfectly governed city" --the dream of every ruler (198-199).

In his major work, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1977), Foucault mentions Jeremy Bentham's *Panopticon*, which, he claims, all mechanisms of power derive from. Bentham conceived this exclusive architectural design in the late eighteenth-century for it to serve as hospitals, schools, sanatoriums, daycares, asylums, but especially and the best applicable to as prisons:

> *..at the periphery, an annular building; at the center, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other.* (200)

Unlike its equivalents, this prison is not dark, but consumed all in light. Light, in this structure, is the most effective agent of disciplinary power --a light which 'blinds' the residents of the cells -be it "a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker, or a school boy," causing them not to see what is under full sight. This is, as Foucault notes, the reversal of the principle of a dungeon --it opens up, exposes to light, and reveals (200). The gazer in the inspecting tower has the privilege of watching the residents of the cells, within the security of the light coming across, comforting his gaze. He watches, and the residents know that they are being constantly watched. Even though there is no way for them to be sure whether the agent is *actually* there or not, they very well know that they are under constant surveillance. This belief breeds the double gaze in similar contexts of surveillance: the inspecting gaze and the 'inner gaze' which conditions the self to the firm belief of being under constant surveillance, which in turn leads to self-discipline. This is a process of interiorization (Krips, 2010: 96/ Lee, 2003). The resident internalizes the gaze, and keeps himself under surveillance even in the absence of surveillance. Phil Lee (2003) calls this a superb formula: 'power exercised continuously and for what turns out to be minimal cost".

Foucault's *Panopticon* is structured based on 'binary division' and 'branding' (199), a system which divided individuals in contrast to each other, creating divisions in society such as the normal and, its inevitable, the abnormal; the sane, and its inevitable, the insane, etc. Such divisions furnished by labels stuck to individuals contribute to the self-interiorization process of the individual: having been ascribed a label by the authority, and is continually treated as such, the individual, over time, comes to internalize the requirements of that particular label, and either submits to receive its due, or resists, as Foucault calls "practices of freedom" (Krips, 2010, 96). Foucault's *Panopticon* and the politics of power serve as a perfect example of the mutual exercise of the gaze and labeling: the gaze initiates the labeling process, and the outcome label on the individual conditions the later gazes directed at him from his social milieu.

2.2 What Triggers the *Gaze*?

2.2.1 Self-Image Construction: The 'Mastering Gaze' of the Subject

Throughout his lifetime, the individual constantly constructs and re-constructs his identity based on the needs and demands of either himself or of his social milieu. In other words, he is not always the active agent in this construction, but a passive receiver while the identity of the individual oscillates between the statuses of 'acquired' or 'given'. Lacan talks about the construction of an ego-ideal in his conception of the Mirror Stage, which marks the early periods of childhood when the child for the first time discovers himself in his *seeming* totality. Upon looking at his own image in the mirror, the child observes his movements, his expressions and his whole image, which he has until that moment only seen partially. Now through an external look, he contentedly celebrates his totality and individuality in its ideal. From that moment onwards, he contemplates his surroundings as a 'subject' observing 'objects' around him which are set on display for his gaze. As a subject, he feels himself active, self-confident, and self-sufficient. "The mirror [in a way] transforms the immaturity (which is experienced) into a maturity (which is seen), it reshapes the infantile insufficiency into an imagined self-sufficiency of the ego, it ascends the perception of a fragmented body to the vision of a whole body" (Kaloianov, 1993, sec. 2.1.1).

This is the time for the individual to become aware of the Subject-Object dichotomy. The individual occupies the 'privileged' subject position as he identifies himself with his mirror image that is anticipated externally in its ideal. In his gaze at his ego-ideal reflected in the mirror, the infant enjoys an illusory mastery over his own image as well as over those around him. This is the 'mastering gaze' of the infant-Subject: The child being impotent even to fulfill his basic needs constructs an illusion of "a mastery over her/his own body that [s/he] does not yet have in reality" (McGowan, 2003, 28).

Lacan's Mirror Stage and the assumed mastering subjectness of the individual parallels Hegel's concept of Master-Slave relationship. In his theory of the gaze, Hegel basically states that the Subject's self-consciousness cannot exist merely on its own, but "it exists only in being acknowledged" by the consciousness of the Object (Hegel, 1977, para. 178/ p.111). Hegel puts the stress concerning the self-consciousness of the Subject on its acknowledgement by the Object. Just as the Slave

needs the Master to survive, so does the Master needs his relationship to his Slave to sustain his mastery, subjectness and power. Moreover, this acknowledgement has a twofold significance: The Subject needs to see himself through the eyes of the Object to acquire a sense of self-consciousness, and in doing so, he needs to be aware of the fact that the Object, too, is capable of becoming conscious of himself by seeing himself through the eyes of the Subject. What is in question here is a dialectical relationship, and not a linear one as was traditionally formulated, flowing from an active subject to a passive object.

In this early phase of identity development, the infant, through his gaze at his own image in the mirror, constructs a visuality for himself --a visuality that he defines in superior adjectives, and he begins to 'see' his surrounding and social milieu through the lenses belonging to this visualized self-image. In this visuality, there is a Subject (a Master) and necessarily an Object/objects (or a Slave/slaves). Unaware of his dependency on the Other to sustain his self-image, the illusioned Subject temporarily enjoys the omnipotence of his self-construction. Yet, the Subject is soon to wake up from his illusion with the realization that without a Slave, the Master would be meaningless.

2.2.2   Self-Image Deconstruction: Exposure to the External Gaze

a)   The Labeling Effect

> *What determines me, at the most profound level, in the visible, is the gaze that is outside.* (Lacan, 1981, 106)

The gaze that is outside conditions our identity as we take a stand *in line* or *in reaction to* it. Most of the time it is not possible to escape this gaze. Man, as a social animal, is influenced by the society he is a member of through the latter's definitions of its members. Society, or better stated, the actors of politics of power within society today attempt to exert their power on the rest of society not through physical force, but rather through more psychological means such as defining and labeling its non-conforming members, who are referred to as 'outsiders' by Howard S. Becker in his analysis of social deviance. Here, understanding the difference between 'describing' and 'defining' is significant.

Different from 'describing', the term 'defining' aims to finalize the otherwise ongoing meaning, or put an end to interpretation, and in order to do so, the process of

defining 'tags' the defined. For the individual to get rid of this tag, or definition, is no easy task, as society prefers to stay within the safety zone that such tags provide. How and then for whom does, labeling create such a safe and comforting zone? And more importantly, why do some people label some other people?

Without a doubt, to know the unknown, and to get familiar with the unfamiliar creates an environment of safety and comfort for the labeler who in that case feels free of the threatening 'foreign' factor. "What we are doing, when we name an object is denying that we are that particular object. Labeling objects around us effectively anchors us and saves us from the indifferent flux of our world. Our own individuality, that we tend to value so highly, requires this differentiation" (Cummins, [18.07.2013]). Now that the outsider is labeled as such, the labeler, confident of his own subjectness, assumes to *know* exactly who/what he faces, and he feels secure concerning the limits and potentialities of the other. The labeled, on the other side, has to struggle to live with the label (few manage to live without the label). For most cases however, the labeled finds two possible ways in front of him to follow: either to accept the label by submitting to the assumption, or to reject it by preferring to continue as an 'outsider'. Both of which require the deconstruction of the ideally constructed self-image so it can be re-constructed later down the line with or in reaction to the given label.

With its labels, society creates its own 'others', or 'outsiders' as Becker calls it. Referring back to Lacan's stages of identity construction, the Subject defines the other as an object so as to be able to imagine the latter's acknowledgement of his power, and to keep sufficient distance from that 'object' in order to secure his stand: *He is the Subject, because he is not the Other.*

b)   From the Mastering Gaze to the Imagined Gaze

Lacan talks about the Symbolic Stage following the ideally-constructed self-image of the Mirror Stage. Here, the subjectivity-conscious individual comes across a major challenge as to the unity and totality of his identity. Being completely unaware of the link between the consistency of his identity and its dependency on the consciousness of the other, the Subject, until a certain stage, enjoys his unique existence and command over others. Yet, a certain stage of awareness arrives when the individual, as a Subject at the center of his universe, comes to see the 'objects' around him under a different light. This stage is initiated when the self-centered individual, defining

others as 'objects' under his *gaze*, becomes aware of *the gaze of the other*.

Referring back to Lacan's fisherman story, here, the Subject does not encounter the real look of the object, yet, he becomes aware of the *existence* of the gaze of the other. The disturbance that young Lacan feels following the utterance of the fisherman opens up a new level in the identity construction of the individual; i.e. the desire of the Subject to be the *object* of the look of the other, the desire to be *seen* by the other, or to put it shortly, the desire to be *acknowledged* by the other. The Subject realizes that he could sustain his 'ideal' self-image as long as he is acknowledged as such by the other. In the absence of this acknowledgement, the totality of his identity shatters, and he faces his *lack*, as Lacan writes about, in the possibility of the gaze back of the object. Now, the Master has realized that he needs a 'Slave' to sustain his mastery.

In the utterance of the fisherman, he says 'it doesn't see you' instead of 'it cannot see you' as would be expected from an 'object'. In the latter case, the subject would be secure in terms of his mastery and the other's impotentiality. Frustrated by the fact that he is not seen by the Object, the Subject voluntarily objectifies himself by putting himself on display for the gaze of the Other. This is an attempt to restore his totality, and to be complete again. Back to Lacan's stages, the child realizes that "identification with [his idealized] image is a primary misidentification...for its image of itself comes from the outside," and that it is not possible to construct merely on its own. This is the *lack* that the child becomes conscious in himself. As a result, the previous "mirror identification is replaced by *desire* when the child recognizes the lack" (Olin, 1996, 215). At this point, the child goes into an exhibitionistic relation with the Other, exposing his body (and/or self) to the other's gaze to be able to seen.

When Lacan talks about 'gaze', he does not necessarily refer to the actual look of the Other, rather he defines gaze "not as a seen gaze but rather as a gaze *imagined* in the field of the Other...where the eye viewing the object belongs to the subject but the gaze is only on the side of the object. The gaze becomes the 'objet a in the field of the visible' or rather the object of unattainable desire that we seek in the Other." (Lacan, 1981, 105).

> *The objet a is something from which the subject, in order to constitute itself, has separated itself off as*

31

> *organ. this serves as a symbol of the lack, that is to say, of the phallus, not as such, but in so far as it is lacking. It must, therefore, be an object that is, firstly, separable and , secondly, that has some relation to the lack.* (Lacan, 1981, 103)

Literally meaning 'the little other object' in French, *objet petit a*, corresponds to the unattainable desire of the Subject that he *imagines* in the other. This is also when the subject fantasizes about the Other. It refers to his lack, and his endeavor to re-store his ideal image as "instead of suffering the perpetual uncertainty of desire, fantasy allows the subject to gain a measure of certainty" (McGowan, 2003, 36). The Subject presents himself to the gaze of the Object, and *imagines* in this gaze an acknowledgement of the latter, which will enable the Subject to assume his subjectness and power over objects around him as in the Mirror Stage. The issue of the exhibitionism of the Subject as a means to claim back an identity in its unity will be analysed deeper in the following sections.

c)   The Construction of Beauty and the Visual Media Effect

The delusioned subject, who himself has fallen into objectification, hurries back to re-attain his identity in its 'ideal' and finds himself guided (or manipulated) by and through the notion of 'beauty', which is constructed within and by societies to connote its relation with various other components of the 'ideal', including goodness of heart, success and happiness. Bernadette Wegenstein (2012) in her book, *The Cosmetic Gaze: Body Modification and the Construction of Beauty* traces such close relation between beauty and a good soul back to Plato in his *The Republic* (as cited in Wegenstein, 2012, 5):

> *Therefore, if someone's soul has a fine and beautiful character and his body matches it in beauty and is thus in harmony with it, so that both share in the same pattern, wouldn't that be the most beautiful sight for anyone who has eyes to see?*

Especially in the colonial and postcolonial periods, being white became an indispensable element of the beauty 'ideal', with certain bodily and facial features being brought on the pedestal, while certain others are condemned implying them to be evil and impure. This obsession with the physical body and its parts were further taken to extreme with the ideology of the biological determinists such as Cesare Lombroso (1835--1909). Lombroso is notoriously known for his extensive analysis

concerning the facial features of numerous criminals in his crime studies of the 'natural deviation of the criminal.' He eventually came up with specific bodily features, which he claimed destine the bearer of those features to commit crime in his *Criminal Man* (Wegenstein, 2012). He summarizes such bodily features, connoting 'evil inclinations,' as "low, sloping foreheads; overdeveloped sinuses, jaws and cheekbones; prognathism (an apelike forward thrust of the lower face); oblique and large eye sockets; dark skin; thick and curly head hair; large and protuberant ears; and long arms" (Wegenstein, 2012, 31). Biological determinism can be claimed to hide underneath an obsession with the notion of a 'better race', as well, which lies in the ambition of eliminating, or at least covering, the 'faulty' features in order to achieve the better/ideal. Hans F. K. Gunther's (1891--1968) 'racial science' served this aim, and was later devotedly practised by the Nazi Germany in order to create the ideal 'Aryan race' with the 'ideal' German bodily features (Wegenstein, 2012, 42-48).

Such specification concerning certain biological make-up of man can be called an extreme labeling/defining process. Moreover, ideas such as Lombroso's and Gunther's, are contemptuously labeled as 'racist' today. Despite this, labeling based on physical appearance cannot be called a myth even today, either. Wegenstein calls this tendency of judging based on appearance the *physiognomic gaze* at the physiologically 'different' (39). Even though the obsession with virtually producing a superior 'better race' like the Aryan Race of the Nazi Germany has long become a part of history, its extension can be claimed to have survived today hidden under a different mask.

The resistance to migrant identities by the host countries is not always and solely due to economic anxieties of the latter; but there is also the anxiety not to mix the 'pure and original' identity with other races, colors, or identities. The socially and economically second-class status of the immigrant is a result of this anxiety-driven resistance. Even within the same 'pure and original' identity of a certain society, such resistance could be observed in several cases with the 'exclusivity' of certain places ('classy' and predominantly upper-class streets, malls, or cafes), certain activities (going to opera, ballet, art exhibitions or theatres) and certain goods (high-tech devices, luxury items) to certain type of people. Upon the appearance of an -outside-of-the-circle individual in relation to any of these *certain* phenomena, the

within-the-circle others attempt to stress the perceived difference and thus out-of-placeness of the unwelcome individual, who is labeled as an outsider and an intruder, either through words, or actions, or at least through their *gazes*.

Then who decides on the nature of this 'different'? Or how is one determined as an outsider or an insider, as an intruder or the 'natural' member? Each society, and within each society each community, constructs what is normal and what is abnormal. Likewise, societies also construct what is common (should be desired) and what is 'different' (should be avoided). Such constructions are instilled in their members from early ages onward through its various mediums, like its social, cultural, educational and political institutions, with visual media being among the most effective.

d) From the Body Seen on TV to the Body *Gazed* in the Mirror

> *By directing us to look at 'organs instead of a body' within the visual culture of the globalized West, this gaze has generated a breakdown between the interiority and exteriority of the human body.*
> **Bernadette Wegenstein, *The Cosmetic Gaze*, ix**

Jean Baudrillard says that we are living in a world of simulacra, where nothing is unmediated, and one of the major intermediaries is, without question, the visual media. Culture and media create and define, again what Baudrillard calls, the 'hyper-real' -more real than real- through various images of the 'ideal'. They simultaneously define the 'ideal' especially over the images of the 'body', and the self-illusioned individual soon realizes that his definition of the ideal, as he has seen in his mirror image, and that of the external world do not necessarily match most of the time.

In the mirror stage, the individual places himself at the center being confident of his subjectness, he is the one who looks at things, who sees them, and who attaches meaning to them. In time, he comes to 'see' that the culture he is born into and its visual intermediary, the visual media, promote their own images of what is ideal and what is not. Here, especially the images of the female body deserve special attention. Today the female body sells everything from jewelery to cars and biscuits. Thanks to fast-improving technologies, those on screen are becoming younger and thinner. Women's magazines are full of articles urging that if they can just lose those remaining 5 kilos, they will have it all –the perfect marriage, the loving husband, the

rewarding career, just as in those TV series. TV and movies reinforce the importance of a Barbie-doll-like thin body as a measure of a woman's worth, which, needless to say, causes lots of women to lose self-respect. What is problematic with these constantly promoted images is that they do not reflect the 'real'. Yet their conscious or unconscious acceptance as such by the majority make these un-real images more real than real, shortly the 'hyper-real'. Eventually the hyper-reality of the image overwhelms the reality of the common people we actually live among.

The 'ideals' of media culture have a real close touch with the concept of 'beauty'. It is possible to witness the definition of 'beauty' especially by the western media through its Hollywood films, advertisements and reality television productions, such as makeover shows, which promise a new, bright life to its desperate contestants through a new look. (Wegenstein, 2012) Such productions also find their counterparts in today's increasingly globalized consumer community, which are becoming more and more beauty-conscious around a *similar* set of criteria defining the beautiful. Bernadette Wegenstein (2012) calls this bodily appearance conscious look the *cosmetic gaze*, and basically defines it as "how humans experience their own and others' bodies as incomplete projects that await the intervention of technologies of enhancement, which will help them better approximate their true self or natural potential" (109).

Constant exposure to visual images presented as the 'ideal' also instill in the minds of the exposed individual the imperative to employ a cosmetic gaze toward both his environment and more dramatically toward himself. Just like the connection that Plato made between beauty and a good soul, the individual comes to ascribe all positive adjectives and achievements with the achievement of beauty, of bodily 'completion' in Wegenstein's words. Yet, this is not an empowering process, either. Desiring to be *seen* within the framework of the defined and accepted 'ideal', the individual falls into desperation upon his cosmetic gaze at his own body in comparison to the ideally presented, (and technologically enhanced) images in the visual media. This is the gaze back of the individual at himself, which brings a process of *self-labeling* alongside. The individual, who falls outside the frame of the 'ideal' features, labels himself as incomplete, inferior and in need of modification and enhancement. This internalization of this preached 'lack' in his appearance leads to a loss of self-respect, and may eventually turn into an inferiority complex. The

individual in order to achieve the accepted standards of the 'ideal' may then strive to hide his 'difference' so as to be able to *pass* into the normal, the acknowledged and the seen instead of the gazed, with a "desire to return to that ideal state in which [he] had control of the world" as in the mirror stage (Wegenstein, 2012, 136). In short, the individual willingly submits to fall into that familiar self-illusion of Mastery.

To achieve this desired mastery this time over his own body, and parallel to this to re-gain self -confidence enjoyed in the mirror stage, the individual becomes the guardian, and constant observer over his body, in line with what Michel Foucault calls *biopower* in his *The History of Sexuality* vol.1, which is the disciplinary power of the individual over the body. Today, this biopower, or the taming of the body, is actualized by modern man through strict diets, unhealthy fads such as anorexia, and cosmetic surgery. What the individual tries to achieve through such means is to *change* into the visible that is desired to be seen, from the invisible that is avoided from the gaze of the other. The individual under the constant exposure of the 'idealized' images becomes in time so much obsessed with one undesired part of his body that that one body part comes to represent for him "the entirety of [his] appearance. [He] cannot look into a mirror without seeing only the one part that 'ruins the rest.'" (Wegenstein, 2012, 132). Behind this fixation on the visible body lies the desire to get free of all the 'imagined' gazes and the accompanying labels of others that serve to reduce the self-image of the individual by objectifying him. Eventually, the individual may find himself having the desire to *change* in order to reveal his true potential, and inner beauty, just like the promise of the 'reveal' moments' of the make-over TV shows, where the contestant faces his new image in the mirror after a series of operations enabling his transformation.

Behind all this fixation and effort, though, hovers the question 'for whom/what do we really want to change our outer look?' Is it really for surfacing the true yet hidden potential of the self, or is it again for the exterior gaze, which is, in fact, responsible for starting this process of desiring the change? Wegenstein in her book writes that the physical and technology-driven transformation of bodies turns them into "'science fictional referentless fetish images' [which] are looking back at us from an unreal place" (55). Is it really from an unreal place as she claims, or has it already turned into a more real than real place in Baudrillard's terms as stated at the beginning of the section? With such increasing popularity of the identity-claim over

36

the physical body, or over what is visible to the exterior eye, Baudrillard definitely has a point concerning the transformed nature of the real, though. It is easier, especially for the twenty-first century individual to construct a self-image by means of technology, then to enhance this image again using devices and applications of technology, ultimately to portray a self-picture, or visual identity, that he desires to approximate the once-lost ideal self-image.

2.2.3 Self-Image Re-Construction

Time to Update Status: Instant Identities and the Social Network Intermediary

> *Indeed she wouldn't have been so beautiful if she hadn't been seen.* **Elif Shafak, *The Gaze*, 125**

Today's consumer culture is one which can consume virtually everything from goods to images, and moreover can consume it fast, and still be able to look for other new things and trends for further consumption. Even identities are constructed in an instant on online network sites to be presented to this consumer culture. These are the 'instant identities' constructed by the individual himself and which are visually available to the gaze of the other, yet distant enough not to be challenged by this very same gaze that objectifies. Caught in a vicious circle of identity construction and re-construction, today's individual is, much more than before, prone to the influence of mass media visual ideals in a world crowded with spectacles. He, in turn, tries to re-construct his lost 'ideal' through visuality, as well. To do so, he willingly puts himself and his body on display to the gaze of others in order to be acknowledged in his created 'ideal', and in order to be *seen* as he wishes to be seen. This is how online social networks have become an intermediary for today's individual to set the scene for his increasing visibility. Online social network sites, such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, have helped and still help the individual to paint a self-satisfactory and 'more real than real' self-picture to the eyes of others. Visual effects serve to enhance his looks; pieces of literature and arts, which could easily be 'googled' to address a particular need or experience. This makes it possible for the individual to look as intellectual as he wishes without the effort of reading pages and pages of books. Now lots of information and visuality, no matter how personal they may be, are not abstained for the sake of privacy as before, but revealed in order to be approved, and admired under necessary measures to prevent their not fading away

unnoticed and *unseen*.

Then what is particular about today's increasingly globalizing modern society that instills in the modern individual the desire to be as visible as possible? What urges the modern man to exhibit himself, especially over his own body? Thanks mainly to fast-improving technologies, the individual of the twenty-first century is much more profoundly surrounded by visual images than his predecessors; having the means to get in touch with, and acquire information about the external world much more easily than before. He has fallen in an even more ambivalent situation in his struggle to sustain an identity as much in his totality as possible. Being constantly exposed to images not only from media but also from his immediate social milieu, his notion of 'ideal' keeps changing more frequently, and in the meantime becomes more prone to outer influence. In such a fast changing environment, online social networks enable the individual to re-construct an ideal self-image closer to the one in the mirror stage, which is lost upon the gaze back of the other, by providing him with a safe and comfortable *distance* from the *real* gaze of the *real* Other. In the absence of this physical and real gaze, he feels confident to paint a picture of the self as he has the luxury of formulating and re-formulating in advance of becoming visible, i.e. before 'posting'.

The gaze is real, and it is a part of being a *zoon politikon* -a social animal, as Aristotle calls it. Gaze is always there whenever two persons have an encounter in the same setting. It occurs whenever the individual attempts to assert his subjectivity, and whenever the objectified individual resists being defined. In the twenty-first century this encounter over real gaze is being replaced by a *digital gaze* which is likewise *desired* by the subject individual. Yet, in this digital gaze, unlike the real one, the subject does not suffer from the threat of shame that Sartre talks about upon the gaze back of the other. The reason is due to the absence of this counter-gaze against a subject in his secure position behind the screen. He only becomes conscious of the 'gaze back', if we could talk of any, through comments and likes left on his updates/posts. In this exhibitionism over online media, as in Lacan's concept of *objet petit a*, the subject again tries to be the object desire of the other, who appears here in the form of 'followers'. He tries to re-construct his ideal identity over being liked and followed by others, and this seems to be possible only by staying as visible as possible.

It is almost becoming a reverse process with trying to become how one wishes to *appear* to the other gaze, instead of appearing how he really is. In such online networks, it is relatively easier to present one's self to others through various images. These images tell others what the person likes doing, where he spends his time and with whom, what he wears, what he eats, what he listens to, what he has achieved, what he hopes, namely all the necessary parts to make up an 'ideal' whole. In this picture, even worries and misfortunes are shared to contribute to visibility. The problem with this attitude is that since it is a forced and not that genuine an attitude, it may not be quite possible to sustain a consistent identity. In the absence of the real gaze of the other, the individual feels bold enough to create fragments of his ideal, yet the challenge starts when it comes to exhibit the same ideal as a whole in the external physical world, in physical communication with the other. There, unlike in the world of online social networks, the individual cannot help but feel uneasy upon being followed under the gaze of the other, while it may be quite pleasing to him to see one more follower in his twitter account.

In his *Camera Lucida*, Roland Barthes writes that "once I feel myself observed by the [camera] lens, everything changes: I constitute myself in the process of 'posing.' I instantaneously make another body for myself, I transform myself in advance into an image" (as cited in Wegenstein, 2012, 51). Just like that, in his engagement with the digital gaze, the individual, consciously or unconsciously reduces himself into an *image* in the form of a profile picture or photographs which are meant to hint clues as to who he *really* is to the outer gaze. This could be called the willing self-objectification of the individual in order to be acknowledged as a Subject. Just like Hegel writes, now, the Subject has already realized and internalized the fact that he needs a 'slave' in order to sustain his mastery.

Yet, it is in fact questionable who the master is and who the slave in the case of an individual who is exhibiting himself to the other's voyeuristic gaze in the hope of acknowledgement by the other. Online social network sites in a way reverse the looking relations: from a traditionally voyeuristic master subject and an exhibited object, to an exhibitionist subject and a voyeuristic other. Yet in exhibitionism, different than being exhibited, there is the will and active consciousness of the individual, which seems to prevent him from being victimized by the other's gaze and labeling. In fact, quite paradoxically, the individual in his virtual identity/image,

desires to be *labeled* in the form of tags through the other's gaze. The reason is the fact that what is perceived there by the individual is not a gaze, but a look, and preferably and desirably an admiring look at the individual who desires to be the desire object of the other as in Lacan's fishermen's story.

Behind the popularity of such instant identities may lie the obsession with the notion of a 'better self' "that suits our bodies or our character better than the 'original'" (Wegenstein, 2012, 111). Those online social sites have become a place where the delusioned individual seeks to re-gain his lost ideal-self. On the other side, it is open to debate whether it is problematic to rely more on the digital identity than the physical one, or whether it is not possible to turn the first into the latter, and make the virtual the actual. It is frequently observed that the social network profiles (SNPs) seem to have more self-confidence than one's actual profile, and this digital self-confidence may urge the individual to fulfill that image in his real physical environment, as well. In his effort of not looking inconsistent in terms of his identity, and in an attempt to satisfy the gaze, the individual may become more conscious of his self and conditions himself towards attaining this constructed image. It becomes all about creating the right self-picture. And once achieved, this picture may well hide all imperfections behind the *exhibited* self.

> *So one day I decided to dye my hair. It was clear I couldn't get rid of the letters f-a-t-t-y. But with the right hair colour, I could make them invisible; like a sweater that doesn't show stains.* (*The Gaze*, 95)

2.3   Alternative Gazes

It is possible to talk about a number of 'gazes' within the Gaze Theory, such as the colonial gaze, the orientalist gaze, the nationalistic gaze, the patriarchal gaze, the male gaze, the female gaze, the white gaze, the black gaze, the tourist gaze, etc. A gaze can virtually be created out of any circumstance where two individuals are present, and when at least one difference could be observed between them, either physical or economic or ethical or political or cultural. And it is of utmost importance to note that the 'gaze' that objectifies, partially evaluates, and reaches a claim or defining statement concerning the other is what proves to be problematic within the theory of gaze, and it is this objectifying gaze that forms the subject matter of this dissertation.

It can easily be said that there is hardly any occasion devoid of the presence of 'difference' between individuals. Yet, the presence of 'difference', which is by the way inevitable and quite natural and normal, is not alone, and at all, the underlying reason behind the objectifying gaze. Difference triggers curiosity, enthusiasm, at times fear, but, most of the time, basically a desire to *know*. When this desire leads the observer to -not describe but- *define* the observed with generalized remarks, it proves to be problematic, and breeds the objectifying gaze. Such desire to know, intrinsically, gives the desire-owner a Subject status, while reducing the observed to an Object status. In such relationship, it is hard for the 'object' to speak for himself as brand-new, on the contrary, he will quite probably find himself in a position trying to refute the definitions attributed to him over the same wording derived from these definitions. This section of the dissertation will be an analysis of this 'desire to know' specifically portrayed under 'alternative gazes' in (post)modern culture, which may be regarded as neutral in nature, and are -most probably- the least assumed to bear any objectifying tendency. Yet, can any gaze be immune to objectification of the Other?

2.3.1   The Cinematic Gaze

Laura Mulvey (1999), in her influential article "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" epitomizes men's power over women in the concept of the 'male gaze', and claims that man basically exerts his power on woman through his gaze, which "triangulates vision, knowledge and power" (Middleton, 1992, 7). Attributing to the dominant patriarchal culture, Mulvey writes that woman takes the stage only as a "signifier for the male other, bound by a symbolic order in which man can live out his fantasies and obsessions through linguistic command by imposing them on the silent image of woman still tied to her place as bearer of meaning, not maker of meaning" (1999, 834). In portraying her argument, Mulvey analyzes the mainstream narrative cinema (specifically the Hollywood), and writes "the magic of Hollywood arose...from its skilled and satisfying manipulation of visual pleasure" (834-35). Referring back to the 'vision-knowledge-power triangle' of Middleton (1992), power can maintain its influence through visuality as visuality gives one the means to portray one's own truth as the sole truth over a claim to *know* the essence of what is being put on display. In the case of the mainstream cinema, Mulvey claims, the role of woman as an object of pleasure does not change, and woman is portrayed as

something nice to look at in line with the desire of the mainstream director as well as with the expectation of the mainstream spectator. At the end of the day, what Hollywood 'achieves' is just another constructed dichotomy of active/subject/looking/male and passive/objectified/being-looked-at/female, with the female whose "form is styled accordingly [within the dominant male discourse] with their appearance coded for strong visual and erotic impact so that they can be said to connote to-be-looked-at-ness" (837).

In this role of *to-be-looked-at-ness*, Mulvey adds that it is not only the male actor's gaze that subordinates woman, but the camera (and the director), and even the spectator, see the woman character from the eyes (the *gaze*) of the male protagonist. When the female is looked at by the male actor, the camera focuses on the face (and/or the body) of the female, and through the lens of the camera, the spectator also sees what the male protagonist sees, or what the director wishes to show. Here, the spectator, in his comfort zone of being in the dark and behind the camera, - consciously or unconsciously- identifies himself with the looking male, instead of the being-looked-at female. Here, Mulvey concludes this pleasure of looking at an objectified other as scopophilic[3] and narcissistic, epitomized under the images of *Peeping Tom* and *Narcissus* (1999, 836-37). In his identification with the male protagonist, the spectator both enjoys peeping at the objectified other, and furthermore, comes closer to the ideal "more perfect, more complete, more powerful" (838) self-image as he becomes "fascinated with the image of his like [being the male protagonist] set in an illusion of natural space, and through him gaining control and possession of the woman within the diegesis" (839). Due to this illusion created by the camera, portrayed by the male protagonist, and reflected on the female, Mulvey calls the mainstream traditional cinema an "illusionistic narrative" form: *cinematic codes create a gaze, a world, and an object, thereby producing an illusion cut to the measure of desire* (843).

Though Mulvey posits her criticism against the mainstream traditional cinema, it is possible to direct similar criticism against today's cinema and its portrayal of woman on screen, as well, especially when one considers the 'sexy warrior female' image quite popular on screen today. To such image, *Trinity* character (as featured by

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[3] In her Freud's definition, scopophilia as "taking other people as objects, subjecting them to a controlling and curious gaze" (Mulvey, 1999, 3).

Carrie-Anne Moss) of the *Matrix* series (The Wachowski Brothers, 1999 and 2003), *Charlie's Angels* characters (Cameron Diaz, Drew Barrymore, Lucy Liu) of *Charlie's Angels* (McG, 2000), *Lara Croft* (Angelina Jolie) of *Tomb Raider* (Simon West, 2001), *Beatrice Kiddo* (Uma Thurman) of the *Kill Bill* series (Quentin Tarantino, 2003 and 2004), *Selene* (Kate Beckinsale) of the *Underworld* series (Len Wiseman, 2003), and *Alice* (Milla Jovovich) of the *Resident Evil* series (2002, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2012) can be given among the popular examples. These female characters with their super talents in martial arts and intelligence seem to be quite different from the weak, fragile and romantic female image of the traditional cinema, who is waiting for a male hero to save her from distress. Yet in their sexy, body-revealing leather attire, these modern female characters are likewise subject to the same male gaze as criticised within the traditional Hollywood cinema. When one pays attention to the fact that the directors of the above-mentioned examples are also male, it could again be claimed, in line with Mulvey's criticism, that these modern characters are also created primarily from the perspective of a male director, again, to satisfy the gaze of, primarily, the male audience.

In structuring the problem around the fantasizing and self-serving male gaze directed at the female in traditional cinema (and as well in contemporary cinema), Mulvey shows the possible way out in "[freeing] the look of the camera into its materiality in time and space, and the look of the audience into dialectics, passionate detachment" (844). Mulvey's solution is not meant to bring an end to the active/male and passive/female dichotomy. Rather it is meant to make the spectator get conscious of the construction to which he becomes an accomplice, and such consciousness will "destroy the satisfaction, pleasure and privilege of the 'invisible guest'" (844) by bringing the camera (and director's gaze) into the film, and the spectator in front of the camera removing him from the comfortable safety of peeping.

The gap in Mulvey's analysis of the spectator gaze could be pointed concerning the status of the female spectators. What is their stand in 'peeping' a same-gender objectified other on screen? Do female spectators, too, share the same visual pleasure in looking-at the same object of the male protagonist's gaze? Or do they feel uneasy upon the objectification of another woman? Do they identify with her, or rather distance themselves from her through dissociation? As could be an answer to such questions, in a similar fashion, the influential black movement activist and writer bell

hooks, in her *Black Looks: Race and Representation* book (1992) analyzes this gap from the perspective of the black spectatorship, while introducing a white director/black spectator dichotomy into Mulvey's critical analysis. Like Mulvey's critique of the mainstream traditional narrative cinema, epitomized in the image of the Hollywood, hooks sees mass media in the US as "a system of knowledge and power reproducing and maintaining white supremacy" (1992, 117). Referring back to the gap mentioned above, hooks' critique is concerned with 'black images in front of the camera' and 'black looks behind.' How does a black spectator associate with the black image portrayed on screen by white directors? Hooks answers this question as: *We laughed at television shows like 'Our Gang' and 'Amos'n'Andy', at these white representations of blackness, but we also looked at them critically.* (117)

This critical looking is what Mulvey proposes as a way to "break down the voyeuristic-scopophilic look that is crucial to the traditional filmic pleasure" (1999, 843) -with one exception that in hooks' case, that would be a double break down with race added to gender. In looking at what the camera shows (and what the director wishes the spectator to see), the black spectator comes to the awareness of the construction especially in "moments of 'rupture' when the spectator resists 'complete identification with the film's discourse'" (1992, 117). This awareness is followed by a distancing from the image portrayed. Such awareness and distancing seem to be more common for the black spectator as s/he assumes that the white spectator may not share the same awareness, and mistake the illusion created on stage for reality once outside of the movie theater.

Referring back to Mulvey's claim concerning the objectifying nature of the female's being-looked-at-ness within the dominant patriarchal gaze, hooks talks about the black female's *not*-being-looked-at-ness in the dominant white supremacy. The black female body in the mainstream cinema is not there as an image of fantasy, but rather "to serve -to enhance and maintain white womanhood as object of the phallocentric gaze" (119). In the case of the black female spectatorship, constantly employing a critical eye at the black female image shown on screen may be a painful experience, and may totally take the cinematic pleasure away. There is pleasure, as in the way Mulvey uses the term, only if and when the spectator can identify with the powerful active gazer, and likewise can distance himself from the objectified passive gazed-at. In the case of the objectified black female body on screen, the reaction of the black

female spectator takes the form of displeasure and a resistance to identification, as it is exemplified in hooks' own analysis of the black female character 'Sapphire' from *Amos 'n' Andy*:

> *She was not us. We laughed with the black men, with the white people. We laughed at this black woman who was not us...We did not want our construction to be this hated black female thing - foil, backdrop. Her black female image was not the body of desire. There was nothing to see. She was not us.* (120)

The misidentification and distancing of the black female spectator from the *not-being-looked-at* black female image on screen is definitely a conscious attitude: Being already subject to gazes in her daily life (white gaze/male gaze), the black female spectator feels uneasy about confronting the totalizing and long-rejected identity on screen, which claims to be *her*. Thus when she *looks* at the image on screen, she looks at being "on guard" (1992, 126). Different than the mainstream spectator who is unaware of the construction, or at least the seriousness of the construction, she *sees* the politics of race and racism behind, as much as and maybe more than she sees the politics of gender. Hooks in her criticism of the mainstream cinema, directs criticism at "mainstream feminist film criticism", as well, like that of Mulvey (123), and blames the feminist film theory for keeping silent in the double objectification of the black woman representation and for "[participating] in the abstraction of women" (Mary Ann Doane, "Remembering Women: Psychical and Historical Construction in Film Theory" essay, as cited in Hooks, 1992, 124).

Yet, Hooks agrees with Mulvey in the necessity of employing a critical eye and a questioning gaze at the images shown on screen. Hooks calls this 'the oppositional gaze' which is also the title of her essay. Such attitude helps in deconstructing the totalizing representation, and enables the spectator to be able to see the politics at the backstage. And, this, in turn, functions as a way of resistance -resisting to identify with the constructed image on stage, resisting the power and knowledge claimed over visuality, and resisting the *gaze* both in front of the camera, and also behind. This is a different type of looking, as Hooks writes "one learns to look a certain way in order to resist" (116). This is also "the pleasure of deconstructing" (126) -watching to become aware of the construction and then to deconstruct it. Such pleasure is,

needless to say, quite an alternative pleasure targeted by the mainstream traditional cinema, which dictates a cinematic gaze -a combination of the male gaze/camera gaze and spectator gaze.

In terms of resistance, there is more than such "critical consciousness" (127) and the pleasure of deconstructing, in hooks' own words: *We do more than resist* (128). Through her oppositional gaze, both the black female spectator and also the black female director reproduce the looking relations over and over again by changing the angle of the camera, just as Mulvey proposes by "[freeing] the look of the camera into its materiality in time and space, and the look of the audience into dialectics, passionate detachment" (1999, 844). The oppositional gaze increases the thirst for truth as much as it could be attained, and also the desire to show this 'truth' to others who are yet unaware. Even though it is not possible for even the productions by black female directors to be totally free of constructions, looking at it from a different angle definitely still provides the spectator with a broader view. This is important for at least becoming aware of the fact that it is not the end of the movie, and that there is still a lot more to *see*.

2.3.2 The Traveler's Gaze

In her book *Looking For the Other: Feminism, Film and the Imperial Gaze* (1997), E. Ann Kaplan lists the reasons of humans' travels throughout history as the following: "they travel out of necessity (to get food and water or, most recently, as 'guestworkers' to obtain a living and return home), for power (to control more territory), for pleasure (to look at new things and peoples), for scientific and cultural knowledge, for political or religious survival (to escape imprisonment for one's beliefs), for missionary zeal (to convert others to one's beliefs), for greed (to exploit other people's resources). Importantly, some people are coerced into travel for the gain of other people, as in the slave trade" (5). Out of this list, it may be claimed that the reasons of 'for pleasure' and 'for scientific and cultural knowledge' could be called related to an *objective* gaze. However, they, too, are not immune to pre-established cultural stereotypes existing within the society of the traveler.

In the 2009 production movie *Cairo Time* directed by Ruba Nadda, the main character Juliette Grant (starring Patricia Clarkson), upon her arrival in Cairo has to wait for her husband's return from Gaza. She answers the question of what she'd like to do in Cairo with '*Explore!*' This answer could be given as an exemplary reason of

travel for pleasure, and to see new things. Yet, in this desire to explore, the traveler for most of the time expects to see come into body what is already in her mind in the form of images belonging to an unseen yet about-a-lot-heard setting. She looks around to prove the truth of what she has read/heard/wrote. When she encounters a match between the image in her mind and what she actually sees at a specific time and place, she feels confident and comfortable to generalize and declare the objectivity and truth of the pre-established image before any real contact whatsoever. As it is almost impossible especially in this information age to have a *tabula rasa* mind concerning a people and/or setting, the traveler, intentionally or not, sets out to verify her pre-conceptions. Otherwise it would require quite a good deal of time and effort to revise the conceptions anew.

a)   Is it possible to objectively know the Other?

Likewise, when the traveler sets out for the sake of scientific and cultural knowledge, the question concerning the possibility of 'objective' knowledge about the Other becomes crucial to consider. Is it ever possible to *objectively and truly know the Other*? Kaplan writes "looking relations are never innocent. They are always determined by the cultural systems people traveling bring with them. They are also determined by the visual systems a particular stage or type of technology makes possible" (1997, 6). The traveler is a part of a society which has its own value systems, notions and conceptions, collective memory and tradition of its own, all of which cannot ever be encompassing all cultures and societies. Born into such a society, the individual cannot be completely immune to such existing notions, which embody several labels about other nations/people/societies/individuals. Thus while enthusiastically setting out for a new adventure, the traveler cannot help but bring with himself, as Kaplan notes, some of these labels, consciously or unconsciously. He travels with a consciousness concerning his own identity, and with the conception (or the desire?) that what and whom he is going to encounter will be *different* from him, as Kaplan writes "[travel] heightens a sense of national belonging. People's identities when they traveling are often more self-consciously national than when they stay home. In addition, travel provokes conscious attention to gender and racial difference" (5-6). The traveler's going to a foreign setting with such self-awareness, in turn, makes it quite challenging for him to 'objectively' approach his *object*. It becomes a challenge for him not to refer back to the already existing images and

notions in his mind, and likewise it is quite probable that, consequently, he falls into a situation where he finds himself tracing down the reality of such images in the actual setting.

This could be called 'the illusion of the traveler'. When and if the traveler puts himself in the place of a scientist in search of an objective truth about the other, he definitely falls into an illusion, as with the inevitable pre-established notions in his mind, it is by no means possible to achieve an *absolute* reality about a people. Moreover, as it is not a natural phenomenon in question here, but a complicated social being, it would be absurd to set out with an aim to get to *the* truth. All such attempt would definitely result in invalid generalizations, and generalizations in human studies, unlike in scientific studies, could only lead to still more labels and misconceptions. What could be at most targeted, instead, would be an attempt to achieve as many multiple realities as possible, with each data building up our acknowledgement about the Other. Therefore, for the traveler to claim that he is presenting the other 'as it really is' proves to be problematic. Kaplan calls such claim 'politics of authenticity' (1997, 143). Wherever there is power, authenticity is questionable. The traveler, setting out as the one to 'explore' the other, treats the latter as an *observable* object as is the case in physical sciences. Yet, mere observation and for a limited span of time is definitely not enough to attain any healthy information in the absence of actual contact and sharing with the other for a much longer span of time. In short, what the traveler presents could only be one possible reading in relation to the other, and definitely not the sole. by the same token, in this one reading, all assertive and absolute claims and remarks would again lead to generalizations, and therefore would make the reading likewise invalid.

b)   Is the Traveler's Gaze Problematic?

In her book, Kaplan makes a differentiation between *look* and *gaze* by writing that "'look' [connotes] a process, a relation, [while] 'gaze' [stands] for a one-way subjective vision" (1997, xvi). This distinction is important in order to better understand 'the politics of authenticity' mentioned earlier. To such 'gaze', all rigidly problematic gazes could be given as examples; such as the colonizer's gaze, the orientalist's gaze, the patriarchal gaze, the racist gaze, and the like. Anywhere in which the gaze from the 'subject' to the objectified other takes the form of labels, stereotypes, and thus results in discrimination. In the context of the traveler, though,

this distinction can further be extended through a comparison between *curiously* looking to *acknowledge* and *enthusiastically* gazing to *define/know* the Other. To exemplify; when one looks out of curiosity, he quite probably tends to see in order to get a hint of and learn about what has been foreign to him till then. Of course, at the beginning of this process, he can preserve a certain distance from what he feels different from him in order to be able to feel secure. As he starts to get familiar with this *difference*, if he wishes to identify himself with it in any way, this initial gap quite probably starts to get bridged. However, if he continues to feel insecure at the face of this *difference*, this time, he will consciously choose to secure that gap as tight as possible so that he could start looking at the other from afar, talk about it from afar, and eventually feel content that he *knows* it --yet only from afar.

However, when he has already a *distance* in his mind in the form of already established images, statements and definitions as to this so-called *difference*, this time, the person tends to keep that distance as secure as possible from the very beginning of the getting to know process -or even before the process has actually begun at all- to the actual contact with the Other. The reason of this conscious, or unconscious, attempt/desire to keep the distance from the Other could be explained in relation to the identity-consciousness and construction of the subject-individual. When the subject-individual cannot, or does not want to, identify himself with the Other, he turns to stress the perceived, or at times imagined, difference between himself and the other. In the context of the traveler, especially in this age of easy access to any information, real or unreal, it has become no longer possible for the traveler to *curiously* 'look' at the Other, but rather *enthusiastically* 'gaze' to either verify or deny the pre-established conceptions about the Other that he has inherited within his own society. Even when he tries to deny such pre-conceptions, he cannot free himself from speaking within the same terminology, or setting out from the same definitions. Here, the agenda of the traveler matters together with his preferences and priorities. As a result of selective perception, the traveller tends to notice in the foreign setting anything that is somehow related to what already engages his mind. Out of this tendency, he cannot help but may portray the Other by evaluating from a limited perspective, accentuating a single part of it -sometimes even a trivial part- as almost the whole.

In spite of claiming the impossibility of a *neutrality* in the gaze of the traveler at a foreign other, this dissertation by no means aims to equate it with the previous centuries' colonial and/or the orientalist gaze. There is obviously, if not still neutral, genuine effort, through documentaries, programmes and independent research, to try to get to know the Other in its 'plurality' instead of sticking to that long-invested one single dominant image. This dissertation claims that one should not take for granted any such attempt, no matter how good it means, as the pure reality, as that would be another *subject gaze* at the objectified other. With a plurality of meaning and a multifaceted reality as to the Other, one needs to suffice with getting access only *one* possible interpretation out of many as to the *difference*, and thus with *getting to* know, and not definitely *know*, the Other.

2.3.3   The Nationalist Gaze

Nationalism urge peaked with the French Revolution of 1789, and took quite a lot of states and empires under its influence sooner or later. This movement did not only create new states, borders and countries, but also re-created people under new labels. These labels were dearly adopted as a leading ingredient of one's identity and being. Moreover, they brought an accompanying history and a set of 'realities' along with themselves, as well. Needless to say, in the formation of nation-states, providing people with a common identity to increase belonging and solidarity was crucial, and national consciousness and pride were necessary to be implemented both in the minds and hearts of people for them to act and *look* as a unified nation. These concepts also meant regarding those under the same flag as comrades and others on the other sides of the borders at best as 'neighbors'. Yet, how does this nationalistic gaze affect its beholders in their regard for those belonging to other nations and ethnicities? How is it different from a discriminating racist gaze? What marks the difference in-between? What is that feature which makes one dear and the other evil? This specific section will attempt to look closer at these questions.

With the formation of nation-states, a nationalist gaze was created as a way to differentiate one's self from members of other nations and countries; and this differentiation also increased a conscious, or unconscious, awareness as to one's racial and ethnic identity, as well. In other words, a nationalist gaze has come to be directed at not only people of different races and ethnicities, living in other countries and continents, but also at other members of the same race within borders yet

belonging to different ethnicities. What was taken as criteria for comradeship has become the same flag and language, the ultimate signs of nationalism. Even though creating national 'pride' may be seen as crucial for the sense of belonging, its attainment through a nationalistic gaze may also prove problematic especially for the people belonging to different nationalities yet living within the same borders -and in most cases, for years. Likewise for states which are composed of various ethnicities under their authorities, employing a nationalistic gaze in their domestic and foreign policies may lead to severe complexities and distress. Turkey can be given as an example to states with a rich ethnic variety.

Christopher Lee, in his article titled "What Colour are the Dead? Madness, Race and the National Gaze in Henry Lawson's 'The Bush Undertaker'" (1991), writes that "the gaze perceives the 'real' …[and] the 'other' side of the real is the unreal, the speculative, the imaginative, the romantic, the female, the imperial and the mad. The 'other', therefore, has no validity within the gaze of the National and the real. It is the distinction between these binary values which locate the boundaries of the National gaze" (14-25). As Lee states, the politics of 'the National' has a quite rigid frame defined by the nationalist ideology. And within the context of Turkish nationalism, into this frame falls only the Westernized modern secular Republican identity as it is defined by the nationalist ideology. Other identities are generally regarded as potential threats to the national existence and even the regime. To this perception, 'the Kurdish slogan crisis' (Kadınlar Günü Yürüyüşünde Kürtçe Slogan Krizi, [10.11.2013]) -as it was titled so in papers, can be given as an example that happened on March 8, 2011 in Giresun, Turkey. During the March 8th International Women's Day March organized by KESK (Confederation of Public Laborers' Unions), and had participation from various unions, CHP (Republican People's Party) Giresun Women's Branch, other CHP constituents and university students in the city of Giresun, CHP Women's Branch broke away in the middle from the march as a protest to the Kurdish slogans uttered by some other women university students participating in the same march. The reason for their protest was not about the content of these slogans, as they basically said 'Freedom to Women', 'Long Live March 8th' and 'Long Live Women'. The problem with these slogans was the language they were uttered in, which was Kurdish. Presumably, the Women's Branch of CHP perceived these slogans, the meaning of which they probably did not

know, as propaganda for Kurdish nationalism. And instead of asking for the meaning of the slogans to one of the women uttering them, they preferred to quit the march as an explicit reaction to the 'propaganda' to Kurdish nationalism as well as an explicit support for Turkish nationalism.

Such reaction in favor of nationalistic discourse is not an exception, either. A similar reaction took place this time during May 1st Labor Day celebrations organized by KESK in Kütahya, Turkey (CHP ve KESK arasında Kürkçe Krizi, [10.11.2013]), where upon the utterance of some Kurdish slogans by some of the union members, and the singing of Kurdish songs to celebrate the day, CHP constituents again protested the Kurdish utterances by shouting back the Turkish national proverb: *Happy is a man who can say I am a Turk!* The stress on being a Turk in this cross-slogan was a direct denote of the displeasure with being exposed to Kurdish. Neither of the two occasions given as examples were from a 'national holiday' event -in which case the national sensitivity could perhaps be understood up to a certain extent. And although neither of them was aimed at propagating for a Kurdish state, it could be that the demand for equal recognition of Kurdish citizens as members of the Turkish state like the Turkish population, was perceived as a threat to the 'national consciousness' and made constituents greatly disturbed. Even though the Republic of Turkey is the homeland for various ethnicities, including Turks, Kurds, Armenians, Circassians, etc., the nationalistic gaze seems to allow only the Turkish citizens to claim certain rights -for example as a woman or as a laborer deriving from the cases given. All other minorities seem to be allowed to participate as long as they look and behave Turkish. In other words, as long as they stay within the national frame mentioned earlier.

On the other hand, the nationalist gaze's skeptical focus is not only on minority ethnic groups, but anyone of Turkish ethnicity, as well, could fall under this gaze if they, too, do not fit in the defined Westernized modern secular Republican identity. The Republic's Woman project of the early Republican period (which could be set between 1923-1950) serves as a perfect epitome to better understand this identity and the nationalist gaze and ideology. The early Republican period witnessed a series of reforms aiming to socially transform Turkish society to 'take it up to the level of modern civilizations'. And in this transformation, women were expected to shoulder the responsibility to a great extent as she was regarded as the display case for

modernization and westernization in the image of a 'modern Turkish Republic woman'. In such a crucial time at the dawn of a new state, new regime and a new domestic and international agenda, the Girls' Institutes were established to raise and educate girls to become modern Republic women who would be modern wives and also mothers to bring up the Republic's future generations. Upon this agenda, the first girls' institute, 'Ismet Pasha Girls' Institute' was established in 1928.

Instead of endowing girls with the necessary knowledge and practice to participate in the scientific, political or economic endeavors like men, these institutes aimed at making Turkish women excel in western-type clothing, manners, family household and kitchen culture. Shown below is the 1932-33 academic year curriculum of Selcuk Girls' Institute:

Table 1. Curriculum of Selçuk Girls' Institute (1932–33)

General Courses	Grade 1	Grade 2	Grade 3	Grade 4	Grade 5
Turkish	X	X	X	X	X
Civics				X	
Geography	X	X	X		X
History	X	X	X		X
Husbandry, Botany	X				
Mathematics	X	X	X	X	X
Physics		X	X		
Chemistry		X	X		
Physiology		X	X		
French	X	X	X	X	X
Physical Education	X	X	X	X	
Music	X	X	X	X	

Vocational Courses	Grade 1	Grade 2	Grade 3	Grade 4	Grade 5
Cutting-Sewing		X	X	X	X
Fashion Design		X	X	X	X
Tailoring	X				
Embroidery (White Linen)	X	X	X		X
Coloured Embroidery	X	X	X	X	
Embroidery					X
Repair	X	X	X	X	
Ironing-Starching	X	X	X	X	
Cooking	X	X	X	X	
Child care				X	X
House Management					X
Hat Making					X
Hygiene				X	
Technology			X		

Source: Gök (1999).

Girls' Institutes were an attempt to re-produce and re-define not only the urban Turkish woman but also the more traditional rural woman to fit her in the fast modernizing and westernizing new Republic. The following lines from the poem titled 'Atatürk'ün Cumhuriyet Kadını' (The Republic Woman of Atatürk) written by Halil Çimen (Antoloji.com, [10.11.2013]) portrays such attempt:

> *Tırnaklar ojeli dudak boyalı / Giysileri dantel dantel oyalı / Namuslu iffetli edep hayalı / Atatürk'ün Cumhuriyet kadını / Çağdaş uygarlıktan almış adını*
>
> *...*
>
> *Borani'nin[4] şehidinin anası / Laikliğin omurgası binası / Elvan elvan ellerinin kınası / Atatürk'ün Cumhuriyet kadını / Çağdaş uygarlıktan almış adını*
>
> **
>
> (**trans**. *With the nails polished and the lips also lipsticked / Her clothes are embroidered in lace / The chaste, modest and honorable / The Republic woman of Atatürk / Taken her name from modern civilization.*
>
> *...*
>
> *The mother of Borani's martyr / The backbone of Secularism / With her hands dyed with henna / The Republic woman of Atatürk / Taken her name from modern civilization.*)

These lines could be read as a portrayal of the Republic Woman's image back then, addressing both urban (polished nails, lipstick applied lips) and rural (hands dyed with henna) features of women. Yet these same components are seen as conflicting speaking in today's perception of the Republic woman in today's Turkey. In the image of the early Republican period, the Turkish woman was expected to look and think and behave modern, yet she was also expected not to stand out, but rather be modest both in her looks and her social visibility, and function as complementary to

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[4] The poet's pseudonym

the Turkish Republican man and be a good role model and raiser of Republic's future generations. She was expected to be a display case for the fast westernizing and modernizing Republic, yet she was also expected to stay indoors to perform excellent housewifery. Today, those are definitely not the exact expectations from (or at least the perception of) the modern Republic woman. Returning to the nationalistic gaze at those of Turkish ethnic origin, this gaze seeks to see that modern Republic woman in her westernized attire, manners, lifestyle and thoughts, yet not necessarily expect her (or even desires her) to excel in housewifery and/or family household. In fact, these last two are generally seen as features of the domestic, traditional woman who does not that much have a say outdoors in the social, political and/or economic life.

The nationalistic gaze does not feel threatened by the above-mentioned domestic, traditional, 'village' woman as long as she does not appear on and/or claim to be the so called display case of modern and westernized Turkey. Traditional 'village' woman is respected where she belongs, even a proud gaze is directed at the industrious, hard-working, sturdy Anatolian woman. Yet, the same woman can be gazed at even contemptuously in an urban, more 'modern' setting, and regarded as misplaced as she does not align with today's defined Republic woman image -a westernized-looking, educated, modern, independent woman. In a similar fashion, the urban hijabi woman living in the metropolis is subjected to a similar gaze, even to a more strong one, as she, too, does not align with the earlier-mentioned ideal image no matter how educated, westernized-looking or independent she might be.

The nationalistic gaze denotes more than a love for the nation. It rather attempts and desires to keep the nation as homogenous and 'pure' as possible by ignoring or disregarding or excluding all that are *visually* not appropriate to the idealized Republican image. The birth of a state and regime demanded reforms in an attempt to dissociate itself from the old empire as quickly as possible in order to be able to start anew and afresh. Nevertheless, in this fast transformation, certain crucial and indispensable elements of the people, like traditions, beliefs, history and certain identities were preferred to be disregarded in order to catch up with the fast-moving modern Western world. The visual transformation was hoped to bring the desired social transformation; yet, the fact that its enactment did not come gradually in parallel with the needs and demands of the people, but rather came forcefully, in some cases demanding change overnight. This later proved to bring deep gaps of

understanding between the state and its own people, as well as among the varied subjects within the body of the nation.

2.3.4   The Virtual Gaze

According to Lacan's re-reading of Freud, the Mirror Stage, where the infant encounters his image for the first time in its totality, is an egocentric stage in human development where the infant-individual, who has seen only parts of his body till then, comes to see the totality, and identifies with this image in the mirror which becomes his Ideal-ego. Accordingly, he assumes that he is the total, and all he sees around him (including his mother) constitute the parts. Yet, as he enters the linguistic and social sphere in the following years, which marks the Symbolic Stage for the individual, he encounters the Other (mostly in the image of a father, as well as the society) who introduces rules that he is expected to abide by. In this stage, the individual forms his ego-ideal[5] (different than his Ideal-ego) that is pleasing to the gaze of the Other, yet not necessarily meeting up his self-satisfaction. This constructed ego-ideal is what Lacan calls "the symbolic *je* (I)," and he defines it as "the place from which I identify myself as the other sees me. The subject builds its ego under the auspices of the other's gaze, a place from which its fragmented bodily experience may be seen as whole and as 'sutured' together. Lacan has depicted this process with the diagram of the inverted vase" (Wegenstein, 2012, 179). Over his diagram of the inverted vase, Lacan talks about the relationship between the virtual and the real experience of the subject individual.

William Egginton writes that Lacan's inverted vase diagram,

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[5] William Egginton (2003), in his book *How the World Became a Stage*, defines ego-ideal as a "perspective from which subject sees itself as lovable" (24), and describes the difference between ego-ideal and Ideal-ego as "what I am for others with what I am for myself" (27) respectively.

reproduces a parlor trick cum experiment in optics in which an observer can be made to see a vase with some flowers in a mirror where such an object, at least so arranged, does not in fact exist. What exists, on the side of the observer's body, is something else: a box, with the backside open, and a vase suspended upside down inside it. On top of the box, rightside up, are the flowers, but without a vase. Behind the box, about where the observer should be standing, there is a concave mirror. In front of the vase, and in the observer's line of sight, a flat mirror. If the observer is correctly positioned within the cone of light emanating from the concave mirror and converging on his or her visual cortex, he or she will see, reflected in the flat mirror, a virtual vase containing an equally virtual bouquet. The scenario is Lacan's metaphor for the constitution of the ideal ego. This image (the vase) attains its coherence in a virtual world, what Lacan calls the space of the Other. It is where the Other sees us, and where we see ourselves as seen by the Other. (25-26)

This is a virtual space that the individual sees himself in 'the space of the Other', and as Egginton continues "it is not only a space where we are seen and where we see ourselves as seen, it is also the space in which and from which we speak" (2003, 26). Drifted away from his Ideal-ego, and identifying himself with his ego-ideal to 'pass' within society, the individual still seeks to approach his lost ideal as much as possible. In today's world, social media and online identities provide a means for the individual to achieve this desire, and to re-gain his ideal image encountered in the mirror.

a) *MySpace* or the Space for the Other?

Today, social media and online identities have long become an indispensable part of daily life -at least for the urban individual. Many of us even start the day with a quick check on our facebook or twitter accounts. Now we communicate, socialize, agree, disagree or even fight with each other in a virtual space. On social network sites which enable the individual to constitute an identity online with their various features and possibilities, the individual forms his online self with his updates, likes, sharings, friends and followers in addition to his resume-type knowledge. Referring back to Lacan's inverted vase diagram, this virtual space gives the individual the opportunity to see himself from a specific perspective (just like the specific angle in the experiment which enables a perfect virtual image of a bouquet in a vase). He

positions his ideas, his lifestyle, his looks, his life, in short his identity as he pleases, and as close as his ideal-ego desires. Looking at a mirror, the individual gazes himself as an outer gaze; i.e. he sees what he *thinks* others see when looking at him. In a similar fashion, in virtual space, the individual gazes at his online identity in the way he *thinks* it is seen by others. As a result, he revises and re-positions, deletes and adds so as to make this seen self-image both acknowledged by and pleasing to the other gaze, and also addressing his self-satisfaction. In a way, virtual space becomes a means for the individual for a compromise between his ego-ideal and ideal-ego. In real life, such a compromise is much more challenging for the individual as he does not have the opportunity of actually seeing himself as seen by the Other. As Sartre says, "it is never eyes which look at us; it is the Other-as-subject" (Sartre, 1978, 277).

In his book *How the World Became a Stage*, in the chapter titled "Actors, Agents, and Avatars", William Egginton describes the situation of individual in his social environment approximating it to the confinement depicted in Jeremy Bentham's *Panopticon*. Being "constantly aware of the possibility that we are being watched, an awareness that is all the more acute when we cannot perceive any evidence of an observer" (2003, 22) makes the individual cautious in his actions, words and ways of living. In this caution, he tries to avoid the feeling of shame that Sartre talks about upon the realization of the gaze of the other directed at us. Consequently, the individual pays attention to present his ego-ideal which is acceptable by his social environment as it has also been dictated by it through its norms, values, expectations, and pressure.

Egginton calls this consciousness of the individual concerning his actions *theatricality* which he defines as "our existence as characters on the stage of the Other" (28). Just like an actor on stage addresses his lines to the audience in the body of the character he is voicing, the individual in his social life presents his ego-ideal to the perceived gazes. Erving Goffman talks about a similar consciousness in his 1956 book, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, where he claims that "when an individual enters the presence of others, he or she immediately sets about reading the situation in terms of what roles are being played and what sort of role will be expected of him or her" (Egginton, 2003, 20).

On the virtual space, on the other hand, the individual feels the relative comfort and safety of the absence of direct gaze at his own person. There, the addressee is his

virtual self. In the absence of direct gaze of the other (though still *knowing* that he is being gazed at) he tends to feel more reckless in comparison to his face-to-face relationship. Even though both in the virtual space and the real space the individual desires the gaze of the other in order to get acknowledged and to claim his subjectivity, different than the real space, in the virtual space, the individual feels more in command of the labels (or tags) that he is constantly exposed to, and he positions himself as he pleases to be labeled in line with his self-labeling. In a way, the virtual space becomes a space of self-realization, presenting one's self as he wishes to be seen. The current popularity of social media channels could again be seen under the light of the individual's desire to be *seen*, as being seen as he wishes to be seen helps him come closer to achieve his ideal-ego, freeing himself from his ego-ideal. The virtual space is set as a display case of the self, and yet it is prepared for the gaze of the Other.

2.4   Afterword: The Gaze of Orpheus and the End of Meaning

In his irresistible urge to know, Orpheus looks back once and for all to capture the meaning of death which is forbidden to the mortal gaze. He looks back and at that very moment loses what he has wished for for good. What is problematic with Orpheus' gaze is that with his gaze he wanted to get the essence/the ultimate even though the real is not that simple to capture with a gaze. The gaze has a high risk of giving us generalizations and stereotypes.

Looking relations do matter in human relations, yet if the look targets to know the ultimate meaning instead of to see what is presented by the other, then it turns into a *gaze*, not seeing but classifying and framing the other, which makes the gaze problematic. Framing reduces the framed into homogeneity within an ascribed group and thus rips him off from his singularity and unique subjectivity. Framing reduces the individual into the terrain of the knowable by speaking in the name of the Other instead of hearing what he has to say; and the gaze frames the Other over 'labels'.

The power of gaze is quite contextual, too. All the actors within a specific context may get engaged with some sort of gaze directed at a specific other, or all the others. Likewise, there may be more than one hegemonic gaze in some contexts. Within the colonial context, while the white gaze may objectify the black man, the gaze of the black man may objectify the black woman in the form of patriarchal gaze. What

makes one hegemonic gaze more dominant than the other is determined by power relations within the politics of power. The ones constructing the dominant ideology tend to have a stronger say as to the assumed roles and identities of others by defining them through labels. The following chapter on 'Labeling' will deal with the labeling theory, the politics of labeling and the motives behind the process in greater detail.

CHAPTER III

ON 'SOCIAL LABELING'

> *"Sometimes I ain't so sho who's got*
> *ere a right to say when a man is crazy and when*
> *he ain't. Sometimes I think it ain't none of us pure*
> *crazy and ain't none of us pure sane until the*
> *balance of us talks him that-a-way. It's like it ain't*
> *so much what a fellow does, but it's the way the*
> *majority of folks is looking at him when he does it."*
> William Faulkner, *AS I LAY DYING*
> in the opening page of Becker's *OUTSIDERS*

3.1   Labeling Theory and Deviance- A Historical Analysis

Edwin M. Schur (1965) talks about 'crimes without victims' in his same titled book, which he defines as "the combination of an exchange transaction and lack of apparent harm to others," as in the example of a suicide (171). Then, what about *victims without crimes*? The focal point of this dissertation will be an attempt to answer this particular question over a close reading of the **labeling theory**, which draws a correlation between labeling people deviant and the deviant outcomes of their acts. Before going deeper in the specific category of the 'falsely accused' taken from Howard S. Becker's categorization of types of deviants, the chapter will first dwell upon a historical analysis of this approach together with its social implications in modern social setting, and in what way it can be related to the concept of 'gaze'.

Howard S. Becker, in his well-known book *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance* (1963), defines 'deviance' as "*not* a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an 'offender.' The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label" (9). In other words, contrary to the causal focus of the classical approach seeking to find the reasons of deviance within the acts and selves of the individuals, this approach, which Becker officially places in

social studies under the 'label' of labeling theory, sees deviance emerging not as a result of a specific act or a failing in character, but rather within a *process* which is fundamentally shaped by society more than the individual himself. This new perspective shifts the attention from what the deviating individual has done to "*reactions* -to what *others* are doing or have done" in the case of a perceived deviance (Schur, 1971, 28), and from 'why rules are broken' to 'who sets these rules and more importantly on what criteria'.

Societal order has always been a concern for sociologists and former thinkers, as it has been seen as the prerequisite for progress and advancement. Thus, to sustain this order, rules emerge, which all members of society are expected to abide by. Some of these rules are formulated through a social contract upon the consent of the majority, yet there are still other rules which are not produced through a shared experience but are rather 'given' or 'dictated' from above. As a result, as Becker writes, "social rules [come to] define situations and the kinds of behavior appropriate to them, specifying some actions as 'right' and forbidding others as 'wrong.'" (1963, 1). Yet there are certain loops here --the first is the scope and nature of these rules: Who will guarantee the objectivity of the rules? It is quite a challenge to produce all-encompassing rules in highly heterogeneous modern communities, which are "highly differentiated along social class lines, ethnic lines, occupational lines, and cultural lines" (Becker, 1963, 15). Therefore, it can very well be the case that the rule-breaker 'deviant' may not "accept the rule by which he is being judged and may not regard those who judge him as either competent or legitimately entitled to do so" as "different groups judge different things to be deviant" (Becker, 1963, 2-4). The second loop concerns the motive of the rules: Who will guarantee the competency of the rule-makers? The motives of the rule-makers could be egocentric or aimed at a certain agenda, at which case again there will be a conflict concerning the interests of the related parties.

Regardless of these complications, though, formal or informal rules, the first in the form of laws, and the latter in the form of traditions, norms, and expectations, continue to have profound influence on the members of a society, who are continually 'seen' in terms of their compliance to or deviance from these established rules. Labeling theorists regard society, its rules and rule-makers as the root leading to the deviance of its certain members through a labeling process toward the

'deviant'. The label, or 'stigma' as Erving Goffman (1963) calls it in his same titled book, is an attempt to 'define' the individual, who is thought to be deviating from common norms, and thus to restore the disrupted order through a series of actions ranging from 'isolating, treating, correcting or punishing' as Edwin M. Schur lists in his book *Labeling Deviant Behavior: Its Social Implications* (1971, 24).

If one is to look at the origins of the labeling approach, it could be traced to the beginnings of the twentieth-century, though not particularly under this name. Yet it would not be wrong to claim that certain preceding concepts and movements prepared the ground for the labeling theory to later flourish in 1960s. Charles Horton Cooley's concept of the **'looking-glass self'** is one of these concepts. In his book *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902), Cooley writes about the process of one's self-definition: the individual bases his acts upon how he *imagines* he appears to the *other*. He then shapes himself according to this *imagined* judgment of the other concerning his appearance. Eventually the outcome becomes the self-feeling of either pride or shame resulting from this imagined judgment. This is the attempt of the individual to try to *see* himself through the mirror of the other, though it is himself who is holding the mirror. This early concept of 'looking-glass self' brings the importance of the reactions of others within the same social milieu of the individual to the fore in understanding the motives of individual actions and behaviors.

Later Frank Tannenbaum introduced the concept of '**dramatization of evil**' in 1930s, through which he attempts to define the criminalization process. He writes in his *Crime and the Community* (1938) that this criminalization process "is a process of tagging, defining, identifying, segregating, describing, emphasizing, making conscious and self-conscious; it becomes a way of stimulating, suggesting, emphasizing, and evoking the very traits that are complained of." The individual who is labeled upon his first perceived 'deviance' continues to be seen under this label with regard to his future acts. This tendency on the part of society towards the labeled individual can then lead to a change in the *self-concept* of the individual: "The person becomes the thing he is described as being." The more society tries hard to eliminate the deviant act through such a labeling process, the more persistent it becomes, as the perceived evil has already been dramatized. Tannenbaum shows the way out "through a refusal to dramatize the evil" (1938, 19-20).

This is what Robert Merton (1968) originally calls the '**self-fulfilling prophecy**' where the labeled individual cannot help but eventually come to the point of accepting what he has previously tried to deny. This specific label "proclaims his career in such loud and dramatic forms that both he and the community accept the judgment as a fixed description. He becomes conscious of himself as a criminal, and the community expects him to live up to his reputation, and will not credit him if he does not live up to it" (Tannenbaum, 1938, 477). Kai T. Erikson (1962) summarizes the similar situation of such change in self-concept in three phases in his "Notes on the Sociology of Deviance" article: 1) a formal *confrontation* between the deviant suspect and representatives of his community, 2) [announcing] *judgment* about the nature of his deviancy, 3) [performing] an act of social *placement*, assigning him to a special role [through a specific label] which redefines his position in society (Becker, 1964, 16).

Even though studies concerning deviance have been carried out since the beginning of twentieth-century, it is in the 1960s that such studies acquired a new perspective with the sociology of Howard S. Becker and the Labeling Theory. In his *Outsiders* (1963), Becker dwells upon various definitions of 'deviance' from statistical to medical and relativistic, yet eventually asks whether "a person [who] may break the rules of one group by the very act of abiding by the rules of another group" can be labeled as deviant or not (1963, 8). He later goes on to categorize four types of deviant behavior upon the parameters of whether a behavior is perceived, or not perceived, as deviant, and whether it is an obedient or rule-breaking behavior. Out of these parameters, he comes up with the following chart:

	Obedient Behavior	**Rule-Breaking Behavior**
Perceived as Deviant	Falsely Accused	Pure Deviant
Not Perceived as Deviant	Conforming	Secret Deviant

Much of the studies in labeling theory has been directed toward the Pure Deviant and Conforming Behavior, with all its stress upon how labeling and social control lead to further, and in certain occasions permanent, deviance. Concerning this point, Edwin M. Lemert's distinction between **primary and secondary deviance**, Everett C.

Hughes' distinction between **master status and auxiliary status**, Becker's concept of **deviant careers**, and Edwin M. Schur's concept of **role engulfment** deserve special attention.

Lemert writes "when a person begins to employ his deviant behavior or a role based upon it as a means of defense, attack, or adjustment to the overt and covert problems created by the consequent societal reaction to him, his deviation is secondary" (1951, 75). He does not dramatize on the initial deviance, but rather attracts attention to the following societal reaction, which, he claims, breeds the actual and permanent deviance, which in turn posits a threat back on society. This **second deviance** is committed consciously and as a reaction to the societal (re)action rather than on egocentric motives. The 'deviant' becomes conscious of the deviant label attached to his identity, and upon witnessing that his other actions are also regarded under this label, he takes up to actually fill in the label as a counter-reaction. In this manner, societal reaction (or society) breeds its own malice that it has been trying to avert.

Hughes describes this practice of evaluating a person's all actions according to one dominant label with his concept of '**master status**': "Our knowledge or assumption of an individual's involvement in deviation overwhelms what other knowledge of him we may have or dampens our desire to obtain such knowledge. Our picture of him is primarily determined by the belief that he has deviated" (Schur, 1971, 30). Hughes in his article calls this status as the overriding ingredient in determining a person's general social position, and moreover this status is *expected* on the part of the rest of society to be accompanied by a number of auxiliary traits. To exemplify; a doctor in American society is expected to be also upper middle class, white, male and Protestant (Becker, 1963, 32). Becker later repositions this concept in his analysis of deviance within labeling theory, and dwells upon Hughes' similar distinction between **master status and subordinate status**. Some status traits, such as gender, race, and religion are seen more important and determining in society than other traits that are treated as subordinate, such as talents, achievements, etc. As it could be deduced, what societies treat as master status of an individual are generally 'given' traits -many of which the individual is born into, while the subordinate ones are generally 'achieved' traits. Becker later analyses Lemert's concept of secondary deviance and Hughes' distinction concerning master statuses deeper with his concept of '**deviant careers**'. Basing his study on marijuana users, Becker finds that even

though the users willingly cure themselves from the addiction, they continue to be treated as an addict by their social milieu, "on the premise, apparently, of 'once a junkie, always a junkie'" (Becker, 1963, 37).

Lemert draws attention to the link between societal reaction and deviance, and in a similar fashion, Kai T. Erikson (1962) in his article draws a close relation between social control (and its institutions) and deviance. He claims that social control institutions such as prisons that are built to inhibit deviation "actually operate in such a way as to perpetuate it" (Becker, 1964, 15). He backs up his argument by claiming that "such institutions gather marginal people into tightly segregated groups, give them an opportunity to teach one another the skills and attitudes of a deviant career, and often provoke them into employing these skills by reinforcing their sense of alienation from the rest of society" (16). Erikson takes labeling from an alternative perspective, and writes that attempts to reform deviant individuals in the form of confined spaces do more harm than good both to them and to the rest of society. Michel Foucault adds "the psychiatric asylum, the penitentiary, the reformatory, the approved school and, to some extent, the hospital" to such places (1977, 199). Foucault includes these institutions in his book *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1977) so as to claim that the disciplinary power and control exercised in such institutions lead to a changed self-concept of the individual confined in it. In time, the individual comes to regard himself under the labels attached to his name. This becomes an internalization process, the internalization of the labels given by the always observing authority to the constantly observed individual, who learns to behave 'accordingly' even when he is not actually observed. Erving Goffman calls such regulating/reforming institutions '**total institutions**' in his *Asylums* (1961) which he defines as "a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life" (Goffman, 1961, p. xiii).

As it has been mentioned above, much of the studies carried out in the area of deviance have been directed towards some kind of perceived deviance in society, either in the case of criminals, addicts, queer identities, patients, and the like. As Erikson writes, "the difference between those who earn a deviant label and those who go their own way in peace depends almost entirely on the way in which the

community sifts out and codes the many details of behavior to which it is witness" (Becker, 1964, 12). Setting out from Becker's chart of types of deviant behavior, and the premise that not much has been said *within the framework of labeling theory* concerning the 'falsely accused' category, this dissertation in part attempts to analyze the case of the 'falsely accused' --those who are labeled upon no actual deviance, by drawing a correlation between the 'community screen' that Erikson mentions as "a very important instrument of social control" (Becker, 1964, 11), the societal gaze, labeling and their accompanying social implications both on the part of the gazer/labeler and the gazee/labeled.

3.2   The Case of the Falsely-Accused

Howard S. Becker in his famous analysis of 'deviance' gives a list of definitions of the term from different perspectives and disciplines. One of these definitions, he writes, "as the failure to obey group rules" (1963, 8). The 'falsely-accused deviants' are not immune to this definition, as they are 'perceived' as deviant based on the 'perception' that they have (or must have) violated a certain rule of society. In this section of the dissertation, this 'perception' of deviance will be put under scrutiny in order to be better able to understand where the falsely-accused stand in deviance discussions.

Looking back at Becker's definition of deviance stated above, there are a number of crucial questions to be asked (and if possible answered, or at least considered) beforehand: Who decides on the rules, and upon which criteria are these rules formulated? Who decides on 'whose' rules will 'rule' in society? Is the existence of 'universal rules' possible that are binding to everyone? Who decides on the 'accepted standard'? Is it possible that there may be more than one 'standard'? Or, as Becker, too, asks, "a person may break the rules of one group by the very act of abiding by the rules of another group. Is he, then, deviant?" (1963, 8), to which I'd like to add the question, what if the 'violated' rule is against basic human rights even though the majority chooses to abide by it? In the following paragraphs, answers will be attempted to be given to these questions.

Geof Wood in his article "Labels, Welfare Regimes and Intermediation: Contesting Formal Power", compiled in the book titled *The Power of Labelling: How People Are Categorized and Why It Matters* (2007), writes that "the interesting question is

not whether we label and categorize. We all do that," (31) where he duly asserts that we *all* label, to which it should also be added that, in turn we are *all* labeled in one way or another. And he continues: "Rather, the interesting questions are which and whose labels prevail, and under what contextual conditions? These 'which', 'whose' and 'what' questions become more significant as we move to outer circles" (19). In "[moving] to outer circles"; i.e. "from intimate kin and friends to strangers, from multi-dimensional to single-dimensional transaction, from *gemeinschaft* to *gesellschaft*" (19), as a *zoon politikon*, the individual inevitably faces the challenge of getting to know, and accordingly treating others, who *seem* to be *somehow different* than himself. In his limitation of time and opportunity, or in some cases lack of desire, to get to know each and every *difference*, the individual generally prefers to take refuge within the safety of some 'labels' already existing within society. He realizes with relief that these labels save him time and energy -as Joy Moncrieffe in her article writes: "without labels, social interaction would be costly and cumbersome" (2007, 1) with their all-inclusive remarks accompanied by detailed characteristics and potentials of the other. Upon his first encounter, the individual feels that he already knows what is to be most necessarily known as to this *difference*; i.e. answers to certain questions, including but not limited to, 'what does this Other want (to achieve/say)?, What does s/he think/believe?, and What can s/he do?'. In short, the individual now 'knows' the ideals (or ideology), the ideas (or impositions), and the potentials (or threats) of the encountered *difference*.

What is problematic with this 'easy knowledge' is for most of the time, it comes without the actual mutual exchange of words and ideas between the related parties; rather it is simply obtained over a *gaze*. Upon looking at the *difference*, the pre-existing definitions within society start crowding the mind of the individual, and unless he resists, and becomes aware of this construction, he falls into the reality illusion of these definitions. Such definitions are problematic, as they tend to generalize, define and melt all heterogeneous plurality into a homogeneous singularity, reducing all not-that-easy-to-grasp complexity into a too-easy-to-understand simplicity; and not all simplicity is good and desired. This is where most of the falsely-accused 'deviants' are produced within societies.

At the bottom line, the labeling theory claims that societies produce their own deviants, in a way that creates more and permanent deviance from a single deviance,

and they do it by aiming at just the opposite. In the case of the falsely-accused, this production becomes even more paradoxical as well as more problematic, as the society now is at risk of creating deviance from *no deviance* at all. Then how does this paradox come into being? To understand, it is crucial to consider the labeling process leading to the perception of deviance: It is no wonder that the physically apparent (or the different than the self) triggers the *gaze*. This apparent can be the color of one's skin, his/her attire, gender or language, simply anything that could be physically perceived -seen and/or heard. If and when a physicality happens to be a 'keyword' within any constructed social definition, then the gaze further triggers statements about this not-yet-known other, by pulling it into the knowable (and manageable) terrain. If the constructed definitions include no claims that are unwelcome to the defined other, in this case, there is greater chance that real interaction could take place where the other can talk for his name and/or revise any present misunderstanding or misconception. Yet, this is not often the case, as the static nature of definitions is contrary to the constantly-changing reality of human being. And, for most of the time, the result becomes mere incomplete and/or unjust perceptions, and not real knowledge. Several examples of falsely-accused 'deviants' within different societies could be given as influenced by this labeling process; one of which is the perception that the black have a greater tendency to crime and violence than the white. In his book, Becker writes that "the law is differentially applied to Negroes and whites," and that "it is well known that a Negro believed to have attacked a white woman is much more likely to be punished than a white man who commits the same offense" (1963, 13). The skin color, a physically apparent feature, may lead to a non-rational generalization, and affect at least some of the society members to treat others according to this perception. Being seen as a more potential deviant, the labeled individual may feel frustration, and in case of an injustice, may even react in a way to fill in that given label, and that is when society produces its own deviants itself. Directing attention to the possible existence of double standards within societies, Becker states that "the degree to which an act will be treated as deviant depends also on who commits the act, and who feels he has been harmed by it. Rules tend to be applied more to some persons than others" (1963, 11).

Stereotyping is inevitable in labeling, as one label given to a single person based on a specific feature or trait, which is *visible* for most of the case, becomes binding for all others who happen to possess the same trait. As a result, a list of definitions is brought about the person through labels immediately upon visibility over the physical. Categorizing people that way, then, inevitably turns different individuals, possessing maybe only a single feature in common, into a homogeneous group with a standard look, ideal and potential. The production of falsely-accused deviants is directly linked to such stereotyping tendency. It is the victimization of a 'different perceived' individual by depriving him of his natural right to speak for himself. Wood calls this process 'social othering and identity creation' (2007, 20).

3.2.1 'Social Othering' and Self-Identity

Even though the labeler subject turns the single one into anyone within a homogeneous group, he, consciously or unconsciously, does the same to himself, as well. This marks the beginning of the 'we-they' rhetoric, and by setting the other as the 'deviant/abnormal/different/they', he implicitly sets himself within the 'conforming/normal/standard/we'. In his *Crimes Without Victims* book (1965), Edwin M. Schur calls the deviant-labeled "a psychological scapegoat --a social sacrifice who complements and at the same time establishes the very possibility of conformity in other group members" (176). Schur calls the labeled a 'scapegoat' which serves to set the *normal* by being defined within the *abnormal*. The existence of the abnormal in a way justifies and necessitates the existence of the normal, and it constantly shapes and reforms its norms. In a similar fashion, Emile Durkheim sees crime as inevitable, because there are always differences existent within societies. There are also functional differences, as well -as it hints that social change is necessary within society. Therefore, he sees any attempts or ideals to eradicate it irrational and futile, which contributes to the detriment to society. "Punishment strengthens social solidarity through the reaffirmation of moral commitment among the conforming population who witness the suffering of the offender" (Deviance: Durkheim's Contribution, [11.11.2013]). Punishment, he claims, does not deter the deviant from future deviance, but it rather deters the non-deviant from any potential of future deviance. In this way, deviance directly helps preserve and maintain social solidarity, conformity and order within society, as it sustains the 'normal' over the 'abnormal'. The nature of deviance may change from society to society. Nevertheless,

there seems to be one reality; i.e. societies will always have (or prefer to have?) deviance as long as there continues to be differences among the members of a society.

What both Schur and Durkheim claim as to the justification of the 'normal' over the existence of the 'abnormal' set out from the assumption of the real occurrence of deviance/crime. Even though this dissertation focuses on *perceived* deviance, yet, here too, what Durkheim asserts preserves its validity; i.e. the existence of differences within a given society triggers the perception (and/or reality) of deviance as well as the labeling of this *different*. The motive behind could again be explained with the desire to set the normal/standard/accepted/desired, namely the ideal.

> *Imagine a community of saints in an exemplary and perfect monastery. In it crime as such will be unknown, but faults that appear venial to the ordinary person will arouse the same scandal as does. normal crime in ordinary consci-ences. If therefore that community has the power to judge and punish, it will term such acts criminal and deal with them as such.* (Durkheim, 1982, 100)

Wood calls labeling "a pervasive process" (2007, 20), and hardly anyone can escape being a part of it, either as the labeler or the labeled, and eventually ends up being both. We all label as much as we are labeled. One basic motive behind being a part of this process is that labeling enables us to (re)construct self-identity by obtaining/claiming a say over the other. By defining the other/the different, the individual underlines the other's *otherness*, and his exemption from it by stressing the latter's *difference* from himself. In this attempt of social othering and self-identity construction (or affirmation), the individual himself is inevitably caught within the loop as he himself becomes *other* than the other, not the same but *different* than the other. Extending on Wood's 'social othering', it could be claimed that the individual practises socially self-othering, or *self-labeling*.

3.2.2   Self-Labeling

As mentioned previously, the labeler's labeling *difference* as the other, is likewise a practice of self-labeling claiming to be 'other' and 'different' than the labeled. Yet, more than acknowledging an identity by itself, this process rather marks a refutation of an undesired counter-identity. It is rhetoric of negation, telling 'what it is not', rather than 'what it is'. It is an attempt to construct the self over a reconstruction of

the other identity. Therefore, it would not be wrong to state that even though labeling seems to be a one-way process -from the labeler to the labeled, it is double-ended - one aiming at the labeled, the other at the labeler, himself.

In this rhetoric of negation, certain terms and concepts lose their neutrality through bearing extra implication(s). The problem with this rhetoric is that there may not be a direct relation at all between the original concept and its perceived implication(s). To exemplify, today the term 'modern' does not only mean 'relating to the present or recent times as opposed to the remote   past' (Oxforddictionaries.com, [18.08.2013]). Especially in the context of Turkish society, when an individual uses this word as self-identificatory, he generally implies that he is modern; *therefore* he is 'secular', 'democratic', and 'westerner' in mind and lifestyle. Bearing in mind that the perception of being all these adjectives is generally received over the physical appearance, one can say that an individual who does not *look* modern enough is not perceived and expected to be secular, or democratic or western-minded, either.

Such direct associations between certain concepts and what is visible on the body are not uncommon within the Turkish context, either. To exemplify, one can notice the frequent association between long hair on men with anti-religiousness, accessorize-using men with homosexuality, slightly long beard with religious extremism, etc.

a)   *The Other of the Other*: The gaze of the Headscarved women at the Women in Black Veil

Since 'being modern' has long come to be perceived as being "open-minded", "rational" and "progressive" in the context of Turkish society, and is generally perceived with appearance, again in the context of Turkish society, it surfaces itself as the desire and goal that needs to be achieved one way or another. As it has been stated before, labeling a group as the 'other' helps the labeler individual to set himself apart from/other than/different from that specific group, thus helps him self-label himself by claiming *not to be* like the labeled group. The secular part of the community feels confident to apply the term 'modern' as self-identificatory, as they already 'appear' modern. Yet, one could witness a similar struggle and desire to be perceived as 'modern' in the conservative-living public, as well. An example from the conservative part of Turkish society could be given concerning the headscarved-women's perception of the women in black-veil; i.e. *çarşaf*.

The article carried out by Banu Gokariksel and Anna Secor titled "You Can't Know How They Are Inside: the Ambivalence of Veiling and Discourses of the Other in Turkey" published in the book *Religion and Place: Landscape, Politics and Piety* (2013) focuses on "the discursive rendering of the *çarşaf [black veil]* among *tesettürlü [women wearing headscarf]* women in Turkey" (110). In this study where the two scholars listened to a number of headscarved ('*tesettürlü*') women concerning their look onto the women in black veil ('*çarşaf*'), most of their informants are seen to stress the importance of 'moderation' and that "*-one shouldn't exaggerate*" (as uttered by one of the informants, 109). The informants, who are all wearing headscarves, and could be called *tesettürlü* women, seem to be careful about "*-not drawing the society's attention to [themselves]...[in order] not to get reactions*" (104) with their attire, and thus perceive the *çarşaf* on the extreme end to attract attention in a negative way. In this context, based on the interviews, while wearing headscarf in covered fashionable clothing is regarded as 'moderation', wearing the black veil ('*çarşaf*') is regarded as 'extreme'. Gokariksel and Secor, in their study, come to conclude that even though "it is not unusual to have *tesettürlü* and *çarşaflı* women in the same family or to observe them walking side by side on the street, yet, in their discourse of the *çarşaf*, *tesettürlü* women amplify the distance between these two styles of veiling in their attempt to justify and stabilize their own position within Turkish society" (110). Even though the thoughts and perceptions of the informants in this study cannot be generalized at all to represent the views and outlook of all women wearing the headscarf in Turkey, the findings present an existing reality in society concerning the attempt and desire of the headscarved women to set themselves apart from/other than/different from the women in black veil ('*çarşaf*'). This attempt could also be interpreted as a self-labeling attempt of the headscarved women to apply the terms being 'modern' and 'moderate' as self-identificatory as opposed to appearing 'traditional' and 'in the extreme' as the image of the black veil denotes.

b) *Ideology and Its Concepts*: The Extra Meanings Attributed in Politics

The similar domination of certain concepts is also observed within politics. Each ideology produces its own discourse, where it defines specific concepts as keywords, and consequently attempts to exert its authority and domination through and over

these concepts. Moncrieffe states that even though this domination over concepts does not guarantee their success and permanence within ideology, they are definitely likely to survive quite long as they stay "often unquestioned" (2007, 2). The authorities make sure that such concepts refer to either the ideal and/or the sacred of its subjects. And an unquestioned terrain or idea/ideology is where the labeling process proves to be the most effective.

In the Turkish context, there are several images and applications which are closely associated with patriotism and love for one's nation; such as the national anthem, the national flag, the national pledge, and the national ceremonies like one minute's silence for the Turkish national leader, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Since the Turkish public holds all these values highly sacred, any hint of lack of care and regard is equalized with disrespect or disregard (or even enmity and treason) towards Turkish nationalism and threat directed against the Republican regime. An example of such attributing higher meanings to images could be given from the evening show, titled 'Hülya Avşar Show' hosted by the Turkish actress and singer, Hülya Avşar (Dağlar, 2002). In her program dated April 27, 2002, the studio was decorated with the Turkish flag designed-balloons which were spread all over the floor as a celebration for the Turkish national football team's success in the 2002 World Cup. In the show, Hülya Avşar was seen pushing the balloons with her feet away to clear her way when she stood to welcome her guests of the evening. This gesture of her pushing the balloons away with her feet was perceived as an insult to the Turkish flag itself by one of the audience, who went to file a complaint about Avşar for her act. Together with the reaction from the public, Avşar's act of pushing away the Turkish flag designed-balloons was seen in 'violation to the law of the Turkish flag', and consequently all who produced, purchased and used the balloons were sued with a demand of up to six months of sentence. Even though eventually the court decided for the acquittance of all the defendants (Hülya Avşar'a Balon Beraati, [26.11.2013]), this lawsuit together with the sensitivity and reaction against pushing away 'balloons' while they are decorated in the image of the Turkish national flag can be seen as presenting the close relation and equation perceived between anything related to Turkish nationalism and the devotion to one's nation and patriotism.

Yet, one could also witness today, after a decade, a relative dissolution in this perceived association, at least in some parts of society. Even though the extreme

secular section of society is still highly sensitive about the strict conservation of 'national images', an understanding of normalizing 'nationalism' is also finding its way throughout society especially with wider and more recognition and acknowledgement of citizens living within Turkish borders from ethnicities other than Turkish. An example could be given concerning the abolition of the national pledge, which was recited every morning by students in primary education. Even though this abolition was severely criticized and seen as a treason against the Turkish nation and nationalism, and was even claimed to serve as a step in the abolition of the Republican regime itself later, yet, by quite a lot of citizens together with several academicians, intellectuals and politicians, the abolition of the national anthem was evaluated as a just act as making other Turkey-citizen students from other minorities (like Kurds, Armenians, Circassians, Jews, and the like) utter pledges of "I am a Turk; I am honest; I am hardworking…Let my entire being serve as a gift to Turkish existence" (Ziflioğlu, 2011) would be unfair to their own nationalities and heritage, and on the whole to their self-identities.

3.2.3 Struggling to Prove Otherwise

Extending on the example given in the previous section, in a similar fashion, an individual who is not *perceived* to be 'modern', may choose to abstain from using the word while defining himself if one or more of its constructed implications do not address his identity. This is a 'submitting to the label' type of reaction. On the other end, the same labeled individual may prefer to intentionally accentuate what is being perceived in him as contrary to being modern as a reaction to being labeled as unmodern. This marks a pure 'resisting to the label' type of reaction. Still or he may appropriate the word by adding an alternative interpretation to it, and this makes a hidden 'resisting to the label' type of reaction. An example to the last reaction in Turkish society would be the recently-coined phrase 'modern muslims' or 'moderate muslims' in an attempt to directly associate being modern with leading a conservative way of life. This is an attempt to refute the contrasting association between being modern and being conservative by trying to prove just the opposite, claiming that a conservative way of living is no hindrance to being modern. Since it is a refutation of the association in between, and not of the labeling process altogether, the labeled continues to stay and speak within the domain that the labeler has determined. This, therefore, inevitably becomes another affirmation of the

domination and rhetoric of the labeler.

Yet, it is no easy task and also not common among the labeled to reject in the first place the labeler's *authority* to label. He, rather, starts his struggle *with* the label: he tries to prove that he is not what the label denotes, that he is *other* than the label. On the whole, upon new encounter, the falsely-accused do not start neutral, but one step back, and find themselves in a frustrating struggle to prove himself before he could really have an equal say on the social arena. This disadvantageous condition of the falsely-accused causes him to adopt different reactions against his labeler both in his direct social milieu as well as within larger society. These reactions will be further and separately analyzed in detail in "The Gaze Back of the Object' of the dissertation.

3.2.4   Double Labeling

The falsely-accused deviant's disadvantageous beginning of social encounter gets doubled in disadvantage if the individual is exposed to *double labeling*. As stated before, certain physical and also non-physical traits trigger the *gaze* that leads to labeling. When the individual happens to bear more than one such trait, the *gaze* becomes even more rigid and stereotypical. To exemplify, being a *woman* may be disadvantageous in a strongly patriarchal setting, yet being a *black woman* generally becomes double disadvantageous, as being black is relatively much more exposed to labeling than being white. In a similar fashion, being a *Muslim* may be disadvantageous in some non-Muslim setting, yet being an *Afghani Muslim* (in traditional attire and with a beard) may become even more disadvantageous, as this image tends to be related with terrorism especially after 9/11.

On the whole, if labeling upon one trait makes the labeler *feel* that s/he knows the Other; labeling upon two or more traits makes him/her *believe* that s/he definitely knows the Other. In a way, one additional trait, which is perceived as a high potential for deviance, proves the labeler that his/her initial perception is true. From this point on, a genuine interaction becomes even more challenging, with a labeler who is *sure* of his/her perception as to the other's deviance, and with a labeled who has to fight off all the labels and prejudices before having any chance to be able to talk for himself.

3.2.5 The Politics of Labeling

a) The Political Sphere

On the dichotomy of normal-abnormal, Becker turns the tables by looking from the perspective of the 'deviant'. In his *The Other Side* (1964), Becker writes that "deviance can be viewed as a 'normal' social response to 'abnormal' social circumstances, and we are therefore invited to assume that every act of deviation results from some imbalance within the social order --a condition of strain, anomie, or alienation" (10). Becker sees deviation as a normal social response of the individual being in 'a condition of strain'. There is a similar concern in his question: "a person may break the rules of one group by the very act of abiding by the rules of another group. Is he, then, deviant?" (1963, 8). For example, if the violated rule is against basic human rights, then can the person who has violated it be called a *deviant*? Here, the problematic of the universality of laws, and that of the rule makers stand out.

Returning to Geof Wood's previous question: "which and whose labels prevail, and under what contextual conditions?" (Moncrieffe & Eyben, 2007, 19), the answer to this 'which and whose' question seems to lie in **the politics and relations of power**; i.e. whoever holds the power/authority in his hand, or better said whoever has the domination over 'others', which is not limited only to relations between state and people, but also extents and includes all types of relations (social, interpersonal, economic, face-to-face, virtual, etc.) setting out from the premise stated by Foucault that power is *everywhere*. In a nutshell, "the power issue is expressed in terms of whether the individual controls the presentation of self-image, or receives and lives within the images imposed by others" (2007, 20).

Joy Moncrieffe states that the "more powerful actors...use frames and labels to influence how particular issues and categories of people are regarded and treated" (2007, 2). On the political level, the State creates its own rules, by which all citizens are expected to abide in order to sustain order. Yet, the State also creates its own problems that threaten the very same order, and it simply does this by *framing* issues and categorizing/*labeling* its citizens. Returning to the previous quote, Moncrieffe defines the processes of framing and labeling successively as "framing refers to how we understand something to be a problem, which may reflect how issues are represented (or not represented) in policy debates and discourse, [and] labeling refers

to how people are named/categorized (by themselves or others) to reflect these names" (2007, 2). Even though it is inevitable (as well as may be necessary) to define/frame the potentially 'problematic' areas within borders, there is a great risk that the State authority creates its own discourse, takes the issue at hand only from a limited (and selected) perspective, and consequently ends up prioritizing (and at times even dramatizing) certain elements at the cost of deprioritizing and/or excluding/disregarding other elements within the same 'problem'. And such partial consideration of the problem may accentuate it even more instead of serving for just the opposite. This attitude of the State could be apprehended over a comparison between 'producing knowledge' and 'providing 'evidence'' as stated in Moncrieffe's article. The article states that if the authorities could approach the issue at hand as objectively as possible, by taking into consideration each and every element regardless of how contradictory and oppositional they may be, and by including all related parties who can affect or are affected by the issue, only then, there can be the possibility of 'producing real knowledge' which could be used for the solution of the problem. However, if the authorities seek specific information within the problem area that would 'prove' what the authority thinks it already 'knows' about the framed issue, then the outcome inevitably becomes partial knowledge where "the conflicting messages are filtered out...[and] the mechanisms [are] used to achieve desired, and sometimes pre-defined, results" (2007, 4).

Once framed, the problem area produces its own labels and labeled individuals: while the State attempts to address those falling within the frame, it may exclude the ones outside. However, what if those outside of the frame are not outside of the problem at hand, and on the contrary are being affected by the same problem in one way or another? In a similar fashion, what if the ones within the frame are partially represented, or misrepresented? Such partial knowledge and address of the State can create additional problems; such as the misrepresentation of the addressee, misrepresentation of the issue as well as non-representation of those outside of the frame.

To exemplify briefly how State frames and labels, one can look at the Turkish state's long-time 'Kurdish problem' issue (Kürt Sorunu, [15.11.2013]): The origins of this problem dates back to the beginnings of the 20th century, to the start of Turkish State. (Even before this date, the autonomous Kurdish tribes were in a constant struggle to

keep their autonomy under the long-time struggle for authority between the Ottoman State and Iran; yet after WW1 and the constitution of the Turkish State it starts to be seen as a 'problem'.) When with the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923), the oil-rich Kurdish territories, Mosul and Kirkuk were confiscated by the British, the Kurds' struggle for freedom increased in intensity as well as in suffering. Eventually, with the Turkish State, a number of policies of assimilation, exile, denial of autonomous existence and disregard of previously-promised rights were applied which brought the well-known 1925 Sheikh Sait Uprising. After the suppression of this revolt, harsher actions were taken by the State such as to ban the use of Kurdish language. The State also attempted to propagate the thesis that the Kurds were of Turkish origin. In the meantime, all resulting discontent of the Kurdish people led them to further and constant revolts and uprisings. In an environment of silencing of ideas and othering, gradually there became a gap between the Turkish population and the Kurdish population -two peoples who had lived together for decades, and fought side by side in the War of Independence. The Kurdish issue evolved into a challenging 'problem' that can be claimed to have taken place with the framing of the issue by the Turkish State on the axis of and within the problem of the terrorist actions of the PKK[6] founded in 1978.

The State's priority to subdue PKK's actions and attacks, and the equation of the problem mainly with terrorism and with the target of establishing an independent Kurdish State on Turkish land inevitably pushed the long existing Kurdish righteous demands into the background. The accompanying labeling of the Kurds inevitably led to an accentuation of differences between Kurds and Turks, and eventually resulted in the perception of Kurds as 'potential terrorists and revolutionaries' by the rest of society. In reality, a great number of Kurdish population did not support PKK's actions, and rejected its claim of total representation of Kurdish people. Framing, in a way, meant reducing a multifaceted issue that has such a long history to a single-level together with a conscious or unconscious exclusion of the long-extending background. Naming brings consciousness, which is good. Yet, if the State brings a certain issue into the forefront at the expense of excluding others, this may result in an over-consciousness and an over-(and also mis-)representation for the first, and non-(or limited-) representation for the latter. This, by itself, is the harbinger for

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[6] Partiya Karkên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers' Party)

future problems, as both conditions are problematic.

It is not uncommon in the power discourse to frame an issue and label its content in order to sustain authority. "Labeling actually depends on relationships of power (with power understood as domination) that, following Foucault (1977), enforces 'control, regulation and management', thereby allowing authoritative state actors to serve the interests of some to the exclusion of others" (2007, 7). This is called *authoritative/State/hegemonic labeling*, and the State authority generally does this over ethnicity. If and when the country is composed of different ethnicities, and once these differences are accentuated by the State and thus politicized, the attitude adopted makes the phenomenon evolve first into an *issue*, and eventually into a *problem*. In this context, it is not uncommon for the authority to deepen the issue by naming it, and once named and framed, the authority unconsciously, or consciously, produces its own problems for which it later seeks, or pretends to seek, solutions.

b) The Social and Interpersonal Spheres

Extending on the example of the Kurdish problem, The State's framing and reducing the whole nationality initially around the problem of the PKK also finds its echo on the social level within Turkish society. Especially by citizens in the western part of the country where the Kurdish population is relatively fewer relative to the eastern regions, the perception of the Kurd may tend to be primarily negative, with labels such as 'the dark Kurd' (alluding to the physical appearance which is assumed to be quite dark skin and hairy built. Yet, this is an overgeneralization as there are a lot of Kurdish people with fair skin complexion and colored eyes, as well), 'mountainous', 'zoroastrians', and 'ignorants'. A simple Google keyword search in Turkish may also put forward such prejudice against Kurdish people: Upon writing "Why are/do the Kurds" on the search bar, the automatically appearing questions have been found as the following:

(*Why are the Kurd ugly / Why do the Kurd live on mountains / Why did the Kurd revolt*)

When it comes to interpersonal relations, the dominating labeler, securing his identity as the active subject, feels free to single out one specific (and often visible) aspect of another individual with an aim to re-position the latter's identity mostly under this specific trait through the use of labels. Here the gaze functions as a 'screening device', as Kai T. Erikson calls it, which "sifts...details out of the person's over-all performance, [and which also turns into] a very important instrument of social control" (Becker, 1964, 11). Now that he has been labeled, no matter either he submits to or resists the label, the labeled individual has to start reconstructing his identity by having to set out from the very label that is not achieved, but *given* to him by the more powerful. In the case of resisting it, then, why is it generally that the labeled feels he has to prove the invalidity of the label first in order to later re-claim his identity, instead of simply ignoring or disregarding the label altogether? The reason could be, as a social being, man constructs his identity not independent of others' views of him. Just like looking at a mirror: When he looks at his own image in the mirror, man does not actually see his self, but what and how an outer gaze sees him. In this self-gaze, if he does not feel content about what he sees, he attempts to rectify it either to the liking or discontent of the outer gaze. The first reaction points out his submission, and the latter his resistance to and refutation of the label and the gaze.

3.3   Afterword: Caught in a Vicious Circle

Goffman (1963) claims that "framing and labeling serve the interests of the 'normal', 'better off', 'us' as much as -and perhaps more than- they do those classified as needing assistance" (Moncrieffe, 2007, 10). The basic reason possibly is that the labeler does not always take the pain to sincerely and as objectively as possible *approach* the other individual or group, and instead prefers to *know* him *at a distance*. However, "framing and labeling, particularly that conducted at a distance, can overlook whole sub-categories of people and a range of substantial issues" (Moncrieffe, 2007, 10) by reducing a complex and multifaceted issue into a one-sided, one-level issue which is assumed to be all-inclusive and all-representative. And the resulting mis/partial/non-representations eventually serve nothing but to turn the issue at hand into a problem as well as to produce additional problems. It all starts with a *gaze*, at a distance, and it claims to *see*. But, in order to see the real cause of the 'problem', the different, the other, it is vital that one *looks*. What is vital

is 'to look so that one can see, then understand, and only then *partially* know', instead of 'to gaze so that one will totally and absolutely know' the other.

In his *Crimes Without Victims* book (1965), Edwin M. Schur writes "for one reason or another it has been 'arranged' that these social problems shall remain insoluble" (176). This 'one reason or another' seems to lie in the politics of power both on the political and also on social and personal levels. Labeling almost functions like a vicious circle which has a *potential* of converting the falsely-accused -labeled as 'potential deviants'- into actual delinquents: as labeling triggers the labeled individual's reaction, which may breed this time real deviance and becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. This in turn serves as a justification for the labeler as to the truth and reality of his label, which then leads to further labeling, more rigid ideas, widening distances and eventually less and less possibility of interaction.

'Street children' can be given as an example to (as well as victims of) such a vicious circle between gaze/labeling and deviance. Staying within the Turkish context and referring to several studies carried out on the topic (Bilgin & Kızmaz, 2010; Güngör, 2008; Işık, 2007; İçli, 2009; Özsüer, 2006); it could be claimed that among other various factors, the prevalent social perception concerning street children is the link between them and their potential criminal activities. In his article (2006), Özsüer claims that the rhetoric of the national media strengthens this generalizing perception with its judging and accusing tone. To this claim, Özsüer gives examples of a number of newspaper headlines:

> *Historical buildings will be saved from the invasion of thinner-addicts (*Tarihi Yapılar Tinerci İşgalinden Kurtarılacak, Zaman*) -* 14/3/2005
> *The age of that girl: 14, her number of crimes: 176 (*O Kızın Yaşı: 14 Sabıka Sayısı 176, Gözcü*) - 10/02/2005*
> *The danger "growing up" in streets (*Sokaklarda "Büyüyen" Tehlike, Cumhuriyet*) - 10/02/2005*
> *35% of street children are addicts (*Sokak Çocuklarının %35'i Bağımlı, Akşam*) - 09/01/2005*
> *Gangs of children are coming from the Southeast* (Güneydoğudan Çocuk Çeteleri Geliyor, Cumhuriyet) - 16/11/2004
> *Not thinners, but "gangsters"* (Tinerci Değil "Çeteci", Dünden Bugüne Tercuman) - 15/11/2004

In spite of the appearance of more positive and sympathizing headlines, as well, such judging tone still finds its place on the headlines of national media today.

Consequently, with the perceived association of street children with concepts like 'thinner-addiction', 'gangs' and with certain crimes such as 'theft and pickpocketing', 'rape' and 'assault', there grows an over-generalizing perception concerning street children which even comes to see *all* children living/working on streets as potential convicts/deviants or simply criminals who need to be avoided, mistrusted and feared. Such perception then naturally leads to fear and anxiety as to these children even though what they basically *need* are love, sympathy, understanding and a helping hand which will hopefully rescue them from the miserable situation they are in. In a way, this perception blinds the eyes of society as to one basic reality about street children; i.e. they are still 'children'.

Even though studies show an increase in the crime rate of street children (İçli, 2009) in recent years, what is crucial to initially turn our attention to is to find and eliminate the *reasons* instead of just focusing on the consequences if we want the issue of street children not to turn into an irresolvable problem. Likewise, in the solution of a social problem, it is of vital importance to look at the general perception concerning that problem to see how the public perceives and approaches the phenomenon at hand. Without making a change in the social perception, it would be unrealistic to be able to talk of the elimination of the problem concerning a disadvantaged group. In the case of the street children, there are several studies and statistics done on the crimes of street children, yet, it should also be taken into account that in the continuity of these crimes, the negative generalizing perception as to the high tendency of street children to deviance and crime also plays an important role. It is not that difficult to visualize a child who is constantly treated as a potential criminal, and who is feared and avoided and ignored, to be a perfect candidate to fall for victim in the hands of some adults who would move to take advantage of the desolateness of these children. Together with many other factors (which are not within the scope of this study), this expectation of society concerning street children to commit crime may definitely lead street children to behave so, where the resulting deviance adds to the strength of the existent perception -as caught in a vicious circle.

Like almost all labeling theorists claim, whether an act is (or is perceived as) deviant depends not merely on the act itself, but also, and mostly, on *who* commits it, and on *how* other people *react* to it. When social pre-constructions, generalizations and prejudices shadow open interaction between individuals, labels are adopted as a way

to claim knowledge about the other, and this leads to the illusion of having a right to judge (and sentence) the other. On the part of the falsely-accused and labeled individual, the label, in turn, incites different reactions on the scale from *submission* to *resistance* as to the label, and from *hiding* to *exposing* as to the perceived 'difference'. These different types of reactions will be analyzed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV
THE 'GAZE BACK' OF THE OTHER

4.1   The Gaze Back of the Other: Reactions of the Gazee

When a member of a community who is *seen* somehow different from the majority, or the powerful minority, is labeled concerning his *difference*, he starts to be primarily defined under this label as it becomes his *master status* (Hughes, 1945). While labeling a deviant as 'deviant' is claimed to lead to secondary, more serious and sometimes permanent deviance by various labeling theorists (Becker, 1963; Erikson, 1964; Lemert, 1951; Schur, 1971; Tannenbaum, 1938), this situation becomes even more problematic in the case of the labeling of the non-deviant. It is problematic mainly because labeling here occurs not as a result of a deviant act, but rather as a result of a perceived difference over the physicality of the person; namely over his or her body. The current chapter will be an analysis concerning the outcomes of the labeling of the such 'falsely-accused deviants', from Becker's chart of the types of deviant behavior, and the subsequent reactions of the labeled individual which will be analysed over four categories under two parameters: **Submitting** to or **Resisting** against the label, **Hiding** or **Exhibiting/Exposing** the *difference*.

Attitude towards the Label Reaction concerning the Difference	Submitting to the Label	Resisting against the Label
Hiding the Difference	Submitting-Hiding	Resisting-Hiding
Exposing the Difference	Submitting-Exposing	Resisting-Exposing

Each combination will be analysed separately, yet in relation to each other. Greater focus will also be dedicated to the two extreme reactions; i.e. **Submitting-Hiding** and **Resisting-Exposing**. These two reactions will also be exemplified in comparison to each other through an analysis of the Turkish author, Elif Shafak's book, *The Gaze*, over the reactions of the book's main characters -an overweight woman and her

dwarf lover, who are the addressee of the physiognomic gaze and labels of the community.

4.2   A Comparison over Elif Shafak's novel, The Gaze

Submitting to the Label - Hiding the Difference vs. Resisting the Label - Exposing the Difference:

> *I was dreaming about a flying balloon. I couldn't make out the colour, but because the sky was charcoal-grey, and the clouds were snow-white, and the sun was bright-yellow, it was definitely a colour other than charcoal-grey, snow-white or bright-yellow. The flying balloon in my dream existed for so long as I could see it, but ceased to exist the moment I couldn't.* (*The Gaze*, 9)

These are the opening lines of the book where the bottom line is given in the form of colors and a flying balloon, whose color matters as long as and only when it is *visible*.

> *...let's get her inside so the neighbours won't see her. It doesn't matter if they hear her so long as they don't see her.* (13)

Seeing has always been more powerful than hearing, yet more pre-constructed, as well. Man, who is born into a society with already established conceptions, norms, and definitions of its own, cannot be immune to seeing through the lenses of these pre-constructions. He looks, and for most of the time sees the picture that is already in his mind, as in Lacan's words 'in the depths of my eye the picture is painted" (96).

Shafak in her novel portrays two characters that are quite distinct and different from each other. They have only one common reality; i.e. they are among those labeled as 'outsiders', those who are constantly looked-at, and those whose bodies and visualities have shaped their master statuses. These two characters, the obese protagonist whose name is not revealed in the novel, and her intellectual dwarf lover, who is called B-C, epitomize the two common reactions of the labeled: successively *trying to be completely invisible*, and *trying to be as overtly visible as possible*. While the protagonist exhibits the first (and also the more general) reaction that is accompanied by internalizing the external gaze, and submitting her identity to the given label; B-C exhibits the other reaction, which embodies a rebellious attitude to

labeling.

> *Then, in order to escape the stares of the people surrounding me, in order not to guess what is on the minds of the people who are looking at me, I look for a spot that I can stare at vacantly until I reach my stop.* (22)

Fallen from the mirror stage, and having faced the labeling and defining gazes of other members of his society, "the subject-turned-object sees itself as the other sees it: it *internalizes* the gaze. Thus the poor self-image and limited sense of one's own possibilities result when women see themselves as men see them, when minority groups see themselves as the majority see them" (Olin, 1996, 215), or those physically attracting attention in the negative sense see themselves as the visual culture sees them --being outside of the 'acceptable' scope of body ideals. The protagonist in Shafak's novel is very much conscious of her appearance which attracts attention wherever she goes, and whatever she does. Being that detached from the bodily standards, it is futile in her case to try to be invisible while being that overtly visible. In the meantime, her dwarf lover, B-C, who was attracting enough attention with his miniature height, chooses to work as a nude model for art students.

> *with indifference he posed...I find it odd that he is so untroubled. Perhaps I thought it was my duty to take on the anxiety he was neglecting.* (77-78)

While she is too conscious to be that visible, he is too indifferent to be that visible. He poses "out of stubbornness," almost in a way to make his body so much visible to the curious eye that after some time, the eye gets tired of this image, and pulls its gaze back to settle on another odd, unseen visuality. This is the gaze back of the object which is meant to arouse shame in the gazing subject, as Sartre writes. Upon the gazing subject's realization of the gaze back of the object, he feels uneasy facing the consciousness of the object which reduces the subject's self-image and similarly objectifies him. The gaze back of the object is an attempt to re-store the slave to the level of the master, to claim subjectivity, and to resist against the given definition. "If you look back, you cannot be possessed by the gaze of the other. What is proposed is not a stare-down. It is a shared gaze" (Olin, 1996, 217).

The protagonist, on the other hand, is not emotionally secure, and is so much disillusioned concerning her appearance that she constantly *imagines* gazes sticking on her body. And this "felt gaze is more powerful than the seen one" (Olin, 1996, 218). Upon a gaze, she imagines the thoughts crowding the minds of the gazing others --the 'spectators' having the right to watch what is on display. Feeling herself always on display, the protagonist is puzzled and confused concerning the modeling of her lover: *How could a person display himself; and why?* (79)

> *..the students watch B-C with meaningful smiles, and*
> *B-C looks aimlessly into the distance.* (81)

Throughout the novel, the comparison between looking-related words contributes to accentuate the dichotomy of looking and being-looked-at. Although they may seem close to each other in their dictionary meanings, these words also bear sociologically crucial and distinct meanings, which even stand in opposition to each other, as is the case with the words, **looking vs. watching**. While the word 'looking' connotes a more natural and unbiased action of seeing, 'watching' bears a curious interest in the object displayed. 'Looking' does not create a crisis between the subject and the object, yet 'watching' objectifies the other, and denotes power on the side of the watching subject. 'Watching' almost gives the 'spectator' the right to fix his gaze on the other without feeling any shame or discomfort:

> *If you're as fat as I am, people don't see you. They'll*
> *look and they'll watch; they'll point you out and talk*
> *about you to each other. In their view, you're material*
> *for observation. It doesn't even cross their minds that*
> *the way they look at me makes me uncomfortable. They*
> *always watch. But they never see. Looking at my body*
> *gives them an excuse not to look into my eyes. They*
> *never see within.* (230-231)

A similar comparison arises between **looking vs. seeing**. In the identity construction, seeing has a crucial space -the infant starts to become conscious of his identity in its totality upon *seeing* his image for the first time in the mirror. Later, in order to be able to sustain this image and his power, the Subject (or the Master) always desires to be the desire of the Other, he desires to be *seen* by the Other; and in the absence of this seeing, he feels shattered and disillusioned just like young Lacan in his autobiographical story. Likewise, the object, or better-said the objectified individual, desires to be *seen* by the gazing other, as seeing will confirm his identity and will

make the other acclaim his subjectivity. Yet, in the case of the 'Other', there is usually one type of seeing; i.e. he is *seen* different and queer by the majority. Instead of being seen in terms of his self-identity, who he really is, his appearance speaks for him out of his desire, as he is defined as "strange to look at".

> *Suddenly I shuddered. People who exist without existing who are not seen in public because they are put on display; dwarves, cripples, fat people...all people who are strange to look at...Those who hide from outside eyes, who embrace the privacy of their homes, who like to keep their existence private...* (233)

Being constantly exposed to the gaze, sticking labels on, the individual who is regarded as 'strange to look at' may come to *see* himself through the lenses of this gaze, as well. That is when the identity de-construction peaks as the individual internalizes the external gaze and definition, and becomes frustrated with and intolerant against his own self, almost blaming himself for his presence among others. This marks the tragedy of the self which is doomed to hover above the individual unless he genuinely starts questioning the validity of the definitions addressed towards him. What he needs in order to re-construct his shattered self is common sense both on the part of himself, and those of the other visually judging him.

> *Those who end up next to me in a narrow elevator begin thinking with their eyes rather than with common sense.* (85)

This is the self-fulfilling prophecy of the labeling theory, which is initiated by the gaze: the labeled individual comes to see himself under the shadow of this label, internalizes it, acts according to the expectations of his labelers, and by doing so, eventually justifies the label. Thus the imaginary becomes the real. Upon this internalization, the individual does not get into any further effort to refute the label, or to revert back to his previous self. Now, when he looks at the mirror, he looks at himself as a 'spectator', gazing and judging.

> *The woman whose mask was her face, and whose face was her mask.* (67)

The protagonist takes refuge in the privacy and seclusion of B-C's apartment, that she moves shortly after the two have met. This apartment in the *Hayalifener Apartments* becomes the only place where she is not watched, but seen as a woman, a

beloved, a companion, a friend --more importantly, an individual. This is where she forgets the *gaze*, and regains her conscious, and becomes her-self again.

> *I who for years had looked at myself and the world around me through the lenses of my body, was now momentarily able to take these glasses off. On top of that, as I gained the ability to see through my body and into myself, I discovered new aspects of myself.* (241)

The other main character in the novel, B-C, on the other hand, has quite a different attitude towards society and its gazes. Contrary to the protagonist, he voluntarily puts himself on display -both in his job where he poses naked in an art studio, and also in his daily life. Being already on display with their appearances, he sees it futile to try to avoid eyes. On the contrary, *"instead of avoiding the eyes of others, he concerned himself with eyes, and displayed himself out of stubbornness even in the knowledge that it would subject him to the abuse of other eyes"* (229-230). If a sight is rare, it attracts attention, just like that, if it has grown to one of commonalities, then it loses that attraction after a while. B-C, with his attitude to life, in a way tries to achieve this end by exposing and exhibiting himself as much as possible. Michel Foucault mentions this exhibitionistic pleasure in his *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction* where he juxtaposes voyeuristic pleasure with an exhibitionistic one: "The [voyeuristic] pleasure that comes of exercising a power that questions, monitors, watches, spies, searches out, palpates, brings to light; and on the other hand, the [exhibitionistic pleasure] that kindles at having to evade this power, flee from it, fool it, or travesty it." Like Foucault, Lacan also draws a correlation between gaze and pleasure where he points out that "the gaze must function as an object around which the exhibitionistic and voyeuristic impulses that constitute the scopic drive turn -in short, the gaze must be an object of the scopic drive, producing not merely anxiety but also pleasure" (as cited in Krips 2010, 93).

Behind exhibiting one's body, more than the desire to be liked, lies the desire to be *seen*, as being seen means the acknowledgement of one's self by others. By exhibiting himself, the objectified individual tries to present his identity apart from his immediately visible appearance, and sometimes at the most desperate level, this exhibition serves to distract the gazer from the 'strange to look at' part of the individual to another sight again in his appearance and body. This is what B-C is trying to achieve when he proposes his lover to go one night out in extreme disguise.

> *'If we don't look like ourselves, we'll be able to go out together.* (98)

They do disguise themselves to make them even more explicitly visible than their present condition --with B-C disguising as a woman in her dramatic make-up and high heels, while the protagonist disguising as his man lover walking stiff in a corset. In this extreme look, B-C feels fine as at least now, it is not *them* that attract attention, but their disguises. The only solution that he finds to be able to go out with his lover is to be what they are not.

Man generally prefers to stay within the safe zone of the familiar, and upon an encounter with the foreign, he either tries to avoid it, and if not, to evade the assumed threat against his assumed status as the Master. Therefore, he makes it compatible with his safe zone by defining and turning it into the manageable other. Both in the theory of the gaze as well as in the theory of labeling, there is the attempt to paint a picture of the Other through visual contact *only*. This is an attempt to make the unfamiliar familiar by accentuating his one or a number of visual features and using it to construct a story of and about the person and his life. After ascribing several definitions to the individual in spite of him, the gazing labeler consciously continues to avoid any real contact with the objectified other, as such communication will ultimately and necessarily require the total or partial deconstruction of his *wholly-constructed* story. Unwilling to face the other's reality, he prefers to continue the gaze to be able to find further details and examples in the actions of the other that will support his construction.

> *A Western traveler was burning with passion to make love just once to an Eastern woman hiding behind her thin veils among her carved, inlaid wooden cages. He continually walked through the back streets in the hope of finding an open door he could sneak through or for the wind to play with a veil so that he could peer under it.*
>
> *When he returned to his own country, though he hadn't touched any Eastern women nor seen their milk-white skin, their smooth thighs and their fleshy lips, he spoke at length to his friends as if he had. He returned to the East every year without fail.*
>
> *Years later his fantasy finally came true. An Eastern woman returned his desire. When the traveller arrived at the woman's house, he saw that the door had been*

left ajar for him. He went inside, and saw that the Eastern woman had begun to undress. In panic, he said, 'What are you doing? Don't take it off. By no means take off what you're wearing.' When the woman looked at him in surprise, the traveller fled.
When he returned to his country, he gathered together the friends who were eager to hear his latest amorous adventures with Eastern women. As was the case every year, he had a great deal to tell them. (192)

What proves more problematic than this construction is its dictation as the real to the rest of society and to the labeled individual himself. Such dictation can be quite difficult to refute especially when it comes from within the context of the politics of power. Within the politics of power, its actors in society act to make the labeled phenomena go unquestioned by applying the label in question in a profoundly repeating pattern. This influence is further stressed through the visual images in mass media where the gaze almost commodifies the other by always presenting the labeled visuality and by creating a viewfinder effect as Bryson calls it in his article "Gaze in the Expanded Field" (1988): In his article, Bryson writes about the object's appearing to the subject at the end of a viewfinder which creates "a kind of tunnel vision in which all of the surrounding field is screened out. Only that which appears within the framing apparatus --perspective, picture frame, camera-- exists: the viewer on one side, the object on the other" (100). This is why B-C puts himself naked on stage as a model for drawing. As society already sees him only at the end of the viewfinder, he is just presenting them in reality what its curious gaze already 'visualizes' upon looking at him.

This metaphor of viewfinder and looking within a singled-out frame appears in a similar format in Shafak's novel, as well, if not in the body of a viewfinder, in that of a camera. Through the end of the book, the author reveals the first encounter of the protagonist with her dwarf lover. While B-C is out one day taking pictures of everything with his camera, he sees the protagonist, and starts taking pictures of her. Feeling quite uneasy at first having being photographed, she soon relaxes as she sees the serenity of the dwarf. The dwarf whose name she later learns is B-C offers her the camera to have a look at life through "an intermediary":

'Sometimes it happens to me, too. I want to take pictures of everything. Sometimes it does one good to

put an intermediary between the one who's seeing and the one who's being see...As for us, we're afraid of both of being seen and of what we can't see...it's as if our entire existence, as well as our non-existence, is founded on seeing and being seen.' (235)

'We're afraid of both of being seen and of what we can't see' --just like the gaze in Sartre's story of the man in the park who feels uneasy upon the realization of being watched by another, and the gaze in Lacan's fisherman story where he feels uneasy upon not being able to see the glittering sardine can. As B-C says, man's existence is all about *seeing and being seen*; and this realization also serves the motive for the dictionary that B-C is preparing throughout the novel -the *Dictionary of Gazes*. Only the roles do change from time to time and from occasion to occasion. Sometimes a Subject is curiously *watching* and defining the Other, and at other times, the Subject is trying to be *seen* by the Other. Conversely, sometimes it is the Object that is trying to be *invisible* from the gaze of the gazing Other, and sometimes is *gazing back* at the Other. The actors do change, but it is always the *gaze* which persists.

şişko (fatty): She was so fat that wherever she went, people would stop whatever they were doing and stare at her. The way people looked at her made her so uncomfortable that she would eat even more and become even fatter. (Research fatty's childhood.) (242)
-from B-C's *Dictionary of Gazes*-

The protagonist in Shafak's novel experiences the extreme psychology of inferiority complex, as it finds its name in Adlerian psychology[7]. She submits to the visual norms of the dominant culture, and judges herself even before anyone else does. She does not see herself even deserving to mix with public, and in order to escape the curious public gaze, she prefers instead the solitude and confinement of her apartment. The dominant beauty norms of society sees fatness not "simply as a physical state, but also as evidence of some basic character defect," therefore a kind of deviance (Schur, 1984, 71). And this 'deviance' from the accepted beauty norms of society seems to become even more problematic for the individual as a female. Even though an overweight male may experience the same gaze and accompanying labeling by the dominant culture, it is more common that this labeling is less tolerant in the case of women as women are expected more to abide by and preserve the

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[7] The psychoanalyst Alfred Adler

beauty norms. In order words, they are expected to 'look feminine'. This normative expectation, in turn, finds its address in the majority of women, especially the urban woman who is continuously exposed to the visual ideals through media, and subsequently who becomes anxious not to violate the frame to become "visually deviant" in the perception of the dominant culture (76). Consequently, the visually labeled individual, "especially if she is a woman, probably suffers more from the social and psychological stigma...than she does from the actual physical condition" (71).

Such submissive and hiding reaction of the labeled individual, portrayed within the body of Shafak's protagonist, is not rare among other 'visually deviant' individuals, either. Even though labels may vary, the outcome may prove to be similar among different labeled individuals, whose *difference* is visible either because of their skin color, gender and sexual preference, clothing, or belief and ethnicity; and present itself through "various patterns of withdrawal and defensiveness, passivity, ingroup hostility and identification with the oppressors, as well as seriously impaired self-esteem" (Schur, 1984, 39).

4.3   Resisting the Label - Exposing the Difference

> *I was special. Being different was my cross to bear, but being aware of it was my compensation.*
> (from Lucy Grealy's ***Autobiography of a Face***)

One other reaction which has grown quite frequent among labeled is the pure opposite of the submit/hide rection; i.e. *resist the label/expose the difference* reaction. Here, the perceived deviant does not accept the imputed label, and furthermore exhibits his resistance by accentuating the perceived difference in an attempt to 'normalize' it. The rationale behind is that rarity attracts attention, and this attraction generally tends to wane as the rare sight gains wider exposure. Referring back to Shafak's story, B-C, the dwarf lover, accentuates his difference further, and puts himself on display instead of being placed there anyway through the gaze of the other. He poses nude as a model for art students, and one night disguises himself as an overtly sexy female who conscientiously flaunts himself in a way where he would attract even more attention-- being a dwarf *and* a woman. What Shafak's character is trying to achieve is to normalize and neutralize his identity and save it from sticky labels by distracting his audience to a more extreme sight so that walking out as a

plain dwarf man will prove less of an attraction.

4.3.1 Visibility as Resistance: The Increasing Popularity of Hijabi Fashion

Within the context of Turkish society, it is possible to come across examples of the resist/expose reaction; one of them could be the recent rise of the hijabi fashion. In order to be better able to understand this recent rise especially within the last few years, it is crucial to be aware of the underlying factors paving the path during the last three decades of Turkish politics and social life. Following the 1980 military coup, an increasing consciousness and fear against Islamization of the state jutted to the surface while the mainstream media ran a flux of images of women all-covered in black during the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran. And this conscious, or unconscious fear, manifested itself, maybe the most explicitly, in the 'headscarf' which was re-defined as a political symbol -a symbol of 'political Islam', instead of a religious one. It came to be seen once again a threat on the way of secularism and modernization of the state and society, and consequently a ban on headscarf was enacted forbidding its appearance in the public sphere; i.e., in state offices, public schools and universities.

Yet, this was also the time when Turkish society came to witness the rise of 'Islamic capital' through the neoliberal policies adopted which also encouraged Islamic entrepreneurialism and the consequent flux of Anatolian-based and migrant capital to the urban setting. With the establishment of associates following a conservative line, like MUSIAD[8] and ASKON[9], various companies in various sectors flourished to a great extent, some of which directly targeted the conservative population with their product lines and/or services. The emergence of hijabi fashion companies coincides to such political, social and economic environment. (Gokariksel and Secor 2009; 2010; 2012). However, that fashion produced by some companies was far from affecting a wide population with its relatively plain line of design and modest colors[10]. Instead, what this section aims to dwell upon is the more recent rise of hijabi fashion[11] which stresses a reconciliation of fashion (and also being modern)

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[8] Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association
[9] Association of Anatolian Businessmen (a.k.a. 'Anatolian Lions')
[10] The forerunner of such companies is *Tekbir*, which was founded in 1982, yet became a brand especially after the first *tesettur* fashion show organized by the company in 1992. In spite of leading the sector with its brand name, Tekbir was not regarded a trendsetter -with its long skirts and classic-cut jackets and overcoats especially by the young urban hijabi women.
[11] *Hijab* is the Arabic word used for headscarf in Arab countries. In order to talk about the fashion of

with an Islamic duty; i.e. *tesettur* -the covering of the hair and body of women in a modest way[12].

The headscarf ban in the public sphere not only placed an economic and educational barrier on the way of women wearing headscarf, but it also affected this population in a psychological way. The increased prejudice against headscarf and its identification by the secular elite with backwardness, traditionalism and shari'a[13] together with its unwelcome in the public sphere, as well as in the 'modern setting' such as certain cafes, restaurants, shopping streets, holiday areas which are regarded chic and classy as well as certain activities, such as going to theater, opera, art exhibitions, and concerts, caused lots of women wearing headscarf to retreat to their domestic milieus accompanied by a hurt self-esteem and an acceptance of disappearance. Still a good number of women wearing headscarf went abroad to pursue their education and/or profession for greater chances of a thriving life. And some tried to accommodate themselves and their identity within this challenging setting through a compromise: they revised their understanding of *tesettür*, and instead of long skirts, overcoats and large headscarves in plain designs and muted colors, they preferred a more 'modernized' way of clothing, and started to wear tunics with pants, more colorful scarves and dresses, as well as attention grabbing accessories together with an increasing interest in the consumption and possession of brand items. While it is definitely possible to interpret this revision as a part of getting influenced and being a part of the fast globalizing consumer culture, it can also be read as an attempt to dissociate headscarf and *tesettür* (and in the wider frame, the islamic way of life and Islam, itself) from the images of extremism, bigotry, backwardness and the 'all-covered dark veil' of Iran.

Parallel to the rise of 'Islamic capital' -'green capital' as some call it, and the increasing prosperity of the conservative middle classes, this accommodation attempt described in the previous paragraph in time took a relatively different turn, and started to manifest itself as an overt resistance to the labels directed at the

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Islamic clothing, *hijabi fashion* phrase will be used in the dissertation. Other possible names could be *'tesettur' fashion, veiling-fashion, Islamic fashion, conservative fashion*.

[12] Even though *tesettur* connotes more than just the covering of hair and body, and necessarily extends to a modest way of living and attitudes, it is generally regarded in relation to clothing and in a way equalized specifically with the headscarf by society.

[13] Islamic law. In the Turkish context, it also symbolically corresponds to a fear of '*becoming like Iran*' -a country governed by 'molla's after the 1979 revolution, where women are forced to wear the black garment and headscarf at all times.

conservatives, and specifically to the label of 'non-modern' and 'backward' among others. As a way of refuting such labels, and in order to expose their identity as both religious *and* modern, fashionably-dressed young urban hijabi women started to crowd places and activities, which have long belonged to 'modern' secular elite. Starting with the first modernization efforts during the Tanzimat Period of the late Ottoman era, modernity and 'being modern' have tended to be interpreted over the visual, namely the clothing, and especially over the clothing of the women. When it comes to the millennium, modernization efforts over the visual/body seem to still have a say. In the fast flourish of the hijabi fashion, too, it marks its say with the appearance of hijabi designers, and styling advisors, boutiques, conservative lifestyle and fashion magazines, and an increasing favor towards international brand items -a tendency which implicitly, or quite explicitly, draws a direct correlation between wearing brand with being chic, fashionable and modern. Through such correlation, the young urban hijabi woman in her fashionable attire spiced up with upper-end brand items in a way has felt ready to step in the fashionable shopping and eating areas dominated by the secular 'white turk[14]'.

Even though the hijabi fashion and its applications through fashion shows and organizations, fashion magazines, blogs and boutiques are harshly criticized especially by the conservative religious population as of degenerating Islamic values and missing the essence of religion with their focus on the material and the ostentatious, its continuous attraction and favor by especially the young urban hijabi women seems to deserve a deeper analysis as to the motives behind. This section of the dissertation has attempted to interpret this attraction, among many other motives, partly as a resisting reaction of the long-devalued, silenced, excluded and/or ignored 'other' who has been continuously labeled as opposed to being modern and all the positive attributes that are associated with being modern, such as progressive, open-minded and rational.

Yet, such a reaction is in no way free of complications, either. The fact that such reaction is coming while staying within the discourse of the powerful labeling context and, likewise, exhibiting its resistance over the instruments and claims of this

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[14] A phrase coined by the Turkish journalist Ufuk Güldemir, which he used to define the wealthy population living detached from the general public. The Turkish sociologist Nilüfer Göle also used this term to refer to the military and civil bureaucracy and the intellectuals who regard themselves as progressive. The phrase was later used also to refer to the secular elite.

very same discourse is problematic in itself. Resisting against the claim which correlates wearing headscarf with backwardness and being not-modern re-creates the claim that modernity is related to the visual, as the refutation of the label does not come from the anti-claim that being modern is a mental process, not a material/visual one; quite the contrary, it comes from an attempt to 'modernize' the traditional look. Moreover, this attempt does not question the nature of 'being modern' and its relation with religion, either, or whether it is something that is vital to be achieved at all costs. Like many other concepts which are *loaded* with extra meanings other than what they really and directly connote, 'being modern,' too, in the Turkish context, has been made and is perceived as a pre-requisite for being open-minded and progressivist. The rise of hijabi fashion in its 'modernized' way can be seen just as another example of this perception.

4.3.2 Language as Resistance: 'The *Kanak Sprak*'

One other way of resisting a given label is to virtually adopt that very label but only by and after re-appropriating it to one's own advantage and claim of identity. The *Kanak Sprak* of the third generation Turkish immigrants living in Germany can be given as an example to such re-appropriation.

> *The Kanake's verbal power expresses itself in an expulsive, short-winded, hybrid stammering without period or comma, with arbitrarily placed pauses and improvised expressions. The Kanake speaks his mother tongue only imperfectly, and his command of "Almanisch" is limited. His vocabulary is comprised of gibberized words and expressions that exist in neither language....He embellishes his free-style sermon with gestures and facial expressions.* (Loentz, 2006, 41)

Kanak Sprak is a German sociolect created by Turkish male youth in Germany in late 1980s. The sociolect is named this way after the book *Kanak Sprak* (1995) by the German-Turkish author Feridun Zaimoğlu. This name refers to the word *Kanake*, which was originally 'given' to foreigners, especially Turks, by the German majority in the 1970s, and was used in a pejorative way of labeling *the other* in an attempt to distance themselves from the feeling of uneasiness in the face of the difference. Yet this pejorative label led to a counter movement called *Kanak Attak*, which was initiated by Zaimoğlu himself. The members of the young Turkish immigrants, rejecting German dominance, instead preferred to seek their identity in a self-chosen, aggressive segregation by re-appropriating the negative connotation of the word

Kanaken. By taking this word as a title for themselves, in a way, they re-defined the word, and adopted it, almost with pride, by negating its meaning and attributing a totally different meaning to it. This, by itself, is a rebellious resistance to the host country's exercise of power on the immigrant through language.

While seemingly a claim of identity, this *Kanak Attak* movement, in fact, rejects all politics of identity and ethnicity and the multiculturalist discourse. They have no preoccupation with the attempt for integration or a search for a stable identity. They define themselves as *Kanaksta* –with an allusion to the *gangsta* of the Black in the States. This is both an anti-racist and an anti-nationalist movement, as they describe themselves as such in their *Kanak Manifesto* (see Appendix1)*,* which was written and dispatched in November 1998 marking the beginning of this resistant activism:

> *'Kanak Attak' is a community of different people from diverse backgrounds who share a commitment to eradicate racism from German society. Kanak Attak is not interested in questions about your passport or heritage, in fact it challenges such questions in the first place. Kanak Attak challenges the conservative and liberal orthodoxy that good 'race relations' is simply a matter of tighter immigration control. Our common position consists of an attack against the 'Kanakisation' of specific groups of people through racist ascriptions which denies people their social, legal and political rights. Kanak Attak is therefore anti-nationalist, anti-racist and rejects every single form of identity politics, as supported by ethnic absolutist thinking.*

It was a declaration of rejection of representation, and, no other migrant movement probably received that much attention as well as criticism as this movement, even by the criticized German community, for whom this *Kanak Attak* was a way to get to know the 'exotic' (Halle and Steingraver, 2008) but again in their own ways. The non-immigrant German majority took this opportunity to re-inscribe *differences*, "especially at times when minorities…[are] becoming indistinguishable from the [majority]" (Loentz, 2006, 33). Here one can witness the use of language as a means of exerting power and dominance on the other over stereotypes: inspired by the *Kanak Sprak*, the German media coined a new program genre; i.e. the *Kanakcomedy*, which was celebrated by the non-immigrant German audience. This genre "features caricatured portrayals of foreigners and minorities, speaking *Kanakisch*, a stereotyped form of the actual ethnolect [*Kanak Sprak*]" (34).

The appropriation of the given label and the rise of *Kanak Sprak* was a reaction/rebellion against German government's demand from the Turkish

immigrants to learn German as a must, where language is used as a means to exert power and to "make demands on the outsiders in exchange for their admission to the inner circle" (Gibson, 2004, 8). The host country opens its gates to newcomers *if and only if* they accept to stay within their 'given' roles –which, in the case of the Turkish immigrants, the role of the *guest worker* –'guest' referring to temporariness, and 'worker' referring to being the servant without any claim of 'freedom'.

As for the language of this movement, *Kanak Sprak*, it was rebellious, consciously ungrammatical and aggressive. Elizabeth Loentz (2006) in her article "Yiddish, *Kanak Sprak*, Klezmer, and HipHop" lists some of the common features of this language (38-39):

- Use of voiceless palato-alveolar fricative instead of voiceless palatal fricative (*ich > isch, sich > sisch*);
- Reduction of alveolar affricate /ts/ to voiceless alveolar fricative /s/ (*swei, ersählen*);
- Rolled *r*;
- Shortening of long vowels;
- Omission of articles (*Hast du Problem?*);
- Omission of prepositions and articles in prepositional phrases of direction and place (*ich gehe Bibliothek*);
- Errors in gender, case, and word order;
- The use of characteristic lexical items (*korrekt, konkret and krass*) and other discourse markers (*weisst du, verstehst du, hey mann, hey alter, ich schwör*).

In fact, this constructed language was in a form just like the nationalist German power discourse would already assume the immigrant-other to be as such: rebellious, non-adjusting/conforming, irregular, aggressive, still a low-class *guest worker*. Therefore, this conscious and voluntary misuse of (German) language could be read as a conscious re-appropriation (and also mockery) of this dominant assumption about the immigrant-other especially when the fact is taken into consideration that "unlike the first generation, speakers of the ethnolect [*Kanak Sprak*] frequently have a full command of standard German" (Loentz, 2006, 37).

This linguistic phenomenon of *Kanak Sprak* flourished in line with the history of Hip-Hop in Germany. This music in a way provided the "soundtrack for the work of *Kanak Attak*" (Loentz, 2006, 50). Having seen themselves as the Black of Germany, the *Kanaksta* found the Black invention Hip-Hop music as the best representation tool of what they need to say. The famous Turkish-German Hip-Hop group, *Cartel*,

even reclaimed the word *Kanak* by using it liberally in their album, which was quite a success both in Turkey and Germany: *Don't be ashamed, be proud to be a Kanak!*

The *Kanaksta* rapped in both *Kanak Sprak* and also in Turkish. More than the type of language, the emphasis was on the attitude, which was accentuated through the use of body language. All in all, the birth of *Kanak Sprak* was a reaction against the mainstream culture's prejudices, paranoia and xenophobia together with a resistance to its labels, while at the same time a mockery of these labels through an accentuation of the perceived difference and the general assumption as to the immigrant-other.

4.3.3 Thriving to prove otherwise

Resisting the label necessarily requires the labeled resisting individual to *act* in terms of exhibiting to his labeler his real self, the self that he identifies -or would like to identify with. This act could be manifested through exhibiting the perceived visual difference again as a visuality in a more stressed manner as exemplified in the previous section, but also through negating the negative images attached to the self by means of accomplishments, which are socially accepted. To exemplify, when an Afro-American individual is labeled as a potential deviant, a lay about, a rapper-only, in short with labels in relation to personal unproductivity, he may feel the urge to thrive and head for the best in order to contradict his labeler, to invalidate and deconstruct the attached label(s). A similar attitude could be observed in all disadvantaged and/or devalued categories, like the handicapped, ex-convicts, the immigrant, and women, etc.

> *Deviance is a matter of definition. It lies, as many people now recognize, in the 'eye of the beholder.'*
> (Schur, 1984, 22)

Edwin M. Schur in his book *Labeling Women Deviant: Gender, Stigma and Social Control* talks about a 'hyphenization' phenomenon, which is basically addressing to a person's occupation and/or achievement by defining it together with his/her 'difference' (1984, 25). Setting out from the case of the labeling of women, Schur gives the examples of this hyphenization phenomenon applied to women as in a 'woman-doctor,' a 'woman-executive,' a 'woman-novelist,' a 'woman-athlete,' or "as the apocryphal 'woman-driver'" (25). Hyphenization tends to define the individual in question in terms of his/her perceived difference rather than his/her

action/occupation/achievement in question (being a doctor, an executive, a novelist, an athlete or a driver) in a reductionist attitude, and thereby attempts to hint pre-information concerning the individual's performance as to that specific action/occupation by depriving him/her of an opportunity to speak for himself/herself. Stressing the visual adjective before (and in front of) the primary action, such reductionism tends to reflect the devaluation of the adjective on to the action, itself, thus double-aggrieving the labeled.

Referring back to the achievement-oriented resisting individual under the light of Schur's hyphenization phenomenon, upon such achievement and the consequent destabilization of the label by the labeled other, the potential reactions of the powerful labeler, who seeks to maintain intact the validity and consistency of the label (Schur, 1984, 29), could be summed as the following: he either questions his proposition and the possibility of a generalizing construction (which would be the favorable one), or he insists on the validity of his proposition in the body of the alluded label. In the latter case, he again adopts one of the following two attitudes: he either continues to look at the other at-a-distance in order to avoid direct interaction which may disrupt the consistency of the constructed preconception -in which case he simply ignores/disregards the achievement in question contradicting the label (which Schur calls 'selective inattention' (30), or he simply sees this achievement as an 'exception' (30), where the labeler individual acknowledges the achievement, yet does not give credit to the devalued group by dismissing it as an exceptional occurrence. In both cases, the label maintains its validity in the eye of the beholder (i.e., the labeler).

4.4 Submitting to the Label - Exposing the Difference: The Case of the Black Criminals

Becker, in his well-known book *Outsiders*, writes that once a person upon a deviant act is labeled under a certain judgment and treated accordingly, the person, who is unable to evade this label, continues to perform the same deviance in a more permanent and steady fashion. The label turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy (Becker, 1963; Merton, 1936; Tannenbaum, 1938) on the part of the labeled person as well as the labeling community. In the case of the 'falsely-accused deviants' from Becker's types of deviant behavior chart, too, this same self-fulfilling prophecy may occur even though those individuals are labeled on an invalid basis -with no apparent

deviation at all, yet treated negatively over an assumption/prejudice/preconception and for most of the case based upon a 'difference' in their appearance.

The individual, who is assumed to be a deviant based upon previous deviant examples from his 'group' and upon the prejudice that 'he is just one of them,' that 'he is just like all the others' finds himself in a dilemma to either resist the label and try to prove its unjust relation, or to fill in the label in line with the expectations of the labelers in order not to go through the exhaustion and the challenge of proving otherwise. The case of the black criminals could be analyzed under the light of the latter part of the dilemma.

The Criminal Justice Fact Sheet of NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) presents data concerning incarceration trends in America (NAACP.com, [28.09.2013]). Its year 2008 report reveals interesting data concerning the white and non-white deviants in the States, as well as concerning the perception of 'black deviance vs. white deviance.' That '*African Americans constitute nearly 1 million of the total 2.3 million incarcerated population*' and that '*African Americans are incarcerated at nearly six times the rate of whites*' does not strictly denote that that much deviance occurred on the part of the black population (as it could also be seen in the data concerning illicit drug usage: '*About 14 million Whites and 2.6 million African Americans report using an illicit drug, 5 times as many Whites are using drugs as African Americans, yet African Americans are sent to prison for drug offenses at 10 times the rate of Whites*'), but rather it surfaces the deep preconception of the justice system as well as the society concerning the 'high tendency of African-Americans -or generally non-whites- to deviance'. This preconception also leads the jurisdiction to directly incarcerate (rather than offering leniency or release on bail) the black population on a much higher rate than the white for a similar offense: '*According to Unlocking America, if African American and Hispanics were incarcerated at the same rates of whites, today's prison and jail populations would decline by approximately 50%*'. This tendency, needless to say, has a severe after-sentence impact on the prisoner, as it drastically drops his/her chances of finding a decent job and leading a decent life.

Interpreting this data in terms of the prejudice as to the 'higher tendency of the black to deviance' does not mean to claim; however, that African-Americans are sentenced on an unfair basis. What this data reveals, instead, is the double-standard that is

likely to be used more frequently to the detriment of the black population: '*African Americans serve virtually as much time in prison for a drug offense (58.7 months) as whites do for a violent offense (61.7 months). (Sentencing Project)*'. If an identical offense does not incur the same punishment for the persons in question, then that comes to mean that something other than the deviant act, itself, is influencing the judgment/jurisdiction, which in this case is race and ethnicity. The color of the skin is attributed meanings other than the biological, and the attached label to darker skin is taken as a marker to higher predisposition to crime and deviance. On the other hand, it is possible to see in this data the previously mentioned self-fulling prophecy, as well. Once gazed as a potential deviant by society, the individual may find it less impossible to get involved in an offence, especially if there happens to be ex-convicts or ex-detainees in his direct social milieu. This, in turn, may give him (not tendency) but an acquaintance to deviance, or types of deviance.

This submission to the label, especially if shown with consciousness, comes also as a reaction as well as a punishment/revenge directed to the label and the labelers by the falsely-accused deviant. If he can become a 'deviant' on the eyes of society without committing any crime, then it may make more sense to this individual to better 'earn' this label through actual deviance. Such an attitude, in turn, may make the individual acquire a rebellious and pessimistic attitude towards life/society/his fellow beings. This reaction, if shown in a rebellious attitude, is the exact opposite of the thriving-to-prove-otherwise attitude covered in the previous section.

4.5 Resisting the Label - Hiding the Difference: Deconstruction at Work

In his definition of the concept *deconstruction*, Jacques Derrida, instead, says what it is *not*: it is not same as 'destruction,' it is neither an analysis nor a critique, yet nor a method. As he writes in a letter to a Japanese friend, a Professor Izutsu: *What deconstruction is not? Everything of course! What is deconstruction? Nothing of course!* (Wood & Bernasconi, 1985, 5) Likewise, in a video interview[15] where he is asked what *deconstruction* is, Derrida answers by stating one of its gestures, which is *to not naturalize what is not natural, to not assume that what is conditioned by history, institutions or society is natural*.

In line with Derrida's explanations, deconstruction is definitely nothing to with

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[15] Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vgwOjjoYtco.

annihilating/destroying a system/concept/context/text, etc. It is more an attempt to reveal the underlying contradictions within a system/concept/context/text which is *assumed* to be based upon an essence/absolute. To attribute an essence/absolute to a system intrinsically comes to mean attributing perfection and/or ideal to that system. Yet, as it is by no means possible to reach an absolute/universal signified setting out from a multiplicity of signifiers within a system where there is a multiplicity of meanings/interpretations/readerships/relations. Therefore, what is more rational and practical is *a continuous deconstruction* of a 'given' (or being aware of a deconstruction taking place) in order to reveal its contradictions and to enable its survival on a much healthier basis. Anyway, deconstruction is 'already at work within the work', and rather than being an act, it is an 'event', which "does not await the deliberation, consciousness, or organization of a subject, or even of modernity. It deconstructs itself. It can be deconstructed" (Wood & Bernasconi, 1985, 4). Setting out from Derrida's concept of 'deconstruction,' this section aims to analyze the 'resist/hide reaction' as an attempt to reveal the inconsistencies and self-contradictions of a dominant system and its discourse.

Not all resistance is open or exposing. Individuals who are negatively labeled and seen as potential deviants on the basis of (for most of the time) a visible part of their identities may choose to resist and struggle back the labeling system using the system's own tools and instruments and while staying within the system. Resisting necessarily brings with itself a rejection of the dominant discourse and system, and this may necessarily place the resisting individual and his resistance outside of the center of the system through *marginalization of the other*. More than a preference, marginalization can rather be viewed as a strategy of the powerful to secure its existence by warding off anyone perceived as a threat. The actions of the marginalized other are seen as marginal, as well, and consequently, their demands tend more to be questioned, ignored, disregarded or partially attended by the authority and the authority-influenced public. The authority aims to keep the 'potential deviant' always on the margin -away from the center, and under constant surveillance.

It can be easier to refute or revise a system when you are a component of it, and while you are closer to the center rather than being on the margin. This being the case, it does not become an uncommon reaction among 'visual deviants', who are

labeled upon a visual *difference*, to prefer to hide that difference in an attempt to set themselves free from the confining/judging nature of the label which drifts them away from the center towards the margin, depriving them of claiming their identity themselves.

Bernadette Wegenstein in her book *The Cosmetic Gaze: Body Modification and the Construction of Beauty* (2012) writes about the skin-whitening efforts of Michael Jackson in a "desire to transcend the categories of race, age, and gender [which] led him to multiple surgical interventions" (88). Wegenstein further adds that even though his attempt was an escape from his blackness, black folk never actually turned their backs on him or called him a 'traitor to his own race' as "they realized he was merely acting out on his face what [they] collectively have been tempted to do in [their] souls: **whitewash the memory and trace of [their] offending blackness**" (92). In a way, she claims that what Jackson tried to achieve was not an escape actually from the color of his skin, but rather from the attributions alluded to the color of black.

> Michael Kimmel: *When I look in the mirror...I see a human being -a white middle-class male- gender is invisible to me because that is where 'I' am privileged. I am the norm. I believe that most men do not know they have a gender*. (as cited in Middleton, 1992, 11)

This quote by Michael Kimmel in the course of gender discussions tells a lot more than gender. It basically uncovers the dominant ideology's outlook onto all others: What is seen as 'different' and 'deviant' in others is generally *invisible* in the body of the powerful who sets the norm for that category. The white set the norm of 'whiteness' in race -othering 'blackness' and colors other than white, the male set the norm of 'masculinity' in gender -othering 'femininity', etc. In a way, the other is seen as embodying what is 'missing' in him/her that is present in the norm. And when a norm is set and seen as the standard/acceptable/normal/natural, any marker apart from the norm is seen as deviance from the norm/the non-standard/non-acceptable/abnormal/unnatural even though that marker is in fact all natural, like the skin color, gender, ethnic background, and the like.

Returning back to Wegenstein's Michael Jackson example, for Jackson, she claims, "the problem was not the color of the skin itself; Jackson repeatedly insisted that he was a black man and was proud of that. The problem was that Jackson wanted to

escape the confines of being marked per se" (90). In hiding his 'difference', Jackson does not reject or deny a crucial part of his identity, his racial heritage; however, his desire can be interpreted as the desire to be *seen* not as an Afro-American but as just an individual like those within-the-norm, and not just gazed off. Analyzed deeper, it could even be claimed that Jackson's resistance was not only against the dominant, discriminative racial discourse, but against that of gender and beauty, as well, with an aim at "diminishing of [all] makers" (89).

This attempt of getting closer to the center from the pushed-away margins, of blending in, and of not being marked before being given any opportunity of self-claim has been conceptualized in the concept of *passing* by Sander L. Gilman in her work, *Making the Body Beautiful Beautiful: A Cultural History of Aesthetic Surgery*. This passing (or being regarded within the norm) could come either as a result of loss/denial-of-self, or, as in Jackson's claimed case, as a result of a conscious hiding (and not rejecting) the perceived difference. This concept gives the opportunity to critically analyze and deconstruct the dominant rhetoric by means of revealing the inconsistencies within, which are obvious and visible for the disadvantageous-other on the margin, yet which remain invisible to the powerful on the center. Staying within this system enables the labeled-other to be able to talk about the injustice and double-standard, and talk this at the face of the labeling authority, as well. Staying within the system gives the labeled-other the opportunity to make the center to actually *see*, and not just *gaze* at the other, as well as to pave the path to its self-reflexivity.

Of course, this resisting the label by hiding the difference reaction does not come without its portion of risk and cost. The hiding individual acts on a slippery ground, and at all times runs the risk of becoming a part (or victim) of the dominant labeling discourse. The problem is adopted more by the disadvantaged; therefore they 'see' more than the 'norm' as it can be relatively easier to see the failing parts of a system from afar. In a similar fashion, the individual may lose this perspective while being within the system, being a part of it. The power discourse of the labeling authority may influence him. Consequently, he may grow less sensitive about the problem at hand from which once he has been aggrieved. Once his 'difference' becomes invisible, he may relatively (and at times completely) lose the awareness/pain/disturbance concerning the othering effects of labeling, and being

pushed to the margin by the center. And this consequently leads to the assimilation of differences and multiplicity of identities into a dominant singularity at the cost of loss of self.

4.6   Afterword: And the Object Has Gazed Back

Labeling the 'difference' inevitably creates the illusion of the subject -who looks, and upon perceiving the 'difference', 'gazes' and 'labels' the other without actually 'seeing' him. The subject feels himself representing the norm, and the other as a deviant. This perception becomes the 'knowledge' for the subject, and when he acts upon that knowledge, it becomes the reality for him. The subject feels confident that that marks the end of the 'interaction'. Yet, one point is disregarded; i.e. the object gazes back. The gaze back of the objectified other can manifest itself in a number of ways. This chapter has specifically focused on the possible reactions shown by the labeled-other, which have been formulated over the parameters of first submitting-or-resisting the label, and secondly hiding-or-exposing the perceived difference.

The gaze back can be silent and from behind of its labeler without making him become aware of it, or it can be sharp and right at the face of its labeler, where the labeler gets perplexed and may show counter-reactions, which may be a feeling of shame, and an acknowledgement of the other's existence and identity together with a self-questioning of one's subjectness -just like Sartre explains, or, as it is more common, it may be further denial and acknowledgement of the other's deviance. Regardless of what kind of reaction the labeler presents, it is evident that the meaning continues to get articulated through the gaze back of the other even though labeling attempts to finalize it with a solid definition, whether the labeling system may be aware of it or not. Once the object gazes back, there will be new meanings opening up, and creating still new possibilities and changes concerning the interaction between individuals.

CONCLUSION

Setting out from the thesis that all labeling starts with a *gaze*, the dissertation has attempted to draw a link between the theory of gaze and that of labeling, and to re-interpret labeling studies over the theory of gaze. While the labeling theory primarily deals with the concept of occurred 'deviance', and with the 'deviant' label's potential of converting primary deviance into secondary and more permanent deviance, this dissertation handles the labeling theory from the premise of 'no initial deviance' at all, and looks at the probable reactions by the gazed/labeled individual in an attempt to better understand the effects labeling has on the labeled individual.

A number of recent socio-political cases majorly from, but not limited to, the context of Turkish society were studied to exemplify the deep-settled nature of labeling within society, and the inevitable *gaze back* of the labeled even though the gazer/labeler may not always be aware of it. Each of these cases that were studied in various parts of the dissertation, but more specifically within the fourth chapter, were given as example reactions exhibited by the labeled. These reactions were formulated into four categories, as shown below, which also make the main claim and contribution of the dissertation.

Attitude towards the Label Reaction concerning the Difference	Submitting to the Label	Resisting against the Label
Hiding the Difference	Submitting-Hiding	Resisting-Hiding
Exposing the Difference	Submitting-Exposing	Resisting-Exposing

These categories were formulated under two parameters. The first took into consideration the common attitudes in relation to the given label: either **Submitting** to or **Resisting** against the label; while the second dwelled upon the common reactions by the individuals concerning the perceived difference in them: either **Hiding** or **Exposing** the *difference*. These were analyzed in dual-relations. When an individual 'gazes' at another individual by reducing the other down to an 'Object' status and earning (or assuming to earn) himself a 'Subject' status, the objectified

other, in turn, *gazes back* at his gazer regardless of whether the latter is aware of it, or not. The Other gazes back in a number of ways: he can submit to the gaze by internalizing the label, or he can resist it in an attempt to speak for himself.

Submission to the label does not always mean retreating to one's hidden corner in order to be able to escape 'the gaze,' it may also mean implicitly 'reacting' against the label by filling in that label, and by turning the assumption/expectation of the labeler into reality. As it was explained in the *Submitting to the Label-Exposing the Difference* section of the fourth chapter, this submission can come in a revenge-taking form by the labeled directed against his labeler(s). Likewise, resistance does not have to be explicit, either, by openly decrying the unjust assumption sticked to one, but it may also be implicit in an attempt to fight back and deconstruct the dominant system by using the same weapons/instruments that have once constructed the system.

If gaze and labeling are so deeply-settled in societies, then, what could be done, at least, to lessen its influence both on society and its individuals, especially when its total eradication does not seem probable? This conclusion chapter aims to suggest some possible solutions to the problem at hand by setting out from the analyses made all through the study.

Self-Reflexivity or 'Looking at Ourselves Through the Eyes of the Other'

Born into a certain family and society, into a certain socio-economic class, and with a certain world-view, it is not always easy for the individual to actually 'see' others, who seem to be 'different' than him, in the way those others would like to present themselves. Rather, he may prefer to take refuge to the preconceptions which are already present in his immediate and/or close social environment, and thus tends to treat others in line with what those preconceptions dictate. This tendency grows in strength if the individual lives in a closed environment where he comes across and interacts primarily with those who are 'like' him.

Yet, one of the ways to set our minds free, at least to a certain degree, from the grasp of those preconceptions and the accompanying labels that they produce about others is to get conscious of the 'gaze back' of the other and the consequent 'self-reflexivity' of the gazing individual. Questioning the notions which are taken for granted can help the individual to become aware of any inconsistencies and/or injustice that are

embedded within. To do this, rather than re-thinking while staying within the existing context/discourse, one, instead, needs to start re-thinking all the existing concepts in that context/discourse. This is what Peter Middleton calls the *inward gaze*, as it is also the title of his book (1992). Listening to what 'others' are saying may also help, as this provides the individual with the opportunity to look at himself from outside, through the eyes of the other.

This looking at one's self from outside is like seeing ourselves looking at our own image in the mirror. While questioning our deeply-settled notions, rather than the image that we see in the mirror, we actually come to see the actual person in the contemplation of his image. This may help the individual face the 'labeler' side of his identity. This may then lead him to question whether those notions that he has, are indeed 'knowledge' as to the other, or just 'prejudices and misconceptions'. In this self-reflection, he may also come to conclude that the label in his mind has truth in it, yet there is a higher possibility that it may not be so, as well. In either case, he may come to the awareness that before coming to a conclusion about someone, it may make more sense first to actually listen to him -to listen to what he says about himself, rather than imposing certain assumptions as *the* reality about that other.

Self-reflexivity or self-questioning is no easy task, either. It can be quite a challenging and even painful experience for the individual, as he may have to face the plurality of truth and realities instead of *the* reality, and even to face the possibility of that single reality's being totally invalid, limited or acquired from a single perspective only. He may come face to face with the challenge of changing, admitting and acknowledging. On the whole, he may need to get out of the comfort zone of the given conceptions, as he risks those taken for granted 'solid grounds' upon which his ideas, notions, his look onto the others, and even his world-view are founded. As Middleton writes, this distinctive experience "deconstructs almost all the founding concepts on which theories of language, culture and self are based" (1992, 159). Still, for a more encompassing, peaceful, and fair world-view, the invaluable gain at the end is definitely worth the pain.

Normalization of the Perceived Difference

What is 'familiar', and what is 'different'? Needless to say, the answer to this question is that *it is relative*. What we are not accustomed to experiencing is 'different' to us, 'different' from us, and basically becomes the 'other' for us. Yet,

what is exactly the thing that makes one difference the 'norm' and the other 'deviance' from the norm? The answer to this question is marked within the power discourse. The dominant ideology and mentality define both the 'norm' -the normal, the acceptable, the valid, the superior, the legitimate; as well all the 'others' -the abnormal, the unacceptable, the invalid, the inferior, the deviant.

One other way to lessen the influence of labeling and preconceptions is to normalize the 'difference' by acknowledging its legitimacy as much as we do for ours. Schur (1984) calls it the 'humanizing of perceptions' in his book, *Labelling Women Deviant* (19). For our perceptions concerning others to be humane and more just, it is crucial that we start on equal grounds, at least as much as possible, without seeing ourselves as the 'norm' and the other as the 'deviant'. Empathy helps a good deal in the learning of normalization, as through empathizing with the other, the individual may come to see that he, himself, may well seem 'different' to the other. To exemplify, just as the white man saw the 'devil' in the black man, the black man was terrified upon seeing the 'ghost' in the white man. Questioning the dominant discourse, together with its constructedness to the advantage of the dominant group, leads the labeling individual to become aware of the privileges that this dominant discourse favors him while victimizing the other with the charge of the latter's unconformity to the 'norm'.

Normalization is important especially when one thinks about the psychology of the labeled, who is constantly reduced to a disadvantaged situation based upon one or more parts of his/her identity, both body and character. As the 'submit to the label/hide the difference' reaction portrays, the devaluation of the individual may impair his/her self-conceptions resulting in an "impaired self-esteem and induced passivity" (Schur, 1984, 241). Internalizing the label, the individual may prefer to hide his/her 'deviant' visibility in an attempt and desire to *blend in* with all the others, not to attract attention (in an awkward manner in this case), and just to be perceived as 'normal'. However, once normalization, or learning to treat any perceived 'difference' as normal and not as deviance, is adopted by members of society, the labeled individual can also re-gain his/her self-esteem and confidence and learn not to see himself/herself as different than the rest, but rather different as all others.

Recognition of Oppression

Similar to normalization, but this time not from the point of view of the labeler, but from that of the labeled individual, is the latter's recognition of the oppression and the accompanying labels attached to him/her. The individual's awareness of others' unjust treatment resulting from a prejudice, misconception and/or lack of interaction may lead him to not internalizing the label and consequently to not seeking deficiency in himself. Being aware of being oppressed in some way, physically and/or psychologically, adds to one's personality as this awareness can give him the courage to face the challenge, fight it back, and eventually move on self-confident in life. In his book *The Inward Gaze* (1992, 146), Peter Middleton writes that "oppression confers an identity...because that is the moment when [members of an oppressed group] perceive that their experience is not the result of their own specific nature or the nature of the world, but the result of an alterable state of things...It is in the recognition of injustice". Once he is aware, it opens up a possibility for change and reform of things for the labeled individual and also for society in the wider picture. It is specifically crucial for the individuals adopting a 'submitting to label' type of reaction in order to regard themselves through a more sympathetic self-gaze.

Actual Interaction with the Other: Is the 'different' really *that* different?

Getting familiar with the 'unfamiliar' and recognizing the self in the 'other' is possible through a sincere attempt to get to know the other through *interaction*. A turn to the other with fewer preconceptions in mind (since the claim of no preconception would be unrealistic) may provide the individual with the opportunity to revise what has been 'given' to him/her. More interaction would also show the individual, with labels in his mind, all the 'exceptions' in those generalized labels, and may thus lead him to be more skeptical concerning any generalizations about others. When it comes to the labeled individual, such an attempt would provide him with the opportunity to present his own identity rather than continuously trying to refute the already given definitions to him. These, on the whole, will definitely contribute to the well-being of whole society through an increasing compromise among its various components, without the threat or attempt of any blending in of any difference by the more dominant. In that case, there will be less 'tolerance' and more 'acknowledgement and welcoming' as to 'difference'.

Going Cosmopolitan

John Tomlinson, in his article "The Possibility of Cosmopolitanism" (*Globalization and Culture*, 1999), talks about cosmopolitanism in terms of its stand on the face of the local/global binary opposition. As the definition of the word goes, a *cosmopolitan* is a citizen of the world, "free from national limitations and prejudices" (Tomlinson, 1999, 185). Yet, being a citizen of the world does not necessarily mean only being available to and accessing the diversity in the world, this could be the definition of the 'global', cosmopolitanism includes "belonging, involvement, responsibility and [integration] of broader concerns into everyday life practices" in addition to this accessibility (185). In him, there is not the tolerant indifference of the metropolitan citizen –*plurality of isolations* (203), rather "a willingness to engage with the Other" (185). Under the light of this distinction, there becomes another distinction between the true cosmopolitan and the globally mobile people, such as tourists, exiles, expatriates, transnational employees and labor migrants –in whose cases there is either a forced or pragmatic move instead of a willingness to move to engage with the Other in "search for contrasts rather than uniformity" (Hannerz, 239 as cited in Tomlinson, 185). Here, in fact there should be quotation marks around the word "the Other" as for the true cosmopolitan, in fact, "there are no others" at all (194).

Deriving from Tomlinson's argument in favor of the cosmopolitan identity, one's acquiring a cosmopolitan mentality in his relation with the rest of the world enables him to regard 'the difference of the Other' as the valuable variety that needs to be appreciated, rather than as something to be judged and avoided. Such mentality reform is possible, as is cited in Tomlinson's article, "through the routine exposure to cultural difference and the constant reminder of the wider world beyond their locality" (202).

Labeling the 'Labeling'

> *'When I look in the mirror...I see a human being - a white middle-class male- gender is invisible to me because that is where I am privileged. I am the norm. I believe that most men do not know they have a gender.'* (as cited in Middleton, 1992, 11)

It is naturally the disadvantaged who are more conscious of and sensitive about a mistreatment than the ones who are not directly got affected by it. In other words,

they *see* the problem at hand more than the 'norm' does. Still, when any injustice has taken place, and when only the victimized react to it, a major problem occurs for the whole of society. Justice and rights cannot be relative; they are either present or not, and they do not change from one individual to another, or from one context to another. Thus, it is important for members of a society at least not legitimizing the prejudiced act or attitude, as otherwise would be another form of injustice.

Therefore taking action and/or raising their voices on behalf of and together with the labeled other is as crucial as the labeled individual's realization of oppression and standing against it. This can effectively be realized through condemning the labeling and the resulting attitude towards the individual. It would also help prevent the labeling attitude's getting internalized both by the rest of public, and even by the labeled individual himself. Counter-labeling to the labeling authority can be as effective as the initial labeling itself, as the labeler would not like to be stigmatized as being against all the aspired values of the millennium; such as humanism, democracy and open-mindedness.

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Contributions of the Dissertation

By pointing out to the close relation between the concept of 'gaze' and 'labeling', this dissertation directly contributes to labeling studies, which have primarily dwelled upon the concept in its relation to the notion of 'deviance'. Yet, this dissertation argues that the actual happening of deviance is not necessary for an individual to be still labeled as a 'deviant'. The dissertation takes these 'falsely-accused deviants' as its main concern, and opens up an alternative perspective within the studies of deviance from the point of view of this over-generalized, disadvantaged group. The motive behind the choice of this specific group as the main concern is that such individuals are not a minority in any society which is composed of various ethnic or racial backgrounds, religious views, and the like, and the Turkish society is one of them. The dissertation aims to explore the different reactions (or *gaze back*) of the labeled through examples of socio-political cases from various social contexts, but primarily and mostly from the context of Turkish society as well as through analyses derived from theories in social sciences.

The study also contributes to the theory of 'gaze', which is still a popular topic especially in cultural and postcolonial studies as well as in the studies of identity. Among these, it is directly related to the studies and politics of identity, as several sections are also devoted to the themes of identity construction, its deconstruction and re-construction. The gaze back of the labeled brings another perspective to the studies of gaze in an attempt to better understand the psychology of the labeled individual, as well.

With these contributions, this dissertation on the effects of 'deviant' labeling on the 'falsely-accused' individuals and the latter's probable reactions categorized into four axes aims to be a part of the understanding of the acknowledgement of multiple identities by questioning and re-defining the notion of 'difference'.

But, of course, this area is still in need of further research. One such area of research can be 'non-labeling' through which, as Joy Moncrieffe writes, "some issues and peoples are left off policy agendas" (2007, 8). Depending on the context, non-representation, or under-representation, can be as disadvantageous as misrepresentation. In that respect, labeling can even be seen as useful in putting the 'problem' or distress on the agenda. As an example, the struggle concerning the claim for full rights for the Kurdish minority finds coverage much more frequently and profoundly in media and politics than those for other minorities even though they may share similar anxieties. In a similar fashion, over-representation of an issue through excessive media coverage may likewise prove to be to the disadvantage of the represented group again, as it runs the risks of being represented from a single aspect only and as a homogenous group in spite of the varieties within. The coverage of the Kurdish issue over the problem of PKK in media can be given as an example to the latter. Even though the PKK is not representative of all Kurdish people, the over-representation of the Kurdish problem continuously in its relation to the problem of PKK can lead to the perception that the problem is one and the same.

Since labeling is closely related to the politics of power, and since the dominant group(s) define what is the 'norm' and what is the 'deviant/different', a re-definition and further analysis concerning the definitions of 'norm and 'deviant/difference', together with its persistency and/or frequency are necessary in order to be able to understand any 'deviance' in society, and to offer solutions without the victimization of any individual.

In his discussion of *ideology*, Althusser says it [ideology] has very little to do with 'consciousness' and that it is profoundly *unconscious* (1969, *For Marx*, as cited in Hebdige, 1979, 12). Similar to that, in this study, I believe and claim that the tendency of labeling others is, most of the time, unconscious; i.e. all the images, concepts and structures about the Other are brought down on man via dominant social norms and expectations existing in a society. In his interaction with the Other (namely, anyone who is perceived as somewhat 'different' than the self), man generally looks to validate the already existing image in his mind. The reasons of this tendency have been discussed in detail in the chapters of the dissertation.

The Conclusion of the dissertation has also suggested ways to deal with this tendency (of gaze and labeling) in an attempt to minimize its negative effects on social relations of man, as well as to normalize the existence of 'difference' by creating a skeptical view concerning the *neutrality* and *superiority* of the 'norm'. As Dick Hebdige writes "all human societies *reproduce* themselves…through a process of 'naturalization'. It is through this process…that *particular* sets of social relations, *particular* ways of organizing the world appear to us as if they were universal and timeless" (1979, 14). This very process leads man to unconsciously accept the validity and naturalness of the 'norm', while regarding anything outside of the scope of this norm as foreign, defected, deviant, different, shortly as the Other. Even though gaze and labeling seem to exist as long as human societies survive; still, with increasing interaction among and within societies, there is also increasing hope for man to actually 'see' rather than simply look, watch and/or *gaze*.

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KANAK ATTAK UND BASTA!

'Kanak Attak' is a community of different people from diverse backgrounds who share a commitment to eradicate racism from German society. Kanak Attak is not interested in questions about your passport or heritage, in fact it challenges such questions in the first place. Kanak Attak challenges the conservative and liberal orthodoxy that good 'race relations' is simply a matter of tighter immigration control. Our common position consists of an attack against the 'Kanakisation' of specific groups of people through racist ascriptions which denies people their social, legal and political rights. Kanak Attak is therefore anti-nationalist, anti-racist and rejects every single form of identity politics, as supported by ethnic absolutist thinking.

Put simply, we reject everyone and everything that exploits, dominates and humiliates people. The field of interventions of Kanak Attak covers critiques of the political and economical circumstances that allow racism to fester, to the culture industries that perpetuate the commodification of racism, to confronting everyday racism, from discrimination to violence, in Germany. We support the fundamental human rights of all people, yet at
the same time are critical of notions of 'equality' that means the subordination of difference under one hegemonic culture. We want challenge this domination of a hegemonic culture that ignores racial inequality - whether it is termed "global postmodernism" or a dull Teutonism.

For many decades migrant societies, organisations and initiatives have existed, that have criticised the socio-political situation and desperate living conditions for those denied full entry into the German public sphere. However these efforts and campaigns have been restricted to the very communities they seek to help, leaving the main body politic unchallenged. Kanak Attak is therefore critical of the benefits possible from individual
communities lobbying for their particularistic interests, and the non-confrontational mode of politics evident within contemporary democracies. It's high time to stop asking about respect and tolerance without naming the political ecomomic conditions of social inequality.

The End of Dialogue Culture

Although Kanak Attak is a predominantly migrant movement it should not be seen as the 'cool voice' of the ghetto. That's how they would like it, the commercial vultures of the cultural industries, who are searching for 'authentic' and 'exotic' human experiences to be sold to those living in the grey mainstream of everyday German society. Here the figure of the young, angry migrant fits perfectly; the person who endorses the 'out of the ghetto' mythology that assures complacent liberals that

German society is meritocratic after all, and which in turn is used to great commercial success by the German music and film industries in falsifying the 'German Dream'.

Kanak Attak also distances itself against a definition of the 'political', that naively suggests that all that is needed is 'dialogue' and 'peaceful cohabitation' of Kanaken and the majority of this society via the "Day of the foreign fellow citizen", displays of folk culture and humanistic campaigns. When the weather is good and the conscience is bad liberal Germans decorate their cars with stickers: 'Foreigners, never leave us alone with the Germans!'. Kanak Attak is not a friend of such multiculturalism. Anyway there are not many supporters of this concept left which never got beyond the status of local policy experiments before mainstream talk turned to the failure of multicultural society. So it was inevitable that claims for integration and assimilation resurfaced. In this atmosphere it was not German society that was examined but the migrants themselves! 'Of course, what migrants lack is tolerance', we were told. And who does not want to 'adapt' (read assimilate) into the open society has no business in enlightened Germany. Yet tolerance is being claimed from a dominant position that does not have to examine its own complicitness with subordination, and existing relations of domination are being suppressed. This logic suggests that to talk openly about racism, and to challenge the ethnocentrism and nationalism will only cause more trouble and violence. It could produce prejudice among the majority of Germans. The only racists are the extremists or so we are told. We reject all of this. Racism has to be challenged in all ist forms from individual discrimination to violent attacks.

Enter the politics

Kanak Attak challenges fundamentally the status of 'foreigners'. Even if there is a partial granting of civil rights, this would fail to meet our ideas. Without considering it as heaven on earth, if everyone has passports, a right to vote and similar socio-political rights, it is a necessary requirement that everyone receives at least, on a formal level, the same rights. That's why we welcome every attempt to reduce inequality. After all, citizenship is of great significance taking everyday life and sometimes even existential situations into consideration. Last but not least it is better if one can travel around spontaneously and unchecked throughout the EU. This would be a formal-juridical equality and it would help to broaden our thinking about economic and political issues and demands for social equality for all.

Since the last elections a new constellation emerges. The possibility of double citizenship - 'Hosgeldiniz yeni vatandaslar!' 'Heartily welcome new compatriots!' 'Herzlich willkommen neue Landsleute!' (Bild) - undermines for the first time since fascism the fateful bond with the 'folk since birth'. But caution! The process of privileging certain immigrants goes together with the exclusion of others. The dismissive gesture of the
red-green coalition concerning the question of immigration, of asylum and the situation of refugees, the ongoing practice to label and criminalise people, and the deportation of 'unpleasant people' via the Foreigners Act speak for itself. All of this aims at an open and subtle separation between convenient, tolerated and undesirable groups, who more or less have no personal freedom.

124

Whether they appear as Acts and policy statements or through checks in pedestrian precincts, in train stations and on the streets, they all steal time and space from the people. To say nothing of the attacks on life and limb, that are an increasingly everyday reality in modern Germany. This is not only the business of Teutonic jungle law on the streets, but also one of state asylum and deportation practice.

Against contemporary certainties

Racism articulates itself at present mainly in a culturalist form. Likewise in other European countries Islam serves as a space of projection for different kinds of racisms. That's why we think we have to fight against all barriers that prevent recognition of Islam as an equal religious community. For us Islam is no homogenous ideology. One has to divide the everyday religious practice from the organised political Islam. Nevertheless present day Anti-Islamism is one of the key parts to the neo-racist consensus within German society. The false and pseudo-feminist position of German politicians is invoked to defend spurious 'universal' rights. This can be seen in the discourse over headscarfs. At this point even reactionary politicians discover their heart for the suppressed woman, as long as they can pin the blame on Islam.

Another racist form of argumentation that we have to attack is the idea that the 'mixture of people' must somehow be regulated and controlled. This nonsense has spread too far. It hits people through the Foreigners Act in the same way as the person on the door of the club regulates the "right mixture" of people. Those who mean well often point out the so-called pressure that is caused by uncontrolled immigration. But it is not migration
that is the problem it is the problems of those who can only think and live in ways that promote bland homogeneity. Even the tolerant and enlightened are looking for a new club if necessary or a new part of town. Others hope for help from the Nazi-Parties or take charge of the law themselves. We claim not only the extension of the civil rights and other privileges to all groups, but put the apparent obvious regulation of 'inside'
and 'outside' and the absurdity of dehumanising living conditions that racism promotes into question. Punktum e basta.

Repräzent? - Repräzent!

Kanak Attak offers a platform for Kanaken from different social areas and are sick of the easy switching between cultures recommended by postmodernists. Kanak Attak wants to break the assignment of ethnic identities and roles; the 'we' and 'them'. And because Kanak Attak is a question of attitude and not of heritage, origin, roots or papers, non-migrants and Germans of the 2nd and even 3rd-generation are part of it too. But
here as well caution! The existing hierarchy of social existence and the subject positions it imposes cannot be faded out or skipped over with the greatest of ease. Not all constructions are the same. So our project is caught up in the whirlpool of contradictions concerning the relation of representation, difference and the ascription of ethnic identities.

Nevertheless: we compete for a new attitude of migrants of all generations that we want to bring on stage, independently and without compromise. Whoever believes that we celebrate a Potpourri out of Ghetto-HipHop and other clichés will be surprised. We sample, change and adapt different political and cultural drifts that all operate from oppositional positions. We go back to a mixture of theory, politics and cultural practice. This song
is ours.

Es geht ab. Kanak Attak!

<div align="right">November 1998</div>

VİLDAN ÖZERTÜRK SOFU

PERSONAL BACKGROUND
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EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

01.2011-2014   MA **Yildiz Technical University,** Istanbul, TURKEY
Humanities and Social Sciences GPA: 4.00/4.00
Thesis: The End of Meaning: The Effect of 'Gaze' and Labeling on Social Relations

01.2007-07.2008   MBA **University of North Alabama**, Florence, AL, USA
Business Administration GPA: 3.72/4.00

09.2005-06.2006   TESL **Yildiz Technical University,** Istanbul, TURKEY
Teaching English as a Second Language Program

09.2001-07.2005   BA   **Boğaziçi University**, Istanbul, TURKEY
Western Languages & Literatures GPA: 3.72/4.00

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

08.2011-09.2012   **Fatih Sultan Mehmet Foundation University,** Istanbul, Turkey
English instructor at School of Foreign Languages
•   Attended classes (22 hr/week actual teaching + 6 hr/week make-up classes)
•   As the **Reading and Writing Coordinator**, coordinated the related teachers concerning the teaching of reading and writing skills, held and coordinated weekly meetings
•   Prepared exam questions, and contributed to material development
Reason of quit: Moving to Medina, KSA due to marriage

07.2010-10.2010   **Mes Yatırım Danışmanlığı Ltd. Şti.**
Project Consultancy in Purchasing (Project-based work)
•   Attended the project team to carry out a preliminary feasibility study and market research in the Republic of Yemen and Egypt for Mes Yatırım Danışmanlığı Ltd. Şti. which gives consultancy abroad in hard discount retail concept.

11.2008-05.2010 **Yeni Mağazacılık A.Ş. (A.101),** İstanbul, Türkiye
Advertising & Purchasing
• Organized all advertising activities of the company (in various Media channels such as tv, radio, outdoor, and printed media as well as poster and insert design and printing organization), attended meetings and represented the company regarding advertising, prepared the advertising budget, presented the advertising planning and budget to the Management, carried out advertising purchasing.
• Within the job description of the Purchasing Assistant position in Dairy products, Non-Food and Spot Products, carried out firm and product search, firm meetings and price negotiations, product purchasing, market research, product development, and sales reporting over SAP.

06.2008-09.2008 **Roberts-Gordon LLC,** Buffalo, NY, USA
Research Analyst Summer Intern
• Researched and prepared a table for tariff rates for all countries around the world for the assigned company products
• Researched and prepared a table for incentive programs offered by utility companies in US and Canada for energy efficiency products
• Researched trade shows in food processing, refrigeration and fire industries
• Researched target markets and made initial contacts with potential customers in Turkey for various products of the company and its affiliates

OTHER EXPERIENCE
06.2007-05.2008 **Graduate Research Assistant**
Management Dept, College of Business, UNA
09.2007-05.2008 **President**, MBA Club, UNA
• Leading weekly meetings; organizing events; representing MBA student body where necessary
09.2007-05.2008 **Tutor at Academic Resource Center**, UNA
Accounting, Economics, Statistical Analysis and Tools, Finance

CERTIFICATES
Teaching English as second language Certificate given by YTU, Istanbul
Microbiology Training Certificate given by Tubitak, İstanbul
Copy-writing Certificate given by Boğaziçi University WLL Department, İstanbul
International Center for Journalists Certificate, USA
Fine Arts Certificate given by Boğaziçi University Fine Arts Department, İstanbul
Human Resources Expert Certificate given by AYD Training & Consultancy Company, İstanbul

HONORS
UNA MBA Advisory Committee Member Appreciation Certificate
UNA Service Reward as the President of MBA Club
2007 Spring & Summer University of North Alabama Dean's List
2005 High Honors Degree from Bogazici University (Dept 2nd)

THESIS

'Bird Imagery' in Western Literature –in the Classical, Romantic, Modern and Postmodern Periods -BA

LANGUAGES

Turkish   Mother Tongue
English   Fluent
Arabic   Intermediate

COMPUTER LITERACY

MS OFFICE (WORD – EXCEL- POWERPOINT)
SMARTBOARD
PREZI Presentation Tool
PC, INTERNET
GOOGLE ADWORDS experience through the GOMC

INTERESTS/SOCIAL ACTIVITIES

Sightseeing and photography, "ebru" Turkish marbling art, watching culture documentaries, reading and writing, trekking, cycling, learning foreign languages