

**REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
YILDIZ TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES M.A. PROGRAM**

M.A. THESIS

**THE KAZAKH IDENTITY AND ITS
TRANSFORMATION AFTER 1990
IN TURKEY**

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ADVISOR

Assoc. Prof. SETENAY NIL DOGAN

**ISTANBUL
2020
YIL**

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ABSTRACT

THE KAZAKH IDENTITY AND ITS TRANSFORMATION AFTER 1990 IN TURKEY

Nur Banu Zafer

December, 2020

The Kazakh community in Turkey is based on the masses of Kazakh migrants, who were forced to leave their homeland by the violence and genocide policy of China in East Turkestan. Kazakhs are a Turkic ethnic group mainly located around Ural-Altay Mountains and the Northern part of Central Asia. The Kazakh population in Turkey is composed of people forced to leave Altai Mountains in August 1936 and migrate to Turkey due to several reasons. The Kazakh diaspora was formed as a result of a long-distance migration, which was first considered to be temporary but then turned into a regular settlement. Throughout its formation process, the community has been influenced and developed by different historical events and factors such as politics, economy and religion.

This thesis is about Kazakhs who had to leave their homeland and managed to arrive in Turkey in 1950s passing through Tibet, Gansu, Kashmir, India and Pakistan. Based on different theories of the identity, the study aims to examine the social, cultural and political attitudes of the Kazakh community in Turkey. The objective of this research is to show the changing nature of identity shaped by immigration, globalization, and technological advancements. The main purpose of this study is to explore how the Kazakhs define themselves in the light of identity, immigration, and homeland concepts.

Key Words: Identity, immigration, the Kazakh community in Turkey...

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE’DEKİ KAZAK KİMLİĞİ VE 1990 SONRASI DÖNÜŞÜMÜ

Nur Banu Zafer

Aralık, 2020

Türkiye'deki Kazak topluluğu, Doğu Türkistan'da Çin'in şiddet ve soykırım politikasıyla vatanlarını terk etmek zorunda kalan Kazak göçmen kitlelerine dayanmaktadır. Kazaklar, çoğunlukla Ural-Altay Dağları çevresinde ve Orta Asya'nın kuzey kesiminde bulunan bir Türki etnik gruptur. Türkiye'deki Kazak nüfusu, Ağustos 1936'da Altay Dağları'nı terk etmeye zorlanan ve çeşitli nedenlerle Türkiye'ye göç eden insanlardan oluşmaktadır. Türkiye'deki Kazak diasporası, önce geçici olduğu düşünülen ancak daha sonra düzenli bir yerleşime dönüşen uzun mesafeli bir göç sonucunda oluşmuştur. Topluluk oluşum süreci boyunca siyaset, ekonomi ve din gibi farklı tarihsel olaylardan ve faktörlerden etkilenmiştir.

Bu tez, Tibet, Gansu, Kaşmir, Hindistan ve Pakistan'dan geçerek vatanlarını terk etmek zorunda kalan ve 1950'lerde Türkiye'ye gelmeyi başaran Kazaklar hakkındadır. Çalışma, farklı kimlik teorilerine dayanarak Türkiye'deki Kazak toplumunun sosyal, kültürel ve politik tutumlarını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu araştırmanın amacı; göç, küreselleşme ve teknolojik gelişmelerin şekillendirdiği kimliğin değişen doğasını göstermektir. Ayrıca, bu çalışmanın temel amacı Kazakların kimlik, göç ve vatan kavramları ışığında kendilerini nasıl tanımladıklarını incelemektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kimlik, göç, Türkiye'deki Kazaklar...

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Istanbul; December, 2020

Nur Banu Zafer

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	: Ak Parti (Justice and Development Party)
CHP	: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party)
DP	: Democrat Party
FEKA	: Federation of European Kazakh Association
KATEAD	: Kazakh Turks Education and Research Association
KTA	: Kazakh Turk Association
MHP	: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party)
U.S.A.	: United States of America
W.K.A	: World Kazakh Association

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Aims of the Study and the Research Question

Identities formed as a result of interaction with others are “fluid and multiple”, not “fixed and innate.” Taking this into consideration, this thesis aims to study on identity, identity types and changing nature of identities due to migration and globalization. Especially, in postmodern and post-colonial studies, identity is regarded as something which is always in flux and process. It is not stable and shaped depending on the environment, situation and interaction with people. As a result of globalization and migration, identity has become more complicated and problematic because it is not transparent and it is a production which is never complete.¹ The reason why identity is perceived as problematic and complicated is that each encounter adds new identities or belongings to the existing identities. In addition, the fluency of identity has led to the emergence of new perspectives and new definitions about identity. As a result of that identities interact with each other and hybrid identities emerge. In fact, globalization and migration are of great importance in the emergence of homogeneous cultures. On the other hand, these two important elements also emphasizes the heterogeneous structures of societies as Young puts it, “today’s comparative certainty has arisen because heterogeneity, cultural interchange and diversity have now become the self-conscious identity of modern society.”² This cultural change stems from globalization and migration leads hybridity of identities.

Hybridity has gained importance after globalization, decolonization and migration movements. According to Homi Bhabha, hybrid individuals combine both cultures and create a new identity for themselves in the *Third Space* where both sides influence each other through constant interactions. As a result of these interactions,

¹ Stuart Hall, **In Identity: Community, Culture, Difference**, ed. J. Rutherford (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990), 222.

² Robert Young, **Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race** (London: Routledge, 1995), 4.

hybrid identities carry signs of both cultures and this *in-betweenness* provides them to be exposed to both cultures and to live both “here” and “there.”³

As mentioned, globalization and immigration have affected identities and the perspective on identities. According to Amin Maalouf, there are multiple allegiances and identities and all are components of personality.⁴ Since identity has many components, it is a complex mechanism. Therefore, if one wants to examine her/his identity, she/he needs to question her/his affiliations, origins, relationships with others, religion, and all kind of allegiances.⁵ He also states that immigrants are “bridges, go-betweens and mediators between the various communities and cultures.”⁶ According to John W. Berry, while immigrants set up bridges between cultures and communities, they go through acculturation and adaptation processes. He argues that “individuals try to incorporate themselves into the new culture by adopting their traditions, but still preserve their own cultural values and traditions.”⁷ They blend the values, customs, cultural norms and attitudes of the overarching host country. This situation leads to changes in their daily behaviour.

Though inspired by these studies, the purpose of this thesis is to explore the Kazakh community in Turkey who migrated from East Turkestan and arrived in Turkey in 1950s as groups, and have been living together more than 6 decades. This thesis also aims to explore:

- What caused Kazakhs to leave their homeland?
- How do Kazakhs in Turkey define their identity? What constitutes their identity?
- What is the perception of Kazakh community in Turkey about the term diaspora?
- Do they have any effort to preserve their identity and culture?
- Where do they see their homeland as? Has their perception of homeland changed?
- What is their perception of return movement?
- Have globalization and acceleration in technology affected their activities and identity in Turkey?

³ Homi Bhabha, **The Location of Culture** (New York: Routledge, 1994), 5.

⁴ Amin Maalouf, **In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong** (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 14.

⁵ **Ibid.**, 19.

⁶ **Ibid.**, 5.

⁷ David L. Sam, John W. Berry, **Acculturation Psychology** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 27-69.

1.2. Theoretical Framework

This thesis considers identity as fluid and multiple phenomenon which is affected by human interactions in historical process. Taking this into consideration, this thesis is focused on the exploration of the Kazakh community who migrated from East Turkestan and arrived in Turkey in 1950s in groups, and has been living together more than 6 decades. To that extent, this study focuses on Kazakhs and their identity formation considering the historical and political effect on the formation of their identity in Turkey. In order to be able to make an interpretation about Kazakh identity in, this thesis tries to look at identity from a postcolonial perspective benefitting from Buckingham, Connolly, Bauman, Erving Goffman, Maalouf, Stuart Hall, Kehily, Cote, Gerd Baumann, and Erik Erikson.

From the postcolonial perspective, identity is a slippery and ambiguous term because of its root which encompasses both similarity and difference as Buckingham states.⁸ Hence, identities are unique to each of us and they may change according to the situations. As to Connolly, identity needs difference to achieve itself which makes it relational and collective.⁹ These differences make them what they are and feel a need to have a sense of belonging. As a result of that individuals become a part of a group. As Bauman states, “the idea of identity arose from the need for a sense of belonging and security, and it has become more problematic to construct or to talk about one’s identity in postmodern era due to its fluidity and mobility.”¹⁰ It is because identity was regarded as stable and innate. However, in postmodern era, it is considered as something in flux. Cote also argues that in the late-modern society, it is difficult to have a stable identity due to fluidity and mobility.¹¹ In this regard, Stuart Hall claims that identities are fractures and multiply constructed across different positions, practices and discourses.¹² To that extend, Maalouf states that identities are not given by birth and they change throughout a people’s lives.¹³ Since identities are not given once and for all, they are not separate affiliations but shaped through

⁸ David Buckingham, “Introducing Identity.” **Youth, Identity, and Digital Media**, v.1, no.24 (2008): 1

⁹ William E. Connolly, **Confessing Identity\Belonging to Difference** (USA: Minnesota Press, 2002), 14.

¹⁰ Zygmunt Bauman, **Interview: Identity** (Psychology Press, 2005), 1-10.

¹¹ James E. Cote, “Sociological perspectives on identity formation: the culture-identity link and identity capital.” **Journal of Adolescence**, v.19 no.5 (1996): 421.

¹² **Ibid.**, Hall, 6.

¹³ Maalouf, **ibid**, 23.

multiple allegiances.¹⁴ Allegiances such as religion, community, nationality, work, family, etc. help individuals to define themselves. In this regards, Hall also argues that identities “Identities are in process of becoming rather than being.”¹⁵ Seeing that identity is fluid and always in a process, Kehily who agrees with Hall also states that “identity can be seen as multiple: spoken through and in dialogue with arrange of social categories and positions.”¹⁶

Migration and mobility have been instrumental in the fluency of identity and in looking at it from different perspectives. Thus, in this thesis, it is aimed to indicate how immigrants have multiple identities, multiple languages and location as a result of mobility. Migration, however, does not only affect the people who are directly involved in the process but also affect the people who are natives because immigrants bring their own beliefs, cultures, norms, traditions, and preferences along them to new locations. In addition, migration is one of the most important factors which can shape, affect and determine the dynamics of individuals' identity seek. Leaving the lands traumatically where they lived for centuries and being forced for migration cause a change for people. If these immigration movements are not carried out of the individuals' and societies' own accord, that is, their return opportunities are limited, the image of the homeland in the minds encounters the danger of disappearing as the generation progress. Therefore, the efforts not to lose their culture and language and to remain in solidarity at all times are important for these migrant people in host countries. It can therefore be inferred that these migrants tend to combine two different cultures in the same pot and create a hybrid identity for themselves which help them to adapt in the host country and not to lose their ethnic identity. Benefitting from Homi Bhabha's notions such as hybridity, Third Space, and in-betweenness, and also Berry's theories of acculturation and adaptation, this paper aims to explore how Kazakhs in Turkey have become hybrids by combining both Turkish and Kazakh cultural norms and created a *Third Space* for them. Apart from Homi Bhabha, studies of Marshall McLuhan, Young, Paul Gilroy, Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Werbner, Virinder Kalra, Raminder Kaur and John Hutnyk are used to explore and understand hybridity and hybrid identities.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 18-20.

¹⁵ Stuart Hall, Paul Du Gay, **Questions of Cultural Identity** (London: Sage Publications, 1996): 4

¹⁶ Mary J Kehily, **What is identity? A sociological perspective**. In: ESRC Seminar Series: The educational and social impact of new technologies on young people in Britain, 2 March 2009, London School of Economics, UK, 6.

Virinder Kalra, Raminder Kaur and John Hutnyk argue that the term immigration or immigrant has lost its reputation in order to describe communities. The first reason is that the term immigrant is used for people who have not immigrated but offspring of migrants. “The word immigrant, rather than relating to an actual event of movement, becomes a euphemism for not from this place, or for one who belongs somewhere else.”¹⁷ The second reason is that the term immigrant is used to imply people migrating from one place to another, and it is the end of the story.¹⁸ According to Kalra, Kaur and Hutnyk, diasporas, hybrid identities, and ethnic communities show us that the story does not end and it shifts our point of view and continue by changing form. It could be argued that combined with a hyphenated, hybrid identification, diaspora allows us to move beyond the fixed notion and definition of immigrant. In addition, it allows us to perceive migration as an existing process which builds links and relationships at the material and cultural levels.¹⁹ However, the term diaspora might be perceived negative or positive based on the communities and the political scenario. Within this context, this study aims to understand the perception of Kazakh community on the term diaspora referring to William Safran, Robert Cohen, Eleni Sideri, Sheffer, Brubaker, Yossi Shain, Robert J. Young, and Thomas Faist.

Another issue addressed in this study is the effects of globalization and acceleration in technology on the identities. Especially the fact that the internet and social media have become so popular and easily accessible has enabled the members of diaspora or ethnic communities to use these opportunities in their favor. The virtual environments, especially virtual associations that members create online, lead community members to get news about each other, they also play a key role to maintain the unity and expand an ethnic communities’ sense of identity.²⁰

Finally, after the dissolution of Soviet Russia and Kazakhstan’s declaration of independence, the perception of Kazakhs in Turkey has changed. This situation has led Kazakhs to increase their activities in both Turkey and Kazakhstan after 1990s. In this context, this thesis aims to indicate the activities of the Kazakhs based on globalization and Rogers Brubaker’s category of practice.

¹⁷ Virinder Kalra, Raminder Kaur, John Hutnyk, **Diaspora and Hybridity** (London: Sage Publication, 2005), 14.

¹⁸ **Ibid.**, 14.

¹⁹ **Ibid.**, 15.

²⁰ M. Lagurre. **Diaspora, Politics, and Globalization** (England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 85

1.3. Methodological Framework

This study aims to explore Kazakh community and their perception on identity, diaspora and homeland in Turkey. In addition, it is aimed to understand whether the dissolution of Soviet Russia, globalization and advancement in technology affected their activities in Turkey. In order to accomplish these aims, 16 interviews were conducted. I tried to pay attention to find equal numbers of male and female interviewees as well as from equal numbers of participants from different generations. 7 of the interviewees were male, 9 of the interviewees were female. Finally, this study is based on the qualitative research method which aims to adopt an “in-depth understanding and focused on how and why of a particular issue, process, situation, subculture, scene or set of social interactions.”²¹

1.4. Limitations of the Study

The current study chooses to study on the Kazakhs in Istanbul though there are Kazakhs living in other cities. There are two important reasons to choose Istanbul Kazakhs to study. The first and the most important reason is the Coronavirus breakout in the beginning of March and the second reason is that Kazakhs are densely located in Istanbul since they have set up their own neighborhoods in various locations in Istanbul.

A significant obstacle that has been encountered during the research process of this study is Coronavirus breakout in the beginning of March. Therefore, I had to carry my interviews onto a digital platform. Because of the Coronavirus outbreak and not being able to use online platforms, some of the participants from the first generation changed their mind to attend the interview. During the interviews, it was difficult to speak to elder Kazakh interviewees because of their ages. Hence, this study is mostly focused on interviewees from the second and third generation.

1.5. Significance of the Study

There have been many studies on the Kazakh community in Turkey yet; most of them are about their immigration process from East Turkestan to Turkey or the

²¹ “A Quick Guide to Semi-Structured Interviews”, **FuelCycle** <https://fuelcycle.com/blog/a-quick-guide-to-semi-structured-interviews/> [28.06.2020]

memories of the immigrants. As Virinder Kalra, Raminder Kaur and John Hutnyk argue, the term immigrant is used to imply an event that people migrate from one place and settle in another.²² However, the story does not end but continue by changing form. Therefore, it is observed that even though there are many studies on Kazakh community in Turkey, a little attention is given to their situation after the immigration, their perception of homeland and identity and also their activities after 1991. On The Council of Higher Education's Thesis Center website, it is seen that there are two available master dissertations written in Turkey between 2003 and 2020 about Kazakh identity by Turkish students. One of them is in the department of history written in 2003 and the other one in Eurasian Studies written in 2020. However, none of them are related to the Kazakhs migrated to Turkey in 1950s. Hence, this qualitative research focuses on contributing to the literature about the Kazakh community in Turkey from a postcolonial perspective and provides a better understanding on Kazakhs and their identity formation in Turkey. Finally, another reason which makes this study significant is that it collects three generations and their views in one study.

1.6. Organization of the Study

This study consists of five chapters. In addition to the first chapter which grounds for the theoretical and methodological frameworks of this study as well as for the other contextual parts, the following parts are given as follows:

Chapter 2 focuses on identity and identity theories. In this chapter, identity, identity and identity types are discussed. In addition, the theories of hybridity, acculturation and adaptation, diaspora, globalization and its effects on identities are examined.

Chapter 3 examines the historical background of Kazakhs in Turkey. In this chapter, immigration process of Kazakhs migrating from East Turkestan to Turkey passing through India, Pakistan, Kashmir and Gansu is presented. For a better explanation, this chapter focuses on two important topics: resettlement policy of Turkey and identity politics in Turkey. Subsequently, recognition of Kazakhs in Turkey after the independence of Kazakhstan and also repatriation policy of Kazakhstan are discussed to have a better understanding of Kazakhs and their perception of identity.

²² Kalra, Kaur, Hutnyk, *ibid*, 14.

Chapter 4 aims to present methodology and data. This chapter aims to look at Kazakh community in Turkey closer. The narratives of the interviewees are analyzed based on the themes of the study. Finally, chapter 5 provides a summary of this thesis and presents an overview on Kazakh identity formation in Turkey.

2. IDENTITY

In this chapter, identity and identity theories will be presented and defined. In order to define identity, several approaches of various scholars, who have brought different perspectives to identity studies, will be examined. Following to that, the concepts of identity, self and subjectivity will be compared and discussed before explaining their presence and effects within the context of Kazaks in the following chapters. In addition, the concepts of adaptation and acculturation and their impacts on identity will also be discussed with reference to John W. Berry, a psychologist known for adaptation of immigrants and indigenous people and cultural influences on behaviour and to Lafromboise, Coleman & Gerto who are working in the field of sociology and psychology. Since identity is not fixed but fluid and in an ongoing-process from a post-modern perspective, formation of identity on different levels will be defined. After discussing identity on micro, meso, macro and global levels, identity and its relation to post-modernism will be discussed.

Globalization is the most significant cause of fluidity and mobility and it is also one of the core elements that allow us to decipher the meaning of identity and to understand its value. Therefore, the relationship between identity and globalization as well as its effects on identity types will be looked into. Following this, hybridity and hybrid identities will be examined. Moreover, hybrid identities in the diaspora will be presented. In order to understand the relationship between diaspora and hybridity, the concept of diaspora, its relationship with homeland and host countries, diaspora and nationalism, diaspora and hybridity, transnationalism and virtual diasporas will be discussed thoroughly.

In the last part of the chapter, the terms “*Third Space*” and “*In-betweenness*” will be presented by referring to Homi Bhabha, who is a scholar known by key concepts, such as hybridity, mimicry, difference, and third-space in order to understand the situation of hybrid identities.

2.1. Identity and Identity Theories

The term “identity” has been used in many different contexts and for many different purposes in recent years. It is an ambiguous and slippery term as Buckingham states on his article *Introducing Identity*, the term “identity” is ambiguous because the Latin root *idem*, meaning “the same” implies both similarity and difference.²³ As he states, much of the debate about identity stems from the tension between being yourself and to find your true self.²⁴ Yet, one seeks multiple identifications with others, on the basis of social, cultural, and biological characteristics, as well as shared values, personal histories, and interests.²⁵ Therefore, Buckingham argues that there are two formulations of identity. The first one is that identity is “unique to each of us” and the other one is “collective identities” which varies according to social situations and motivations.²⁶ According to Connolly, identity requires difference and distinction so as to be, and identity converts difference into otherness for the sake of its own self-certainty. Thus, identity is relational and collective.²⁷ Personal identities can be defined through collective groups in which one can be identify or identified by others such as being an American, being female or male, being black, a sports fan etc. Hence, identity is connected to a series of differences and these differences help identities to be what they are. As to Connolly, “the initial tendency is to describe the differences on which you depend in a way that gives privilege or priority to you.”²⁸

Bauman argues that the idea of identity arose from the need for a sense of belonging and security.²⁹ The existence of identity is only applicable to the modern society, and it has become difficult and problematic to construct one’s identity in the postmodern era due to fluidity and mobility. However, it is still the hard core of identity to ask “who am I?”³⁰ As to Bauman, it was easy for a person to define herself/himself or to find her/his identity because she/he was born into a society where their identities were determined before their birth. When modernity was

²³ Buckingham, *ibid*, 1.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.

²⁶ Connolly, *ibid*, 14.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 14.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 14.

²⁹ Bauman, *ibid*, 19.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 62.

replaced premodern estates, identities became tasks which individuals needed to perform through their biographies.³¹

According to Bauman, identity was a problem from its birth and, first and foremost, a task.³² It is regarded as a problem because whenever a person doubts where she/he belongs, and then she/he locates herself/himself in a place or group in order to define her/his identity to escape from uncertainty.³³ Identity is tied with the idea that one belongs everywhere and nowhere. He suggests that “One can even begin to feel everywhere *chez soi*, 'at home' - but the price to be paid is to accept that nowhere will one be fully and truly at home.”³⁴ Bauman asserts that identity is revealed to individuals only as something to be invented rather than discovered. It is something that one needs to build or scratch from numerous offers and alternatives and have to protect through and struggle for.³⁵

Identity is not linked to the person's birthplace anymore. It is not only one's biography which determines her/his identity but also the society and situation are important elements to define one's identity. Erving Goffman describes the everyday life as a stage in which we perform our “selves”³⁶ He believed that when we are born, we start to perform on a stage called everyday life. Our performance consists of learning how to play our constructed and assigned roles, interacting with others as well as in the company of others.³⁷ According to Goffman, we use *Sign Vehicles* to present ourselves to others in order to get approval.³⁸ Goffman divides stages in two: front stages and back stages. During our everyday life, we spend our lives on the front stage where we expect to be approved by others. Back stage is our private area where we do not have to act. In the back stage, we practice and prepare for our return to front stages where we recite our lines and perform our roles.

In his book, *In the Name of Identity*, Maalouf argues that “identity isn't given once and for all. It is built up and changes throughout a person's lifetime.”³⁹ According to him, society has a huge impact on shaping the identity. He continues to

³¹ Zygmunt Bauman, **Identity: Conversations with Benedetto Vecchi** (UK: Polity Press, 2004), 49.

³² **Ibid.**, 19.

³³ **Ibid.**, 19.

³⁴ **Ibid.**, 1-10.

³⁵ **Ibid.**, 1-10.

³⁶ Erving Goffman, **The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life** (London: Penguin, 1990), 12.

³⁷ **Ibid.**, 80.

³⁸ **Ibid.**, 15.

³⁹ Maalouf, *ibid*, 23.

argue that “it is often the way we look at other people that imprison them within their own narrowest allegiances. And it is also the way we look at them that may set them free.”⁴⁰ Therefore, one’s identity is not a separate affiliation. It is like a “pattern drawn on a tightly stretched parchment.”⁴¹

Identity has an important role in defining one’s allegiance to a certain place or places. However, it is something incomplete and always in process since it fluid and transcends boundaries. According to Stuart Hall, “identities are never unified and, in late modern times, increasingly fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices, and positions.”⁴² As he states, identities are always in the process of change and transformation. Therefore, identities are created and constituted within; self cannot be formed in isolation but formed itself in interaction with others.⁴³

Identities are not only based on class, ethnicity, race, birthplaces, but also their dreams, behaviour, way of talking, choices, etc. These elements help people to define themselves. However, they all have to interact with the collective values of human groups such as religion, community, nationality, work, family etc.

The formation of subjectivity is built through many elements. Thus, our identities are constantly changing in relation with the things that surround us. Additionally, society is crucial since individuals are influenced by the others around them. Having considered, Stuart Hall’s suggestion on identities, it shows that individuals can have multiple identities which may change in the context of social and personal values. Modern life ascribes multiple and potential identities to people by sorting them in different categories. In that sense, these categories are determined by an outsider who groups these individuals based on their similarities or shared values. As a result of that, identity is imaginary and incomplete and it is always in process. It can therefore be inferred that difference, individuality and temporality are the basis of identity constitution. Identities are constructed through difference, exclusions and inclusions. Since identity is not given once and can change throughout a person’s lifetime, it is not possible for one to develop a stable identity

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁴² Hall, Gay, *ibid.*, 4.

⁴³ Hall, Gay, *ibid.*, 4.

immediately but it is only possible to discover one's identity through exclusions and inclusions step by step.⁴⁴

Seeing that identity is fluid and always in a process, Kehily argues that "identity can be seen as multiple: spoken through and in dialogue with arrange of social categories and positions."⁴⁵ Therefore, one can have multiple identities and shaped by multiple roles. In this regard, Maalouf states that there are multiple allegiances and identities and all are components of personality.⁴⁶ Since identity has many components, it is a complex mechanism. Therefore, if one wants to examine her/his identity, she/he needs to question her/his affiliations, origins, relationships with others, religion, and all kind of allegiances.⁴⁷ However, fragmented identities which are entangled with race, nationality, ethnicity, gender, sexuality have been changing with the modern society. In this regard, Cote argues that in the late-modern society, it is difficult to have a stable identity due to fluidity and mobility.⁴⁸ Therefore, identities vary depending on the community and how one relates to other people.

According to Gerd Baumann, identity, which develops as a product of the socialization process arising from the internal dynamics of societies, is related to the characteristics of human beings that are revealed and acquired after birth. In his book, *The Multicultural Riddle: Rethinking National, Ethnic and Religious Identities*, he argues that there are three types of identities as a basis of culture. Those are: national, ethnic and religious identities. National identity is a person's identity or sense of belonging to one state or to one nation. Ethnic identity is where an individual is viewed by themselves and by others as belonging to a particular ethnic or cultural group. Religious identity is the sense of group membership to a religion. Gerd Baumann sees identity as a riddle and he states that so as to solve the riddle, individuals need to rethink what is meant by the terms nationality, nation-state, ethnic identity, ethnicity, and what is meant by religion as a basis of culture.⁴⁹ Because "national identity is no longer as rationalist as it pretends to be, ethnic

⁴⁴ Maalouf, *ibid*, 23.

⁴⁵ Kehily, *ibid*, 6.

⁴⁶ Maalouf, *ibid*, 29.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁴⁸ Cote, *ibid*, 421.

⁴⁹ Gerd Baumann, *The Multicultural Riddle The Multicultural Riddle : Rethinking National, Ethnic, and Religious Identities*. (New York: Routledge, 1999), 7.

identity is no longer as natural as it appears to be, and religious identity is no longer as eternally unchanging as it is preached to be.”⁵⁰ According to Bauman, all of them are identifications which are reified understanding of culture. Therefore, multiculturalism is a new understanding of culture rather than those fixed identity definitions. In addition, if the culture is something we are member of, we could change our perspective and see it as something we make and are shapers of.⁵¹ Therefore, identities are not fixed but fluid and could be shapeable.

Erik Erikson argues that as people grow and change, they go through many stages where they gain new perspectives which shape their identities. According to his theory, there are eight stages that people encounter in their life. During each stage, individuals experience psychosocial crisis which might have both positive and negative outcomes for their development. During the *Identity and Role Confusion Stage*, individuals search for a sense of self and personal identity. As a result of that, they start to find who they are through questioning and exploring personal values, beliefs, and goals. They seek for acceptance by others and would like to belong to a society. Failure in establishing a sense of belonging in their society might lead them to role confusion which involves being insecure about their place in the society. Therefore, Erikson describes identity as a subjective sense as well as an observable quality of personal sameness and continuity, paired with some belief in the sameness and continuity of some “shared world image.”⁵²

Amiran Kurtkan Bilgisever argues that self and identity should not be confused with each other. According to her, self is the structural integrity of the human mind shaped by social experiences. Identity; however, is the form of socially shaped potential reflected with a voluntary determination. She also states that, while all social factors along with physical environment, health conditions, and biological heritage are involved in the formation of self; group and individual experiences help identity to continue to develop itself.⁵³ Bilgisever’s distinction of self and identity is really crucial in order to understand what identity is or is not because the terms self,

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 137.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 137.

⁵² Erik Homburger Erikson, **Identity, Youth and Crisis** (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994), 19.

⁵³ Amira Kurtkan Bilgisever, **Genel Sosyoloji: Kavramlar-Nazariyeler Bünye (Türkiyede Sosyal Tabakalaşma) Değişme ve Sosyal Gelişme** (İstanbul: Divan Yayınları, 1982), 151.

subjectivity and identity are always confused with each other. Therefore, the next part of this thesis will be about the definitions of these terms.

2.2. The Concepts of Self, Subjectivity, and Identity

The self is the structural integrity of the human mind in a potentially formatted form with social experiences. It constitutes one's identity as a whole. Among other factors, such as the physical environment, health conditions, biological heritage, all social factors participate in the formation of the self. In addition to these, the group experience and the individual's unique experience help the personality to develop itself. The process of self-development continues throughout the life of the individual, in parallel with social life. From this point of view, it can be said that the self is essentially a field where social factors are constantly processed and consequently behavioral patterns are created.

According to Peter Burke and Jan E. Stets, "the self originates in the mind of persons and is that which characterizes an individual's consciousness of his or her own being or identity."⁵⁴ The person perceives himself through the eyes of other people and perceives his self with the results he draws from his reactions, attitudes and behaviors, and these are interpreted by the individual through self-perception and a certain identity is created. Self is acquired through interaction with others. As to Mead, the self is constituted of an "I" and "me." "I" is the agent and "me" is shaped according to society, community, culture, etc. Therefore, "me" lead "I" based on the norms and shape it according to the expectations of the society, culture, and other social elements.⁵⁵ As Oyserman & Elmore & Smith state, self and identity are socially constructed.⁵⁶ They change according to the time and place based on the needs and expectations. Therefore, "people are likely to define themselves in terms of what is relevant in their time and place."⁵⁷

The other terms which are confused are subjectivity and identity. Barker & Jane defines subjectivity as "the condition of being a person and the processes by

⁵⁴ Peter Burke, Jan E. Stets, **Identity Theory** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 9.

⁵⁵ George Herbert Mead, **Mind, Self, and Society** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), 25

⁵⁶ Daphna Oyserman, Kristen Elmore, George Smith, "Self, Self-Concept, and Identity", **the Handbook of Self and Identity**, ed. Leary, M. R. and Tangney, J.P. (New York: The Guilford Press, 2012), 69.

⁵⁷ **Ibid.**, 76.

which we become a person; that is, how we are constituted as cultural subjects and how we experience ourselves.”⁵⁸ Though they are confused, there are differences between them. Identity is the product that we construct whereas subjectivity signifies the ways that individuals situate themselves in relation to power. Subjectivity is constituted of conscious, perspectives, feelings, beliefs and desires. Subjectivity is shaped through economy, political institutions, communities, etc. It is formed and transformed continuously in interaction with the surrounding world.

2.3. Identity Formation

As it was discussed in the previous parts, identity is a term which is fluid and in process. It is not fixed, always changing. According to Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, Gwyn and Margo, identity is formed on four levels: micro, meso, macro, and global levels.⁵⁹ The micro level is self-definition which is about how relationships and interaction are seen from individual level. The meso level is where our identities are viewed and questioned by groups such as communities and families. Macro level is about interactions and connections among people, groups and issues from a national perspective and global level is about interactions and connections among people, groups and issues from a global perspective.

“Personal identities are components of self that are primarily intrapersonal and connect to our individual interests and life experiences. Social identities are components of self that are derived from our involvement in social groups to which we are interpersonally invested. Cultural identities are components of self-based on socially constructed categories that teach us a way of being and include expectations for our thoughts and behaviors.”⁶⁰

One performs of his/her identity through how he/she interacts with other people. “Who am I?” or “Who will I become?” are important questions and have been discussed throughout the history. Therefore, philosophy of personal identity aims to address questions related to existentialism. Thus, personal identity deals with the question whether a person at one time is the same thing as a person at another time.

⁵⁸ Chris Barker, Emma A. Jane, **Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice** (London: Sage Publications, 2006), 260.

⁵⁹ Kirk and Okazawa-Rey, Gwyn and Margo, Who am I? Who are my people? **Women’s Lives: Multicultural Perspectives**. 3rd ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2004): 49-58.

⁶⁰ Foundation of Culture and Identity, **Libraries**, <https://open.lib.umn.edu/communication/chapter/8-1-foundations-of-culture-and-identity> [28.07.2020]

Moreover, social identity deals with individual's sense of who they are based on their interactions with others as well as their group membership. Social identity could be categorized in two: personal and social. All human beings categorize themselves in order to be able identify themselves. It is possible to belong to more than one category. One can identify herself through behaviour based on the group that she belongs to. Subsequently, she compares her group with other groups in order to maintain her self-esteem. Rosenberg argues that self-esteem is negative or positive attitudes that individuals show for themselves. It involves individual's acceptance, respect and self-worth.⁶¹ Henri Tajfel, a Polish scholar best known for his work on the cognitive aspects of prejudice and social identity theory, suggests that the groups such as family, social class, football team etc. are important sources of achieving pride and self-esteem. According to Tajfel's theory, people tend to categorize themselves into one or more than one group and build their identity based on the group's criteria. He also argues that group membership offer individuals both identity and self-esteem which make people feel good about themselves.

Self-identity is shaped by the institutions of modernity. Therefore, Anthony Giddens argues that self-identity is reflexive and is not a passive entity. As he argues, it is shaped by external influences. In traditional societies, the individuals were provided with social roles. However, in post-traditional societies, individuals are forced to explore and create their own identities. Giddens argues that, in order to shape their identity, individuals need to answer some questions such as who to be? How to act? What to do? How to live? Etc. So, the individuals answer to these questions "either discursively or through day-to-day social behaviour."⁶²

Social identity relates to how we identify ourselves in relation to others. Therefore, groups give individuals sense of belonging to the social world. As Penelope J. Oakes suggests in her study, "*Rediscovering the Social Group*", individuals construct their identity through "accessibility" and "fit." Accessibility involves one's past experience, present and future expectations such as values, motives, dreams, targets, etc. Fit shows the compatibility "between category

⁶¹ Rosenberg Morris, **Society and the Adolescent Self-image** (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 1-338.

⁶² Anthony Giddens, **Modernity and Self Identity: Self and the Society in the late Modern Age** (Stanford: Polity Press, 1991), 70.

specifications and the stimulus reality to be represented.”⁶³ Available social categories such as gender, ethnicity, and race give a chance to individuals to categorize themselves and fit in that categorization. However, due to fluidity and mobility, it is not possible to fit in only one group. Therefore, one can belong to many groups. Since identity is a product of culture and shaped by the norms, traditions, values, etc., cultural identity is constructed around similarities and differences.

2.4. Acculturation and Adaptation Strategies

Acculturation and adaptation are significant elements which allow us to understand the versatility of the identity and the construction process of it. John W. Berry defines acculturation is “the process of cultural and psychological change that follows intercultural contact.”⁶⁴ It is a process of social, psychological, and cultural change which occurs from balancing two different cultures while adopting, acquiring, and adjusting to a new cultural environment. As Jean Phinney suggests, “cultural changes include alterations in a group’s customs, and in their economic and political life. Psychological changes include alterations in individuals’ attitudes toward the acculturation process, their cultural identities.”⁶⁵

Acculturation and assimilation start to occur when two different cultures meet and come into meaningful contact. However, acculturation is different from assimilation in many aspects because acculturation refers to modification of an individual or groups in their culture. During the adaptation process, individuals, groups or people interact with the second culture and adopt cultural traits and norms. On the other hand, assimilation is when a group or individuals forget their culture against a dominant culture.

Berry has proposed two key factors that shape the acculturation process: *Cultural Maintenance* and *Contact and Participation*. Individuals try to adapt

⁶³ Penelope J. Oakes, **Rediscovering the Social Group** Eds. J. C. Turner, M. A. Hogg, P. J. Oakes, S. D. Reicher, and M. S. Wetherell. (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987): 205.

⁶⁴ John W. Berry, “Acculturation: Living successfully in two cultures.” **International Journal of Intercultural Relations**, V.29, no.6 (2005):698.

⁶⁵ Jean Phinney, “Ethnic identity and Acculturation” **The Cambridge Handbook of Acculturation Sociology** (2006): quoted by John W. Berry, Jean S. Phinney, David L. Sam, Paul Vedder. “Immigrant Youth: Acculturation, Identity, and Adaptation.” **Applied Psychology: An International Review**, v.55 no.3 (2006): 305.

themselves into the new culture by adopting their traditions, but still preserve their own cultural values and traditions. They blend the values, customs, cultural norms and attitudes of the overarching host country. This situation leads to changes in their daily behaviour. According to Berry, contemporary societies are divided in three as mainstream, minority and ethnic group because in today's world, societies have become culturally plural due to globalization.⁶⁶ Berry suggests that there are different kinds of groups in plural societies and each of them shows another kind of contextual factors which explain "why people of different cultural backgrounds are living together in the same place."⁶⁷ He presents three factors; *voluntariness*, *mobility*, and *permanence*. He argues that there are four types of acculturation strategies based on the interaction of two factors: *assimilation*, *separation*, *integration*, and *marginalization*. Assimilation is adopting social norms of the dominant culture. However, in separation strategy, people reject the dominant culture and keep their culture of origin. Integration about is adopting the dominant culture while maintaining the original culture. Finally, marginalization is rejecting both original culture and dominant culture.⁶⁸ As a result, from dominant group's view,

"Assimilation, when sought by the dominant group, can be termed the melting pot...When separation is demanded and enforced by the dominant group, it is segregation. For marginalization, when imposed by the dominant group it is a form of exclusion. Finally, for integration, when cultural diversity is an objective of the society as a whole, it represents the strategy of mutual accommodation now widely called multiculturalism."⁶⁹

It is important to note that it is possible to have more than one variable strategy. One can be close to both integration and separation. Also, individuals' acculturation strategy may be different based on their private and public life realm. For example, one may reject the values of the dominant culture in his/her private life whereas she/he might adapt to the dominant culture in public parts of his/her life.

Assimilation is sought by the dominant group in a melting pot society. According to Berry, the USA has held an intermediate position with its melting pot ideology. Immigrants have been set free to choose their own strategy in private values, but there has been a strong pressure on them to blend into the mainstream

⁶⁶ David L. Sam, John W. Berry, **Acculturation Psychology** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 27-69.

⁶⁷ **Ibid.**, 29.

⁶⁸ **Ibid.**, 34-36.

⁶⁹ **Ibid.**, 36.

culture.⁷⁰ As a result of that, immigrants created a space where they combine two different cultures.

Multiculturalism is the term used to define the situation in a society where the different groups are encouraged both to maintain their ethnic culture and distinctiveness and to participate in the daily life of the larger society. In a multicultural society, multiple cultures are accepted and individuals are encouraged to adopt integrationist approach towards acculturation. According to Berry, “when cultural diversity is an objective of the society as a whole, it represents the strategy of mutual accommodation now widely called multiculturalism.”⁷¹ As to Berry, multicultural societies, in which certain psychological pre-conditions are established, the integration strategy could be pursued.⁷²

According to Lafromboise, Coleman & Gerton, there are five other models of living in two cultures apart from, assimilation, segregation, integration and marginalization models.⁷³ Those are *assimilation*, *acculturation*, *alternation*, *multicultural model* and *fusion*.⁷⁴ According to Lafromboise, Coleman & Gerton, assimilation is the same with Berry’s explanation. However, acculturation model implies that “the individual, while becoming a competent participant in the majority culture, will always be identified as a member of the minority culture.”⁷⁵ Alternation model assumes that it is possible for an individual or groups to know and understand two different cultures. It also implies that an individual can fit in two different cultures by altering his/her behaviour according to the context. Multicultural model, which is the same with Berry’s model, generates that “an individual can maintain a positive identity as a member of his/her own culture of origin while simultaneously developing a positive identity by engaging in complex institutional sharing with the larger political entity comprised of other cultural groups.”⁷⁶ Finally, fusion model

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 169.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁷² John W. Berry. “Integration and Multiculturalism: Ways towards Social Solidarity.” **Papers on Social Representations**, V.20 (2011): 26

⁷³ Teresa LaFramboise, Hardin L.K. Coleman, Jennifer Gerton. “Psychological Impact of Biculturalism: Evidence and Theory.” **Psychological Bulletin**, V.114, No.13 (1993): 395-412.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 395-412.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 396.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 399.

represents that cultures sharing an economic, political, or geographic space will fuse together until they create a new form of culture.⁷⁷

During the acculturation process, individuals go through acculturative stress caused from pressure to learn a new language, maintaining the native language, balancing two different cultures, and differences between accepted social behaviour of both host and home country. Acculturative stress degree changes according to the degree of willingness and immigration status. In this regard, Berry states that, there are four main categories of migrants: *voluntary immigrants* who leave their homeland in order to find job, advanced education, marriage, reunite with family member who have already migrated; *refugees* are those who displaced involuntarily due to war, natural disasters, etc.; *asylum seekers* are those who leave their homeland voluntarily due to violence; *sojourners* are those who stay in a country for a limited time or for a purpose. However, these people aim to return their homeland.⁷⁸

Berry suggests that there are other factors which affect the acculturation process. Those are age, gender, and education.⁷⁹ According to him, if individuals go through acculturation process at an early age, the process becomes easier unlike older individuals because they encounter difficulties during acculturation process. In addition, gender plays an important factor as well. During the acculturation process, females have more problems compared to men. Berry explains this situation by the words as below:

“Where there is a substantial difference, attempts by females to take on new roles available in the society of settlement may bring them into conflict with their heritage culture, where there is a substantial difference, attempts by females to take on new roles available in the society of settlement may bring them into conflict with their heritage culture.”⁸⁰

According to him, education is another factor which eases the process of acculturation because it is related to certain resources, such as income, occupational status, support networks which are protective factors. In addition, education is seen as pre-acculturation to the language, history, values and norms of the new culture so that individuals can accustomed to the new culture.⁸¹

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 401.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 395-412.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 280.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 49.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 49.

Berry argues that “the greater the cultural differences, the less positive is the *“adaptation.”* This is the case for sojourners, immigrants, and indigenous people because big cultural differences need for big culture shedding and conflict leading to poorer adaptation.⁸² Personality and individual actors are also important for the acculturation process. While some individuals might embrace cultural differences and be a part of acculturation process, the others might perceive the acculturation process as threat. For example, Phinney and Devich-Navarro made a qualitative research in 1997 interviewing with 46 Mexican-American and 52 African-American adolescents. As a result of their research, they have found out that, while some interviewees perceived the acculturation process as threat and experience conflict, some of them could not choose one culture over the other. So, they tried to maintain both of them. According to the research, there are three bicultural types: *blended*, *alternating*, and *separated*. Blended biculturals express happiness and pride in their background and they consider themselves ethnic and mainstream. They see blend their ethnic and mainstream cultural orientations and do not see them in conflict. Rather, they are reluctant to choose one to another. Alternating biculturals perceive their mainstream and ethnic cultures in conflict and quite different from each other. Therefore, they find it difficult to have both of them at the same time. Finally, separated biculturals perceive their identity is not fixed. Rather, they change their identity according to contextual demands. In addition, separated biculturals only describe themselves with their ethnic identities and avoid being a part of the dominant culture.⁸³

Berry’s other important theory about immigrants is adaptation. According to him, adaptation refers to the certain changes that take place in an individual or group as an answer to external demands.⁸⁴ As a result of the acculturation process, some psychological changes occur as it was mentioned before. The fact that individuals manage these changes is expressed as an adaptation. There are two kinds of adaptation: psychological and sociocultural. A study which was carried by Berry in 2006 with 7997 adolescent immigrants from 13 countries showed that boys tend to have better psychological adaptation compared to the girls, and immigrants in integration model tend to adapt well compared to the immigrants in other models.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 50.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 51.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 52.

Both psychological and sociocultural adaptation is important elements for individuals to fit and interact with members of the host culture.

2.5. Identity and Post-Modernism

Post-modernism, which was born as a reaction against modernism, describes not only a period but also set of ideas. It is a period in which everything is questioned. Modernism was a movement in the late 19th and early 20th century which was based on idealism and reason. On the other hand, post-modernism was born of scepticism and suspicion of notions and truths determined by modernism. In addition, unlike modernism, post-modernism advocated that individuals' experiences were more concrete than abstract principles. According to Greenwood, "postmodern thinkers reject the grand narratives of modernity which claim that each person has a core, perceptible identity."⁸⁵ Rather, postmodernity suggests the idea that one's identity is constantly changing. In this regards, Watson states that we have become tourists in our own cultures.⁸⁶

"An individual's sense of identity may be derived from a multitude of sources, including religious tradition, lifestyle choices and consumption of good and services. However, the individual must carefully reconsider what is perceived as 'identity' and how this is constructed relative to 'other.' Through this, one may sustain a sense of identity without the necessary submission to the grand narratives of modernity or traditional shared identity."⁸⁷

According to Bauman, post-modern identity is against fixation. He suggests the idea that "modernity" or "postmodernity" are not enough to describe the on-going changes in sociology. Thus, he developed a new term called "*liquid modernity*" which describes the current society. According to him, in "*solid modernity*" identities were more stable. However, in liquid modernity, individuals are not tied to their birthplace; their identities are not stable and predictable due to the fluidity and mobilization.⁸⁸ On the other hand, Browne argues that in postmodernism, factors such as gender, class, and ethnicity are no longer important to shape the identity because those factors are also changing constantly due to demands of the era and the society.⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Natasha Greenwood. "Tranny Trivia: The Question of Identity In A Postmodern World." **University of Technology Sydney**, (2012):1.

⁸⁶ Nigel Watson, **The Routledge Companion To Postmodernism**, ed. Stuart Sim (New York: Routledge, 1999): 55.

⁸⁷ **Ibid.**, Greenwood, 5.

⁸⁸ Zygmunt Bauman, **Liquid Modernity** (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 1-225.

⁸⁹ Ken Browne, **Sociology for AS AQA** (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 52-54.

2.6. Identity and Globalization

Identities are fluid, plural, unstable, and always in flux as it was mentioned in the previous parts. In addition, they are being shaped by globalization due to the consumption of communications technology which has become the integral part of people's lives. Valentine Moghadam describes globalization as "a complex economic, political, cultural, and geographic process in which the mobility of capital, organizations, ideas, discourses, and peoples has taken on an increasingly global or transnational form."⁹⁰ On the other hand, Baskın Oran describes globalization as the spread and influence of the West with its infrastructure (international capitalism) and superstructure (culture) all over the world.⁹¹ According to him, globalization has spread all over the world with 3 waves: 1490s, 1890s, and 1990s.⁹² The first wave started with mercantilism and ended in colonialism. The second wave started with the Industrial Revolution and ended with imperialism. The third wave started with the birth of multinational companies in the 1970s, the communication revolution in the 1980s, the collapse of the USSR and the West's unrivaled in the 1990s and continues today.⁹³

Globalization is a multi-dimensional concept that encompasses economic, cultural, ideological, and political components. Consequently, globalization has been addressed from different fields. In an increasingly borderless world, preservation of cultures, homogeneity and heterogeneity have become crucial. It is argued that as a result of globalization, local and traditional cultures may be damaged and destructed. However, it is also suggested that globalization may provide new opportunities. According to Cuninghame, because of the media, travelling, globalization, identities in the host countries are prone to be hybrid. As a consequence of globalization, individuals try to be "citizen of the world."⁹⁴ Therefore, globalization provides individuals to incorporate together and create a single world. As to Pieterse,

⁹⁰ Valentine V. Moghadam, "Gender and Globalization: Female Labor and Women's Mobilization." **Journal of World-Systems Research**, Vol. No. 2 (1999):367

⁹¹ Baskın, Oran. **Küreselleşme ve Azınlıklar** (Ankara: İmaj Yayınevi, 2000),4.

⁹² **Ibid.**, 1-14.

⁹³ **Ibid.**, 1-14.

⁹⁴ Patrick Gun Cuninghame, "Hybridity, Transnationalism, and Identity in the US-Mexican Borderlands." In **Hybrid Identities: Theoretical and Empirical Examinations**. ed. Smith, K.E.I, & Leavy, P. Leiden: Brill. (2008):13-40.

“globalizations can be one-directional processes, either structurally or culturally.”⁹⁵ They standardize individuals and detract from their culture. As a consequence, everyone’s life is connected to everyone else’s life in various hidden ways.

In the 20th century, world has become interdependent as a result of an international integration process arising from the exchange of products, ideas, cultures and world views. Locations and boundaries have become easier to cross with development of the technology. In her study, *Globalization: A Triumph of Ambiguity*, Martha C. E. Van Der Bly argues that globalization has created diversity and heterogeneity rather than homogeneity.⁹⁶ Cultural differences do not occur due to the isolation of the individuals but due to the interaction of people with each other. In globally connected world, people might not be homogenized as they think or assume to be.

The cultural aspect of globalization can be explained by the continuous increase in mutual communication and interaction of societies. In addition, general identity structures such as civic identity have begun to be replaced by different ethnic, religious, social and political identities. In globalized world, belonging to a particular place and defining your identity have gained importance. According to Hall, globalization does not hide differences, rather it reveals and empowers them.⁹⁷ Mahirogulları states that “with its current position, the cultural dimension of globalization, depending on the developments in communication technologies that accelerate this process, the Western culture, as the "global culture", intensely influences the cultures of the developing countries.”⁹⁸

One of the important homogenizing elements in cultural globalization is the migration. In the context of the direct impact of global culture, immigration makes it necessary for people to integrate with the social structure of the new country they live in, the legal order, government policies, state institutions and non-governmental organizations. Furthermore, Maalouf argues that everyone is an immigrant in a way

⁹⁵ Nederveen J. Pieterse, “Globalization as Hybridization.” **Global Modernities**. ed. Featherstone, M., Lash, S., Robertson, R. (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995): 46.

⁹⁶ Martha C. E. Van Der Bly, “Globalization: A Triumph of Ambiguity.” **Current Sociology**, V.53, No. 6 (2005): 883.

⁹⁷ Stuart Hall, “The Local and the Global: Globalization and the Ethnicity.” **Culture, Globalization and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity**, ed. Anthony D. King (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1997): 12

⁹⁸ Adnan Mahirogulları, “Küreselleşmenin Kültürel Değerler Üzerine Etkisi.” **Sosyal Siyaset Konferansları Dergisi**, V.0, No.50 (2005): 1278.

because “we all must learn other languages, other modes of speech, and other codes.”⁹⁹

Migration is an important aspect of globalization because more people than ever before are on the move in search of economic prospects, a new living environment, re-unite family, etc. Migration, however, does not only affect the people who are directly involved in the process but also affect the people who are natives because immigrants bring their own beliefs, cultures, norms, traditions, and preferences along them to new locations. As a result of mobility, immigrants have multiple identities, multiple belongings, multiple languages and locations. This movement and mobility of people from one place to another place is called “*translocation*”, and Anthias describes translocation as “the notion of translocations references the idea of location as a social space which is produced within contextual, spatial, temporal and hierarchical relations around the intersections of social divisions and identities of class, ethnicity and gender.”¹⁰⁰

As it was highlighted before, mobility provides immigrants multiple identities. More broadly, globalization exposes individuals to new identity opportunities. However, many thinkers argue that these identity opportunities and differences will cause an identity crisis. For instance, Feyzullah Eroglu argues that one of the important cultural consequences of globalization is the “national identity crisis.” According to him, identity is built from many different directions. He thinks that individuals are faced with a range of resources that go beyond the sub-systems of their own social structure.¹⁰¹ National identity has a tendency to be stronger in the era of globalization. “National identities tend to regress to ‘nationalistic identities’ in periods of crisis, when the ‘normal’ rhythms of life are unpleasantly disturbed.”¹⁰² As a result of that, nationality has become a sentiment discourse and countries concern about globalization and its effects. Contemporary European comprehension of globalization could be a great instance for how globalization is understood as a vitally dangerous concept. For example, in Europe, immigrants are always seen as a

⁹⁹ **Ibid.**, Maalouf, 37.

¹⁰⁰ Floya Anthias, “Thinking Through the Lens of Translocational Positionality: An Intersectionality Frame for Understanding Identity and Belonging.” **Translocations**, V.4 No.1 (2008): 9.

¹⁰¹ Feyzullah Eroglu. “Küreselleşme Sürecinde Kimlik Krizi.” **Türklük Bilimi Araştırmaları**, V.19, No.139-141 (1991) quoted in Mustafa Talas, Yaşar Kaya. “Küreselleşmenin Kültürel Sonuçları” **Türklük Bilimi Araştırmaları**, No.22 (2007): 156

¹⁰² **Ibid.**, 156.

handicap because of unemployment, cultural threats, etc. For many people who prefer national identity as primary identity and support purity, point of immigrants as scapegoats. Therefore, the existence of immigrants creates a national crisis in countries. In addition, children or granddaughter of immigrants are seen as immigrants even though they are not the ones who migrated but their ancestors. Therefore, it leads to another problem: *otherisation*.

Mobility of people affects not only the immigrant but also the natives. For example, Giddens puts forwards that “the more the local becomes penetrated by global flows, the more people move around the world, the more family and community will lose their embedment, and it leads to be less identification with and attachment to the local and the national.”¹⁰³ In a globalized world, belonging to somewhere has gained importance even though the importance of borders and attachment to a locality has lost its prominence. As a result of that new identities have emerged. Immigrants who live in a different environment have created new identities for themselves. They have put themselves in-between and created new hybrid identities for themselves. Those who occupy hybrid spaces benefit from having an understanding of both local and global knowledge.

2.7. Hybrid and Hybrid Identities

Etymologically, the term “hybrid” refers to “something which is made using parts from two different things.”¹⁰⁴ Even though the term actually originated from biology, it was started to be used as a racial term in the nineteenth century. From a sociological perspective, “hybridization is a fundamental characteristic of postmodernism” and as a result of globalization and mobilization, hybrid identities were born.¹⁰⁵ According to Cagirkan,

“Individuals have been displaced throughout history by their own decisions or coercion, and as a result of these displacements, they have caused some changes in the social structure that they are aware of or they do not want. In this historical adventure, human beings wanted to find solutions to their existing problems, the phenomenon of immigration and the understanding of immigrants changed as a result of this process.”¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ **Ibid.**, Giddens, 146.

¹⁰⁴ “Definitions of Hybrid”, Vocabulary, <https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/hybrid> [17.07.2020].

¹⁰⁵ Baris Cagirkan, “Göç, Hibrit Kimlik ve Aidiyet: Yeni Toplumlara, Yeni Kimlikler.” **İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Araştırmaları Dergisi**, V.5, No.8 (2016):2615.

¹⁰⁶ **Ibid.**, 2615.

Hybridity is related with the emergence of post-colonial discourse and cultural imperialism. The term hybridity was in use in 17th century in different fields such as biology. However, in the 19th century, it was started to be employed in different areas. “In the twentieth century, the term hybridity extended beyond the biological and racial framework to embrace linguistic and cultural areas.”¹⁰⁷ Later on, it was characterized upon on identity and culture. One of the important texts on hybridity is *The Location of Culture* by Homi Bhabha.¹⁰⁸ In his article, Homi Bhabha defines hybridity as “a problematic of colonial representation.”¹⁰⁹ According to him, there is an interaction between colonizers and colonized which effects the both sides. As a result, hybridity “which enables a form of subversion” occurs.¹¹⁰ That is, hybridity enables the *other* to be seen in the culture. As a result of the interaction of two cultures, “the process of cultural hybridity gives rise to something different, something new and unrecognizable, a new area of negotiation of meaning and representation.”¹¹¹ Homi Bhabha also states that since all cultures are related to each other, they are in the process of hybridity and there is not pure culture.

Diversity, as a result of immigration, mobilization and globalization, has brought hybridity with itself. The search for identity takes individuals to a construction process on different phenomena and concepts. Hence, individuals build their own identities over time according to their interests, gender, business life and hobbies. In this context, unlike the assimilation process, the hybridization process allows individuals to create their own unique identity. In this regards, Young states:

“Hybridity as in the racial model involves an antithetical movement of coalescence and antagonism, with the unconscious set against the intentional, the organic against the divisive, the generative against the undermining. Hybridity is itself an example of hybridity, of a doubleness that both brings together, fuses, but also maintains separation.”¹¹²

¹⁰⁷ Vanessa Guigneri. **Hybridity, Why It Still Matters?** (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholar Publishing, 2011), 2

¹⁰⁸ Homi Bhabha is an English-Indian scholar who is one of the most significant and prominent figures in post-colonial studies. He has developed many key concepts such as hybridity, mimicry, difference, ambivalence, the third space and in-betweenness.

¹⁰⁹ Homi K. Bhabha. *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 156.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 112.

¹¹¹ Jonathan Rutherford. The third space: Interview with Homi Bhabha. In **Identity: Community, Culture, Difference**. Ed. J. Rutherford. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990): 211

¹¹² Robert Young. **Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race**. (London: Routledge, 1990):20-1

In liquid societies, individuals construct their identities and create a sense of belonging. Therefore, multiculturalism and multicultural societies are important for the construction and survival of hybrid identities as Cagirkan states.¹¹³

According to Marshall McLuhan, the entire world is becoming more connected as a result of globalization and media technologies. His theory *Global Village* indicates that due to daily production and consumption of media, all parts of the world becoming more interconnected. As a result, individuals transcend within the global village framework. Thanks to the technology, people from all over the world interact with each other. Hence, they create not only spatial but also virtual multicultural societies.¹¹⁴

After the development of hybrid theory, a number of arguments raised about the usage of it. For example, Paul Gilroy criticizes the term hybridity. He states that he does not prefer to use the term “hybridity” since he does not believe in it as he states: “I think there isn’t any purity; there isn’t any anterior purity. That’s why I try not to use the word hybrid. Cultural production is not like mixing cocktails.”¹¹⁵ On the other hand, Kraidy argues that there are two kinds of paradoxes about hybridity which stem from its ambiguity and strong divergences on the meaning and implications of hybridity.¹¹⁶ According to her, the first paradox is that hybridity is understood as “subversive and pervasive, exceptional and ordinary, marginal yet mainstream,” and the second paradox is “its extreme openness allows for unpredictable, arbitrary, and exclusionary closure.”¹¹⁷ So, its boundaries can be repositioned by anyone. Additionally, Werbner also sees hybridity as a paradox. She states that “hybridity has emerged as a privileged site for conceptualizing global/local articulations”¹¹⁸ Therefore, she argues that all cultures are always hybrid. Therefore, hybridity is meaningless when it is used to describe culture

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, Cagirkan, 2620.

¹¹⁴ Marshall McLuhan. **The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man** (Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 21-31.

¹¹⁵ Paul Gilroy. **The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness** (London: Routledge, 1993): 54-5

¹¹⁶ Marwan M. Kraidy. “Hybridity in Cultural Globalization.” **Communication Theory**, V.12 , N.13 (2002): 320

¹¹⁷ Marwan M. Kraidy. **Hybridity or the Cultural Logic of Globalization** (India: Dorling Kindersley, 2005), 65.

¹¹⁸ Pina Werbner. Introduction: “The dialectics of Cultural Hybridity.” quoted in **Debating cultural hybridity: Multi- Cultural Identities and the Politics of Antiracism**. Ed. P. Werbner & T. Moddod. (London: Zed Books, 1997): 15

because this “museumizes” the culture as a “thing.” However, “culture as an analytic concept is always hybrid.”¹¹⁹ As to Kraidy, if all cultures are always hybrid, then the term hybridity is disposal.¹²⁰

Another critique about hybridity is to see the term as a cultural effect of globalization. For example; Jan Nederveen Pieterse sees hybridity as “rhizome of culture” and he says “the rhizome of capitalism twins then with the rhizome of culture, which brings us to the theme of hybridization.”¹²¹ According to him:

“Globalization/hybridization makes, first, an empirical case: that processes of globalization, past and present, can be adequately described as processes of hybridization. Secondly, it is a critical argument: against viewing globalization in terms of homogenization, or of modernization/ westernization, as empirically narrow and historically flat.”¹²²

According to Smith, there are multiple forms of hybridity. Those are: “identities that exist across borders, duality, gender (a false dichotomy), new identities, the diaspora (borderless), and the internal colony hybrid (formed within boundaries).”¹²³ A hybrid identity might occur as a result of a false dichotomy where “identity that seemingly only has the capacity to occupy two forms is actually shown to encompass another form.”¹²⁴ On the other hand, duality can be explained as people who have double consciousness or *two-ness* within a body. In order to define their hybridity and duality, people use hyphenation and define themselves Irish-American, Italian-American, and Polish-American, etc. “This hyphenation became a fact, permeating all realms of life.”¹²⁵ According to Erikson, new identity is one of the forms of hybridity and it has a longer history in other related disciplines. For example, Jamaican immigrants in America do not exactly become like Americans. However, they are not like Jamaicans in the home society. They have a new identity shaped by the conditions they encounter.

“Exist beyond borders” is another form of hybridity which was suggested by Smith. He states that globalization accelerated crossing the borders. That is, borders are not fixed and always shifting. On the other hand, the internal colony hybrid is formed within boundaries and it is focused on the relationship between the colonizers

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, Kraidy, 65.

¹²¹ Jan Nederveen Pieterse, *ibid.*, 53.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 87.

¹²³ Keri E. Iyall Smith, Patricia Leavy. **Hybrid Identities: Theoretical and Empirical Examinations.** (Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2008), 6.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 104.

and colonized. Smith states that “the internal colony creates an opportunity to maintain the integrity of its culture while learning to exist within the outsider culture.”¹²⁶ According to, Rod Bush,

“The concept of internal colony more in structural terms and assess the impact of such structural relations on the development of hybrid cultures among the internally colonized populations and, consequently, on how these populations come to view themselves as change agents within the landscape of these societies.”¹²⁷

As internal colonies, these groups live within another society. They live under legal rules and cultural norms of the external society most of the time. They are in search for maintaining their cultural and legal independence and integrity. The internal colony creates an opportunity to maintain the integrity of its culture while learning to exist within the outsider culture.¹²⁸ In this regard, Bush argues that “internal colonialism continues to be relevant, pointing out that the structural relations of colonial oppression persists, and that these relations are important in the formation of identity and culture.”¹²⁹ Finally, diaspora is another hybrid form suggested by Erikson. Although the term diaspora was first used for the cases of historical dispersion, it can be applicable to groups that has have spread beyond its borders now. According to him, diasporas become divorced from the homeland and then they spread to new lands.¹³⁰ However, they remain tied to a border while they live beyond the borders of the homeland. In order to fit in the host land, diaspora members might adopt a hybrid identity, they might attempt to cling to their identity, they might be less likely to adopt a hybrid identity, or “they become different from those who remain in the homeland as they adopt elements of the society they now live within.”¹³¹ Erikson states that, hybrid identities that emerge as a result of diasporized population or that occupy the third space are borderless. Hybrid identities create a new form of identity when multiple categories exist within the same border. However, Erikson argues that “the hybrid identity that is born among internally colonized populations is a hybrid identity that is formed within boundaries.”¹³²

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹²⁷ Bush, Rod. “The Internal Colony Hybrid: Reformulating Structure, Culture, and Agency,” in Keri E. Iyall Smith and Patricia Leavy (eds.), **Hybrid Identities: Theoretical & Empirical Examinations**, 129-164. (Boston, MA: Brill Publishers, 2008): 247

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 6.

2.8. Hybrid Identities in the Diaspora

Most closely related concepts to diaspora are ethnicity and immigration. However, Virinder Kalra, Raminder Kaur and John Hutnyk argue that the term immigration or immigrant has lost its reputation in order to describe communities for many reasons. The first reason is that the term immigrant is used for people who have not immigrated but offspring of migrants. “The word immigrant, rather than relating to an actual event of movement, becomes a euphemism for not from this place, or for one who belongs somewhere else.”¹³³ The second reason is that the term immigrant is used to imply an event that people migrate from one place and settle in another, end of story.¹³⁴ However, the story does not end but continue by changing form. Within this context, the critical questions should be asked: “does diaspora help us think of groups as more settled than the term ‘immigration’ implies? Or does it emphasize difference by highlighting transnational affiliations?”¹³⁵ According to Kalra, Kaur and Hutnyk, if we draw attention to diasporas, wouldn’t it serve as an excuse to exclude them from the society?¹³⁶ Diaspora shows us that the story does not end and it shifts our point of view from one way process. It could be argued that combined with a hyphenated, hybrid identification, diaspora allows us to move beyond the fixed notion and definition of immigrant. In addition, it allows us to perceive migration as an existing process which builds links and relationships at the material and cultural levels.¹³⁷ However, the term diaspora might be perceived negative or positive based on the communities and the political scenario. Therefore, diaspora and its relationship with both homeland and host countries are crucial.

2.8.1. Concept of Diaspora

The word “diaspora” is a word of Greek origin which means dispersion or scattering. It first entered English in the 19th century after the Jews’ captivity in Babylonia in the 5th century B.C.E.¹³⁸ In modern and politic world, the term has started to be used for the minor ethnic and religious groups living in new

¹³³ **Ibid.**, Virinder Kalra, Raminder Kaur, John Hutnyk, 14.

¹³⁴ **Ibid.**, 14.

¹³⁵ **Ibid.**, 14.

¹³⁶ **Ibid.**, 14.

¹³⁷ **Ibid.**, 15.

¹³⁸ Robin, Cohen. “Diasporas and the State: From Victims to Challengers.” **International Affairs**, V.12, No. 3 (1996): 2

environments. According to Leavy, diaspora members are tied to their homeland through a shared national identity even though they are away from their physical borders. As the borders shift and the borders lose their importance due to the globalization and advancement in the technology, “hybrid theory allows for increasingly inclusive definitions of diasporas, empirical scholarship is investigating a wide range of diasporized hybrid identities.”¹³⁹

With modern politics, the word “diaspora” started to be used for the ethnic and religious groups that can be defined as minorities who are away from their own lands and living in new environments. Considered to be one of the most famous names of diaspora studies, William Safran and Robert Cohen have identified some characteristics for an ethnic group to be accepted as a diaspora. According to William Safran, there are six characteristics for a community to be accepted as a diaspora.

- “1) They, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from a specific original "center" to two or more "peripheral," or foreign, regions;
- 2) They retain a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland—its physical location, history, and achievements;
- 3) They believe that they are not—and perhaps cannot be—fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel partly alienated and insulated from it;
- 4) They regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return—when conditions are appropriate;
- 5) They believe that they should collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their original homeland and to its safety and prosperity;
- 6) They continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their ethno communal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such a relationship.”¹⁴⁰

These features set by Safran coincide with the situation of the Jews in the early 20th century but the meaning of diaspora has changed a lot. Even today, it has been observed that even the Jewish diaspora does not comply with the many features mentioned by Safran.¹⁴¹ According to Eleni Sideri, “it became evident that producing a definition based on the memories of one diasporic community (the Jewish experience) and thus, turning it into a paradigm, could be less fruitful than one could imagine.”¹⁴² On the other hand, Cohen made a broader explanation of the definition

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, Smith and Leavy, 174.

¹⁴⁰ William Safran. “Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return.” **Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies**, V. 1, (1991): 83-84.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁴² Eleni Sideri. “The Diaspora of the Term Diaspora: A Working-Paper of a Definition”, **Transtext(e)s Transcultures** (2008): 32

and features of diaspora in his book written in 1997. According to him, dispersal from original homeland traumatically is one of the aspects of diasporas:

- “1. Dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically, to two or more foreign regions;
2. Alternatively or additionally, the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions;
3. A collective memory and myth about the homeland, including its location, history, suffering and achievements;
4. An idealization of the real or imagined ancestral home and a collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety and prosperity, even to its creation;
5. the frequent development of a return movement to the homeland that gains collective approbation even if many in the group are satisfied with only a vicarious relationship or intermittent visits to the homeland;
6. a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and based on a sense of distinctiveness, a common history, the transmission of a common cultural and religious heritage and the belief in a common fate;
7. A troubled relationship with host societies, suggesting a lack of acceptance or the possibility that another calamity might befall the group;
8. A sense of empathy and co-responsibility with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement even where home has become more vestigial; and
9. The possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in host countries with a tolerance for pluralism.”¹⁴³

However, in 2008, Cohen updated his book’s forefront he wrote in 1997. He stated in this forefront that there were five reasons why he had to reconsider his book in ten years: 1) After 1997, there were surprising discussions about the conceptual framework, 2) the diaspora studies in social sciences increased surprisingly. 3) After the events of September 11, the diaspora discussions started to be evaluated together with the security issue, 4) the diaspora communities establish relations with their home country (economically and socially), 5) Different concepts used in close or similar terms cause confusion.¹⁴⁴

According to Cohen, there must be a strong bond with the past and / or resistance to assimilation today and tomorrow for the formation or maintenance of diasporic consciousness.¹⁴⁵ In particular, ethnic groups members protects their identities even though many years pass after their immigration and they resist assimilation. In addition, they would like to protect their relationship with their homeland and people there.

Today, everyone living outside their homeland (immigrant, refugee, worker, businessman, and student) can be called diaspora. But the answer to the question of whether anyone living in different countries as immigrants can be called diaspora is

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, Cohen, 26.

¹⁴⁴ Firat, Yaldız. “Diaspora Kavramı: Tarihçe, Gelişme ve Tartışmalar.” **Hacettepe Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları**, V.18 (2013): 304

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 186

“no.” However, since the word diaspora is a very broad concept, it is not explicitly explained to whom, when and under what conditions a community can be diaspora. There is not yet a clear and common approach in terms of what are the characteristics of diasporas and which groups can be called diasporas.¹⁴⁶ On the other hand, Sheffer defines diasporas as follows;

“An ethno-national diaspora is a social-political formation, created as a result of either voluntary or forced migration, whose members regard themselves as of the same ethno-national origin and who permanently reside as minorities in one or several host countries. Members of such entities maintain regular or occasional contacts with what they regard as their homelands and with individuals and groups of the same background residing in other host countries. Based on aggregate decisions to settle permanently in host countries, but to maintain a common identity, diasporans identify as such, showing solidarity with their group and their entire nation, and they organize and are active in the cultural, social, economic, and political spheres. Among their various activities, members of such diasporas establish trans-state networks that reflect complex relationships among the diasporas, their host countries, their homelands, and international actors.”¹⁴⁷

According to Sheffer, it is important to investigate the quantitative factors in transition of society from the status of immigrant to diaspora status. He states that the dates of migration, the timing of migrants’ decisions to settle permanently in a host country, host countries’ naturalization and citizenship laws, formal membership in diaspora organizations, financial contributions to communal organizations, well-defined political activities on behalf of homelands, and the frequency of visits to and communications with the homelands are the important factors which shape a diaspora.¹⁴⁸

The most important factors of today's definition of diaspora are the traumatic separation from the homeland and the feeling of solidarity with the members in other countries. In addition to that, diasporas build an identity between their ethnicity and the ethnicity in the host country. According to Roger Brubaker, there are three features of diasporas in his article, “*The ‘diaspora’ diaspora*”. Those features are dispersion, homeland orientation, and boundary-maintenance.¹⁴⁹

As a result of the evaluation, it can be said that many diaspora researchers such as Cohen, Brubaker, and Sheffer have agreed on three basic features that a diaspora community should have. The first of these three features is that there must be at least two or more places to go after the dispersal. The second is the relationship of the

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 307

¹⁴⁷ Gabriel Sheffer. **Diaspora Politics At Home Abroad** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 90.

¹⁴⁹ Roger Brubaker. “The ‘diaspora’ diaspora”, **Ethnic and Racial Studies**. V.28, No. 1, (2005): 1-19

diasporic community with a real or imaginary homeland. The third feature is the consciousness of the group about its own identity. According to Butler, the fourth distinguishing feature of diaspora, involving the temporal-historical dimension is its existence over at least two generations.¹⁵⁰ The last feature described by Butler is an important criterion for the future of diasporas, its organization and continuity of their rituals.

2.8.2. Diaspora, Homeland and Host-Society

The most important factor shaping the diaspora is the relationship between the diaspora groups and their homeland. Homeland is the center where diasporas are traumatically dispersed. Some diasporas do not have a homeland where they can return, or even if they have a physical homeland, it is not suitable for their return due to political, ideological and social reasons. However, the idea of being a part of a diaspora holds people together in the lands where they immigrated. In this regard, Safran states that some people do not go home since they do not have a homeland to return. Even though diaspora members have a homeland to return, it is not a welcoming place politically, ideologically or sociologically.¹⁵¹

The triangle between diaspora, homeland and host society/country is really important in terms of majority and minority relations. The diaspora community might be welcomed or seen as strangers in the host country. The integration between diaspora, homeland and host country might also be decided by the host country based on the policies. Recently, scholars have distinguished different kinds of diasporas based on their causes. For instance, colonialism, imperialism, trade or labor migrations or any kind of social coherence within diasporas and members' relationship with their homeland are among the reasons for its occurrence. On this basis, Cohen identified five types of diasporas based on their causes: *victim diasporas* (a group people who have been banished from their place of origin and sent to another land due to genocide, exile, persecution, or conquest such as Jewish, African, Armenian diasporas), *labour diasporas* (a group of people who immigrate to other countries to seek job or economic opportunities without disconnecting their relationship with the homeland such as Indian and Turkish diasporas), *trade*

¹⁵⁰ Kim D. Butler. "Defining Diaspora, Refining a Discourse Diaspora", **A Journal of Transnational Studies**, V.10, No.2 (2001):189-219.

¹⁵¹ **Ibid.**, Safran, 91.

diasporas (a group of people migrating to other countries in order to open trade routes such as Chinese and Lebanese diasporas), *imperial diasporas* (a group of people who migrate to serve and maintain empires such as British and French diasporas), and *cultural diasporas* (a groups of people who move through a process of chain such as Caribbean diaspora.)¹⁵² Even though Cohen distinguished five types of diasporas, those can be reshaped and conceived today due to the advancement of globalization and transportation. As a result of globalization, diasporas are more mobile compared to the past now.

Apart from Cohen, Yossi Shain is another scholar who distinguishes diasporas based on their activities. According to him, there are three types of diasporas: core members, passive members, and silent members.¹⁵³ Core members are organizing elites, intensively active in diasporic affairs and in a position to appeal for mobilization of the larger diaspora. Passive members are likely to be available for mobilization when the active leadership calls upon them. Silent members are a larger pool of people who are generally uninvolved in diasporic affairs (in the discursive and political life of its institutions), but who may mobilize in times of crisis.¹⁵⁴ In addition to that, he analyses the question of what interests diasporas can derive from their desire to shape the foreign policies of their homelands under four groups.

“Diasporas might view the homeland’s foreign policy as having an impact on the interest of “the people.”

Diasporas may have a strong stake in the ways the homeland’s foreign policy affects the homeland’s future (as separate from the people)

Diasporas might view the homeland’s foreign policy as affecting the interests of a specific community.

Diasporas might view the homeland’s foreign policy as affecting the narrow bureaucratic interests of their organizations.”¹⁵⁵

For diaspora members, the situation and the future of their homeland are crucial since they might go back there back one day. In addition to that, the policies between the host country and diaspora are very important in order to protect their future in the host country as well as to preserve their identity, culture, language and customs. Shain divides the host country policies in two: *liberal approach* and *constructivist approach*.¹⁵⁶ According to him, constructivist approach sees the state

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, Cohen, 178.

¹⁵³Yossi Shain, Barth Aharon. “Diasporas and International Relations Theory.” **International Organization**, v.57, no. 3 (2000): 452-453

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 452-453.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 455-456.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 457-458.

as an agent and the identity as the core of the state. In this approach, identity can be molded by the external and internal processes such as economic and political. These processes can construct the national identities, interests and the target of the state as a result. In order to conserve the domestic politics, it is highly important to preserve the national identity dynamics.¹⁵⁷ In this case, two important questions are raised: “How does this approach affect the diasporas and who should be included or excluded?” As to Shain, because national identity is both a variable and a resource; it stands to a reason that different groups attach varying importance to it. In this case, “diasporas -outside the state but inside the people- often attach more importance to national identity than those inside the state. Diasporas thus engage in efforts to shape national identity not so much to gain through it leverage over (material) interests, but mainly because it is their interest to insure and sustain an identity that perpetuates and nourishes their self-image.”¹⁵⁸ On the other hand, liberal approach rejects considering the states as a dominant agent and accepts the individuals as active agents both in international and domestic affairs.¹⁵⁹ The government leads a policy without a forced assimilation. This approach considers diasporas to be ‘inside the people’; they have an influence on international, domestic affairs. Both constructivist and liberal approaches see diasporas as a part of the country which influences both international and domestic affairs.¹⁶⁰

2.8.3. Diaspora Nationalism

Nina Glick Schiller terms diaspora nationalism as “long-distance nationalism.”¹⁶¹ It refers to a nationalist feeling which occurs among the diaspora members who do not reside in their ethnic or national homeland anymore. Long-distance nationalism collects people living in different parts of the world to a specific territory as knows as ancestral home. As a result of that, members of the ancestral home who live in the various places of the world take some actions on behalf of their ancestral lands such as lobbying, voting, demonstrating, etc. According to Demmers, “by long-distance interference with the conflict in their homeland, diaspora communities are engaged in a sort of virtual conflict: they live their conflicts through

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 458

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 459.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 460.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 460.

¹⁶¹ Nina Glick Schiller. “Long-Distance Nationalism.” *Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World*, ed. Carol R. Ember, Ian Skoggard, v.1 (2002):570

the internet, email, television, and telephone without direct (physical) suffering, risks, or accountability.”¹⁶² Therefore, long-distance nationalism differs from other kind of nationalism in terms of borders, membership and the relationship between the members of the nation and national territory.

National borders do not limit the membership in the nation. It is important to note that, as a part of their ideology of belonging, long-distance nationalists in the past, as they do today, tended to evoke a now discredited concept of “race,” portraying each nation “racially” distinct.¹⁶³ Although the idea of race and racially were rejected after the Second World War, new definitions of nationalism emerged later. Benedict Anderson defines the concept of nation as “imagined community.” According to Anderson, diasporas have three important features. Those features are imagined, sovereign and community. It is imagined because the members of diaspora communities do not know their fellow members or even hear of them, yet they still have a link among them and “in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”¹⁶⁴ Even though diasporas do not have a homeland where they can return, or even if they have a physical homeland, it is either not suitable for their homeland or they really do not plan to return, the idea of being a part of a diaspora holds people together in the lands where they immigrated. As the imagined community and homeland continue to live on the minds and also they are supported by the rituals, traditions and customs, new generations do not forget their diasporic and transnational identity.

2.8.4. Diaspora and Hybridity

According to Stuart Hall, diaspora identities are defined by the recognition of diversity and heterogeneity contrary to popular belief that diaspora identities are known for essence or purity.¹⁶⁵ Hybridity implies there are no pure cultures. Robert J. Young argues that “heterogeneity, cultural interchange and diversity have now

¹⁶² Jolle Demmers. “Diaspora and Conflict: Locality, Long-Distance, Nationalism and Decolonization of Conflict Dynamics.” *The Public*, v.9, n.1 (2002), 94.

¹⁶³ Schiller, *ibid*, 572.

¹⁶⁴ Benedict Anderson. **Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism** (New York: Verso, 1991): 5

¹⁶⁵ Stuart Hall, **Cultural Identity and Diaspora**, in *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1994), 393-395.

become the self-conscious identity of modern society.”¹⁶⁶ This diversity that Young implies brings the hybridity itself since “the desire to be from somewhere, to have a sense of roots and a feeling of belonging are key features of the quest for positive identity in postmodern, post-colonial societies.”¹⁶⁷ According to Young, hybridity works both as “organically”, that is, hegemonizing, creating new spaces, structures, scenes, and “intentionally”, that is diasporizing, intervening as a form of subversion, translation, transformation.¹⁶⁸ He also states that:

“Hybridity as in the racial model involves an antithetical movement of coalescence and antagonism, with the unconscious set against the intentional, the organic against the divisive, the generative against the undermining. Hybridity is itself an example of hybridity, of a doubleness that both brings together, fuses, but also maintains separation.”¹⁶⁹

As diasporas have ties to both their homelands and host lands, they combine two different cultures and create a hybrid identities for themselves. In this regard, Homi Bhabha claims that “the process of cultural hybridity gives rise to something different, something new and unrecognizable, a new area of negotiation of meaning and representation.”¹⁷⁰

Diaspora members have to harmonize the cultural values they have in their home country with those they have in the host country. This situation let diasporas to keep alive in a dominant society. The extent to which the regime in the new country is open to cultural diversity is a key factor in their ability to preserve their own culture and identity.

Even if the diaspora retains its identity, including multicultural countries, it also acquires the cultural characteristics and spiritual values of the country where they are located, which reveals hybrid identities. According to Safran, there are four essential features for a diasporic identity: a different language, common history memory, a national religion and continuity of being a minority within a large community.¹⁷¹ Diaspora identities try to adapt new values of the host country while carrying these features, which is the biggest element in the emergence of hybrid identities. “Hybridity as a concept contributes to the articulation of the fluidity and

¹⁶⁶ Robert Young. **Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race**. (New York: Routledge, 1995): 4

¹⁶⁷ Weedon, Chris. **Identity and Culture: Narratives of Difference and Belonging**.(New York: Open University Press, 2004): 85

¹⁶⁸ **Ibid.**, 23.

¹⁶⁹ Young, **Ibid**, 20-21.

¹⁷⁰ Homi Bhabha, 1990, 211.

¹⁷¹ Hall, **ibid**, 280-281.

network quality of social systems and orders.”¹⁷² It is a fact that almost all of the communities' identities and cultures are hybrid. Especially, with the development of mass media and globalization, diaspora and identity have gained other dimensions.

2.8.5. Transnationalism

Since beginning in the mid-90s, the concept of trans-migrant has started to be used for the people whose daily lives are based on multiple connections that transcend international boundaries and whose identities are shaped through their relationships with multiple nation states.¹⁷³ These people have started to both continue their daily-life in the country they are settled and maintain their relationship with their homelands. As a result, transnationalism and non-governmental actors which can help to spread the propaganda of transnationalism have become crucial for states concepts such as citizenship and nationality, which are deeply embedded in a nation's culture, history, and traditions.¹⁷⁴ The development of technological advances enabled diasporas and also other communities to reach beyond their borders, which led governments/states to take serious actions. In other words, governments had to adapt new policies for diaspora communities. Besides, globalization has helped diaspora communities to incorporate alongside national governments. As a consequence of that, migrants have started to live in both countries: their homeland and host country. Consequently, migrants who have started to live both “here” and “there” create new transnational spaces for themselves.

Thomas Faist distinguishes transnational spaces in three: *transnational exchange, reciprocity and solidarity within kinship and friendship systems, transnational circuits, and transnational communities*. According to Faist, *transnational exchange, reciprocity and solidarity within kinship and friendship systems* are typical for the refugees who are from the first generation. Transnational exchange is established by immigrants in order to satisfy immigrants' needs such as mother tongue videos, food, clothing, etc. Reciprocity can be visible when

¹⁷² Paul Jackson, Peter Albrecht. “Power, Politics and Hybridity.” **Hybridity on the Ground in Peacebuilding and Development: Critical Conversations** (Australia: Anu Press 2018): 41.

¹⁷³ Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch and Cristina Szanton Blanc, “From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration”, **Anthropological Quarterly**, V. 68, N.1 (January 1995): 48.

¹⁷⁴“Transnationalism. Encyclopaedia Britannica”, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/transnationalism>, [02.20.2020].

immigrants send money to their families in the country of origin. Also, transnational solidarity can be seen when migrants support projects in their home countries.¹⁷⁵

“*Transnational circuits* are characterized by a constant circulation of goods, people, and information transversing the borders of sending and receiving states.”¹⁷⁶

The immigrants are related to someone in their homeland. Thomas Faist explains the situation of the immigrants as below:

“What is crucial is that these entrepreneurs and their dependants are firmly rooted in either the former sending or the former receiving country and use it as a sort of base from which to carry out entrepreneurial activities in others. Economic, political or cultural entrepreneurs use insider advantages such as knowledge of the language knowing friends and acquaintances abroad to establish a foothold.”¹⁷⁷

Finally, *transnational communities* characterize spaces where communities develop important and dense social and emotional ties over time in two countries. “For transnational communities to emerge, reciprocity and solidarity need to reach beyond narrow kinship systems.”¹⁷⁸ Diasporas can only be called transnational communities if the members develop some significant ties to the host country. Otherwise, it would be an “exile” for the immigrants. Diasporas are either able to act in contrast to the feelings of belonging and loyalty demanded by the nation-states or they can adopt them, which entirely depends on the host country's attitude towards them. Although diasporas are seen as groups that eliminate political-geographical boundaries, they also stand out as structures where the importance of identity politics and nationality concepts increase. Therefore, diasporas can blend different cultures and cultural identities. Thus, they can create new spaces for themselves where they can both preserve their history and culture as well as the identity which they adopt in the host country.

2.8.6. Virtual Diasporas

One of the major changes affecting diasporas has been globalization and the rapid development in technology along with interaction and mobilization within digital territories. This change has brought a new aspect in epistemological approaches. E-diaspora which means “migrant collective that organizes itself and is active first and foremost on the web” has become one of the important terms of the

¹⁷⁵ Thomas Faist. “Transnational Social Spaces out of International Migration: Evolution, Significance and Future Prospects.” *European Journal of Sociology*, V.39, N.2 (1998): 220

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 220.

¹⁷⁷ Thomas Faist, *ibid*, 220.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 221.

21st century.¹⁷⁹ Laguerre defines virtual diaspora as “a pole of an existing diaspora.”¹⁸⁰ According to him, with the advent of technology and as a result of globalization, “one witnesses the rise of groups of immigrants who organize communities based on their ability to navigate in the ethereal space of on-line communications, not on the principle of physical location.”¹⁸¹ WL Bennet and A. Segerber describe e-diasporas as a network of connective action where individuals and their actions are enhanced by digital exchange.¹⁸² Virtual diaspora members can personalize their experiences and participate in groups, discussion or networks. By taking part in online activities, they take peer recognition, reach broader communities online and keep their diasporic activities alive.

Virtual diasporas date back to the “printing press in the 15th century and extended into radio and television in the 20th century.”¹⁸³ However, when large social media platforms emerged in 2000s, connection between groups and individuals has increased a lot. As a result of that, development of technology has enabled many nations to transform the national into the transnational. Therefore, online activities of immigrants have gained a lot of importance. In addition, online platforms have given a big chance to ethnic communities to preserve their ethnicity and culture. Besides, digital tools enable diasporas to remain in continuous contact with their countries of origin. Likewise, governments have also started to use digital space in order to connect with global diasporas. Even though diasporas have been conceived as imagined communities, “through the digital world these imagined communities have transformed into virtual communities.”¹⁸⁴ The transition from imaginary diasporas into virtual diasporas helped communities to maintain a sense of national identity, develop relations with other migrants and send remittances to their home country.

¹⁷⁹ Dana Diminescu. “The Concept.” **Concept & coordination**, <http://www.e-diasporas.fr> [28.07.2020]

¹⁸⁰ Michel S. Laguerre. **The Digital City: The American Metropolis and Information Technology** (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006): 125

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 125.

¹⁸² W. Lance Bennet, Alexandra Segerber, “The Logic of Connective Action”, **Information, Communication and Society**, V.15, No.5 (2012):739.

¹⁸³ Deirde McKay, “The Virtual Meets Reality: Policy Implications of e-diaspora”, **Australian Strategic Policy Institute** (Report, 2017), 10.

¹⁸⁴ Corneliu Bjola, Ilan Manor, “Virtual diasporas: how digital tools influence the politics of diasporas”, **Politics in Development** (2006: University of Oxford): 1

Furthermore, Laguerre proposes that virtual diasporas, by engaging in the domestic and foreign policies of the host land while participating via the internet in the political affairs of the homeland, add a new dimension to the transnational or even global architecture of national security.¹⁸⁵ Also, diasporic groups create plurality by bringing all the members around various topics such as religion, politics, gender, profession, etc. By doing so, they make up of “intersecting circuits that crisscross one another while maintaining their distinct focuses.”¹⁸⁶ The virtual environments, especially virtual associations that members create online, lead community members to get news about each other, they also play a key role to maintain the unity and expand a diaspora’s sense of identity.

2.9. Third Space and In-betweenness

Identities are constructed through interaction with others and shaped by the society. Therefore, hybrid identities are product of fusion of two or more identities, which shift across context and interactions. Instead of choosing a culture, they create a new identity for themselves by combining both cultures, and create a new space for themselves called the Third Space. Edward W. Soja defines Third Spaces are in-between places where the first and second spaces work together to generate a new third space.¹⁸⁷ As it was highlighted, identities are not fixed but fluid and always in flux. As a result of that, hybrid identities shift between two different spaces and shaped by interactions.

The theory of Third Space emerges from the sociocultural tradition and it is associated with Lev Vygotsky who defined sociocultural tradition as a constitutive role of culture in mind which develops by incorporating the community’s shared traditions and norms accumulated over generations.¹⁸⁸ However, later on Bhabha applied sociocultural tradition to the postcolonial era and condition and resembled hybridity to a stairwell which “prevents identities at either end of it from settling

¹⁸⁵ Michelle S. Laguerre, “Virtual Diasporas: A New Frontier of National Security”, **The Nautilus Institute** <http://oldsite.nautilus.org/gps/virtual-diasporas/paper/Laguerre.html> [17.07.2020].

¹⁸⁶ **Ibid.**

¹⁸⁷ Edward W. Soja. **Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-imagined Places** (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996), 1-12.

¹⁸⁸ Anton Yasnitsky, “Guest editor’s introduction: Archival revolution in Vygotskian studies? Uncovering Vygotsky’s archives.” **Journal of Russian & East European Psychology**, V.48, No.1 (2010): 3-13

into primordial polarities.”¹⁸⁹ Hybrid individuals deploy a partial place where they can combine two cultures. It is the Third Place which is separate from other two places yet a combination of them. This new position paves the way for hybrid individuals to choose different identities and cultures at the same time. They can move between their identities and employ different roles. According to Bhabha, there is no pure culture. All cultures are hybrid as well as all individuals. Living in the Third Space brings in-betweenness with itself. Linda McDowell argues that identities which are in-between are always changing due to fluidity and mobilization. She states:

“Instead of identities of oppositional‘ or minority‘ groups being constructed as different from a norm,‘ it is now asserted that all identities are a fluid amalgam of memories of places and origins, constructed by and through fragments and nuances, journeys and rests, of movements between. Thus, the in-between is itself a process or a dynamic, not just a stage on the way to a more final identity.”¹⁹⁰

In-betweenness, as is evident from its name, is neither here nor there. According to Homi Bhabha, in-between spaces provide “the terrain for elaborating strategies of selfhood – singular or communal – that initiate new signs of identity, and innovative sites of collaboration, and contestation, in the act of defining the idea of society itself.”¹⁹¹ He also argues that in-between is a sphere where “the intersubjectivity and collective experiences of *nationness*, community interest, or cultural value are negotiated.”¹⁹² Hybrid individuals combine two different distinct cultures and traditions instead of abandoning one of them. As a result, they are neither one nor other, neither live here nor there. They adopt both of them and reveal any of them accordingly.

2.10. Summary

In this chapter, identity and identity types were discussed. It was argued that identity is not fixed but it is fluid and in state of flux. Therefore, individuals are not composed of just one identity. It was also argued that identities are changed and constructed based on the circumstances and new encounters, and one of the crucial key points is immigration. People who immigrate to other countries go through a process which is called adaptation and acculturation. To that extend, Berry’s

¹⁸⁹ Bhabha, 1994, 5.

¹⁹⁰ Linda McDowell. **Gender, identity and place: Understanding Feminist Geographies.** (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1999), 215.

¹⁹¹ Bhabha, *ibid*, 1-2.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 2.

theories of adaptation and acculturation were discussed so as to understand the situation of the immigrants. As a result of acculturation and adaptation processes, individuals hybridized and they adapt two different cultures and traditions, and they start to live both cultures and reveal any of them accordingly. Therefore, hybridity and hybrid identities were presented in this chapter along with the term diaspora. Hybrid identities in diaspora do not assimilate or take a stand against host country's tradition. Rather, they blend both homeland and host land's tradition and cultures. They start to live both here and there. Their situation is important for both home and host countries. Globalization and rapid developments in technology have led to the reshaping of diasporas and hybrid identities. Globalization is an important element which affects both hybrid identities and diaspora. Therefore, in this chapter, globalization and its effects on hybridity and diaspora were discussed. As a result of globalization and advancement in technology, virtual diasporas emerged and gained importance. Along with virtual diasporas, transnationalism and diaspora nationalism were presented as well. Finally, in the last part of the chapter, Third Space and in-betweenness were discussed benefitting from Homi Bhabha.

3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE KAZAKHS IN TURKEY

Kazakhs are a Turkic ethnic group mainly located around Ural-Altay Mountains and the Northern part of Central Asia. The Kazakh population in Turkey is composed of people forced to leave Altay Mountains in August 1936 and migrate to Turkey due to several reasons. The Kazakh diaspora was formed as a result of a long-distance migration, which was first considered to be temporary but then turned into a regular settlement. According to the studies, 30.000 people of the Kazakh diaspora currently live in Turkey. Throughout its formation process, the community has been influenced and developed by different historical events and factors such as politics, economy and religion. The political reasons that led to the development of the Kazakh migration were the Kazakh-Dzungar war in the 18th century, the Kazakh national liberation wars and rebellions in the 18th and 19th centuries against the Tsarist regime, the national liberation movement of Central Asia against the tsarist regime in 1916, the establishment of Soviet power and the civil war in Kazakhstan, the policy of genocide against the Kazakh nation in the process of collectivization, the war against the Chinese communism in East Turkestan (Xingjian), and the Second World War.

Following to the given informations above, historical background of Kazakh community, settlement policy of Turkey, identity formation, Kazakhstan's independence and recognition of Kazakhs in Turkey will be examined.

3.1. Migration

3.1.1. Reason

The Kazakh community in Turkey is based on the masses of Kazakh migrants, who were forced to leave their homeland by the violence and genocide policy of China in East Turkestan. From the second half of the 19th century, East Turkestan has been a region in which China and Russia have fought hard to establish dominance. Inhabited by Uyghur, Kazakh, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tatar, Russian, Mongol, Hui (Chinese Muslims) and Han (Chinese) people, the region is rich in underground

sources, which makes it geopolitically and strategically indispensable for China. This region had been used by China as a buffer zone against the Soviet threat during the Cold War.¹⁹³ Therefore, all steps made by China were related directly to the safety and stability of the relevant region.

According to the Convention of Peking, signed in 1860 between Qing dynasty of China, and Russian Empire, East Turkestan was agreed to be dependent to China. “It was only after the Opium War in the 19th century when the capitalist Powers, one after another, imposed unequal treaties on China that the Wusuli River was stipulated as forming part of the boundary between China and Russia in the Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking of 1860.”¹⁹⁴ According to established principles of international law, in the case of navigable boundary rivers the central line of the main channel shall form the boundary line and determine the ownership of islands. Situated on the Chinese side of the central line of the main channel of the Wusuli River, Chenpao Island indisputably belongs to China and has always been under China's jurisdiction.¹⁹⁵

With this border agreement, the Manchu government of China became the only politically ruler of East Turkestan. As a result of the assimilation and oppression, which began in the period of the Manchuria dynasty and continued systematically during the Communist regime, millions of people died and were massacred.¹⁹⁶ The army and state organization were occupied by Russians and Chinese many times before it was fully formed. At last, this region was occupied by China and people were exposed by oppression. Even though Muslims from East Turkestan resisted the invasion of the Communist Chinese regime many times, they were forced to leave Central Asia. Determination of Russian-Chinese territorial borders in Central Asia and agreements such as Beijing Agreement (1860), Chaveşek Protocol (1864), Hobdin Protocol (1869), Tarbagatay Border Determination Protocols (1870), Livadi Agreement (1879), Petersburg Agreement (1881), signed between these two countries, caused Kazakhs to lose their lands. One of the other biggest reasons for the dispersion of the Kazakh diaspora is the compulsory

¹⁹³ Hamid Wahed Alikuzai, **A Concise History of Afghanistan in 25 Volumes.** (Manchester: Trafford Publishing, 2013): 283

¹⁹⁴ Keesing's Record of World Events, 1969, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, V.15. 23642

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 23642.

¹⁹⁶ Godfrey Lias. **Büyük Kazak Göçü** (Istanbul: Bilgeoguz. 2013):4.

collectivization process in Kazakhstan between 1928 and 1932, which forced Kazakhs to migrate and form a diaspora abroad. What caused the sudden spread of Kazakh people to the world were the events taking place in East Turkestan (Xingjian) between 1930 and 1950.

“Kazakhs, traditionally and historically a nomadic people, used to occupy the heartland of Eurasia. As the sedentary Russian and Chinese empires began expanding their territories into the areas where Kazakhs had their centuries-old migratory routes, a difficult period commenced for the Kazakh tribes. Border agreements between the Russian and Chinese empires concluded in the nineteenth century divided Kazakh lands and therefore Kazakhs living in these territories suddenly became subjects of these two empires.”¹⁹⁷

Kazakhs had been engaged in nomadic animal husbandry, which had caused them to enter into severe quarrels with landowners for grassland. Between 1930 and 1940, as the armed nomads posed a danger to the government, the administration in Urumqi decided to give the grassland to the villagers (the Chinese). Thus, there have been long and bloody struggles between the Chinese minority and the Muslim majority. In 1944, the placement of Chinese refugees on the lands used by Kazakhs as animal pastures caused an uprising among Kazakhs in the Altai Region. As a result of these developments, eighteen thousand Kazakhs settled in the Barköl region and in 1938 about 500 families immigrated to Mongolia. Five thousand Kazakhs settled in Tibet and India.¹⁹⁸

“From the 1930s, Kazakh resistance became widespread and continued until the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Despite the massive resistance, along with that of the other Turkic and Muslim peoples of the region, there came a time when Kazakh leaders saw no alternative but to leave their ancestral land in order to live freely and preserve their Turkic and Muslim identities.”¹⁹⁹

In 1940, large numbers of Kazakhs set out in three groups to settle in India via Tibet. Many of them died of starvation and cold during that time. Eventually, in September 1941, out of thousand families, only 3039 Kazakhs managed to cross the British-Indian border, which witnessed a conflict causing British India to be divided as India and Pakistan.

3.1.2. Migration to India

In 1940, a large number of Kazakhs set out in three groups to settle in India via Tibet. However, most of them passed away in Tibet during the immigration process

¹⁹⁷ Ingvar Svanberg, Linda Benson, **China’s Last Nomads** (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998) :32 quoted in Işık Kuscu Bonenfant, “Changing Perception of Homeland for the Kazakh Diaspora.” **Nationalities Papers**, V.44, No.3 (2016): 383

¹⁹⁸ Halife Altay. **Anayurttan Anadoluya**, (Ankara, 1981): 288-296

¹⁹⁹ Kuscu, **ibid**, 383.

because of cold, hunger and illness. In 1941, those who managed to cross the British-Indian border were taken to camps as refugees. One of the immigrants who witnessed those days was Ateyhan Bilgin who was one of the founders of the association called “*Eastern Turkistani Qazaq Refugees Association*” in Peshawar. After 3 years in the guesthouse allocated by the state with all Kazakh refugees in Istanbul, he settled in Altaykoy with many other Kazakhs. Between 1956 and 1963, he was elected as the headman of the village. Again he was elected between 1975 and 1977 as the headman of the village for the second time. He talks about their situation in British-India as follows:

“When we arrived in India on 08.18.1941, there were 3,039 people left out of 18,800 people. We were taken to the Muzafferabad Camp near the Pakistan border. People started dying here, too. So did many animals. We were allowed to go from the camp to town. There was Lord Vewol in the British colony of Delhi. We conveyed our request to go to Pakistan-Punjab to him, but he didn’t accept it. So, we stayed here until 1942.”²⁰⁰

He continues;

“Elishan, I, Ahmet Molla, and the Uighur interpreter Gulamhan left the camp at 6 am. The President arrived at 8 am. We managed to talk to him about our situation. We asked for our freedom, but he did not say anything about it. The interpreter did not convey what we said, therefore, Elishan told the president: “You want to destroy us in the camp. Let us go this week, or we will go to Punjab.” So we left after him. That day, the soldiers surrounded the camp. Elishan arrived in the city of Kari Abdullah with Ahmet Molla, Sadevye, Mukay, and Kıynayat in one night. Islamhan met with British Governor Lord Vewol in Delhi and transported the people in the camp to Tirnova in Punjab within a week in about 100 military vehicles. In the summer of 1942, several diseases broke out in Tarnova. Himayas were cold and it was warm here, which led to an imbalance. Then, the government gave us medicine and basic material support. At the end of the same year, free movement permit was granted.”²⁰¹

Following to that, a number of Kazakhs built public housing in one of the suburbs of Bhopal, called Kazakabad.²⁰² In the following years, they migrated to cities such as Lahore, Calcutta and Delhi and started to acquire various professions there.²⁰³ However, 1946-1947 were critical years for India. The British Empire decided to leave the control to Hindu people. But Mohammed Ali Jinnah, founder of Pakistan, and Muslim community was against to that. In March 1947, when a civil war broke out, Muslims in India were forced to leave to Pakistan by trains.²⁰⁴ Kazakhs were also on the train, so they left for their new country. Subsequently, in 1947 August, British India was divided into two as India and Pakistan. Thereupon,

²⁰⁰ Aysegul, Liman Cetin. “Niğde İli Ulukışla İlçesi Altayköyü’nün Kültürel Coğrafi Görünümü” (M.A Thesis, Nigde University, 2006), 30

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 30.

²⁰² Kazibek Islambek, *Anadolu'dan Anayurda Maneviyat Önderi Halife Altay*, ed. Abdolvahap Kara (Istanbul: Kalender Yayınevi, 2017):52

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 55.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 53.

political problems between India and Pakistan and in addition to death caused by various health problems led Kazakhs to a secondary immigration to Turkey. Here, secondary immigration can be explained as the phenomenon of migrants, including refugees and asylum- seekers, who for various reasons move from the country in which they first arrived, to seek protection or permanent resettlement elsewhere.²⁰⁵

3.1.3. Migration to Pakistan

After the establishment of the Pakistani state on August 14, 1947, two sides exchanged their coreligionists under military security measures in agreement with the Indian government. After Kazakhs arrived in Pakistan, they settled in the houses of the Indians along with Muslim immigrants from India. Kazakhs all over India, except for a few families, gathered in Pakistan. But then they settled in different cities.²⁰⁶ Organizing an association there, Kazakhs maintained their integrity and made their voices heard well. During their residence in Pakistan, they established a foundation called “*Eastern Turkistani Qazaq Refugees Association*” in Peshawar to better adapt to the social life and provide unity among the immigrants.²⁰⁷ (Please check appendix I)

In 1949, borders were closed. Therefore, those who wanted to go back to their homeland could not achieve it. Kazakhs in Pakistan earned their life with leather and other types of trade during their time there. Those who were not admitted to the citizenship of Pakistan wanted to immigrate to their first destination country, Turkey, considering those who had died as a result of the poor conditions in Pakistan. They wanted to send an ambassador to Turkey; however, they faced several difficulties due to the conditions then and some economic reasons.²⁰⁸ As soon as the Eastern Turkistani Qazaq Refugees Association was established, a list of Kazakhs living in various cities of Pakistan was prepared. On January 2, 1950, Kazakhs met with the Turkish journalist Mehmet Irfan in Peshawar.²⁰⁹ They paid a visit to the hotel where he stayed in order to apprise him and ask for help to be able to migrate to the Republic of Turkey. Irfan said that he would do his best to help them and he would

²⁰⁵ Anja Radjenovic, “Secondary movements of asylum-seekers in the EU”, **European Parliamentary Research Service** (2017): 2-8

²⁰⁶ Islambek, K. **ibid**, 54.

²⁰⁷ Zafer Selvi, Mansur Teyci, Abdülvahap Kara, **Kazakların Doğu Türkistan’dan Anadolu’ya Göçü ve Osman Taştan** (Istanbul: Kazak Türkleri Vakfı, 1996), 52.

²⁰⁸ **Ibid.**, 55.

²⁰⁹ **Ibid.**, 56.

be together with Turkey's ambassador to Karachi, who would soon visit Lahore, advising Kazakhs to prepare a list and go to Lahore. This list was delivered to the Ambassador of Turkey, Nebil Batu, on the 14th February 1951, and it was reported that Kazakh refugees desired to migrate to Turkey.²¹⁰

The association first prepared a list of all Kazakhs living in several cities after it was established. There was 3039 Kazakhs alive when they entered India. Afterwards, about 2000 people died of disease, there were only about 1000 Kazakhs surviving the epidemic and this number rose to approximately 1400 within a 7-year period thanks to birth, 400 babies were born. (One of whom is my grandmother).²¹¹

Turkey's ambassador to Turkestan was the famous poet Yahya Kemal Beyatli in those years. Immigration applications made in this period were accepted and negotiations continued. It was stated in the letter written by the Karachi Embassy to Kazakhs' association in Peshawar in 20 March, 1952 that Kazakhs' application for immigration to Turkey was approved.²¹²

"However, the Turkish government's response to the requests of the Kazakh refugees was not immediate. Prominent refugee leaders first brought the issue to the attention of Turkish diplomatic missions abroad. When no definite answer was received, the refugee leader of Uyghur origin, İsa Yusuf Alptekin, traveled to Turkey in January 1952. In Turkey, Alptekin, along with another prominent Uyghur leader Mehmet Emin Buğra who had already migrated to Turkey, met with high-ranking government officials. During these meetings, the government officials gave differing responses to the settlement demands and offered various solutions."²¹³

Kasım Gülek, the then secretary general of the CHP (Republican People's Party), advised them to remain close to Xinjiang (Eastern Turkestan) so that if conditions allowed they could go back to their homeland. Gülek also added that if they settled in Turkey, they would forget their language, customs, and culture."²¹⁴ During the negotiations, Fuat Koprulu asked Kazakhs whether they had any communication with the U.S.A. and stated that "It is essential for you to improve your communication with the US since the US is the only country that can help all of us."²¹⁵

"The emphasis on US help was often made by Turkish government officials and should be understood within the Cold War context. Indeed, during the same period, refugee leaders kept in contact with the US embassy in India, as well. From the US government, they requested

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 57.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 59.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 59.

²¹³ Kuscü, *ibid.*, 384

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 384.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 384.

funding for their liberation movement, aid to refugees, and help with refugee children's schooling.”²¹⁶

The demanded requests were provided except for aid that came from the World Council of Churches (WCC).²¹⁷ As a result of the negotiations, acceptance letter of Kazakhs to Turkey was sent to the Karachi Embassy, Pakistan. It was stated in the letter written by the Karachi Embassy to Kazakhs' association in Peshawar in 20 March, 1952 that Kazakh's application for immigration to Turkey was accepted. Kazaks, whose first immigration offer was not approved by Ismet Inonu, was later accepted by Adnan Menderes on the second application. The decision taken by the government headed by Menderes on 13 March 1952 and with the approval of President Celal Bayar, 1800 Kazakh refugees from Pakistan, India and Kashmir were recognized and accepted to Turkey. (Please check appendix II)

On the letter, it was written: *“The application has been accepted by the Turkish Government. Those who are not included in the lists sent to Ankara through the Embassy must apply to the Embassy as soon as possible to get an immigrant certificate to enter Turkey.”*²¹⁸ Those who were accepted were requested to submit the following documents:

- Certificate of residence from the Law Enforcement Agency of the Government of Pakistan, Certificate of smallpox vaccination,
- Health certificate from the Pakistani Municipality,
- Immigrant certificate from the Turkish Embassy based on the approved to be sent by Ankara, Visa from the Iran and Syria Embassies.²¹⁹

Over the past 4 months, from 12.09.1953 to 26.12.1953, 1379 people, 430 families migrated to Turkey gradually. In that process, deaths were still going on. They reached Basra by ship after spending 11 days, and from there, they reached Baghdad by train. After staying in Baghdad for a week, they finally went to the Nusaybin border. In Nusaybin, they got on a train and arrived in Istanbul on 12th Jan 1954.²²⁰ (Please check appendix III: the news published on 28th of October, 1952 on Milliyet Gazetesi)²²¹

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 384.

²¹⁷ Omer Kul. *İsa Yusuf Alptekin'in Mücadele Hatıraları: Esir Doğu Türkistan İçin-1* (Istanbul: Berikan Yayınları, 2010), 16.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 64.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 68.

²²¹ “Türkiye’ye 103 Kazak geliyor.” *Milliyet Gazetesi*, 28th of October, 1952.

3.1.4. Migration to Turkey

Arriving Turkey between 1952 and 1954 in several groups, Kazakhs were placed in guesthouses in Tuzla, Sirkeci and Zeytinburnu. After a period of time, they were settled in Kayseri, Niğde, Konya and Manisa. The Turkish government allocated a house to each of those settled in Manisa as tradesmen, and a house and a farm to each of those settled in other provinces as farmers.²²²

After the settlement, they started to occupy themselves with different activities such as sewing leather products and selling them in order to earn their life. In addition to that, vocational courses such as language, reading, writing and then carpentry, carpeting, weaving and sewing-embroidery were opened in immigrant houses to make the refugees adopt the life in Turkey.²²³ Turkish people did not know who Kazakhs were when they first arrived to Turkey and confused them with Cossacks or with the other Asian people. According to Kara, there are four phases of research on the Kazakhs in Turkey: 1953-1960, 1960-1980, 1980-1990 and post-soviet Russia.²²⁴

During the first phase, the first person who initiated the research about Kazakhs in Turkey was Saadet Cagatay from Ankara University. In 1952, she heard the news that a group of Kazakhs from Kashmir arrived in Turkey. Therefore, she visited the Kazakhs in Sirkeci guesthouse in 1953 in order to meet them. She was one of the most prominent people in Turkey who knew about Kazakhs and their history and culture. Known for her research in the field of language and literature, Saadet Cagatay collected samples of Kazakhs' oral literature rather than the history of migration of Kazakhs. In 1954, she pursued her researches and met Huseyin Teyci who settled in Kayseri. She published her research in Ankara in 1961 under the name "Kazakh Texts" (*Kazakça Metinler*). Its foreword includes Huseyin Teyci's memories about Kazakh immigration. Therefore, it is really important since the given information cannot be found anywhere due to death of Teyci in 1964.²²⁵ Another important book written in this period was by the British journalist Lias Godfrey who

²²² *Ibid.*, 69.

²²³ Ingvar Svanberg, **Kazak refugees in Turkey : A study of cultural persistence and social change**. (Stockholm: Uppsala : Academiae Ubsaliensis, 1989): 84

²²⁴ Abdulvahap Kara, Türkiye'de Kazaklar Hakkında Araştırmalar, <https://www.abdulvahapkara.com/tuerkyedek-kazaklar-hakkinda-aratirmalar> [05.21.2020]

²²⁵ Nurlan Baigabylov, "Türkiye'de Kazakh Diasporası", Göç Politikaları Uygulama ve Araştırma Merkezi (Report, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, GPM Report Series, 11, 2019): 6

came to Manisa in order to make a research about Kazakhs. His book titled “Kazakh Immigration” (*Kazak Göçü*) was published in 1956 in London. The book was about Kazakh immigration from East Turkestan to Turkey in the leadership of Alibek Hakim.²²⁶ Between 1960 and 1980 was a period where Kazakh people started to adapt in Turkey. However, Turkish people still did not know much about Kazakhs. They were confused them with Cossacks or with Tatars. In other words, the Turkish people generally seemed unaware of the existence of a Kazakh people.²²⁷ Therefore, in order to introduce themselves to Turkey, Alibek Hakim’s son Hasan Oraltay wrote a book named “East Turkistan Kazakh Turks on the Way to Freedom” (*Hürriyet Yolunda Doğu Türkistan Kazak Türkleri*) in 1961. According to Kara, writing book about Kazakh in Turkey was highly important since next generations born and raised in Turkey would forget their history.²²⁸

In 1977, Hizirbek Gayretullah’s book named “Goriness Days in Altai” (*Altay’da Kanlı Günler*) was published which includes memories and photos of old people and historical figures who pioneered the Kazakh immigration. This book is highly important since it gives detailed information about the immigration straight from the first mouth. Another important figure who published books was Halife Altay. He published “Genealogy of Kazakh Turks” (*Kazak Türklerine Ait Şecere*) in 1977; “My Memories” (*Hatıralarım*) in 1980, and “From Homeland to Anatolia” (*Anayurt’tan Anadolu’ya*) in 1981. These books are highly important in order to get to know the Kazakhs in Turkey. 3rd phase of research on the Kazakhs in Turkey covers the years between 1980 and 1990. During this period, contacts with the Kazakhs in the homeland started. Some Kazakhs went to Almaty and had the opportunity to see the homeland.²²⁹

On the other hand, China changed their foreign policy and allowed the Kazakhs in Turkey to visit their relatives in East Turkestan. Taking advantage of this situation, Kazakhs visited the places where they were born and raised in East Turkestan. They visited their relatives there and invited them to Turkey.²³⁰ In this period, Ingvar Svanberg arrived in Turkey so as to search about Kazakhs and wrote a book titled “Kazakh Refugees in Turkey”. According to Kara, fourth phase of

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 11.

Kazakh research covers the period after the collapse of Soviet Russia and the independence of Kazakhstan. He states that Kazakhstan started to be interested in diaspora Kazakhs after gaining its independence. It was unusual for Kazakhstan to conduct research and provide information about Kazakhs outside its borders before the independence.²³¹ Many researches from Kazakhstan arrived in Turkey in order to obtain information about Kazakhs living in Turkey. In this respect, a comprehensive study was done by Gulnara Mendikulova from Institute of History and Ethnology of Ch.Valikhanov. Her book “*Historical Fate, Birth and Development of the Kazakh diaspora*” which was published in Almaty in 1997 in Russian include all the Kazakh diasporas all over the world. Kazakhs living in Turkey realized that Kazakhstan did not know much thing about Kazakhs in Turkey. Therefore, they started to write books in Kazakh and published in Kazakhstan in order to give information. Hasan Oraltay’s “Elim-aylap Ötken Ömir” (*Vatan Hasretiyle Geçen Ömür*) in 1999, Delilhan Canaltay’s *Kıyılı Zaman-Kıyın Kunder*” (*Zor Zamanlar Zor Günler*) in 2000 are some of the books written in Kazakh language and published in Kazakhstan in order to introduce Turkey’s Kazakhs to Kazakhstan. According to Kara, the last phase has not finished yet.²³²

3.2. Settlement Policy of Turkey

Resettlement is an extensive concept defined as the way people live in different types of settlements, collectively or scattered because resettlement and the resettlement law play an important role in the formation and shaping of social structures. Republic of Turkey's settlement policy has been shaped by its historical heritage, geography shape security and the perceptions of risk in the strategic environment.²³³ In this regard, population policies based on the principles of increasing the population qualitatively and quantitatively as a political, economic and military force and assimilating it in quantitative terms have emerged as an important component of the settlement policy.²³⁴

²³¹ *Ibid.*, 11.

²³² *Ibid.*, 14.

²³³ Sadi Erguvenc, “Turkey’s Security Perceptions”, *Journal of International Affairs*, V.3, N.2 (1998): 1.

²³⁴ Canan Emek Inan, “Türkiye’de Göç Politikaları:İşkân Kanunları Üzerinden Birİnceleme”, *The Journal of Migration Studies* (2016):12.

The concept of resettlement, which is closely related to the economic, social and political systems of government, can also be defined as a social phenomenon that concerns almost every area of social life. Based on this definition, the resettlement policy and practices appear as a process with economic, social, cultural and political consequences. When we evaluate the issue in terms of resettlement practices, which are the result of the general resettlement policies of the countries, the fact that the said practices are affected by the social system and affect the social system through its results reveals the importance of the issue once again.²³⁵ Settlement policies in Turkey can be examined in three periods; Early Republican Period, 1940-1960 period and the period after 1960.²³⁶

During the Early Republican Period, migrations were related to the internal and external security concerns and settlements were done accordingly. Also, in this period, in order to resist the foreign claims and campaigns in the early Republican period and to protect the country from a possible danger in the future, it followed a population policy that increased the population in a short time.²³⁷ Therefore, according to Article 2 in the Resettlement Law No.885, those who were not included in Turkish culture were not accepted.²³⁸ “Turkish Culture” was identified as a common feature.

“Settlement Law No. 885, as the basic legal regulation in the settlement of immigrants accepted with different names and adjectives within the framework of the principles determined for the immigration acceptance policy and the displacements made within the borders of the country. It remained in force until 1934.”²³⁹

In the second period, between 1940 and 1960, resettlement continued intensely, and new laws were enacted. Especially, Turks in Balkan countries were forced to immigrate to Turkey and settled as resettled refugees (*Iskanlı Göçmen*) and they were provided with new houses and lands. According to Canan Emek Inan, in this period, settlement policy of Turkey was shaped on May 11, 1950, when Turkey applied to NATO against the threat of Soviet expansion.²⁴⁰

Many Turks started to migrate to Turkey not only from Bulgaria, but also from other Balkan countries such as Macedonia and Yugoslavia, due to several

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, 14.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 16.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, 16.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, 17.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, 18.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 19.

reasons between 1940 and 1960. When we approach the topic as a whole, we can see that immigrants had been provided with housing and jobs from 1923 until the 1960s by government policies. The fact that the vast majority of them had been involved in farming and had similar production styles in their homeland helped them to adapt to being resettled in rural areas. In addition, it was thought that it would be less unfavorable to settle the vast majority of them in a scattered manner to cities, towns and villages for them to better adapt to social and the environment.²⁴¹

The migration period of Kazakhs to Turkey coincides with the period between 1940 and 1960. The status of settled migrants (*iskan göçmeni*) provided the refugees with “certain benefits such as land distribution, housing (*göçmen evleri*), tax exemption for five years, exemption from military service for two years, as well as language and vocational training. The refugees were also immediately given Turkish citizenship.”²⁴² The Basic Law on Settlement was adopted on 13th of June “was the first document regulating immigration to Turkey.”

“In Article 3, those immigrants and refugees that could be accepted for settlement in Turkey were defined as those having Turkish descent and those belonging to Turkish culture (“Türk soyundan ve Türk kültürüne bağlı kişiler”). The law empowered the Council of Ministers to decide who could be considered of Turkish descent and belonging to Turkish culture.”²⁴³

In the period of İsmet İnönü, a letter which was explaining the situation of Kazakhs was sent after the end of the World War II to seek refuge and settle in Turkey as immigrant. However, the immigration request was rejected on the grounds that Turkey was passing through hard times and its situation was not suitable to accept refugees.

During the years between 1950 and 1958 Turkey accepted 157.035 refugees in a total of 38.204 families, the majority being expelled Bulgarian Turks. Moreover, the country also accepted Eastern Turkistani refugees and a group of 114 Turkmen families from Syria who were settled in Hatay province in southeastern Turkey.²⁴⁴

Kazakhs who immigrated to Turkey in this period have been placed on rural permanent areas by the Department of Land and Settlement (İskan İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü) which later became the Ministry of Reconstruction and Exchange (İmar

²⁴¹ Geray, C. “Türkiye’den ve Türkiye’ye Göçler ve Göçmenlerin İskânı (1923- 1960)” **Türkiye İktisadi Gelişmesi Araştırma Projesi**, Ankara Üniversitesi quoted by Canan Emek İnan, “Türkiye’de Göç Politikaları:İskân Kanunları Üzerinden Birİnceleme”, **The Journal of Migration Studies** (2016):20.

²⁴² Kuscı, **ibid**, 384.

²⁴³ **Ibid.**, 384-385.

²⁴⁴ **Ibid.**, 75.

ve İskan Vekaleti).²⁴⁵ Those cities were Konya, Manisa, Nigde, and Kayseri. However, these settlements later migrated to bigger cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir because of economic reasons and trend of migration from rural areas to urban areas in 1960s.²⁴⁶ According to Kalkan, this was “largely due to the failed settlement policy of the government, which moved Kazakhs to an area without much consideration for their traditional economic subsistence systems or opportunities for sustainable agriculture.”²⁴⁷

Since Kazakhs migrated to Turkey in the beginning of 1950, they have been living close to each other in the same residential areas either in Istanbul or other cities in Turkey. Although the Kazakh population in Istanbul is more than the Kazakh population in Konya, Nigde, Manisa, and Kayseri today, the Kazakhs lived in those cities for a very long time, and there are still people who live there. Today, In Istanbul, Kazakhs still live together in districts such as Zeytinburnu, Sefakoy, Kucukcekmece and Gunesli (*Kazakh city, Kazakkent*)²⁴⁸ “In order to preserve their unity and not assimilate in the host society, Kazakh migrants wanted to settle in a segregated area.”²⁴⁹ Besides Kazakkent in Gunesli, the other most important things to be mentioned here is that the Kazakhs established their own village in Nigde and named it “Altai Village” (*Altayköyü*) since the Kazakh migration started from the Altai Mountains. Altai Village is located within the borders of Ulukisla District of Nigde Province, in the south of Central Anatolia Region. The foundation of Altay Village, which is in the Ulukisla district of Nigde province, was laid in 1954 and the first settlement took place on 30 July 1955.²⁵⁰ According to the Settlement Law No. 2510, they were placed in the village as 165 households. 30 decares of land was given per person in the village. In addition, everyone has been given 3 decares of vineyard. The area where each house is built is 600 m² and houses of 48 m² are built on it.²⁵¹ Since then, they have been living together as communities in those areas. According to Brubaker, one of the main features of being a diaspora is the feeling of

²⁴⁵ Kuscü, *ibid*, 385.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 385.

²⁴⁷ Kalkan, *ibid*, 138 quoted in Kuscü, 385.

²⁴⁸ Gunesli Kazakkent: With the emergence of migration from rural areas to urban areas in 1970, the Kazakhs established a settlement in Gunesli in order to preserve their cooperation and culture when they also moved from rural places to urban places.

²⁴⁹ Kuscü, *ibid*, 385.

²⁵⁰ TC. Ulukisla Kaymakamligi, <http://www.ulukisla.gov.tr/altay>[04.20.2020]

²⁵¹ C.Liman, Ayşegül, “Niğde İli Ulukışla İlçesi Altay Köyü’nün (Kuruluşundan Günümüze) Kültürel Coğrafi Görünümü” (MA. Thesis, Nigde University, 2006)

solidarity with the citizens in other countries and boundary maintenance.”²⁵² Therefore, these residential areas are the result of such a desire to live together as a community and in order to preserve their cooperation and culture.

3.3. Identity Politics in Turkey

Identities are constructed not only by individuals but also by societies. For this reason, society plays an important role in constructing people's identities. As Mehmet Karakas puts it, “identities are also designed by internalizing the other's otherness by drawing political boundaries, and shaped by the theoretical framework with concrete practices. In addition, it always requires a politicized society.”²⁵³ Turkish social identity has also redefined itself in every renewal process. While doing so, Turkey has not neglected to rely on a political community as well. According to Karakas:

“The preference for westernization, the construction of the Republic and the developments that took place in the post-1980 period mean a renewal of identity construct in terms of Turkish society in the last two centuries. Identity constructs, which renewed themselves as a phenomenon of the processes in question, became political affiliation through the political communities they were based on.”²⁵⁴

Identities have become a part of politics and are used in different ways according to the period. Also, they have become one of the biggest reasons of many separations and political discussions. Karakas also argues that it is important to create a political space by reducing identity discourses to a non-historical and stereotyped dimension so that individuals or groups can take a position in those spaces. “Thus, the dynamic of making politics over identities is formed.”²⁵⁵ Also, in Turkey, different dynamics of making politics over identities can be seen according to the era. For example, the concept of “Ottoman Identity” was introduced in order to resist the “national identity” and “nationalism” when the modernization/westernization policy of Europe started. Afterwards, *Islamism*, *Westernism*, *Turkism* and *Decentralization* started to be seen. These terms created new spheres and identities.

²⁵² Brubaker, *ibid*, 6.

²⁵³ Mehmet Karakas, “Türkiye’nin Kimlikler Siyaseti ve Sosyolojisi”, *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi* V.8, No.2 (2013): 1.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

3.3.1. Islamism

Identities with religious references have always been a sensitive issue. Religion-based identities are shaped according to the responsibilities brought by religion and identity is constructed in this way. This plays an important role in the formation of the community's ground. In the classical Ottoman period, the factor of religion, which was effective in determining the policies in different ways, turned into a tool of identity politics at a certain stage of the Westernization process.²⁵⁶ The role of Islam as a determinant of identity coincides with after 1908. Islamism was adopted in Turkey and it was aimed to gather people within the framework of it. According to Yusuf Akcura,

“Upon the failure of the Ottoman policy, the policy of Islam took place. This idea, which Europeans call Pan-Islamism, was born from the party that partially participated in the politics of the formation of the Ottoman nation. Parallel to this group of young Ottomans, the word "Pan-Islamism" was heard in his diplomatic speeches in the last period of Abdulaziz. After the idea of the establishment of the Ottoman nation was completely abandoned by the government, Sultan II. Abdulhamid wanted to base the power of the Ottoman Empire on the basis of Islamic solidarity through this policy.”²⁵⁷

The first systematic effort to turn Islam into a political ideology was initiated by Islamic modernists and represented by the New Ottomans in the second half of the 19th century; Islamic modernism was an important trend that was transformed into religious creed.²⁵⁸ Both Ottomanism and Islamism tried to preserve Ottoman culture and tradition against Westernism. Especially, during Islamism, two important axes were adopted in order to protect the Ottoman Empire: “The first of these axes is to gather Ottoman Muslims under the banner of Islam; the second is to gather foreign Muslims around the position of the Caliphate.”²⁵⁹ In addition, magazines such as *Sırat-ı Müstakim/ Sebilü'r-Reşad*, *Ceride-i Sufiye*, *Ceride-i İlmiye*, *Beyan-ül Hak*, *Hikmet*, and *Volkan* were published in order to reach more people and spread the idea of Islamism. By publishing these magazines, it was aimed to teach people how to live according to the Islamic rules. However, the idea of gathering all foreign Muslims under the name of the Caliphate was not successful because during the 1st World War, Arabs fought against the Ottoman Empire. As a result of that, “after the 1st World War, the political character of Islamism weakened to a great extent, but the

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 9.

²⁵⁷ Yusuf Akcura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Ankara: Türk Tarihi Kurumu Basım Evi, 1976): 21-22

²⁵⁸ Karakas, *ibid.*, 10.

²⁵⁹ Ş. Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), 93 quoted by Karakas in “Türkiye’nin Kimlikler Siyaseti ve Sosyolojisi”, *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi* V.8, No.2 (2013): 11.

Islamic identity discourse continued to be important in the struggle for independence and the establishment of a new state.” Therefore, during this period, Turkism was adopted in order to create a national state. Furthermore, Turkism had to affiliate with Islamism during the same period. However, “there were big differences between the attitudes of Turkism against religion during the War of Independence and post-war period.”²⁶⁰ When the republic was established, regime’s attitude toward Islam changed a lot. “Thus, Islamism and Islamic identity politics, entered the long period of oppression and identity issues.”²⁶¹ According to Saracoglu, abolishing “all remnants of the Ottoman political system and, to replace it with a new secular national state” was the main target of the Republic of Turkey. In order to achieve this target, Islamic elements were suppressed and a secular national identity was emphasized instead. In addition, ethnicity and nationality were centered and became more significant.

3.3.2. Turkism and Turkishness

According to Zürcher, political and social debate have been discussed and described as going on between three ideologies: “Ottomanism, the old Young Ottoman ideal of a union of the different communities around the Ottoman throne; (pan) Islamism, which sought to regenerate the empire on the basis of Islamic practices and of solidarity within the Islamic Ümmet (Community); and (pan) Turkism, which sought the union of the Turkic peoples under the Ottoman flag.”²⁶² Turkism, just like Ottomanism and Islamism, was emerged as a result of the Westernization politics. However, after the 1st World War, Turkism became a term defining identity rather than a culture. As Karakas argues, there were multiple elements that played a role in the rise of Turkism:

“Especially the reshaping of the borders of the Empire and the differences in its ethno-religious structure are the main factors. After the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, the Union and Progress became an effective actor, the policies of Germany supporting this movement, the national independence movements that emerged in the Balkans and the Arab world are other developments that have been effective in the politicization of Turkism.”²⁶³

“Young Turks, a group of modern-educated bureaucrats and officers, who became active in the 1890s and organized the constitutional revolution of 1908, to modernize and so strengthen state and society on the basis of a positivist and

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 12.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 12.

²⁶² Erik, J. Zürcher, **Turkey: A Modern History** (New York: I.B Tauris, 2004), 127-128.

²⁶³ Karakas, *ibid*, 15.

increasingly nationalist set of ideas.”²⁶⁴ As a result of that, Turkism movement started to highlight Turkishness on the basis of the role of Turks in history, prioritizing the interest in the Turkish people element in the Ottoman state and the Turkish World. In a short time, Turkism started to grow stronger and Pan-Turkism or Turanism formed the political aspect of the Turkism movement. The course of Turkism changed in the process as well as the aim. The primary aim in terms of Turkism policy was not to save and continue the Ottoman Empire, but to produce a policy that would preserve the existence of the Turks. For that purpose, both the language and discourses also changed. Slogans such as “*How happy is the one who says I am a Turk*”, “*One Turk equals the world*” and “*One language, one people, one flag*” came to embody the concept of citizenship. In addition, they tried to focus on a limited and specific country. As Karakas put it, “Turkism gave up ideals such as Pan-Turkism and Turanism and turned towards Turkish nationalism with a territorial character.”²⁶⁵ For this reason, many attempts have been made in Anatolia.

According to Murat Kiliç, the period between 1917 and 1925 witnessed the Anatolianism Movement, which is a movement that emerged as a form of territorial nationalism and a reaction to the three widest-spread ideologies of the Second Constitutional Period, Ottomanism, Islamism and Turanism. This period also witnessed the adoption of the understanding of "Small Turkism" or "Turkeyism".²⁶⁶ Arık argues that Turanism or Islamism was not real policies. However, Anatolianism defended a real homeland against an imagined one and a concrete nation against an abstract one.²⁶⁷ This view based its idea of nation on a certain understanding of homeland whose borders were drawn in history. The *umma* or the international religious community did not constitute a homeland, nor was it a nation. As a matter of fact, the unlimited lands of the race, which constituted a language family, were not a homeland, and in this sense, a race could not be called a nation. In other words, territorial nationalism adopted an attitude towards irredenta explicitly.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁴ Zürcher, *ibid*, 4.

²⁶⁵ Karakas, *ibid*, 16.

²⁶⁶ Ayşe Kadioğlu, Milliyetçilik-Liberalizm Ekseninde Vatandaşlık ve Bireysellik, **Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Milliyetçilik** (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), 287 quoted in Kılıç, M. Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Tipolojisi. **SDÜ Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi**, (2007): 118

²⁶⁷ Hilmi Ziya Ülken, **Türkiye’de Çağdaş Düşünce Tarihi**, (İstanbul: Ülken Yayınları, 2001): 480.

²⁶⁸ Bölükbaşı, *ibid*, 123-124.

In the 1930s, Turkist-Turanist nationalism began to manifest itself in magazines. In addition, 1st Turkish Congress of History was held in 1932. The conclusion that emerged after the various debates in the congress, Turks were defined as a white Aryan society originating from Central Asia and it was stated that the Turks spread to Asia and Africa and brought civilization. With this perspective, the Hittites and Sumerians were also considered as Turks and it was accepted that the Turks ruled in Anatolia since the Ancient Age. The attitude of tracing the origins of the history of Turks to Anatolia ultimately reached the point of neglecting the Mongol and Genghis Khan periods, which were included in the history design of Pan-Turkism.²⁶⁹

Apart from this, another important purpose was to carry the new national identity out of Islam and to connect it with pre-Islamic Turkish history. That is, the newly established state severed all ties with the past. In other words, “the new Turkey had no relationship to the old.”²⁷⁰ According to Robins, “what was being attempted by the Republican elite was no less than the annihilation of the past. The new nation and state were born out of this fundamental disavowal: 'The Turkish nation was born as an autonomous and independent entity, but in seeking its reference points, it could find only itself, since its past was denied.’”²⁷¹ For this reason, new Turkey constantly emphasized pre-Ottoman Turkish history in order to define their historical background. Everything with Ottoman and Islamic characteristics was marginalized. In this period, the Turkification policy was followed. In this regard, Bilici states that:

“You have to be Muslim but not religious. You have to get Turkified (i.e., adopt Turkishness as language and identification) but you don’t have to be an ethnic Turk – even ethnic Turks had to go through this Turkification process. You have to be secular, but you have to support state sponsored Islam.”²⁷²

The Turkist-Turanist Turkish Nationalism is a nationalist movement that emerged in the 1930s, had its brightest period during the World War II, was affected by Italian fascism but was more like German Nazism, however involved some indigenous elements in its content, and was reflected in the statements and thoughts of the ideologists and historians. However, after it became evident that Germany was

²⁶⁹ Zürcher, *ibid*, 191.

²⁷⁰ Kevin Robins, *Interrupting Identities: Turkey and Europe*, ed. Stuart Hall, Paul Du Gay, (eds), Questions of Cultural Identity, (London:Sage Publications, 1996): 68.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 68.

²⁷² Mücahit Bilici, “Black Turks, White Turks: On the Three Requirements of Turkish Citizenship”, *Insight Turkey*. V.11, No.3 (2009):27.

going to be defeated in the World War II, it was foreseen that Turanist-Turkish Nationalism would be a major threat risk for Turkey, many authors who had been supporters of this movement was arrested, and the idea of Turanism was seen as a poisonous movement and was considered equal to racism.²⁷³

After the death of Atatürk, the then-President Ismet Inonu made important statements about Turanism and nationalism during the World War II and the developments on the fronts. In his speech of 19 May 1944, he emphasized that he discredited Turanism by separating it from nationalism and that the people should be careful about this difference:

“We are Turkish Nationalists, but we stand against racism in our country. The very tragic disasters of racist leaders made up in our country for political reasons are still alive in our memories. It was proved in the Grand National Assembly that those who attacked the Turkish soldiers who had made their last efforts by hanging on the rocks with their fingernails to stay in Rumelia together with Hasan Prishtina and Dervish Hima were Turkish racist politicians. These men who doesn't refrain from showing politics as the reason for what they did in those years will never stay away from fomenting new troubles for "political reasons" when we face a bigger disaster.”²⁷⁴

In another part of his speech, he continues as follows:

“It is not an inaccessible and wrong dream that the children of the homeland constitute a solid nation based on a pure ideal and mind within Turkish Nationalism. We fully understand that this is a correct idea and an achievable goal, with its tangible and visible results. Please answer fairly: Do you think we will leave this prosperous way, which gathered all the good conditions to raise an ideal Turkish citizen, and let the Society be poisoned by racists?”²⁷⁵

In these words, he claims that a racist, that is Turanists, want to divide the nation and he won't let the society be used as an instrument to this end. Interestingly, the Turanist ideal has never had a separationist goal. On the contrary, it is in an effort to unite Turks around the world. However, Ismet Inonu considers Racism and Turanism to be the same although Turkish state had sympathy for these people and their followers before. Islam and conservatism were not included in the Ethnic nationalism discourse, which was built in the 1940s. As a result of that, the ethnic nationalism movement observed in the Republican period defined Turkism as the name of Turkish nationalism and defined it as the belief in the superiority of the Turkish race.

²⁷³ Gökberk Yucel, Y. Z. “Türk Milliyetçiliğinde Yol Ayrımı: 3 Mayıs 1944 Irkçılık-Turancılık Davası.” *Milliyetçilik Araştırmaları Dergisi*, (2019): 21.

²⁷⁴ **İsmet İnönü'nün 19 Mayıs Nutku, Irkçılık Turancılık**, (Ankara: Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1944):6.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

The concepts of Islam and Turkishness have started to be mentioned together since the 1960s. After National development Party and Democrat Party (DP) were established, the elections were held in 1946, which was resulted in the victory of RPP. Afterwards, the elections of 1950 ended up with the victory of the DP, which has changed the course of politics in Turkey. Nationalism started to have a conservative tendency which was mainly characterized by an opposition to modernism.²⁷⁶ According to Erik Jan Zürcher, the DP period became a new era in which religious practices are encouraged and freely exercised. The number of preacher schools was increased. There was a marked rise in the number of mosques being built (as much through increased wealth in the countryside as through any government policy) and the sale of religious literature was allowed again.²⁷⁷ It came to be an element of strengthening the national homogeneity of the Turkish nation.²⁷⁸

Karakas argues that, “the discovery of the importance of the Islamic factor in the fight against communism by Alparslan Türkeş, who stood out as the leader of the movement, was a determinant in the development of Turkish-Islamic nationalism.”²⁷⁹ In addition, the reappearance of Islamism in Turkish thought and political life since the 1950s is another development that has influenced Turkish nationalism to establish a relationship with Islam. According to the speech Alparslan Türkeş made on the 50th anniversary of the death of Ziya Gökalp:²⁸⁰

“Of course, new conditions were brought and some amendments will be made in the principles according to these new conditions. But the main foundation has not changed: Turkification, Islamization, and modernization are the foundations that preserve their value today.”²⁸¹

As Zürcher argues, “Türkeş’s programme was not far removed from the Kemalism of the 1930s, but in practice a violent nationalism (also in a pan-Turkist sense, meaning the reunification of all the Turks of Asia) and anticommunism were the elements emphasized.”²⁸² Later on, Türkeş’s party name has changed to Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (*Nationalist Movement Party*). It was not only nationalist

²⁷⁶ Zürcher, *ibid*, 233

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 233.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 233.

²⁷⁹ Karakas, *ibid*, 21-22.

²⁸⁰ Muhammad Ziya Gökalp, a Turkish sociologist who was effective in the negation of Islamism, Pan-Islamism, and Ottomanism. He was described as the real founder of Turkish sociology by Niyazi Berkes in 1936.

²⁸¹ Mehmet Günel, “Alparslan Türkeş’in Türk Dünyasına İlişkin Görüşleri”, Türk Akademisi Siyasi Sosyal Stratejik Araştırmalar Vakfı, <https://www.tasav.org/alparslan-turkes-in-turk-dunyasına-iliskin-gorusleri.html> [18.07.2020].

²⁸² Zürcher, *ibid*, 257.

ideologies but also Islam turned into a political tool. In the hands of the MHP, According to Alev Çınar & Burak Arıkan, “Islam was also politicized as a force that could be manipulated against rising Marxist currents.” In the 1970s, Türkeş and his aides defined Islam as an indispensable part of Turkish culture. Also, Zürcher states that “as well-known as the party itself was its youth organization, officially called the ‘Hearths of the Ideal’ (*Ülkü Ocakları*), whose members called themselves Bozkurtlar (*Grey Wolves*).” Furthermore, MHP tried to “engage their past with Central Asia.”²⁸³ This helped Kazakh people in Turkey to define their identities since Kazakhs were claiming that they chose to migrate to Turkey because they were coming from the same root and having the same religion. This might explain why Kazakhs people’s sympathy towards for MHP and DP, especially for Adnan Menderes. In this regards, Kara states that Kazakhs who live in Turkey supported the *Democratic Party*. After the Democratic Party had been closed, they started to support *Justice Party*. However, in the same period, Kazakhs also started to support *Nationalist Movement Party* for the first time.²⁸⁴

Kazakhs, whose primary immigration request had been rejected by Ismet Inonu (exact time is unknown), were accepted during DP period. Although this situation is not mentioned that much by the Kazakhs, a few participants stated that they were offended against Ismet Inonu and the civil servants of that period. In addition, some of the interviewees stated that this situation might have changed their perspective for the political parties and affected them, which will be discussed on Chapter 4. When Kazakhs were migrated to Turkey in 1950s, they were not recognized by the people in Turkey. Local people were not aware of Kazakhs and they confused Kazakhs with Cossacks or Tatars. However, exclusive recognition of Kazakhs in Turkey coincides with the independence of Kazakhstan in 1991. After the collapse of Soviet Russia and independence of Turkic countries, Turkey developed an exclusive recognition toward them.

3.4. Recognition of the Kazakhs in Turkey

Turkey recognized Kazakhstan on 16th of December 1991, being the first country to recognize Kazakhstan when it declared its independence. Following to the

²⁸³ Zürcher, *ibid*, 257.

²⁸⁴ Kazıbek, *ibid*, 71.

independence after the dissolution of Soviet Russia, Turkey focused on diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan.²⁸⁵ The relationship between Kazakhstan and Turkey arises from sharing the same territory until the 11th century. Being separated in the 11th century, when the ancestors of today's Turks living in Turkey moved to Middle East and created second Turan, the connection between them had been lost.²⁸⁶ However, in the 20th century, by the independence of Kazakhstan in 1991, Turkey and Kazakhstan started to develop and restore their broken relationship. In March 1991, Turkey and Kazakhstan signed an Agreement on Cooperation in political, trade-economic, scientific-technical, ecological, cultural, social, communication and in other areas. This situation has helped Kazakhs in Turkey to be recognized more in Turkey. Migrating from East Turkestan to Turkey, Kazakhs in Turkey started to see their homeland as Kazakhstan instead of East Turkestan.²⁸⁷

Kazakhs in Turkey were not only recognized by Turkey but they were also started to be recognized by Kazakhstan who was trying to reach its diasporas all over the world after declaring its independence in 1991. According to Kara, Kazakhs in Turkey, who were trying to establish closer relationship with Kazakhstan, realized that Kazakhstan did not know much about Kazakhs in Turkey. Therefore, this situation led Kazakhs in Turkey to write some books or articles in order to introduce their history and migration process.²⁸⁸ According to Kuscu, "Kazakhstan's independence in 1991 led to an important change in their homeland orientation and, after 1991, the activities of an increasing number of Kazakh diaspora organizations shifted toward Kazakhstan as the homeland."²⁸⁹ This situation also had Kazakhs reformulate their identity and loyalty to Kazakhstan.

As of mid-1980s, some of the limitations on diaspora activities became more flexible and it constituted almost a turning point in terms of new developments for Turkey and the world. Since this period, demands for plural identity that put pressure on dominant identity politics have emerged.²⁹⁰ As a result of that, the process of dissolving the homogenous, monist and solidified understanding of national identity

²⁸⁵ Thomas Wheeler, "Turkey's Role and Interests in Central Asia", Saferworld (Briefing, October 2013): 11.

²⁸⁶ Petr Bitsilli, **Nation and People** (Moskva: Nasledie, 1996) 66 quoted by Davuthan Aslan, Duygu Bozyigit, "Turkey-Kazakhstan Relations: An Overview of Mutual Relations Since the Collapse of the Soviet Union", KNUV, V.4, No.42 (2014): 138.

²⁸⁷ Kuscu, **ibid**, 392.

²⁸⁸ Baigabylov, **ibid**, 11.

²⁸⁹ Kuscu, **ibid**, 392.

²⁹⁰ **Ibid.**, 389.

started. Furthermore, the search for a non-exclusive collective identity has been paved. Especially, due to the globalization and development of technology in 1990s affected plural and diasporic identities in Turkey in a positive way. Kazakhs in Turkey, who were recognized after the independence of Kazakhstan, has begun to identify themselves as Kazakh-Turk, and they have started to define their identity within the framework of Kazakh, Turkish, and Muslim. As Kuscü argues, “the independence of Kazakhstan brought comfort to many Kazakhs in Turkey and Europe in terms of identification with an independent state as the homeland.”²⁹¹ However, they did not define themselves as East Turkistani anymore. Their homeland perception has changed from East Turkestan to Kazakhstan since Uyghurs were more dominant in there which led to a “decline in the interest of Kazakhs in the same region.”²⁹² Contrary to this, in order to clarify the mixed feeling of belonging; some of the people define their homeland and identity as “Eastern Turkestan is the land of the ancestors, Kazakhstan is the historical homeland, and Turkey is the motherland...”²⁹³

3.5. Return Movement: Repatriation Policy of Kazakhstan

Following to the independence in 1991, Kazakhstan adopted radical changes and homeland discourse and highlighted how crucial the Kazakh diaspora and ethnic Kazakhs can play in laying the foundations for the future of the country and in establishing national identity. As a result of that, important laws have been implemented in Kazakhstan in order to bring all Kazakh under the same flag. In parallel with this, Kazakhstan created *Oralman* status for the diaspora members and ethnic Kazakhs in order to invite them to Kazakhstan with the aim of creating a national state and change their demographical situation. Oralmans are foreigners or people without citizenship of Kazakh nationality, constantly living outside the country at the moment of gaining sovereignty by the Republic of Kazakhstan and who come to Kazakhstan for permanent residing.

In order to create the Kazakh *aul* (nation), Kazakhstan established Foundation of World Kazakh Association (WKA) in 1992. Immediately afterwards, Kazakhstan organized an Assembly (*Kurultay*) and invited delegation from all over the world.

²⁹¹ *Ibid*, 392.

²⁹² *Ibid*, 392.

²⁹³ *Ibid*, 392.

The delegations came from Turkey, Germany, France, Sweden, Norway, Mongolia, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. “Delegates from the People’s Republic of China could not participate in the forum as the Chinese authorities did not allow them.”²⁹⁴ Kazakh-Turks Foundation (*Kazak Türkleri Vakfi*) which was founded in 1986 in Zeytinburnu/Istanbul worked with WKA closely. In order to invite Kazakhs from all over the world, in 1992, Kazakhstan implemented a new law called “*Kóshi-Qony Týraly Zań*” (The Law on Migration) creating a quota system for repatriates.²⁹⁵ Taking Germany and Israeli as an example, Kazakhstan adopted the “Open Door” (*Kazakh-Ashık-Esik*) policy and established an immigration quota system, which changed every year according to the economic and financial index of the country.²⁹⁶

According to the law accepted in 1992, repatriates were supposed to stay in Kazakhstan and work there for five years. At the end of 5 year, they were given the right to choose whether to stay or not. However, there were many people preferred not to stay due to adaptation and economic reasons. Some improvements and changes were made on 1992 immigration law and in 1997, it was started to be implemented again with some significant changes. In this context, the government promised to support all ethnic Kazakhs living abroad. In 2002, some changes were made on the law enacted in 1997. While making the new law, the objectives such as managing the migration process, stabilizing the demographic development and creating the living spaces they need in the places where they have recently migrated to Oralman were taken into consideration. They have the same rights as citizens of Kazakhstan and can enjoy the benefits of Kazakhstan citizenship. Oralman’s adaptation problems were tried to be overcome.²⁹⁷ In the same breathe, the Second World Assembly of the Kazakhs was held in Turkestan in 2002 with the attendance of China for the first time. According to Mendikulova’s article, “*The Diaspora Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan*”:

“Approximately 800 Kazakh families, solely from Mongolia, expressed the desire to return. In recent years, more and more Kazakhs are coming back. In 2004 and 2005, a limit of 15,000

²⁹⁴ Gulnara, Mendikulova. “The Diaspora Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan”, **Regional Routes, Regional Roots**, ed. So Yamane and Norihiro Naganawa (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2014): 83

²⁹⁵ Yuriko Shoji. “Status of Oralman in Kazakhstan”, (Report, UNDP Kazakhstan, 2006): 4-31.

²⁹⁶ Holly Barcus, Cynthia Werner, “The Kazakhs of Western Mongolia: Transnational Migration from 1990-2008”, **Asian Ethnicity**, Vol. 11, No.2, (2010): 218.

²⁹⁷ **Ibid.**, 216-218.

was placed on the number of returning families, and approximately 3 million Kazakhs living abroad today are said to have an intention to return to Kazakhstan.”²⁹⁸

In 2005, WKA organized the 3rd assembly in Astana with over 300 delegates from 32 countries. During the assembly, a decree named “A State Program of Support for Compatriots Living Abroad, 2005-2007” was announced in order to develop the relationship between Kazakhstan and Kazakh diasporas.²⁹⁹ A new law was implemented in 2009 with some changes. This time, Kazakhs were promised to be supported by the government by economically and socially because these two topics made it difficult for people with Oralman status to stay in Kazakhstan. There were Kazakhs from Turkey who migrated back to Kazakhstan as well. During that period, going to Kazakhstan from Turkey and studying there became prominent, as well. There were many students who went to Kazakhstan to study at university. Pre-training and training courses (e.g., language and adaptation measures) were created especially for these students. Young Kazakhs from Turkey, China, Mongolia, Iran and Russia have been able to begin their study in Almaty, Jambul, Turkestan and Taldykorgan. On 18 May 2005, WAK established the Centre for Students within its structure. At that time, the center discussed issues around the study and living conditions among the students from the Kazakh diaspora and irredenta. However, most of the Kazakhs, who went to Kazakhstan as migrants or students, could not adopt there due to several problems. One of the most important obstacles was the difference in languages and alphabets and while Kazakhstan uses the Cyrillic alphabet, Kazakhs in Turkey write in Latin script.³⁰⁰ The other important problem was sociocultural and economic adaptation because the newly independent country did not have the strength to afford them. Oralmans could not fully adopt both social and economic life in Kazakhstan. As a result of that, people who had migrated to Kazakhstan as an Oralman could not stay there for a long time and moved back. Therefore, it was stated that some legislative changes should be made regarding immigration, and these changes were discussed in the new law which was enacted in 2011. It was stated that Oralmans who acquired Kazakhstan citizenship with the new regulation could maintain their Oralman status for three years and have the right to benefit from the social benefits provided by this status. Between 1991 and 2011, over

²⁹⁸ Mendikulova, *ibid*, 77.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 81.

³⁰⁰ Kuscu, *ibid*, 391.

one million Oralmans settled in Kazakhstan.³⁰¹ Ultimately, the ethnic Kazakh population, which constituted 39% of the population in the first years of independence in the first years of independence and remained a minority, has reached the majority status in the country by increasing to 64%.³⁰²

3.6. Summary

Kazakhs who were mainly located around Ural-Altay Mountains and the Northern part of Central Asia and living as nomads were forced to leave their lands in 1936 due to political actions of China. Therefore, in the first part of this chapter; the migration process of Kazakhs was discussed. Their immigration to British-India and Pakistan passing through Gansu and Kashmir, and finally, their immigration to Turkey were examined. The Kazakh community in Turkey was formed as a result of a long-distance migration and throughout the formation process, the community influenced and developed by different historical events and factors. When they arrived in Turkey, they were settled in different regions of Turkey. Thus, in this chapter, the settlement policy of Turkey was argued.

Also, Kazakhs' immigration request letter was accepted during the presidency of Adnan Menderes in 1951 even though their first letter was not accepted during the presidency of Ismet Inonu. In order to understand the possible reasons of the rejection of the letter, the political situation of Turkey was examined in the following parts of the chapter.

In addition, in this chapter, Kazakhstan's independence and its message to all Kazakh diasporas all over the world to go back their homeland was discussed. Kazakhstan declared its independence in 1991. All Kazakhs living in Turkey changed their homeland perception after the independence of Kazakhstan from East Turkestan to Kazakhstan. They started to define themselves with three main adjectives: Kazakh, Turkish and Muslim. Also, after the independence of Kazakhstan, they described their identity as Kazakh-Turk with a hyphen.

Kazakhs had not been recognized and confused with Cossacks. However, after the independence of Kazakhstan they started to be known better and an exclusive

³⁰¹ Alexander Diener, "One Homeland or Two? Territorialization of Identity and the Migration Decision of the Mongolian-Kazakh Diaspora", (PhD Diss. Madison: U of Wisconsin, 2003), 14.

³⁰² Zhansaya Bekmurzayeva, "Yurtdışında Yaşayan Kazakların Kazakistan'a Yeniden Yerleştirilmeleri Politikası ve Kazak Milliyetçiliğindeki Rolü, (M.A, Istanbul University,2012): 103.

recognition developed by Turkey which was the first country recognizing Kazakhstan's independency after the dissolution of Soviet Russia.

Moreover, in the last part, Kazakhstan's repatriation policy was discussed. After Kazakhstan declared its independency, many Kazakh moved there including Kazakhs from Turkey. However, due to language and socio-economic problems, some of the Kazakhs could not settle down there and moved back. Therefore, in the last part of the chapter, Kazakhstan's activities to meet Kazakh diaspora were discussed.

4. THE KAZAKH IDENTITY IN TURKEY

The main objective of the study is to explore how the Kazakhs in Turkey define themselves in the light of the terms such as identity, immigration, globalization, and homeland. Hence, in this chapter, information about methodology and interviewees are presented. Besides, the data is analyzed in accordance with the research questions based on semi-structured interviewees.

4.1. Methodology and Interviews

This research is based on the qualitative research method which gathers “an in-depth understanding of a phenomenon and focused on meaning which are often centered on the how and why of a particular issue, process, situation, subculture, scene or set of social interactions.”³⁰³ According to Joan Sargeant, the sample size is not generally predetermined in qualitative research and the number of interviewees depends upon the number required to inform fully all important elements of the phenomenon being studied.³⁰⁴ According to Dworkin, while some experts in qualitative research avoid the topic of “how many” interviews “are enough,” there is indeed variability in what is suggested as a minimum. An extremely large number of articles, book chapters, and books recommend guidance and suggest anywhere from five to fifty participants would be adequate.³⁰⁵ However, on this issue, Bogdan and Biklen state that “qualitative data are collected in the form of words or pictures rather than numbers.”³⁰⁶ Therefore, the words, pictures as well as the experience are important than the number of participants.

³⁰³ Shari, L. Dworkin, “Sample Size Policy For Qualitative Studies Using In-Depth Interviews,” **Archives of Sexual Behaviors**, (2012):1319-1320

³⁰⁴ Joan Sargeant, “Qualitative Research Part II: Participants, Analysis, and Quality Assurance”, **Journal of Graduate Medical Education**, V.4 N.1 (2012):1-3.

³⁰⁵ Dworkin, Ibid, 1319-1320.

³⁰⁶ Robert Bogdan & Sari Knopp Biklen, **Qualitative Research for Education: An Introduction to Theories and Methods**. 5, (Pearson: 2007): 54

To study Kazakh community in Turkey and the immigration, this study is based on qualitative research method and semi-structured interviews with Kazakh people living in the Republic of Turkey. For this study, semi-structured interviewing is chosen since it allows for open-ended answers from interviewees for more in-depth information, and allows them time to open up about sensitive issues.³⁰⁷ Since I live in a place where Kazakh people live together, I wanted to conduct face to face interviews in order to collect data regarding my research topic. However, due to the Coronavirus breakout in the beginning of March 2020, I had to conduct my interviews onto digital platforms and on phone. I had an interview with 16 people. Out of 16 people, I managed to make an interview with one interviewee face to face, and other interviews were conducted on the phone, and online platforms. Out of 16 participants, 15 interviewees live in Turkey, 1 interviewee lives in Germany. Although my thesis is about Kazakhs living in Turkey, I did an interview with a participant living in Germany when he came to Turkey as he is from the first generation who remembers all the details about before and after immigration. He used to live in Turkey for many years before he moved to Germany as a worker in 1960s. I chose an interviewee from the first generation who could enlighten me properly about his immigration period and experience, then after having a face-to-face interview with him, I asked him to give me a name that I should make an interview with. The interviewees are from different circles of friends, different schools, different age groups and backgrounds; some of them are relatives of each other. I tried to pay attention to finding equal numbers of male and female interviewees as well as from equal numbers of participants from different generations. 7 of the interviewees were male, 9 of the interviewees were female. I divided them in three generations. The first arrivers belong to the first generation, the first people who were born in Turkey after the migration or the ones who were babies when they arrived to Turkey belong to the second generation. Their ages ranged between 45 and 65. The children of the second generation belong to the third generation. Their ages ranged between 20 and 40. All of these interviewees are from first, second and third generations have different kinds of occupations. In terms of age, the interviewees' ages ranged between 20 and 85. In terms of the place of birth,

³⁰⁷ Fuel Cycle, "A Quick Guide to Semi-Structured Interviews," <https://fuelcycle.com/blog/a-quick-guide-to-semi-structured-interviews> [28.06.2020]

they were born in Pakistan, Kashmir, Xinjiang (Barköl), Niğde, Konya, Manisa and Istanbul.

Not all the interviews were conducted in Turkish; some of the interviewees, especially from the first and the second generation, spoke Kazakh from the beginning of the interview and some of the interviewees switched from Turkish to Kazakh time to time in order to express themselves better. Also, they tried to make sure whether I, as one of them, could understand them when they spoke Kazakh. Sometimes, I felt like they were intentionally testing me. As soon as they found out that I could understand and gave them response in Kazakh they felt happy since I was from the third generation who was born and raised in Turkey. Since some of the interviewees spoke both Kazakh and Turkish, the quotations were translated to English by me.

Before starting the interviews, I introduced myself and explained my research briefly. Before asking for their consent, I explained them that their identities would be kept controversial. However, although some of them told that it would not be a problem for them, some of them gave their consent for the use of pseudo names on my thesis paper. My interview started with basic questions such as their names, surnames, age, occupation, place of birth, etc. The following questions were semi-structured and interview questions covered a wide range of topics. I did not interrupt while they were answering my questions. Some of the answers were so long that they already answered my other question before I asked. I recorded their voices and before doing that I asked for their consent and guaranteed that their voice records would be kept controversial. Because of the Coronavirus outbreak and not being able to use online platforms due to age, some of the participants from the first generation changed their mind to attend the interview. Some of them hesitated to speak on the phone instead of talking face to face. Therefore, I got refused several times. Even more, two people who told me that they were willing to have an interview with me ignored me after giving me promise by saying that they did not know much about Kazakhs and their history even though they did not see or hear my interview questions.

During my interview period, I realized that people from first and second generations were eager to speak and talk about their memories. Yet, some of the people from third generation hesitated to speak at first by saying that they would not be able to answer my questions because they did not trust themselves about the migration questions. After the interviews ended, people from the first generation

were more curious about their Kazakh background because they asked me a couple of questions, and they also thanked me for making such an interview and dwell in such kind of a topic.

One of my interviews was done in August 2019 face to face and my online interviews started on 8th of April, 2020, and lasted until 14th of April. The Coronavirus outbreak was a huge challenge for me as well as other researchers. As Adam Jowett mentions on his article, “*Carrying out Qualitative Research under Lockdown-Practical and Ethical Considerations*”, for data generation, researchers have started to use video-calling (Zoom and Skype) or WhatsApp to replicate face-to-face or focus group interviews. Notwithstanding problems, such as participants not being able to use the technology or having a poor WIFI connection, video-calling is a close substitute to in-person interviewing and can allow for data to be collected over large geographical areas even when social distancing measures are not in place. In addition to video-calling, online surveys can also be used to collect qualitative data by asking respondents to type their responses to open-ended questions.³⁰⁸

Since I could not do all my interviews face to face, I did not have any chance to observe their mimics and gestures; however, I tried to pay attention to their reactions to my questions as well as their silence and the answers where they did not want me to take notes or avoid giving any direct answers. In addition, to keep the identities of the interviews, I used pseudo names in order to comply with ethical concerns. (Please check Appendix IV to find the interviewees) The interviewees were asked questions on identity, immigration, diaspora and adaptation etc.

4.2. How to Define the Kazakhs in Turkey?

In the conceptual discussion section of the study, the views, studies and researches of different scholars on identity were presented in order to explore and understand the Kazakhs and their perception of identity in Turkey. Hence, the following sections are formed around the significant issues such as identity, homeland, diaspora, hybridity, in-betweenness, return movement, and globalization in order to understand the transformation of Kazakh identity in Turkey by referring

³⁰⁸ Adam Jowett, “Carrying out Qualitative Research under Lock down-Practical and Ethical Considerations.” <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2020/04/20/carrying-out-qualitative-research-under-lockdown-practical-and-ethical-considerations/> [09.06.2020].

to the interviewees with Kazakh participants from first, second, and the third generations.

When interviewees were asked about how they define themselves and what constitutes their identities, most of them replied “I am from Istanbul (etc.) but I am originally a Kazakh. While some interviewees said they are Kazakh-Turks, some participants said that it would not be proper to call themselves as Kazakh-Turk because Turkish geography is very large and therefore, it should be remembered that they refer to being Turkish when they say they are Kazakhs. However, almost all of them gave mutual answers when they were asked to define themselves: being Kazakh, Turkishness and Islam. As it can be seen below, the interviewees defined themselves with their race, ethnicity and religion:

Nuriye (26-year-old teacher): If somebody asks me where I am from instead of saying where I was born, I say that I am Kazakh-Turk even though I and my parents were born and raised in Turkey. If I do not emphasize that I am Kazakh, I do not feel comfortable. I really do not know the reason but I just need to say it. (3rd Generation)

Bade (a 27-year-old employee): I define myself as Kazakh-Turk (3rd Generation)

Celal (a 57-year-old leather dealer, retired): I define myself as Kazakh ethnically and Turk as an intellectual. (2nd Generation)

Feyza (a 57-year-old housewife): I define myself as Turk whenever people ask me where I am from. (2nd Generation)

Hatice (a 55-year-old housewife): I am Kazakh. My mother, father, grandfather, all of them are Kazakhs. (2nd Generation)

Gul (a 26-year-old Chinese Teacher): My mother is Turkish and my father is Kazakh. I am half-blood. I am a Kazakh girl. (Kazak kızı) (3rd Generation)

In the second chapter, it was argued that there are different types of identities, not just one. As it can be seen, the interviewees did not define themselves as having one identity but two identities: Kazakh and Turkish. Most of the interviewees combined both of them and answered as: I am Kazakh-Turk. However, one of the interviewees highlighted the wrong use of the word Kazak-Turk. He stated that it is a problematic world and creates a lot of conflictions and confusions:

Kemal: (57-year-old faculty member): Using the word Kazakh-Turk to define somebody is problematic. For instance, when I am asked to define myself, I say “I am Kazakh” Some people warn me in Turkey and say that I should not define myself as Kazakh but I should say that I am Kazakh-Turk. When I use the word Kazak-Turk to define my identity, some other people stop me and say that I should define myself as Kazakh, not Kazakh-Turk. When I go to Kazakhstan and say that I am Kazakh-Turk. People in Kazakhstan interrupt me and tell me that we are Kazakh. So, I should describe myself as Kazakh, not Kazakh-Turk. Same thing goes for the language as well. When I say it is Kazakh language (*Kazakça*), they warn me tell me it is not Kazakh language (*Kazakça*) but it is Kazakh-Turkish (*Kazak Türkçesi*). We have only one language and it is Kazakh language. I really do not understand why they say it is Kazakh-Turkish. Therefore, I have decided not to argue anyone about these issues anymore.

Berkay (a-30-year-old Faculty Member): I define myself as Anatolian Turk. Kazakhstan has changed a lot. They are closer to Russia now.

This situation brings Buckingham's words to mind that identity is an ambiguous and slippery term. As it is stated "identities are not the fixed markers people assume them to be but are instead dynamically constructed in the moment."³⁰⁹ So, as the surroundings change the perspective to the identities can change. It is remarkable that interviewees emphasized they were Kazakh immigrants when they were asked where they were from considering that it has been more than 60 years and entire of 3rd generation was born and raised in Turkey. If we look at the second generation, some of them were born in the places such as Kashmir and Pakistan during the immigration and some of them were born in Turkey. Nonetheless, if the 3rd generation was asked where they were from, they are very likely to give a long answer as "*I was born and raised in Istanbul, my father is from Konya but we are originally Kazakh.*" Even though they did not immigrate but were born in Turkey, children or the grandchildren of the immigrants still feel a need to highlight their grandparents' migration.

During the interviews, it is observed that they always feel like they need to emphasize their ethnic identity. On the other hand, it is also observed that there is not a huge difference between the meaning of the Kazakh identity or Turkish identity for the interviewees. For the interviewees, they can be used interchangeably. According to David Bailey and Stuart Hall, "identities can, therefore, be contradictory and are always situational."³¹⁰ From this point of view, the interviewees actually approach both identities equally and they combine these two different identities and call themselves Kazakh-Turks rather than just Kazakh or Turkish only. This is a result of their hybrid identities because they have a mix of two or more other identities. As it can be seen of the interviewees above, it is difficult to define oneself with just one identity. This is because their identities involve more than one ethnicity. They carry both Kazakhness and Turkishness and perform them identities accordingly. While some interviewees were defining themselves as Kazakh-Turk, the others did not. They approached the question from a Turanian perspective as Kadir and Kemal state:

Kadir (51-year old-retired): I am Kazakh, I am Uzbek, I am Turkmen, I am Azeri, and I am Turkish. I am from East Turkestan. I exist wherever there is a Turk. (2nd Generation)

³⁰⁹ Buckingham, *ibid*, 1.

³¹⁰ David Bailey, Stuart Hall. "The vertigo of displacement: shifts within black documentary practices." **Critical Decade: Black British Photography in the 80s** (1992):21

Kemal (57-year-old faculty member): The Turkish world is a whole. Kazakh, Uzbek, Turkish, Tatar, Uyghur does not matter. If this happens, we can preserve ourselves because everything changes with globalization. Language and culture are in immense danger. The population of Kazakhstan is 18,000 million but when the Turkish world comes together, the number becomes 300,000. (2nd Generation)

Fatma (85 years old): (Speaking Kazakh): I do not discriminate people as Turk or Kazakh, and I do not like people who discriminate like that. Either Kazakh or Turk, they are one. (1st generation)

The interviewees did not only emphasize their Kazakh or Turkish identity but also they referred their religious identities when they were asked to define their identity. According to Maalouf, identity is constituted of a number of elements, and these elements are not restricted to a particular set down. Instead, the elements include “allegiance to a religious tradition; to a nationality sometimes; to a profession, an institution, or a particular social milieu.”³¹¹ In regards of Maalouf’s words, when my interviewees were asked how to define themselves, some of the interviewees emphasized their religious allegiance as well:

Halime (a 60-year-old Faculty Member): If you would like to question about Kazakh’s identity in Turkey, you need to look at two main elements: Turkishness and Islam. (2nd Generation)

Gul: (a 26-year-old teacher): I am Kazakh and Muslim. (3rd generation)

Turkishness and Islam are identity cards as interviewees answered during the interviews.³¹² As Elizabete Aunina states, “Being part of Turkishness and a Turk in both social and legal senses have not only been seen as the modern, non-threatening course towards the state, but also beneficial to the citizenship conception and the political rights stemming from that.” Turkishness and Islam are an important bridge which helps immigrants to adapt the host country easily. According to Yegen,

It is visible that the concept of Turkishness plays a large role in the relations between the Turkish state and its minorities, and is manifested in both the social and legal dimensions, therefore indicating a very in-depth social incoherence. The minorities, although perceived as citizens, unless assimilated and accepting of Turkishness are seen as pseudo-citizens.³¹³

Turkishness and Islam are the common words used by the interviewees throughout the interviews. After the question of how they define themselves, another question rose was about what helped Kazakhs adapt to the life in Turkey and what makes them feel they are part of Turkey. The answer was “Turkishness and Islam”

³¹¹ Maalouf, *ibid*, 10.

³¹² Elizabete Aunina. “Perpetual Conflict of 'Turkishness': The Turkish State and its Minority Groups.” *E-International Relations*. 2018. <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/11/04/perpetual-conflict-of-turkishness-the-turkish-state-and-its-minority-groups/> [15.06.2020]

³¹³ Yegen, M. “Prospective-Turks” or “Pseudo-Citizens”: Kurds in Turkey”, *Middle East Journal*, V. 63, N.4. (2009): 598-615.

again. Islam is one of the most important factors which helped Kazakhs to adapt in Turkey and combine both Kazakh and Turkish cultures.

Gul (a 26-year-old teacher): First of all, the harmony between two cultures stems from Islam. Secondly, both Kazakhs and Turks are coming from the same language family, Ural-Altay. Our cultures are similar and we are Muslim. (3rd Generation)

Halime (a 60-year-old Faculty Member): Have you heard the word refugee (*muhacir*)? It is an important word for Islam. In 1950's, Kazakhs entered Turkey as refugees. (2nd Generation)

Feyza (a 57-year-old housewife): Kazakhs were defined as refugees (*muhacir*) back then.

Even though the word, *muhacir*, is used to describe people who migrated from Balkans to Turkey, the interviewees defined themselves as *muhacir* because the word was used for those who migrated from Mecca to Madinah in the first years of Islam. Those who leave Mecca with the Prophet are called as emigrants.³¹⁴ Halime explains the relationship between Islam and Turkishness as follows. Her answer also emphasizes how important it is for Kazakhs to be both Muslim and Turkish:

Halime: My pre-university times coincide the period of anarchy in Turkey. During that period, I asked my grandfather why he brought us to Turkey and told him that those people were killing each other and cannot be our brothers, and said I wish we had gone somewhere else. My grandfather was 60 years old at the time. He fell into silence about 5-10 minutes and said "When I arrived in Kashmir, I could go to Pakistan, India, Taiwan or the USA. However, I did not want you to stay in Pakistan and be a Pakistani Muslim, I did not want you to go to Saudi Arabia and become an Arab Muslim, I did not want you to go to Taiwan and become a Chinese Muslim, and I brought you here to be Turkish and Muslim." Two main words outlining my life are Turkishness and Islam. These two words connect us to Turkey, and the most important things which let us adopt Turkey and become a part of it. (2nd Generation)

The same religion has enabled individuals to camouflage their small differences in daily life and increase the emphasis on individuals' similarities. According to Berry, if the cultural differences are great, the adaptation is less positive.³¹⁵ When the Kazakh and Turkish ethnic identity are viewed from a religious perspective, Islam is a common feature of both identities. It is seen that Islam as well as Turkishness helps to dissolve both Turkish and Kazakh cultures in the same pot. Looking at another hybrid identity, if this community's religion is not Islam, it may be more difficult for two different identities to meet at a common point. As to Karakas, "the term Islamic has primarily a socio-cultural and ritual dimension and Turkish society is dominated by Muslims."³¹⁶ So, for Kazakh community in Turkey,

³¹⁴ Muhacir Ne Demek? <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/muhacir-ne-demek-muhacir-nedir-muhacir-tdk-kelime-anlami> [15.06.2020]

³¹⁵ Berry, *ibid*, 9.

³¹⁶ Cemal Karakas, "Turkey: Islam and Laicism Between the Interests of State, Politics, and Society" (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, PRIF Reports, No.78.)

both Turkishness and Islam are key factors which shape their identity and help them to define themselves.

As it is observed, interviewees accept all their allegiances and avoid binary categorization because of their hybrid identity. Browne argues that hybrid individuals play down their ethnicity and culture so as to fit into majority groups and to be accepted by them. That is to say, the hybrid individuals reveal their identities accordingly. Furthermore, most of the interviewees defined themselves with a hyphen: Kazakh-Turk.

Nuriye (a 26-year-old teacher): If somebody asks me where I am from instead of saying where I was born, I say that I am Kazakh-Turk even though I and my parents were born and raised in Turkey. If I do not emphasize that I am Kazakh, I do not feel comfortable. I really do not know the reason but I just need to say it. (3rd Generation)

Bade (a 27-year-old employee): I define myself as Kazakh-Turk (3rd Generation)

Celal (a 57-year-old leather dealer, retired): I define myself as Kazakh ethnically and Turk as an intellectual. (2nd Generation)

Feyza (a 57 year-old housewife): I define myself as Turk whenever people ask me where I am from. (2nd Generation)

Berkay (a 30-year-old Faculty Member): I am ethnically Kazakh, mentally Turk. (3rd Generation)

Individuals' defining themselves Kazakh-Turk causes from their in-betweenness as it was argued in the second chapter. As Bhabha states, hybrid individuals create a Third Space for themselves. This space helps them to interact with both of their cultures and go-between them. Hybrid individuals who live in the Third Space understand both cultures and create a new identity for themselves. By calling themselves Kazakh-Turk, they both can embrace their host country's culture while preserving their own ethnic-culture and identity. As Grossberg suggests, "in the '(post)structuralist' position, structural unity and identity are always deconstructed, leaving in their place the complexity, contradictions and fragmentation implied in difference."³¹⁷ As a result, identities are not singular but fragmented. Therefore, ethnic community members can define themselves in between. According to Aslihan Yeniceri's research called *Kazakh Identity in Turkey*, interviewees were asked to define themselves. Seventy-two percent of participants stated that being Turkish is very important when they define themselves and sixty-six

³¹⁷ Lawrence Grossberg, "History, Politics and Postmodernism: Stuart Hall and Cultural Studies", *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, V10, N.2 (1986):61-77

percent stated that being Kazakh is very important. However, thirty nine percent of people stated that they define themselves “Kazakh-Turk” when they are asked.³¹⁸

“In addition to self-ethnic identification, we examined the importance of self-identification with being Turkish and being Kazakh. The findings were remarkable. Seventy-two percent of participants stated that being Turkish was “very important” when they define themselves, while 22% stated it to be “important.” Only 4% acquired average importance to it, and 1% said it was “not important. The answers and their respective percentages to the question of importance of self-identification with being Kazakh are as follows: “very important” for 66%, “important” for 27%, “average” for 4%, “does not matter” for 1%, and “not important” for 1%... To the question “do you feel assimilated?” Twenty-six percent of participants said “yes,” Sixty-nine percent said no. Moreover, the sample embraced a various identities: there were three types of responses. Five percent of participants did not state their thoughts. The question “to which ethnic group do you belong?” Sixteen percent of the sample answered “Turk,” 36% answered “Kazakh” and 39% answered “Kazakh Turk.”³¹⁹

According to Brown, not only dispersed ethnic communities but also new generations born into interethnic marriages have two distinct identities, and it is really difficult to identify themselves as having ethnic identity drawn from one parent, an identity arising from the ethnic minority group of the other parent, or whether they see themselves as having a new hybrid identity drawing on both parental ethnic groups. There was one of interviewees whose mother is Turkish and father is Kazakh. The same question was asked her, and she replied; “*My mother is Turkish and my father is Kazakh. I am half-blood (melezim). I am a Kazakh girl.*” It is very difficult to predict which side will outweigh of a hybrid because the same interviewee described herself as a nationalist Turk as well. So, for people who have hybrid identities, defining themselves as either Kazakh or Turkish depends on social, ethnic, and political circumstances. On this subject Maalouf states, “each of us has known what it is to jib when he feels that some significant factor in his identity is being threatened, whether it is his language, his religion, the symbolic elements in his culture, or his independence.”³²⁰ So, for this reason, which identity you will reveal depends entirely on the current threat situation and shape. According to Homi Bhabha,

The theoretical recognition of the split-space of enunciation may open the way to conceptualizing an international culture, based not on the exoticism of multiculturalism or the diversity of cultures, but on the inscription and articulation of culture’s hybridity. It is the in-between space that carries the burden of the meaning of culture, and by exploring this Third Space; we may elude the politics of polarity and emerge as the others of ourselves.

³¹⁸ Aslihan, Yeniceri, “Hybridization and Kazakh ethnic identity formation”, (Iowa State University Capstones, Master Thesis, 2015), 100.

³¹⁹ Yeniceri, *ibid*, 100-101.

³²⁰ Bhabha, 1994, 10.

Based on Bhabha's definition, hybrid individuals live in a Third Space where they have a chance to get to know both cultures, and deconstructing identity and creating new forms to be able to express themselves.³²¹ Therefore, it is very likely to get a long answer as "*I was born and raised in Istanbul, my father is from Konya but we are originally Kazakh*" when they are asked to define themselves. As Herminingrum argues, cultural hybridity arises from two or more different cultures that come together and blend. Besides, the unavoidable social interaction due to the globalization has increased the power of hybridity.

In the conceptual discussion section of this study, the views, studies and researches of different writers describing the characteristics of diaspora were examined. All these studies and researches examined showed that a diaspora cannot be defined based on a single diaspora example. Therefore, different communities evaluated in the category of diaspora by the authors and researchers, and diasporic features related to these communities were presented and necessary criteria to be defined as a diaspora were defined. Since the concept of diaspora has been able to be used for anyone living outside the homeland, regardless of any criteria, there has been a need for a current review and evaluation of the concept.³²² Also, the fact that the characteristics of diaspora communities such as being forced to migrate, which is seen as a prerequisite for their formation, has changed due to globalization has caused us to question the current requirements of the concept. As it was discussed in the second chapter, it can be said that many diaspora researchers such as Cohen, Brubaker, and Sheffer have agreed on three basic features that a diaspora community should have. The first of these three features is that there must be at least two or more places to go after the dispersal. The second is the relationship of the diasporic community with a real or imaginary homeland. The third feature is the consciousness of the group about its own identity. It was thought that it would be more appropriate to make an assessment within the framework of the three features mentioned above when discussing about whether the Kazakhs community in Turkey meet the criteria to be accepted as a diaspora. According to Butler, the fourth distinguishing feature of diaspora, involving the temporal-historical dimension is its existence over at least

³²¹ *Ibid.*, 120.

³²² Firat, Yaldiz, "Diaspora Kavramı: Tarihçe, Gelişme ve Tartışmalar", **Hacettepe Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları**, V.18, N.18 (2013): 289-318

two generations.³²³ The last feature described by Butler is an important criterion for the future of diasporas, its organization and continuity of their rituals.

As it is observed during my interview with interviewees and the community which I live in, Kazakhs' dispersion, started in 1935 until their settlement in Turkey in 1952, was a traumatic one and even after six decades and three generations, they still live together in the same residential areas as it was discussed in Chapter 3. After migrating to Turkey, some of the group members migrated to other countries, as well, such as Germany, Netherlands, England, Sweden, Norway, Austria, and the U.S.A. in order to find a job. As Kuscü states, "once Kazakhs had established themselves in Turkey and in Europe, they established organizations, involved in various activities and adopted a distinct stance."³²⁴ Kazakhs experienced initial difficulties as migrants but were able to adapt to major changes after a few years, including moving from a nomadic to a sedentary lifestyle. While first-generation Kazakh migrants experienced more difficult conditions of transition, the later generations, who had access to education in their host states, succeeded in a variety of professions.

After having adapted to life in Turkey, "Kazakhs started joining diaspora organizations founded by prominent community members in the early 1960s"³²⁵ However, according to Ohannes Kilicdagi, in Turkey 'diaspora' is a word used often to insult in reference to the Armenian diaspora. The word "diaspora" is perceived as something negative and it reminds "Armenian diaspora, many Jewish diaspora, or rather their lobby activities to the masses."³²⁶ Therefore, other ethnic groups living in Turkey feels a need to justify themselves by claiming that they cannot be seen as diasporas.

During the interview, interviewees were asked whether they defined themselves diaspora. It is observed that the word diaspora has a negative connotation because of the Armenian diaspora group in Turkey, and it makes some of the interviewees biased against the word. Some of the interviewees do not know the meaning of diaspora; while others accept being a diaspora. However, some of them

³²³ Butler, *ibid*, 189-219.

³²⁴ Kuscü, *ibid*, 380

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, 386.

³²⁶ Ohannes, Kilicdagi. "Diasporik Karmaşa." *Agos*, <http://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazi/8563/diasporik-karmasa>. [09.06.2020]

do not see themselves as diaspora and the word diaspora is perceived as a negative word. For instance, Nedim who was born in Kashmir and arrived in Turkey when he was little, raised, worked and retired in Turkey answers the question as below:

Nedim (66 years old, retired): We are not a minority group in Turkey. I have not received or heard any bad word from any kind of authority so far in Turkey. On the contrary, I experienced positive discrimination since I am from East of Turkestan. Some impertinent people may think that we are a minority group in Turkey. However, we are not. (2nd Generation)

On the other hand, Gul who is 26-year-old working as a teacher in Turkey answers the question as below:

Gul: I do not see Kazakhs as a diaspora as I do not see Kazakhs as minority living in Turkey because we are now a part of Turkey. I have never heard of anyone in my neighborhood, from my elders or friends, who said that the Kazakh Turks escaped from the war and were a minority living here. On the contrary, I have heard beautiful sentences as they are from us; they are our part, and foundation of Turkishness. One of my future goals is to go to Kazakhstan or Central Asia to learn about those places, to see the places where my language and customs are experienced, and to see my elders who have lived up to this time and to hear what they have suffered so far. In addition, I would like to write a book and collect all the information about Kazakhs to transfer it to the next generations. We must try hard not to forget our customs. We must keep it alive as we can because the most important essence that makes a nation is its customs and traditions. There is a saying that, we can identify a nation from its custom, tradition and identity. (3rd Generation)

During the interviews, the interviewees focused on the good relationship between Kazakhs and the host country and claimed that they were welcomed just because they were from East Turkestan. In addition, throughout my interview, it is observed that for most of the interviewees, the very first criterion of being a diaspora is discrimination. According to Maalouf, claiming a more complex identity is a reason to be marginalized. Therefore, some interviewees think that if one is not marginalized or discriminated by the host country, he/she cannot be called a member of diaspora. Some of the interviewees say that since they do not encounter any discrimination in Turkey and they are called as real Turks, they believe they cannot be a diaspora as Gul states:

Gul (a-26-year-old teacher): When we say we are Kazakh, Turkish people welcome us more than others because of Turkism and Nationalism. They tell us that we are also Turks and we both are coming from the same root. Therefore, I have never encountered discrimination in Turkey. (2nd generation)

Unlike those who say they have never experienced any discrimination, some of the interviewees expressed the discrimination that they have encountered:

Bade (a 27-year-old employee): Weren't we all discriminated because of our appearance? We all have experienced this. We have been living in Gunesli, Zeytinburnu or Kucukcekmece for 50 years. Even here, when people pass by me, they point at me and say "Look at the Tatar! Look at the Chinese!"

As some of the interviewees were talking about how they were welcomed, most of them talked about adaptation problems which Kazakhs encountered when they came to Turkey. Even though Turkey welcomed Kazakh refugees and provided them with property and job, they had various adaptation problems in the beginning, which were told by the interviewees but they asked me not to write those adaptation and discrimination problems in my study. Especially, one of the interviewees talked about the discrimination which her relatives and acquaintances faced during their early years in Turkey. However, she did not want me to write anything about it. When I asked the reason, she answered as: *“It is just so sad.”* Based on my observations, Kazakhs community in Turkey is really afraid of being seen as a problematic group and defined as separate from Turkish identity. They think that anything which they say against Turkey or Turkish politics would be perceived as disloyalty. *“I do not want to say more, it would be about politics then”* said Ahmet when he was asked about the acceptance letter of Kazakhs in the 1950s which was discussed in the third chapter. As Berry states, it is the basic process of adaptation. According to him, “adaptation refers to changes that take place in individuals or groups in response to environmental demands.”³²⁷ For him, attitude of the society of settlement is important. Some societies are accepting cultural pluralism resulting from immigration and support the diversity while others seek to eliminate diversity and marginalize them.³²⁸ Rather than reflect the problems, they voluntarily enter into acculturation process. Even though some of the interviewees do not see themselves as a diaspora or ethnic minority living in Turkey, they are seen as a diaspora by Kazakhstan due to political issues as Kemal states:

Kemal (a 57-year-old Faculty Member): If you look at from Kazakhstan side, Kazakhs are a diaspora in Turkey. However, if you look at from the aspect of Kazakhs who live in Turkey, it is not like that. I do not see myself as a diaspora member here, but I see myself as a normal Turkish citizen. I have not experienced any discrimination by Turkey. I get excited whenever I hear a Turkish song or a ballad. On the other hand, I get excited whenever I hear a Kazakh song or sound of dombra. So, I don't feel like a stranger here. If someone told me to leave Turkey, my answer is ready. I would say; you came to Turkey 1,000 years before me, you came in 1071 and I came in 1953. It is not a bad thing that the Kazakhs do not give up their culture and language. It is a must. The Turkish world is a wealth. We mustn't lose the feeling of being Kazakh. It is also a branch of the Turkish World. If we lose that sense, we will damage Turkey. Today Kazakhstan and Turkey still do not know each other very well. We still need bridges between the two countries. If you know Kazakh well, you will be a cultural ambassador between these two countries. Kazakhstan does some statistics. How many diasporas are there outside Kazakhstan? They calculate that way. According to their aspects,

³²⁷ Berry, *ibid*, 9.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

we are a diaspora here. This is pretty normal. Turkey also does the same thing for other Turks living abroad. It is all about statistics and feel of belonging. (2nd Generation)

While most of the interviewees approached cautiously to the word diaspora, some of the interviewees accept it. However, Halime claims that Kazakhs are not a diaspora of Kazakhstan but East Turkestan since they started their immigration from there, and she also adds that showing Kazakhs as a diaspora of Kazakhstan in Turkey is a policy of Kazakhstan for its political expedience. On this topic she says:

Halime (a 60-year-old Faculty Member): It is a policy of Kazakhstan. They want us to look like we are a diaspora of Kazakhstan. However, we are a diaspora of East Turkestan not Kazakhstan.

She continues her words by highlighting that Kazakhs do not like the words “diaspora” and “minority”

Halime (a 60-year-old Faculty Member): Kazakhs are like chameleon in order to survive. For example, if you look at the Kazakhs who live in western countries, you will see that they never attend any kind of Armenian or Kurdish demonstration. All of them escape from such events. Kazakhs never have courage to say that those minorities are a part of Turkey as well. In my understanding, East Turkestan means Kazakhs. However, today, when somebody says East Turkestan, Uyghurs come to people’s mind. Uyghurs did not help Kazakhs when we were having a battle there. Uyghurs were the ones who reported Osman Batur.¹⁸⁹ However; Uyghurs are giving a huge battle there to have their freedom today. If there will be an independence movement there, I would prefer Uyghurs to have it. Because, I would like Muslim Uyghurs to pray while passing near my grand grandfather’s graves on contrary to Chinese. In 1949, if we had acted together as all Kazakhs, then we would not have given those lands to Chinese. (2nd Generation)

Hatice: I think Kazakhs are minority living in Turkey. Compared to 83 million of people living in Turkey, Kazakhs are of course minority. Why do I see Kazakhs as a minority group living in Turkey? Let me explain. In the past, Kazakhs were only marrying to Kazakhs. However, our customs are changing...Now our daughters are marrying to Turkish boys; our sons are marrying to Turkish girls. Generation is changing, our customs are changing... Our breed is changing. The Kazakh generation is changing. So, I see us as minority in Turkey.

According to Colleen Wood, who is a writer working for *Diplomat*, “More than 4 million Kazakhs, more than a quarter of the world’s Kazakh population, live beyond Kazakhstan’s borders, as a result of annexed territories and diasporic migration in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.”³²⁹ Berkay who was born and raised in Turkey is another interviewee who thinks that Kazakhs in Turkey might be diaspora as he states below:

Berkay (a 30-year-old faculty member) If we look through the eyes of the first generations, we can say that we are a diaspora. Because wherever people are born and raised, they miss there. However, we may not say the same thing for the current generation. They do not want to return physically. Now, when we look at the situation politically, there are a lot of problems there, in East Turkestan. Although it is desired, it is very difficult to return. A few years ago, a relative came to visit us from there. We saw him/her for the first time. He said goodbye after staying with us one month by saying that he/she would not be able to see us

³²⁹ Colleen Wood, “Meeting the Kazakh Diaspora”, *Diplomat*, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/meeting-the-kazakh-diaspora/> [15.06.2020]

again because of the political issues there. I don't know if we can meet him/her again. On the other hand, if I see diaspora as a return to culture, not regionally, I can say we are a diaspora because of Kazakh nationalism. Yet again, not all the people have that sense. (3rd Generation)

On August 2, 2018, a program prepared by a Kazakhstan channel was shared on the Kazakh Turks Foundation YouTube page.³³⁰ One of the interviews given by a Kazakh for this program is an indicator of how much the Kazakhs support each other in Turkey, which is a substantial criterion of being a diaspora. He says:

Muhammed (a 73-year-old job owner) Yes, we live among the Turks. We work with the Turks but we always try to support the Kazakhs here. We never leave a Kazakh, even a stranger to us, in trouble. Not only us but older generation thought the same way. Our children mostly speak Turkish. They understand Kazakh language but they cannot answer freely. Even kids, when they visit someone, they only play with Kazakh children. Younger Kazakh generation always try to stick together. (2nd Generation)

4.3. The Kazakh Community in Turkey and Their Perception of Homeland

After the dissolution of Soviet Russia, Kazakhstan attempted to create new ties with Kazakhs who were located out of Kazakhstan, and those members also began to reformulate their identities and loyalties with Kazakhstan as the new homeland.³³¹ This situation changed the perception of homeland of the Kazakhs who lived in Turkey as well. Eastern Turkestan was perceived as homeland by the Kazakhs of Turkey before Kazakhstan declared its independence. However, after Kazakhstan proclaimed its independence in 1991, Kazakhstan was started to be seen as homeland. As Isik Kuscü argues on her article, *Changing Perception of Homeland for the Kazakh diaspora*, “after the independence of Kazakhstan, Eastern Turkestan was forgotten, our homeland overnight became Kazakhstan.”³³² Kazakhstan’s independence led Kazakhs of Turkey to be recognized more by both Turkey and Kazakhstan. As it was mentioned in chapter 3, Kazakhs were confused with Cossacks who are East Slavic-speaking Orthodox Christian people. Following to independence of Kazakhstan, it adopted a homeland discourse which underlined the very crucial link between the country and Kazakhs living outside the new state’s borders. In this context, the interviewees were asked about their homeland perception in the continuation of the interviews. The first arrivers who migrated from Central Asia to Turkey use the word “fatherland (Atayurt/memleket) when they talk

³³⁰ Kazaktürklerivakfi, <https://www.youtube.com/watch> [04.20.2020]

³³¹ Kuscü, *ibid*, 381.

³³² *Ibid.*, 391.

about their memories. Supportively, Emel who was born in Manisa/Salihli thinks that she sees Turkey as the foster-land (Yavru Vatan). She states:

Emel: I see Turkey as our foster-land (*yavru vatan*), and the place where we came from is our homeland. (Central Asia). (Second-generation)

Nuriye: The Central Asia is our fatherland/homeland (*atavatan/memleket*), and Turkey is our motherland. Our elders always say like that. They call Central Asia as “homeland” when they talk about their memories. (3rd generation)

In Hasan Oraltay’s works, the idea of Turkestan as the homeland for all Turks was frequently mentioned. He defined Turkestan as the “land of Turks in the heartland of Asia, which was divided by Russian and Chinese imperialists.”³³³ In his book, *From Homeland to Anatolia (Anayurttan Anadolu’ya)*, Halife Altay defines the homeland as Turkestan, not only for Kazakhs but also for all other Turkic nations, a land which was divided between Russia and China in the East and West. According to Altay, their homeland, that is East Turkestan, was occupied and exploited by communist powers.³³⁴ During the interviews, it was observed that interviewees made a distinction between motherland (*anavatan*) and homeland/fatherland (*memleket/atayurt*) and answered the questions in that direction.

Mert: I see Turkey as my homeland. The reason why I see Turkey as my homeland is because of Islam and Turkishness. If I had been answering this question in another country, I would have thought of it as East Turkestan or Kazakhstan. (3rd generation)

In the course of the interviews, some of the participants answered the question from a nationalist point. They stated that it is not right to separate Kazakhstan, East Turkestan or Turkey from each other because the Turkish world is a whole:

Kemal (a 57-year-old Faculty Member): For me, the Turkish World is my homeland. It is not right to separate Kazakhstan, Turkey and East Turkestan. The Turkish World is a whole, and we are the branches. We are part of it. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan are brotherly and friendly with each other. In the past, some political leaders made political statements about each other. However, it is not like that anymore. (2nd generation)

Nedim (66 years old, retired): As a Turk, everywhere a Turk lives is my homeland. If a Turk lives in Afghanistan, it is my homeland, if a Kazakh lives in Oslo, it is my homeland, if a Kazakh lives in Somalia, it is my homeland. If a Turk lives in Mongolia, Siberia, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, China, that is my homeland. Wherever the Turks live, it is my homeland. We can achieve only if we unite. (2nd Generation)

Gul (a 26-year-old teacher): As a Kazakh, I see Turkey as homeland. I was born and raised here. I earned my life here. According to me, for all of us, people live in Central Asia, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz people, and Uzbeks would say the same thing as mutual: Turkey is our homeland. Turkey is a paradise. (3rd generation)

³³³ *Ibid.*, 389.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, 388.

On the other hand, other interviewees answered that since they were born in Turkey, they see Turkey as their homeland, and Kazakhstan or East Turkestan do not come to their mind since they have never been there as Bade states:

Bade (a 27-year-old employee) When I think about it, Konya comes to my mind; neither Kazakhstan nor East Turkestan comes to my mind because I have not been to Kazakhstan or East Turkestan. My mother did not live there; my grandfather did not live there. I have no relevance. (3rd generation)

Kadir (51-year old-retired): Of course I see Republic of Turkey as the homeland. (Second-generation)

Feyza(a 57-year-old housewife): Since I was born and raised in Turkey, I see Turkey as my homeland. (Second-generation)

As it was observed throughout the interviews, when it comes to politics, the interviewees emphasize their Turkish identity; however, when it comes to culture, they emphasize their Kazakh identity more. It shows their identity is fluid. In addition, I, as one of them, observed that when Kazakhs talk about internal affair and politics about Turkey, they always emphasize that they are Turks, and Kazakhs and Turks are the same. So, Kazakhs and Turks can come together for the same ideal (*ülkü*). However, when they talk about their ethnic background, customs, traditions, food, language, and appearance, they feel their Kazakh identity and differences more. In this regard, one of the interviewees from the second generation states that she misses something which she cannot name when she talks about Kazakhs and Kazakhstan. She says: “*I miss hearing Kazakh sounds.*” (*Kazak seslerini duymayı özlüyorum*)” Even though, some of the participants were born and raised in Turkey, they still create a loyalty with their homeland.

According to Aslihan Yeniceri’s research on Kazakhs, when interviewees were asked whether they thought they were assimilated, “twenty-six percent of participants said yes, sixty-nine percent said no. Moreover, the sample embraced various identities: there were three types of responses. Five percent of participants did not state their thoughts.”³³⁵ Indeed, hybridization is different from assimilation. As it was discussed in the second chapter, assimilation is to lose identity and adopt the other identity which is more dominant. However, hybridization is embracing differences and creating a Third Space by combining more than one identity and culture. So, it can be said that Kazakhs, as hybrids, adopted and integrated in Turkey rather than assimilated.

³³⁵ Yeniceri, *ibid*, 101.

During the interviews, almost all of the interviewees highlighted that even though they and their ancestors were invited by other countries, Kazakhs chose Turkey to live and settle down. In this context, participants were asked the reason behind choosing as a country to settle down. According to the interviewees, they chose Turkey because of two reasons: Turkishness and Islam. These two elements are really important to define Kazakhs and their situation in Turkey. Kadir, who is from the second generation, answers the question by referring to 1071, Battle of Manzikert (*Malazgirt*).³³⁶ He says:

Kadir: We chose Turkey because we are Turkish and Muslim, and we are not newcomers. We arrived to Turkey in 1071.

Kemal: If someone told me to leave Turkey, my answer is ready. I would say; you came to Turkey 1,000 years before me, you came in 1071 and I came in 1953.

Gul (teacher, 26 years old): The first thing which comes to mind is Islam. It is a country where we can . Even though we cannot practice our religion properly in 2020, our ancestors thought that we should preserve our religion and Turkey is the best country where we can do that.

Celal (retired, 57 years old): Kazakh people were invited by the U.S.A before they migrated to Turkey. However, they chose Turkey because of Islam.

Islam is a peacemaker as Gurses states.³³⁷ As a result, “Islamic brotherhood as the glue that holds numerous ethnic nationalities together.”³³⁸ Another unifying factor is Turkishness for Kazakhs to choose Turkey. Bahar who was born and raised in Turkey answers the questions why her ancestors chose Turkey to settle down as below:

Bahar (a 20-year-old student): As the name implies, we are Kazakh-Turks. It is our homeland.

On this issue, Ergul says: “The Turkishness had grounded on some organic bonds such as ethnicity or religion.”³³⁹ Therefore, when Kazakhs define themselves as Kazak-Turks and Muslim they made themselves as an inner subject not an outer. As it was discussed in Chapter 2, host country’s approach to the ethnic communities is really important. While Kazakhs in Turkey constantly emphasize their Turkish identity during the interviews, in a street interview which was done in 2017 in

³³⁶ According to Oxford Bibliographies, the decisive defeat of a Byzantine field army and capture of the Eastern Roman emperor sent shockwaves across the Christian and Islamic worlds and opened the floodgates of Turkish invasion and migration into Anatolia, strategically the most important region to the Byzantine Empire.

³³⁷ Mehmet Gurses, “Is Islam a Cure for Ethnic Conflict? Evidence from Turkey” **Politics and Religion**, (2015):135-154

³³⁸ *Ibid.*, 135.

³³⁹ Feride Aslı Ergül, “The Formation of Turkish National Identity: The Role of the Greek ‘The Other’” (METU. Ph.D Disstertation, 2009)

Kazakhstan, people were asked whether they identify themselves as Turks. Here are the answers that I selected from the interview:

- “1. I don't know, but I don't define myself as Turkish. It is still unclear who said what or proved. Isn't it right? Most societies do not know their origin and history.
2. Of course, our origin is Turkish. They were a tribe here, but in the past, they migrated to Anatolia because they had difficulties here. They preserved their own culture and language. That's why we love the Turks. We seem them as our brothers. They set out from East Turkestan. Back then, it was the center of the Turks. On the other hand, we entered the Soviet Union and became like Russian.
3. It is not a lie that our ancestors came from the Turkish people. So, I accept myself as a person from the Turkish speaking people. Our culture and traditions are similar. Of course, our languages are similar too but I don't know if I see Turks as my brothers, I never felt that.
4. No, I do not define myself as a Turk. First of all, we need to understand who we are talking about? Are we talking about the Turks who live in Turkey or real Turks? Turkish people are brunette in Turkey. However, real Turks are blonde. Kazakhs are coming from Turkic race but I do not think that we have a tie with Turks in Turkey.
5. I don't know, if we look at the history, we are from the Turkish language family.
6. Yes, we are Turkish. The Turks went from here to the West, to Anatolia.
7. In terms of genetics and geology, yes, we are Turkish, but as a member of society I am European.
8. I do not define myself as a Turk. Maybe a little... Kazakhs were captured and ruled many times, a lot of wars broke out. Our blood was mixed. Our languages are same. However, I do not know whether I see them as brothers but I know that they are Muslims.”³⁴⁰

Although Kazakhs in Turkey identify themselves as Turks or Kazakh-Turks, people in Kazakhstan do not emphasize their Turkishness, and do not like to be called Kazakh-Turk as Kemal stated during the interviews. According to Mihr, “Turkishness was used as a proxy ideology to keep the multi-ethnic and politically diverse state together.”³⁴¹ Although Kazakh people that I had interviewed with stated that they and their ancestors chose Turkey as a place to live because of Islam and Turkishness, there were other important topics that were mentioned by the interviewees.

As it was argued in Chapter 3, during the presidency of Ismet Inonu, a letter which was explaining the situation of Kazakhs was sent after the end of the World War II to seek refuge and settle in Turkey as immigrant. However, the immigration request was rejected on the grounds that Turkey was experiencing hard times and its situation was not suitable to accept refugees. The decision taken by the government headed by Menderes on 13 March 1952 and with the approval of President Celal Bayar, 1800 Kazakh refugees from Pakistan, India and Kashmir were recognized and accepted to Turkey. This situation affected the political thinking of Kazakhs as it is

³⁴⁰ Azhar VlogsKz, “Kazaklar kendilerini Türk olarak görüyorlar mı?” <https://www.youtube.com/> [18.04.2020]

³⁴¹ Anja Mihr. *Regime Consolidation and Transnational Justice: A Comparative Study of Germany, Spain and Turkey*. Cambridge University Press. (The UK:2018) ,342

mentioned in the book, Anadolu'dan Anayurda Maneviyat Önderi Halife Altay by Kazibek Islambek. There is an important paragraph which summarizes the Kazakh's perception of political party in the book:

In May 1960, Alibek Hakim, Hamza Uçar, Halife Altay were sent invitation letters by the Chinese Government's ambassador of Turkey in Taiwan, Shao Yu Lin to the "Asian Nations Anti-Communist Society" which is organized annually to discuss the current issues. As soon as they received the letters, Hamza Uçar, Alibek Hakim, Halife Altay applied to the governor of Manisa and talked for their passport transactions...However, they were hesitant about whether the military administration would issue their passports after the 27 May 1960 military coup occurred. This was because some Kazakhs (including Halife Altay) supported the Democratic Party.³⁴²

In this regard, the editor of the book Abdülvahap Kara says that:

I guess they (Kazakhs) supported the Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*) because they played an important role in bringing Kazakhs from Pakistan to Turkey. Most of the Kazakhs supported the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*) after the Democratic Party was closed. I saw a photocopy of the picture which Halife Altay had taken with the leader of the Justice Party, Suleyman Demirel in the picture section of the archive in Almaty.²³⁷ Halife Altay delivered the original painting to the printing house for the book he is writing today. In this period, it was the first time among the Kazakhs to support the Nationalist Movement Party. (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*).³⁴³

In the following years, Kazakhs got closer to Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and later took an active role in political violence in Turkey which lasted from 1968 to 1980. MHP's announcements about ethnic definition in the following years brought the Kazakhs, who suffered from communism in East Turkestan, closer to them. Since they suffered from communism in their home country, MHP's expressions about anti-communism connected Kazakhs to MHP. According to Dogan, "As anti-communism can be regarded as a basic theme in Turkish politics throughout Cold War, it was particularly embraced by MHP."³⁴⁴ In addition, another consideration which brings Kazakhs and MHP was the political view defending the unity of all Ural-Altay tribes. That is, Turanism, "and to some extent MHP inherited the theme."³⁴⁵ Therefore, while the idea of Turanism/Pan Turkism brings MHP and Kazakhs together, it also allows many Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and Uyghurs who took a refuge in Turkey to do politics in MHP.³⁴⁶

³⁴² Islambek, *ibid*, 70-71.

³⁴³ *Ibid.*, 71.

³⁴⁴ Setenay Nil Dogan, "Formation of Diaspora Nationalism: The Case of Circassians in Turkey" (Ph.D Dissertation, Sabancı University, 2009), 131

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 132.

³⁴⁶ Tanay Yücel, "Turancılığın Doğuşundan Günümüze Turancı Partileri ve Dernekleri." <https://www.turansam.org/makale> [28.06.2020]

In order to understand whether the refusal of the first letter affected the political view of Kazakhs, the interviewees were asked what they heard about the rejection of the letter by Ismet Inonu. Ahmet who was born in 1935 in Barkol/China and witnessed all the immigration process says that the refusal broke people's heart. However, he does not want to talk about politics:

Ahmet: The response of Turkey to our first letter broke our heart. I do not want to say anything else. (Starts to speak silently) Otherwise, it would be politics. (1st generation)

On the other hand, Kemal states that it might have changed the political closeness of the Kazakh immigrant. He states: "*It may have changed the sympathy of people. (2nd Generation)*"

Halime highlights that Kazakh people did not want to immigrate to Turkey by supporting any kind of political parties. She also claims that "*Kazakh people supported the 6 arrows.*"³⁴⁷ However, she states that, on their first application, they were not accepted to Turkey because of four reasons: "Turkey's neglect of Turkish World, internal conjuncture, Turkey's ideological view, and ignorance of Turkish people." She continues her words as below:

Halime: (Not only about Turkish world) Even if you ask Turkish people about Russians, they do not know anything. They do not know the history and the past of Russia (for example.) What is even Russian history? It starts in the 8th century with Kiev Russians. Before that, Kiev, Ukraine, and Northern part of Black Sea belonged to the Turks. What did Putin say two days ago? He said: "We will beat the Corona Virus as we beat the Patzinaks (*Peçenekler*)."
Who are Patzinaks? We are the Patzinaks. The memory of Anatolia cannot go too far. When you talk about the Central Asia, it reminds Taimur (Timur) to Anatolian People. They are afraid of him. They say that Turkishization of Anatolia was delayed 50 years because of Taimur. It is difficult to break down some perceptions. Another thing is that Anatolian Turks do not like slanting-eyed-Tatars. When Reina massacre happened, Binali Yildirim said: "We gave up on Tatars and saw the worse" (*Tatarından geçtik de beterini gördük.*) What does he mean? Another thing is that when a battle was lost in Vienna, they said that they lost the war because Crimean Tatars withdrew their army due to disagreement so they lost the war. When you talk about Tatars, people remember these events. It is really hard to erase the things which settle down in social memory. For example, they criticize Central Asians eating horse meat. In Anatolia, people have become Middle Eastern. They do not eat horse meat. They gave up eating horse meat in the 12th century so horse meat sounds like something which cannot be eaten. Therefore, they are marginalizing the Central Asians.

During the interviews, it was observed that many interviewees had not heard about the refusal of the first letter. They only know detailed information about the second letter which was accepted by Adnan Menderes in 1952. However, they all gave the same answer about the lack of recognition of the Kazakhs in Turkey. As Kara states on his article: "Turkish people were confused Kazakhs with Cossacks or

³⁴⁷ The six arrows symbolize fundamental pillars of Kemalism. Those are Republicanism, Populism, Nationalism, Laicism, Statism, and Reformism.

with Tatars. In other words, the Turkish people generally seemed unaware of the existence of a Kazakh people.”³⁴⁸ During the interviews, In regard of this, interviewees answered as below:

Nedim :We were accepted by Adnan Menderes. It was written that our Turkistani brothers, Turkistani refugees were coming to Turkey on the newspapers. People who were following media knew that we were coming from the same race but I cannot say the same thing about the public. Some of them did not know us. They called us Tatars because there were many Tatars living in Sehermini. (2nd generation)

Kadir: When we came to Turkey for the first time, Turkish people did not know anything about us. In that day's condition, people did not have lots of knowledge, they did not watch TV, and there were no internet or telephone like today. So, people did not know about us. However, as we started living together, they got to know about us and people got used to each other. (2nd generation)

Feyza: People did not know anything about Kazakhs. They called Kazakhs as immigrant or refugees. (2nd generation)

Gul: As far as I know, Adnan Menderes, Turgut Ozal, and Yahya Kemal Beyatlı 245knew about us. They were aware that our ancestors were struggling there in Central Asia. I cannot forget one sentence that I heard before. “The people who lived in Central Asia are our citizens. (3rd generation)

Bahar: I do not know anything about it. (3rd generation)

Nuriye: Our elders used to say that the Kazakhs were not very well known by the Turks here, and therefore they were confused with Tatar, Uzbek and Turkmen. (3rd generation)

While some of the interviewees were thinking that Adnan Menderes and other politicians accepted Kazakhs to Turkey because they thought Kazakhs and Turks were coming from the same root, Halime thinks differently and she thinks that Kazakhs were accepted to Turkey because of political circumstances:

Kazakhs were accepted when they wrote a letter during Adnan Menderes because the conjuncture of that period was thought to be appropriate. If you check the names on the acceptance letter you will understand. Fuat Koprulu, who was the minister of foreign affairs at that time, was the scholar who started the studies of the Turkish World. Fevzi Lutfi Karaosmanoglu, who was the minister of internal affairs, was one of the Ottoman ancestors (ayan) of the 19th Century. During the War of Independence, he was a landlord. Then, he became a minister of internal affairs. He helped Kazakhs to settle down in the Aegean Region. At that time, there were Kazakhs who were resettled in Kayseri, Konya, and Nigde. Until the Independence War, there were a lot of Greeks living in those cities. Those regions had to be Turkified. I do not believe Kazakhs were accepted to Turkey because Adnan Menderes loved Kazakh people. For example, the World Bank gave money for the immigrant houses built in Salihli. Those houses were built in that way.

As a matter of fact, except Halime, nobody wanted to make political comments during the interview. Maybe it was because they did not know, or maybe they did not want to involve in politics. For the interviewees, to emphasize their Kazakh or Turkish identities depend on the social and political circumstances. When the interviewees talk about politics, they emphasize their Turkish identity more

³⁴⁸ Baigabylov, *ibid*, 7.

compared to their Kazakh identity and by doing so they act as bridges between Turkey and Kazakhstan as Maalouf states about immigrants:

“...They have a special role to play in forging links, eliminating misunderstandings, making some parties more reasonable and others less belligerent, smoothing out difficulties, seeking compromise. Their role is to act as bridges, go-betweens, mediators between the various communities and cultures. And that is precisely why their dilemma is so significant: if they themselves cannot sustain their multiple allegiances, if they are continually being pressed to take sides or ordered to stay within their own tribe, then all of us have reason to be uneasy about the way the world is going.”³⁴⁹

Kazakh people feel a need to highlight their gratitude to Turkish nation. They do not like to talk about the discrimination that they or their ancestors encountered. Thus, some of my interviewees did not want me to write down the sad things that they talked about as Berry states, “ethno cultural group members generally prefer integration, and when they do, they tend to make more positive adaptations” which is important for cultural acculturation.³⁵⁰ Berry also highlights that one of the important strategies of acculturation is integration as ethnic communities can both keep their identities and adopt host country’s culture.³⁵¹ As they choose to show their gratitude all the time, they also describe themselves as the happiest Kazakh diaspora as Kara states:

“Kazakhs in Turkey are really happy with living in brother country Turkey which they share the same religion, language, and culture with. The friendly relationship which is improving day by day between Turkey and Kazakhstan makes Kazakhs happier. So, undoubtedly, Kazakh diaspora in Turkey is the happiest compared to other Kazakh diasporas all over the world.”³⁵²

Kazaks, whose second immigration offer was later accepted by the decision taken by the government headed by Menderes on 13 March 1952 and with the approval of President Celal Bayar, the Kazakh refugees were recognized and accepted to Turkey. As a consequence, Adnan Menderes has become an important figure for Kazakhs and his execution wounded them deeply. Therefore, Adnan Menderes' death anniversary is remembered among the Kazakhs. According to the news published on Newspaper Sabah which is one of the most well-known newspapers in Turkey, Dr. Abdulvahap Kara, who is a historian and Turkologist writer and known throughout the Turkish World for his research on the history,

³⁴⁹ Maalouf, *ibid*, 4.

³⁵⁰ Berry, *ibid*, p.27.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 27.

³⁵² Abdulvahap Kara, “ En Mutlu Kazak Diasporası Türkiye Kazakları”<https://www.abdulahapkara.com/en-mutlu-kazak-dyasporasi-tuerkiye-kazaklari/> [10.06.2020]

language and culture of the entire Turkish World, especially Kazakhstan, had a speech on Adnan Menderes' death anniversary, which shows the impact of Adnan Menderes on Kazakhs. According to the news which was published on 19th of March 2012:

“On their 60th anniversary in Turkey, Kazakhs who live in Turkey remembered late Adnan Menderes upon his grave. Speaking at the ceremony, Assoc. Dr. Abdulvahap Kara said: “The decision taken by the government headed by Menderes on 13 March 1952, 1850 Kazakh families from Pakistan, India and Kashmir were recognized and accepted to Turkey as Resettled Refugees (iskanlı Göçmen). We have gathered here today in order to show our gratitude to Adnan Menderes.”³⁵³

According to another newspaper, on 67th anniversary of the Democratic Party, a speech by Kara again shows how important Adnan Menderes was for Kazakhs. He states:

“Late Adnan Menderes undertook the most important role bringing Kazakh-Turks to Turkey. When our ancestors were invited to the U.S.A as immigrants in the 1940s, they answered: “We will not go anywhere except Turkey.” They took this decision in order to maintain the Turkish Culture. The decision taken by the government headed by Menderes on 13 March 1952, we came to Turkey as refugees. Today, Kazakhstani people living in Turkey offer their gratitude to Adnan Menderes. Not only the Kazakhs living in Turkey but also Kazakhs living in Kazakhstan offer their gratitude to Turkey because when Kazakhstan declared its independence in 1991, Turkey, under the leadership of late Turgut Ozal was the first country to recognize Kazakhstan's independence. Therefore, Kazakh community has a very special love for Turkey. Undoubtedly, the biggest share in the formation of this love is Adnan Menderes and Turgut Ozal.”³⁵⁴

As it is discussed in Chapter 2, the relationship among diasporas, ethnic communities and home country is important. According to Robert Paarlberg, the political parties in the host country utilize diaspora members as voters.³⁵⁵ In addition, the members can also be used as symbols in party campaign messages. Therefore, the parties attempt to influence the potential voters and show them closeness. This closeness was provided by MHP and AKP for Kazakh diaspora in Turkey. Kazakh-Turks Association or Kazakh people's houses were visited many times by these mainstream political party members such as Meral Aksener, Ahmet Davutoglu, and other political party members. These visits were reflected in the newspapers many times:

“Ahad Andican of MHP visited the Kazakh Foundation. Prof. Dr. Ahad Andican, who served as the Minister of State responsible for Foreign Turks from the ANAP period and is now the

³⁵³ “Kazaklar Menderes'i Kabrinde Andı” Sabah Gazetesi, March 19, 2012. <https://www.sabah.com.tr/yasam/> [24.03.2020]

³⁵⁴ “Kazaklar Niçin Türkiye'yi Seviyorlar?” IstanbulTimes, January 7, 2012. <https://www.istanbultimes.com.tr/siyaset/2014-secimlerinin-galibi-demokrat-parti-olacaktır> [15.06.2020]

³⁵⁵ Robert, Paarlberg, “Food politics: What Everyone Needs to Know.” **The Journal of Politics**, V.73, N.2 (2011): 619-620.

MHP Istanbul 2nd Region 4th candidate, informed the foundation members by visiting the Kazakh-Turks Association.”³⁵⁶

“AK Party candidate Arısoy attended the 'Engagement Ceremony' of the Kazakhs. Meeting with the citizens before the 31 March local elections, AK Party Zeytinburnu mayor candidate Omer Arısoy participated in the 'Engagement Ceremony' held at the Zeytinburnu Kazakh-Turks Association.”³⁵⁷

Not only AKP or MHP but also Republican People's Party (CHP) paid a visit to Kazakh-Turks Association in Zeytinburnu /Istanbul in order to meet Kazakhs before local elections. According to the news,

“CHP district president Metin Dogan and the district administrators accompanying him visited the Kazakh Turks ... While the Kazakh Turks Foundation drew attention with the hospitality they offered, Metin Dogan said that they were very pleased with the close attention and care they showed to them.”³⁵⁸

According to Kaloudis, political parties compete in order to take control of government. So, they try to take attention of ethnic communities.³⁵⁹ Political members who visited not only Kazakh associations in Istanbul but also in other cities commented on the opposition parties as well. According to the news which was done by Hurriyet, one of the important newspapers in Turkey:

“Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arınc, together with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu, visited the Salihli Kazakh Turks Social Solidarity and Culture Association in Turkeli Park... The two ministers, who were gifted with the local clothes of the Kazakhs, tasted local dishes in the Kazakh tent. Davutoğlu, who passed from Manisa to Uşak, targeted CHP Leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu in his speech at the meeting he attended. Davutoğlu said: “Kılıçdaroğlu went to Israel and told the newspapers and complained about us. What kind of despair and dishonor is this? Where those who have been expecting apologize for three years? They have become silent when an apology comes.”³⁶⁰

Kittilson and Tate argue that the parties in competition with other parties so they strategize and manipulate their policy so as to win elections. Thus, the party itself “initiates change, marketing its new ideas to the electorate. By promoting minorities for office, parties may ‘advertise’ to potential voters their support for minority issues.”³⁶¹ Therefore, diasporas and ethnic communities are arenas for political parties in order to gain more power in the country. In addition to that,

³⁵⁶Istanbultimes. “Mhpli Andican Kazak Vakfını Ziyaret Etti.” <https://www.istanbultimes.com.tr/zeytinburnu/> [15.06.2020]

³⁵⁷Internethaber. “Akparti Adayı Arısoy Kazakların Nişan Batasına Katıldı.” <https://www.internethaber.com/ak-parti-adayi-arisoy-kazaklarin-nisan-batasina-katildi-1937172h.htm> [15.06.2020]

³⁵⁸ Zeytinburnu Haber. “CHP’den Kazak Türklerine Ziyaret” <http://www.zeytinburnuhaber.org> [15.06.2020]

³⁵⁹ George Kalaoudis, “Modern Greeks and the Diaspora Greeks in the United States,” **Lexington Books**(London: 2018): 183

³⁶⁰ Hürriyet Gazetesi. “Kazak Sofrası” <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/> [15.06.2020]

³⁶¹ Miki Caul Kittilson and Katherine Tate, “Political Parties, Minorities and Elected Office: Comparing Opportunities for Inclusion in the U.S. and Britain.” (2004), 10

“homeland political parties utilize diaspora members not only as voters but also ‘as activists, fundraisers, lobbyists, candidates, influencers from afar, and symbols in party campaign messages.’”³⁶²As a result, they try to cooperate with ethnic groups in order to have a say in the country.

4.4. Return to Homeland

Dissolution of the Soviet Russia, Kazakhstan’s independence and major changes occurred with globalization such as internet, which helps diaspora groups to communicate with their homeland, affected Kazakhs and their activities in Turkey. Following to independence of Kazakhstan, it “adopted a homeland discourse which underlined the very crucial link between the country and Kazakhs living outside the new state’s borders. Subsequently, the term “Kazakh diaspora” started to be frequently used by the government and by scholars in Kazakhstan. As a consequence of that, “the Kazakh government has actively supported return migration; a move some have argued was meant to rebalance the country’s demographics in favor of the titular group.”³⁶³ Kazakhstan initiated a policy which urges Kazakhs all over the world their historical homeland. Mendikulova summarizes the situation of Kazakh ethnic groups and diasporas as below:

“The Kazakh diaspora is not a large one – they are just small groups of ethnic Kazakhs in host countries in Western Europe and North America. This is of little concern to those who live in Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, where their small presence has enabled them to show a desire for joint settlements and ask for relevant policies from their host countries. Although the Kazakh diaspora as an ethnic minority has never occupied a politically significant place in host countries, this does not preclude them from thriving there economically and socially. Drawing on the nomadic life of ancestral Kazakhs through the millennia, they have facilitated their social-psychological and physiological capability to perceive the surrounding world and to adapt themselves to the highly competitive multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious conditions.”³⁶⁴

The construction of Kazakhstan as the homeland for all Kazakhs, even for those living outside its borders, became the most important target of Kazakhstan as it was discussed in Chapter 3. In this regard, interviewees were asked whether they would like to return to Kazakhstan or East Turkestan permanently. It is observed that people from younger generations have not been to Kazakhstan before. However, they

³⁶² Skrbuš, Zlatko. “Homeland, Diaspora Relations: From Passive to Active Interactions,” **Asian and Pacific Migration Journal**, V.6, N. 3–4 (1997)

³⁶³ Coleen Wood, “Meeting the Kazakh Diaspora,” <https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/meeting-the-kazakh-diaspora/> [29.06.2020]

³⁶⁴ Mendikulova, **ibid.**

would like to visit Kazakhstan in order to see where their grandparents migrated from. In this regard, Gul says:

Gul (a 26 year-old teacher) : One of my future goals is to go to Kazakhstan or Central Asia to learn about those places, to see the places where my language and customs are experienced, and to see my elders who have lived up to this time and to hear what they have suffered so far. In addition, I would like to write a book and collect all the information about Kazakhs to transfer it to the next generations. We must try hard not to forget our customs. We must keep it alive as we can because the most important essence that makes a nation is its customs and traditions. There is a saying that, we can identify a nation from its custom, tradition and identity. (3rd Generation)

In addition, interviewees from second generation and who only have been to Kazakhstan as a tourist answers the question as below:

Halime: I do not want to go there permanently. If I go back there permanently, I will miss Turkey's values such as olive oil, Zeybek, Harman, and Izmir. On the other hand, whenever I go to Kazakhstan, I feel happy. We are like in between Turkey and Kazakhstan. When I go to Kazakhstan I really want to see real Kazakhs. I want to see Kazakhs who have the characteristics of my family and the elders that I lost. When I went to Kazakhstan, I was asked many times that what I miss a lot about Kazakhstan. My answer is, I miss Kazakh voice and Kazakh language. I miss Kazakh conversation that came to my ear while I was sleep as a child.(Interviewee starts speaking Kazakh here.) "Close the door, why did you open the windows, c'mon let's have some food and tea." I miss hearing those sentences or I miss some certain food and flavors when I used to have when I was a child. I miss listening to Kazakh songs or Kazakh words. Of course, these are totally personal things. (2nd generation)

Emel: I do not want to settle in Kazakhstan. I have relatives living there. I would like to visit there but I really do not want to move and settle there. (2nd generation)

Feyza: I have never been to Kazakhstan but I really would like to go there. (2nd generation)

Celal: I heard people returning to Kazakhstan. However, they could not adopt there and came back. I did not want to join them. (2nd generation)

Unlike others, Kemal stated that he would like to settle in Kazakhstan and it would be an honor for him. However, he has a mission in Turkey:

Kemal: I see the Turkish world as a whole. I do not see any difference between my immigration to Kazakhstan and immigration from Istanbul to Ankara. It's like changing places in my own country. Turkey also makes it easy to do so. I can maintain my citizenship even if I go there. This is a huge advantage. Even if there is no definite return there, there are those who live here and there on a regular basis. I have a relative who went to study, got married and stayed there. Of course, I would love to go, too. But I have a mission in Turkey. I would like to tell about Kazakhs and their history here in Turkey. (2nd generation)

On the other hand, Berkay states that "one cannot love what he does not know." Since he has never been to Kazakhstan, he is not planning to return. He says:

Berkay: I have never been to Kazakhstan and not planning to go there. I have never been there. One cannot love what he does not know. (3rd generation)

As it was discussed in Chapter 3, Kazakhstan prepared quota system in order to gather all the Kazakhs around the world under the same flag. However, due to some adaptation problems such as language, economic, and social problems, most of

the Kazakhs who migrated to Kazakhstan had to move back to their host land countries. About the adaptation problems, Nuriye states that Turkey Kazakhs and Kazakhstani Kazakhs are very different from each other:

Nuriye :I am a Kazakh and I was born and raised in Turkey. I can speak Kazakh and I still practice Kazakh customs and traditions. I live in Kazakh community in Istanbul, as well. However, whenever I meet a Kazakh from Kazakhstan, I feel like she/he is different from us. Everything about them is just so different from Kazakhs who live in Turkey. The way they act, the way they speak, the way they think. I feel like they are much closer to Russians and we are much closer to Turks. In addition to that, I have met a lot of Kazakhs who cannot speak Kazakh properly and they do not show any effort to preserve it. However, as a 3rd generation Kazakh living in Turkey, I preserved both my language and tradition. It was so surprising for me. I do not know the reason but whenever I meet a Kazakh living in Turkey or the ones who migrated to Europe as a worker, I can have an easy communication and feel warm. We still have a connection. However, it is not like that when I meet a Kazakh from Kazakhstan. I would like to tell you one of my memories. When I was a university student, there was a girl in my classroom and she was from Kazakhstan. When I heard about it, I got really excited and went to talk to her and I spoke Kazakh. She just looked at my face and told me that she did not understand me. So, we spoke English. Can you imagine? Later on, I came to know that she could not speak Kazakh very well. Then she learnt how to speak Turkish. We started to speak Turkish. It was like she and I were from different worlds, different identities...I believe the Kazakhs in Turkey are still like from 1930s, they have not changed at all, preserving their essence. However, I do not think the same for Kazakhstani Kazakhs. Therefore, I would like to see Kazakhstan one day but I believe I cannot adopt if I go there permanently. On the other hand, I cannot give up on my Kazakh identity. I feel in between. It is so complicated. (3rd Generation)

Nuriye's answer is also an example which shows that Kazakhs have created a new hybrid identity for themselves which includes both Turkishness and Kazakhness. They are integrated in Turkish culture but not assimilated. They are in-between. On the other hand, Kemal states that one of the biggest adaptation problems was employment. He states that since people could not find job there, they had to go back.

Kemal: It is very difficult now to go back to East Turkestan due to political issues. However, there were people who went back to Kazakhstan. For example, approximately 20.000 Kazakh people who migrated to Turkey from Afghanistan went back to Kazakhstan. There were Kazakhs from Altai Mountains who returned as well but the number was not high. However, they could not get used to there and some of them came back to Turkey. There are reasons why they could not adopt there. One of the reasons is Russian. They cannot speak Russian and it is important to speak Russian in order to find a job there. That's why they could not adopt there.

As it can be seen, except one interviewee, others would like to visit Kazakhstan as tourists. They do not want to settle in Kazakhstan permanently. As it was observed during the interviewees, they do not want to break their connection with Turkey. However, some of the interviewees would like to continue their visit to Kazakhstan. As Erciyes states, returning is not only about settling in homeland and breaking the connection totally with the host country. Visiting the homeland

occasionally is also a way of return.³⁶⁵ After the independence of Kazakhstan, it constructed itself as the homeland, and the perception of the Kazakhs for East Turkestan as homeland has changed. Especially the young generation does not know much about East Turkestan. Kazakhstan's success in constructing itself as the homeland is not only evident in the discourses of the Kazakh diaspora in Turkey and, but also in the activities of Kazakh associations abroad with the help of globalization as it empowers diasporas to meet their homeland.

4.5. Activities of Kazakhs in Turkey

Activities of Kazakh in Turkey should be examined as before and after the independence of Kazakhstan in order to understand the transformation of their identity in Turkey. In their early years in Turkey, the Kazakhs used to define themselves East Turkistani. Once they had started to adapt to life in Turkey, they started to involve in many activities and founded organizations. As discussed in the second chapter, diasporas' relationship with the homeland and host land countries are significant in terms of providing rights for the members to establish organizations and or arrange activities. Turkey has hosted many different communities in the republican period. However, while the new republic welcomed the immigration of such communities, it was determined to encourage the development of Turkish nationalism and therefore immigrant groups were not allowed to develop strong, distinct national identities. During the Cold War era, as long as the discourse of such groups focused on anti-communism, their activities were tolerated to a certain extent.³⁶⁶ In 1960, prominent Kazakh community members established “*Eastern Turkestan Refugees Association*” (*ETRA, Doğu Türkistan Göçmenler Derneği*) in Turkey. However, Kazakhs were not the only members of the association. The association also housed Uyghurs. In the same period, another association called *Turkistanis Culture and Cooperation Organization (Türkistanlılar Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Derneği)* was founded in 1963, which was later closed due to political reasons. One of the most significant things in this period is that Kazakhs wrote many books to introduce themselves to their host country. They defined themselves as

³⁶⁵ Cemre Erciyes, “Sovyet Sonrası 25 Yılda Türkiye’den Kuzey Kafkasya’ya Geri Dönüşün Dönüşümü: Köprüleri Yakmaktan Köprüler Kurmaya” *Journal of Caucasian Studies* (JOCAS). V.2, N.4 (2017):18.

³⁶⁶ Kuscı, *ibid*, 386.

good Muslims belonging to the Turkish World.³⁶⁷ The books and the foundations were very crucial in forming the identity of the Kazakhs. During this period, Kazakhs defined themselves as East Turkistani and their homeland as East Turkestan, and they felt closer to Pan-Turkic circles during the Cold War.³⁶⁸ One of the reasons why the Kazakhs did not bring their Kazakh identity to the fore was due to the cold war period. In this period, revealing separate nationalist identities by migrant groups was not welcomed by host countries due to the political concerns. Hence, it was easier for them to introduce themselves under East Turkistan and associating themselves with the dominant discourse, Pan-Turkism.

Globalization has paved the way for homogeneity as well as heterogeneity as it was discussed in Chapter 2. As Smith suggests, borders are not fixed and always shifting. Furthermore, globalization accelerated crossing the borders. It has created identities beyond boundaries, and ushered the transnationalization of migrations by empowering ethno-cultural elements. The declaration of independence of Kazakhstan in 1991 led Kazakhs in Turkey to take a more active role in Turkey and recognition. According to Kuscu, “as of the mid-1980s, some of the limitations on the activities of diaspora groups in Turkey became more flexible as a result of the general liberalization trends affecting Turkish politics.”³⁶⁹ Therefore, in the beginning of 1990s, Kazakh activities in Turkey increased. The other important improvement in the early 1990s is advancement in computer and telecommunication which increased people’s ability to reach information. According to Laguerre, “the internet has given rise to another form of lobbying, virtual diasporic lobbying.”³⁷⁰ Because by the help of internet, diasporas can use platform, forums, and websites to participate in matters related to homeland, and they can keep in touch with their ethnic compatriots from all over the world.

Founded on 25.09.1986 in Zeytinburnu, Istanbul, the Association of Kazakh Turks (*Kazak Türkleri Vakfı*) has played an important role in gathering Kazakhs together since it was established. The association was founded in order to prevent being too quickly assimilated and perhaps forgetting about their roots. The association, which is still active, has hosted many events such as wedding

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 383.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 387.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 389.

³⁷⁰ Laguerre, *ibid*, 85.

ceremonies, funerals, activities which aim to bring all Kazakhs together, shows, and interviews, channel programs, etc. In addition, some of the Turkish political parties have visited this association and dinners were organized to introduce the Kazakh culture to the party officials, which led the association to acquire a political identity. On a TV program prepared by a Kazakh TV Channel, an interviewee talks about the association as below:

Our ancestors were very far sided. They were worried what would happen to Kazakh youth in the future. For Kazakh generation to remember they are Kazakhs not to forget their traditions and customs. They founded a foundation. In 1986, the elders (aksakals/ aksakallılar) held a meeting, and decision was made. So, we were able to preserve our culture and customs. They told us that the younger generation should not forget their roots. We are responsible for insuring that. (2nd Generation) ³⁷¹

In this sense, interviewees were asked whether they had any effort to preserve their customs and tradition. The interviewees stated that they had an effort to preserve their traditions not to be scattered and lose their identity:

Mert (a 27-year-old archeologist): Of course, I show a huge effort to keep the Kazakh culture alive. I am 27 years old and I have lived in Gunesli Kazakkent since I was a child. Since there are a lot of Kazakhs here, my daily speaking language is Kazakh. We all go to same schools. Therefore, we do not let our culture to die. Also, we still continue to practice our cultural things like clothing, food or wedding our funeral ceremonies. While dreaming for the future, I think about how to pass them on to our children. (3rd Generation)

Berkay: There are some efforts to keep the culture alive in the first and second generation. But when I look at it from my point of view, when I meet Kazakhs at the university, I protect them considering that they come from the same culture with me. (3rd Generation)

Kemal: We are always together and support each other not to be scattered and lose our identity. (2nd generation)

According to Sonia Gsir and Elsa Mescoli, migrants' consumption and use of cultural products and commodities associated with their country of origin; food, clothes, various objects used on an everyday basis and also artistic products contribute to defining their specific image and to displaying it, an identity which is designed both for the self and for others.³⁷² Similarly, people wearing Kazakh traditional clothes on cultural occasions are also an expression of the sense of belonging. The Kazakh music they listen to or the Kazakh channels they watch on TV can be mentioned as two of the most common things Kazakhs in Turkey practice in order to keep their identity and their loyalty to it alive. It should be noted that these practices have an important role in the construction and maintenance of identity

³⁷¹ Sonia Gsir and Elsa Mescoli, "Maintaining national culture abroad Countries of origin, culture and diaspora" **Interact Research Report**, (2015), 16.

³⁷² **Kazak Türkleri Vakfı**, "Kazak Aru Güzellik Yarışması" <https://www.youtube.com/watch> [20.04.2020]

as they function as culture carriers and a bridge between past and future and remind people of their identity as Nuriye states:

Nuriye: Kazakhs have an active foundation in Istanbul. Its name is Kazakh-Turks Association. (Kazak Türkleri Vakfı) Kazakhs gather here at weddings, at funerals or similar occasions and have a meal or drink tea, that is, Kazakh food or Kazakh tea. You can only see the things which are related to Kazakh culture. In addition to that, some activities were organized here to bring Kazakh youth closer together. As far as I can remember, Kazakhs gathered here again and acted together when they were going to move to Kazakhstan. Also, dombra lessons, Kazakh language lessons or Karazhorga dance lessons are also provided in this foundation. This is like the center of Kazakhs. When I attend these events, I remember again that I am Kazakh and I am proud of it. (3rd Generation)

Kazakhs migrated from Turkey to European countries in 1960s as workers have established associations there both physically and virtually (i.e. through the social media pages they refer to as associations). The Kazakh associations which were established in Germany for the first time in the early 1980s were followed by others in other European countries. Thus, the Kazakh associations, whose numbers increased in Europe, started their efforts to meet under a roof organization in the Coordination Boards they have established to increase cooperation and solidarity between them. These efforts resulted in the establishment of the *European Federation of Kazakh Associations (FEKA)*, which brought 10 Kazakh Associations together in different countries of Europe under one roof in 2009.³⁷³ According to Kesici, in these associations, identification of young generation, protection and survival of the national identity, mother tongue problem, and keeping cultural and traditional values alive have been discussed. In addition, Kazakhs' migration from East Turkestan to Turkey, then from Turkey to Europe and the importance of Kazakhstan were told to the young generations in order to create a collective awareness.³⁷⁴ There is a dual sense of belonging in the Kazakh diaspora in Europe. First, because they are Kazakh, they see themselves as a natural extension of the Kazakh society in Kazakhstan. Therefore, they have very strong financial and moral ties with Kazakhstan. Second, they went to Europe from Turkey, because of their history and they are close in Turkey, formerly with the commonly used name "external Turks" see themselves as a part of the community. So also, with Turkey have very strict material and spiritual bond.³⁷⁵ The idea of gathering once a year in a different European city emerged as a result of getting together for soccer

³⁷³ Kuscı, *ibid*, 391.

³⁷⁴ Kayyum Kesici, "Türkiye Asya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi." <https://tasam.org/tr>. [07.05.2020]

³⁷⁵ *Ibid*.

tournaments. It should not be forgotten about the Kazakh Conventions, which they organize every year in a city of Europe and has become a tradition. Since 2009, European Kazakh Youth Conferences have been organized with the exclusive participation of young Kazakh diaspora members in Europe.³⁷⁶

There are two other associations in Istanbul, Kazakh Turks Education and Research Association (KATEAD) and The Khoja Ahmad Yassawi (*Hoca Ahmed Yesevi Vakfi*) Foundation. KATEAD was founded on 3rd of July, 2014 in Zeytinburnu with the aim of making Kazakhs residing in Turkey closer, preparing to meet and welfare facilities, the development of moral and intellectual life of their national culture, strengthen their national unity, strengthening their social structure, to ensure that enabled their civil society activities and organize joint work with people who are working on this issue and organizations, the development of cultural relations between Turkey and Kazakhstan, and showing the way to all their compatriots in education in Turkey.³⁷⁷ The association has been publishing their magazine called *Kazak Eli* since 2016. On the other hand, The Khoja Ahmad Yassawi was founded in 1991. The foundation's original goal was to give a two-year long religious education to high school graduates from the former Communist regions primarily from Kazakhstan, but also from places such as Mongolia, Albania, and Dagestan. After two years abroad, these students either returned to their native homes or were encouraged to continue their university education in Turkey. Eventually, all of these students were expected to return and serve their homeland; in this way the foundation aimed to help close the gap in Islamic knowledge within the former Communist regions.³⁷⁸

With globalization and development of internet and social media, people keep their consciousness of identity alive through the internet, and in this way, they gain power from the virtual environment. According to Garcia, "with larger and more diverse groups of human beings roaming the planet far from their traditional homelands, many are turning to online connections."³⁷⁹ Online platforms are

³⁷⁶ Kuscu, *ibid*, 391.

³⁷⁷ KATEAD, <http://www.katead.org.tr/> [05.07.2020]

³⁷⁸ Kuscu, *ibid*, 391.

³⁷⁹ Raphael Tsavkko Garcia, "The New Internet Diaspora" <https://www.overtureglobal.io/story/the-new-internet-diaspora> [22.06.2020]

significant places for ethnic community members to communicate, organize or reproduce their ethnic identity ties, emotion, and myths and symbols.³⁸⁰

Community members can be active both in their homelands and host countries without geographic barriers. They can also accelerate the processes of building and reproducing identity more actively and vividly compared to the past. New social media groups and associations have been established on several social media platforms such as Facebook, and it is aimed to get Kazakhs closer to each other and thus preserve their identities even more. I have observed that especially the second-generation Kazakhs use the Kazakh language when sharing Kazakh songs, TV programs, and news on their accounts.

Nuriye: There is no age to use the internet. Even our grandparents are using Facebook nowadays. My grandmother's uncle is over 80 years old and he also has a Facebook account. All my older relatives have Facebook accounts and generally share things such as Kazakh proverbs, Kazakh songs, etc. (3rd Generation)

In addition, it is observed that people on social media not only keep in touch with Altai Kazakhs all over the world but also people in Kazakhstan. The development of internet and technology enabled the Kazakhs in Turkey to contact with people in Kazakhstan. Many TV programs and interviews have been done about Kazakhs in Turkey and this led the Kazakh community in Turkey to be well-known by people in Kazakhstan. Thus, the presence of Kazakhs in Turkey has reached many audiences there. Events, festivities, celebrations etc. are transferred to individuals through this page and forums. With the flow of information in these channels, new formulations of citizenship and sovereignty and the ways the nation is imagined as community is created. Additionally, they still preserve their strong interest in maintaining emotional link to Kazakhstan even after more than 60 years of their immigration.

4.6. Summary

In the beginning of this chapter, methodology of the study and information about the interviewees were presented. The main target of the chapter was to research how the interviewees define themselves, and to understand what constitutes their identity. Almost all the interviewees highlighted three elements which build their identity: Being Kazakh, Turkishness and Islam. Their identity changes as the context and

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

surroundings change. Furthermore, it was observed that they have combined both Turkishness and Kazakhness and created a hybrid identity for themselves. As a result of that, almost all of the interviewees answered that they define themselves Kazakh-Turk when they are asked where they are from. Interviewees from the second or third generation expressed that they feel the need of expressing their Kazakh identity and that their ancestors are migrant. Otherwise, they feel uncomfortable. So, they have a chance of moving between their Kazakh and Turkish identity. On the other hand, some of the interviewees responded the question from a nationalist perspective and stated that it would be wrong to identify themselves Kazakh-Turk since Turkic World is a whole. Therefore, it can be observed that their identity is fluid, not stable, and can change based on the context. When interviewees talked about their national identity, they highlighted their Turkish identity and when they were talking about their ethnic identity, they emphasized their Kazakh identity more.

In this second part of the chapter, Kazakhs' return to Kazakhstan was discussed. As it was argued in the third and fourth chapter, dissolution of Soviet Russia and Kazakhstan's declaration of independence have given a new perspective to Kazakhs to identify themselves as well as their homeland. Eastern Turkestan was seen as Kazakhs' homeland. However, after the independence of Kazakhstan, it was perceived as Kazakhs' homeland, and East Turkestan was forgotten.³⁸¹ It was also observed that, elder people still remember East Turkestan and highlight the importance of it for Kazakhs. However, young generation does not emphasize East Turkestan as their homeland or fatherland. Turkey, being the first country which recognized Kazakhstan's independence, started to recognize Kazakhs in Turkey more. In this regard, interviewees were asked where they see as their homeland. According to the answers, it is observed that they make a distinction between the terms fatherland and homeland. Most of the interviewees emphasized that their fatherland (*memleket*) is Central Asia but their homeland (*anavatan*) is Turkey. On the other hand, some of the interviewees stated that the place where the Turks are is their homeland, and Turkic world is a whole.

Furthermore, after Kazakhstan declared its independence, efforts to return Kazakhs back from the diaspora to the home country gained momentum. A quota system was established for Oralman status and many Kazakhs returned to

³⁸¹ Kuscu, *ibid*, 392.

Kazakhstan. However, most of the Kazakhs moved back to Turkey due to language, economic, and social adaptation problems. In this regard, the interviewees were asked whether they would like to return to places where they or their ancestors migrated from. Most of the interviewees gave a negative answer. They stated that they would like to visit Kazakhstan as a tourist but they would not prefer to move there permanently. It is because they have a life in Turkey. Some of the interviewees emphasized that Kazakhs of Kazakhstan and Kazakhs of Turkey are different from each other even though they both are coming from the same race. It is an important example which shows that identity is fluid and change according to the context and surrounding as Bauman states. It also shows that Kazakhs in Turkey are hybrid. They have combined both Kazakh and Turkish cultures and created themselves a Third Space where they can embrace both of the cultures and identities rather than choosing one over another. It also provides them to move between the identities at any time and at any level.

Also, in this study, it was tried to understand whether Kazakhs in Turkey saw themselves as diasporas or not. There were various answers on this topic. In one hand, some of the interviewees stated that they see themselves as a part of diaspora. One of the interviewees said that they are diaspora living in Turkey but not Kazakhstan's diaspora. They should be seen as East Turkestan's diaspora living in Turkey. On the other hand, some of the interviewees stated that they are seen as diaspora because of the politics of Kazakhstan. Otherwise, they cannot see themselves as diaspora. However, some of the interviewees approached diaspora as something negative. Also, they claimed that one should be discriminated in order to be seen as diaspora. They were welcomed just because they are from Central Asia, so they are real Turks and cannot be seen as diaspora.

Speaking of discrimination, some of the interviewees claimed that they and their ancestors were discriminated in Turkey because of their appearances and ethnic background. However, they do not want to talk about it. According to Berry, immigrants do not want to talk about politics because they do not want to be marginalized which means they go through acculturation process voluntarily.

Finally, in the last part of the chapter, Kazakhs' activities before and after the independence of Kazakhstan were examined. They described themselves as East Turkestani when they first came to Turkey from East Turkestan. All the

organizations and activities they established during this period were held together with the Uyghurs under the name East Turkistan. However, with the declaration of independence of Kazakhstan and the convenience brought by globalization, both the perception of the homeland and the way they define themselves have changed. The next activities they carried out were about preserving their own identities. Additionally, they started to define themselves as Kazakh-Turks and built a hybrid identity for themselves.

5. CONCLUSION

This study is based on Kazakhs who had to leave their land traumatically and managed to arrive in Turkey in 1950s passing through Gansu, Tibet, Kashmir, India and Pakistan. The main purpose of the research is to explore how the Kazakhs define themselves in the light of identity, immigration, and homeland concepts. The main questions were:

- What caused Kazakhs to leave their homeland?
- How do Kazakhs in Turkey define their identity? What constitutes their identity?
- What is the perception of Kazakh community in Turkey about the term diaspora?
- Do they have any effort to preserve their identity and culture?
- Where do they see their homeland as? Has their perception of homeland changed?
- What is their perception of return movement?
- Have globalization and acceleration in technology affected their activities and identity in Turkey?

Hence, in this study, it was questioned how their identities are formed and transformed and whether they adhered to one identity or multiple. As a consequence, when the interviewees were asked to identify themselves, they identified themselves with racial, ethnic and religious terms. Except two interviewees, all of them defined themselves Kazakh-Turk. Although the interviewees implied that there is not a huge difference between being a Turk and being a Kazakh, they tend to emphasize their Turkish sides when they talk about their national identity and when they talk about their ethnic identity, they show their Kazakh sides more. Therefore, their identities are not composed of just one but multiple allegiances. All the participants answered that their identities are composed of being Kazakh, being Turk, and being Muslim, and each of them has added something to their identity. As a result of having multiple identities, they have the opportunity of belonging to both Kazakh and Turkish society. Additionally, they sometimes feel more Kazakh or more Turkish as their surrounding and social and political environment change. However, they do not give up on any of them. Instead, they try to combine both of them and live in the

Third Space. Being in the Third Space shows that they do not have one stable identity but fluid identity which provides them to be a part of both Kazakh and Turkish culture at the same time. In other words, it provides them to move beyond the boundaries. In addition, when the participants were asked to identify themselves, they emphasized that they were all Muslims. This showed us that identity does not only consist of ethnicity and nationality but religion as well. As Maalouf states, identities are composed of many allegiances, therefore they are multiple.³⁸²

Furthermore, it was observed that the Kazakhs in Turkey try to comply with the requirements of the social and political context. For instance, until 1991, they used to define themselves as Eastern Turkistani and their homeland as East Turkestan; however, after Kazakhstan declared its independence, the Kazakhs in Turkey started to reformulate their identities with Kazakhstan as the new homeland. As the political context change, their identities change too. Since they were recognized more after the independence of Kazakhstan, they began to and emphasize their Kazakh identity more. Besides, they started to claim themselves “Real Turks” since they were from the Central Asia. On the other hand, their identities have gained another definition: they have started to be seen as diaspora of Kazakhstan. As it can be seen, an individual can have different and multiple identities. The Kazakhs in Turkey have been defined with many adjectives; refugees, immigrants, Eastern Turkistani, Kazakhs, Kazakh-Turk, real Turks, diaspora members, etc. They have combined and blended all the cultures that they have encountered. They have combined and blended Kazakh, Turkish and Pakistani/Indian traditions, customs and cultures which shows the flexible nature of the identity. Identities are fluid, always in flux and cumulative.

As they are referred a diaspora of Kazakhstan after the declaration of independence, the interviewees were asked what they thought of the term diaspora and whether they saw themselves as diaspora members. It was observed that some of the interviewees did not know the meaning of diaspora; while others accepted being a diaspora. However, the term was perceived as a negative word by some of them because the very first criterion of being a diaspora is discrimination. Therefore, some interviewees stated that if one is not marginalized or discriminated by the host country, he/she cannot be called a member of diaspora. Another noticeable thing

³⁸² Maalouf, *ibid*, 23.

during the interviews was the unwillingness and avoidance of some of the interviewees to talk about political issues.

After Kazakhstan declared its independence in 1991, its first aim was to gather all the Kazakhs under the same flag in order to change the demography of the new country. Therefore, they developed various quota systems to ask Kazakh diaspora members to return their homeland. However, due to some certain social and economic problems, Kazakhs who returned Kazakhstan came back to Turkey again. To that extend, interviewees were asked whether they have any intention to return to Kazakhstan. Except one interviewee, almost all the interviewees stated that they would like to visit Kazakhstan as a tourist. However, they do not want to go there permanently. They also added that even though they do not wish to move there permanently, it makes them happy that Kazakhstan has gained independence, they have freedom, and their homeland is independent. Some of the participants stated that there are big differences between the Kazakhs in Kazakhstan and the Kazakhs in Turkey. They also stated that they have changed and become much closer to Soviet Russia. However, Kazakhs in Turkey are still protecting their Kazakh identity and they are much closer to Turks. In this regard, the interviewees were asked whether Kazakhs in Turkey try to protect their ethnic culture, and it was found out that even the younger generation can speak Kazakh and they think about how they can transfer their culture to the next generation. They also stated that it is a great wealth to have more than one culture and language, and they should protect it.

Their hybrid identity protected themselves not to be assimilated or discriminated. Instead it helped them to preserve their own culture and language. Both the Kazakhs and Turks have gone through mutual acculturation and embraced their differences. The acculturation process they entered voluntarily enabled them to integrate into Turkish society. However, they did not do it by giving up on their own identity but by uniting both Kazakh and Turkish identity in the Third Space.

Furthermore, in this study, it was sought whether the homeland perception of Kazakhs have changed. The interviewees made a distinction between homeland and fatherland. It was found out that all but a few stated that they saw Kazakhstan as their fatherland (*atayurt/memleket*) and Turkey as their motherland (*anavatan*). Except a few interviewees, East Turkestan was not mentioned, especially by the young generation. Among the elder generations, East Turkestan is still important and means

a lot for them. The following sentence in Kuscü's article actually summarizes the Kazakhs' perception of homeland: "Eastern Turkestan is the land of the ancestors, Kazakhstan is the historical homeland, and Turkey is the motherland..."³⁸³ During the interviews, it was observed that, the interviewees feel belong to Turkey but they cannot forget Kazakhstan. It continues to live in their memories. So, they live both here and there, and it gives them a feeling of being in-between.

Lastly, in this thesis, it was aimed at exploring the activities of the Kazakhs in Turkey after the dissolution of Soviet Russia, declaration of independence of Kazakhstan in 1991 and globalization. Activities of Kazakh in Turkey should be examined as before and after the independence of Kazakhstan in order to understand the transformation of their identity in Turkey. In their early years in Turkey, they used to define themselves East Turkistani. Once they had started to adapt to life in Turkey, they started to involve in many activities and founded organizations. One of the reasons why the Kazakhs did not bring their Kazakh identity to the fore was due to the cold war period. In this period, revealing separate nationalist identities by migrant groups was not welcomed by host countries due to the political concerns. Hence, it was easier for them to introduce themselves under East Turkistan and associating themselves with the dominant discourse, Pan-Turkism. Realizing that the Turks did not recognize them, they wrote many books in order to introduce themselves to the host country. In these books, it is frequently emphasized that they are a part of Turkic family, and East Turkistan is homeland for all the Turks in the world. This situation changed the refugee identity of Kazakhs and made them to be seen as a part of the Turkish world. Especially after Kazakhstan declared its independence in 1991, the Kazakhs claimed their national identity and their perception of the homeland changed. The Kazakhs, who were happy for the independence of Kazakhstan and considered it as their homeland, changed their status and started to be seen as Kazakhstan's diaspora living in Turkey. In this period, with the help of globalization and technological developments, a bridge was established between the two countries. In addition, during this period, they opened foundations where they could use the Kazakh name instead of Eastern Turkistani. Thanks to social media and the internet, they were able to stay in touch with all Kazakhs around the world and organized many events, congresses, and tournaments.

³⁸³ Kuscü, *ibid*, 392.

This situation has enabled them to preserve their hybrid identity and maintain their commitments for both Kazakhstan and Turkey.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I: Eastern Turkistani Qazaq Refugees Association



APPENDIX II: Acceptance Letter of the Kazakhs to the Republic of Turkey

T. C.
BASBAKANLIK
MUAMELAT UMUM MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
Kararlar Müdürlüğü
Karar sayısı
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KARAR

Doğu Türkistan'dan Hindistan'a iltica eden (350) Türk ile ayrıca Hindistan, Pakistan ve Suudi Arabistan'a sığınmış olan beş bin Türk'den (1500) kişi olmak üzere ceman (1850) Türkün iskânîli göçmen olarak yurdumuza kabulleri; Devlet Bakanlığının 10/3/-1952 tarihli ve 3232-C-3035/12765 sayılı yazısı üzerine; Bakanlar Kurulunca 13 / 3 /1952 tarihinde kararlaştırılmıştır.

CUMHURBAŞKANI
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Başbakan
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Devlet Bakanı
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Devlet Bakanı

Adalet Bakanı
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Millî Savunma Bakanı
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ve Dev. B. V.
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APPENDIX III: The newspaper report about Kazakhs' arrival in Turkey in 1952

02.08.1952, Milliyet, Sayfa 3

Çin Türkistanından 103 kişilik bir kafilé geliyor

Srinagar, 1 (AP) — Batı Tibeti aşınmış sultanlığı Çin Türkistanı ve Moğolistan'da buraya varan 103 Müslüman aşiret men subunun üç grubu yakında Türkiye'ye hareket edecektir. Kıyafet kafilé ve aşiret reisleri Hünayn Tağı tarafından bildirilmiştir. Aşiret reisinin ifadesine göre, Türkiye 1850 Müslüman nüfusunu kabul muvafakat etmiştir.

28.10.1952, Milliyet, Sayfa 3

Türkiye'ye 103 kazak geliyor

London, 27 (Nafes) — Komünist rejim yollarından memleketlerini terk etmiş olan Müslüman kazaklardan 103 kişilik bir kafilé Türkiye'ye yola çıkarak Kırım'dan hareket etmişlerdir.

Bu kazaklar, Aşiret reisi Hünayn Tağı'nın rızasıyla hareket etmektedir.

Bu Müslüman kazaklar yollarından beri hareket yollarında diller, dinler, komünizm marifetleri, bunların yerlerine gideceklerini oradan hareket etmekte ve Çin Türkistanına Sinkiang'a geçerek yerleşmektedirler. Fakat 1949 komünist devri Sinkiang eyaletine de gelince bu Müslüman kazaklar komünist idareyi kabul etmekte ve yollarından hareket etmektedirler.

Bu Müslüman kazaklar din ve din ritüelleriyle Türklerden farkları olduklarından, Türk hükümeti tarafından Türkiye'ye yerleşmek üzere davet edilmişlerdir.

APPENDIX IV: Details of the Interviewees

Name	Age	Profession	Place of Birth	Tribal Association
Ahmet	85	Retired	BARKOL	Çıbaraygır
Fatma	85	Retired	KASHMIR	Cadık
Gül	26	Teacher	ISTANBUL	Cadık
Berkay	30	Academic Member	ISTANBUL	Bazarkul
Bahar	20	Student	ISTANBUL	Kıstavbay
Nedim	66	Retired	KASHMIR	Çakabay
Celal	57	Retired	KONYA	Bazarkul
Mert	27	Archaeologist	ISTANBUL	Molku
Halime	60	Academic Member	SALIHILI-MANISA	Çakabay
Bade	27	Employee	ISTANBUL	Bazarkul
Hatice	55	Housewife	SALIHILI-MANISA	Molku
Kadir	51	Retired	ISTANBUL	Cadık
Emel	62	Housewife	SALIHILI-MANISA	Cadık
Feyza	57	Housewife	NIGDE-AKSARAY	Molku
Kemal	59	Academic Member	ISTANBUL	Nayman
Nuriye	26	Teacher	ISTANBUL	Bazarkul

CV

Nur Banu Zafer was born in 1993 in Istanbul. After graduating from Fatih University Department of English Language and Literature in 2015, she started her master's degree in the department of Humanities and Social Sciences at Yıldız Technical University in 2017.