T.R.
YILDIZ TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
DEPARTMENT
MASTER OF ARTS PROGRAM

MASTER THESIS

THE UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS TOWARDS THE BOSNIAN WAR: A THEORETICAL EVALUATION OF IDEAS' INFLUENCE ON POLICY ADJUSTMENT

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ABSTRACT

THE UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS TOWARDS THE BOSNIAN WAR: A THEORETICAL EVALUATION OF IDEAS' INFLUENCE ON POLICY ADJUSTMENT

Dzenet Mujezinovic

May, 2016

The foreign policy decisions of the United States towards Bosnia during period of the Bosnian War from 1992 till 1995 had been altering and fluctuating from a policy of disengagement to a policy of hesitant engagement and, eventually, to a full-blown military intervention. The questions this thesis concerns are the reasons behind these policy inconsistencies: What were reasons behind initial U.S.' disengagement during George H. W. Bush's presidency, which factors influenced President Clinton's increased engagement efforts throughout 1994 and what propelled the United States to intervene in the summer of 1995? The central claim of this thesis is that American foreign policy decisions regarding the Bosnian War are best understood through a theoretical framework of neoclassical realist theory. This relatively new strand of realist theory carries a renewed interest in the role of domestic factors in defining the limits of traditional 'power politics'. The role of *ideas* has long been discussed among the scholars in the international politics, however the theories of International Relations have seemingly failed in their endeavor to apprehend their influence in the formation of foreign policy or the nature of the international system. With this aim in mind, this thesis introduces the role of ideas in foreign policy, as an intervening variable between state- the central apparatus of governmental institutions- and it's pursued foreign policies. In the absence of any tangible threats to the United States' power in the unipolar post-Cold War environment, its grand strategy formation was less affected by the imperatives of the international system and more by ideas at the domestic level advanced to conceptualize American foreign policy. These ideas were groped under the labels of *isolationism* and *internationalism*. The competition between these strategic ideas resulted in the United States pursuing a disorganized foreign policy that reflected on its foreign decision-making in the Bosnian War.

Keywords : The United States' Foreign Policy, The Bosnian War, Neoclassical Realist Theory, The Role of Ideas

ÖZ

AMERİKA BİRLEŞİK DEVLETLERİ'NİN BOSNA SAVAŞI İLE İLGİLİ DIŞ POLİTİKA KARARLARI: POLİTİKA DÜZENLEMELERİNİN ARDINDAKİ FİKİRLERİN TEORİK DEĞERLENDİRMESİ

Dzenet Mujezinovic

Mayis, 2016

Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin 1992 – 1995 tarihlerinde Bosna Savaşı sürecinde aldığı dış politika kararları değişiklik göstermiştir; başlangıçta aldığı kararlar soruna dahil olmamak üzerineyken, sonrasında tereddütlü bir askeri angajman politikasına dönüşmüş ve en sonunda tam teşekküllü askeri müdahale gerçekleşmiştir. Bu tez çalışmasının ilgilendiği şu sorular, ülkenin politika tutarsızlıklarının ardındaki sebeplerdir. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin George H.W. Bush Başkanlığında, savaşın gidişatına dâhil olmama politikasının ardındaki başlıca sebepler nelerdir? 1994 yılında Başkan Clinton'ın savaşa dâhil olma çabalarını hangi faktörler etkilemiştir? Son olarak, 1995 yazında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ni savaşa müdahale etmeye iten neden ne olmuştur? Bu tez çalışmasının ana iddiası; Amerika'nın Bosna Savaşı ile ilgili dış politika kararlarını, neoklasik realist kuram ile en iyi şekilde anlatmaktır. Diğerlerine nazaran realist teorinin bu yeni kolu; geleneksel 'güç politikası' sınırlarının tanımlanmasında, ülkenin iç politikasındaki faktörlerin rolüyle yenilenen bir çıkar anlayışını ortaya koyar. *Dış politikada fikirlerin rolü*, uluslararası politika alanındaki bilim adamları arasında uzun süredir tartışılmaktaydı. Fakat görünen o ki Uluslararası İlişkiler teorileri, dış politika oluşumundaki ve uluslararası sistemin doğasındaki etkisini yakalama ve anlama çabalarında başarısız olmuştur. Bu amacı akılda tutarak bu tez, fikirlerin/teorilerin dış politikadaki rolünü; yani devlet - özellikle kamu kurumları- ve dış politika kararları arasındaki değişen müdahale anlayışını ortaya koymaktadır. ABD'nin gücüne karşı, Soğuk Savaş sonrası tek kutuplu dönemde herhangi bir somut tehdidin yokluğunda, ABD'nin kapsamlı stratejisi, uluslararası sistemin dayattığı zorunluluklardan daha az etkilenirken, dış politikasını kavramsallaştırmaya yarayan ülke içi politikalar için geliştirilen fikirlerden daha çok etkilenmiştir. Bunlar tematik olarak; yeni izolasyoncu politika ve liberal enternasyonalizm çok taraflılık başlıkları altında gruplandırılır. Bu stratejik fikirler arasındaki rekabet, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin düzensiz bir dış politika izlemesiyle sonuçlanmıştır ve bu da Bosna Savaşı'nda dış politika konusunda aldığı kararlara yansımıştır.

Anahtar kelimeler :Birleşik Devletler'in Dış Politikası, Bosna Savaşı, Neo-klasik Realizm Teorisi, Fikirlerin Rolü

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CIA	: Central Intelligence Agency
CNN	: Cable News Network
EC	: European Community
HDZ	: Croat Democratic Union
JCS	: Joint Chiefs of Staff
JNA	: Yugoslav People's Army
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCR	: Neoclassical Realism
SDA	: Party of Democratic Action
SDS	: Serb Democratic Party
UN	: United Nations
UNSC	: United Nations Security Council
UNPROFOR	: United Nations Protection Force
U.S.	: United States
WMD	: Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. INTRODUCTION

Contrary to the expectations and hopes of many, the international system in the aftermath of the Cold War was far less peaceful and secure. One single conflict between 'the West' and 'the East' was now replaced by tensions dispersed across the world; civil wars and religious-ethno conflicts in Haiti, Afghanistan, sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans became the new reality of world politics. The Bosnian War, in its four long years of duration from 1992 to 1995, caused an outrage in the world with its violence and brutalities and it was among the first serious strategic challenges for the United States' post-Cold War leadership. The policies created by the United States' presidents and their respectable administrations were focused on the management of the Bosnian crises that Washington perceived as a consequence of an old tradition of ethnic hatred among various religious and ethnical groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The principal intention of this thesis is to scrutinize, from the perspective of neoclassical realist theory, the United States' policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the period of the Bosnian War. The foreign policy decisions that are under examination in the thesis were created and implemented by the United States' presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. The policies in respect to the Bosnian War summarize the key feature of the United States foreign policy ideas that guided the United States in its relationships with other countries throughout its relatively short history; the constant oscillation between its essential need to avoid commitment and entanglement outside of the sphere of its vital national interests and its desire to protect and ensure its great power status and project its values internationally.

Although the Bosnian War and the policies implemented by the United States and other foreign powers in their effort to stop the war were covered extensively in the world media, those policies were still rarely explored in a methodical and theoretical manner. Academic researchers of International Relations and of the Balkan region have indeed dedicated a considerable amount of interest to historical relations

between Yugoslavia and the United States, especially in the post-Cold War period. Most of these studies do also provide a concise portrayal of the United States' stance to the breakup of Yugoslavia and the successive wars in this region. However, very few endeavored to explore the reasons behind the inconsistent and unpredictable policies of U.S. during the Bosnian War from the perspective of International Relations theory. This is almost a logical oversight as the Bosnian War had no great significance to the United States and was sadly placed between the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War and the drama of the 9/11 attacks in 2001. In general, the post-Cold War era was a time when the interests of academics, politicians and the media were dispersed to the many issues and problems of a newfangled international system. Thus, this thesis attempts to explore different opportunities and elucidate on the reasons behind the foreign policy of the United States in the Bosnian War using a distinct theory of International Relations.

It should be clarified that this work directs its focus explicitly on the policies conducted in the last year of George H.W. Bush's presidency and during the first three years of Bill Clinton's presidency. The reasons behind this focus are various factors that influence the decision-making processes' of the presidents in office. For example, George H.W. Bush was a president with a great appetite for foreign policy affairs, but as it will later be presented, he refrained from any direct actions in Bosnia due to his desire to win Presidency for four more years in the White House. The tradition of extensive elections campaigns in the United States, the requirement for newly elected president, in this case Bill Clinton, to establish an acceptable domestic and foreign policy agenda and time-consuming changes of the previous administration's policies, which all tend to affect a current president's ability to act and manage certain issues in his preferred and desired manner. Alongside these constrains emanating from the domestic level, the ones operating on the international level were strong in their influence on the decision-making processes of both Bush and Clinton.

As mentioned above, a completely diverse range of strategic problems and challenges characterized the post-Cold War era. The once predominant aim of containing of the Soviet Union and its dangerous ideology of Communism was replaced by a broader specter of issues, shifting and dispersing the United States' focus from Europe to the Middle East, mainly the Persian Gulf, to the economically

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emerging Japan that was posing a serious threat to the economical dominance of U.S., to the broader, but growing international problem of nuclear proliferation, money laundry, the drug trade, environmental changes etc. The truth was that the United States had neither a prepared nor comprehensive foreign policy to prioritize or combat all of these problems, resulting in debate among its high-level political elite, media and academia over the appropriate role for the United States in this new, unipolar international system. The most dominant characteristic of the United States' foreign policymaking in the early 1990s was the attempt to find a replacement for George Kennan's all-encompassing doctrine of 'containment', a doctrine that could now guide U.S. foreign policy in a new world order. However, it is widely believed that the period between the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 9/11 attacks was a period of the 'lost years' for U.S.' foreign policy, and its grand strategy in a broader sense.

While struggling to define the United States' new global role, the international system was quickly changing its nature from a focus on military security in the bipolar world to a system rife with rising nationalist feelings and ethnic turmoil, many of them now unfolding in the heart of Europe. When these unrests turned violent and brutal with heavy civilian casualties, they provoked tensions between the United States and Europe over accountability and duties for arbitration and intervention. More so, the Balkan region became the symbol of tensions and debate within U.S. itself. The Balkans' and certainly Bosnia's strategic and geopolitical significance largely declined after the end of the Cold War and was of marginal interest to the United States. So, when it became obvious that the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1990s was beginning to take a violent turn, the United States' approach to managing this crisis largely corresponded to that visualization of the Balkans and, specifically, Bosnia as a region of peripheral interest.

Throughout the four years of Bosnia's brutal war the actions undertaken by the United States, NATO and UN were somewhat passive, hesitant and fluctuating. However, when the atrocities of the war were exposed and brought to the attention of the broader public by the world media, the United States and many European countries started to get accused and criticized for the negligence and indifference in resolving the conflict. This definably influenced the promotion of the Bosnian case on the agenda of both the United States and the United Nation. However, what made

the Bosnian case high on the list of priorities was the failure to bring peace to the region, despite more determine efforts of both UN and the United States. This fiasco by the world's now greatest power to end or at least prevent massive civilians killings began to seriously damage the United States' superior position in the international system. It was then that Bosnia started to be seen in terms of American power in the world.

The discontinuity in the foreign policy decisions applied in Bosnia are obvious and range from policies of complete disengagement that progressed into slight engagement during 1993/1994 and policy that had the United States military intervening in the summer of 1995 with the largest aerial bombing campaign in Europe since 1945. This incoherence logically raises questions such as what prompted these adjustments in the United States' foreign behavior and what factors could have influenced it? In order to answer this research question, this thesis will use a distinct strand of International Relations theory that integrates traditional approaches to studies of foreign policy, but also puts a emphasis on the role of the ideational factors in one nation's foreign policy decision-making processes.

1.1 Theoretical Context and Hypothesis

The starting argument of this thesis is that the United States' foreign policies in regards to the Bosnian War are best explained with the theory of neoclassical realism. Neoclassical realism is a relatively new extension of realist theories that provides a rationale for the inclusion of external and internal, systematic and domestic factors in outlining the limits of traditional power politics. Neoclassical realism uses the concepts of domestic politics to amplify the concept of power, the main feature of classical realist theories, acknowledging that independent variable on the domestic level are key elements in the self-help process natural and characteristic to the anarchical system. While neorealism argues that anarchy in international system provides a strong motivation for states to accumulate power, neoclassical realism agrees with this assumption, but upgrades it with the belief that power cannot be comprehended without taking into account what is happening inside of the state or what and how are their leaders' and people's opinions formed. Therefore, neoclassical realism argues that the distribution of power in the international system

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is a key independent variable in defining the range of a state's foreign policy (the dependent variable). This is conditioned by the interplay of 'intervening variables' within the state itself, which might be key features of its internal politics such as the ideas and perceptions of its leaders, system of government, relationship between the state and its citizens etc.

The neoclassical realisms' focus on the domestic level variables is highly beneficial for understanding a particular state's behavior. When examining why certain foreign policy components were designed and implemented, domestic elements need to be taken into account. Neoclassical realism is indeed a valuable strand of realist theory as it attempts to reconcile and incorporate both ideational and institutional variables into its analysis methods. This is the reason why this thesis utilizes a neoclassical realism based approach to explain the United States' foreign policy decision-making processes towards the Bosnian War, taking into account both the systematic and the institutional context of foreign policy and the unit-level factors.

The unit-level factors that operate within the state are various and numerous, so in order to narrow the scope, this thesis will focus on the role and influence of one particular unit-level factor on a state's foreign policy; the influence of intervening variable of foreign policy *ideas*. Fortunately, there is a wide selection of literature that has examined the factor of ideas, mainly the work of constructivist theory after the Cold War. When structural theories failed to predict the peaceful end of the Cold War standoff, international relations theories took the constructivist turn, allowing for the greater influence of the ideational, social factors in explaining a nation's foreign policy behaviors. This thesis relies on the work of Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane and their arguments of ideas as causal or normative beliefs held by individuals who provide 'road maps' that increase actors' clarity about goals or ends-means relationships influencing how particular strategic situations are perceived.

Within the United States, and especially throughout its history, there are many competing ideas about its appropriate foreign policy, however it is arguable that specific types of foreign policy ideas can be gathered into the 'idea complexes' or groups of similar, related ideas about district features of the state's foreign policy. For example, ideas that perceive international affairs as defined by the hard power are connected and interrelated to the ideas that presume military instruments are the optimal foreign policy means. Thus, even though there are many ideas within the

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United States that hold different visions of America's role in the world, this thesis argues that two specific 'idea complexes' have a determining and regulative impact on the United States' foreign policy behavior throughout its history and, specifically in regards to the Bosnian War. These two foreign policy idea complexes are interestingly completely opposite and contrasting; the first being *isolationism (unilateralism)* and the second one *liberal internationalism*. The idea complex grouped under the label of isolationism to a greater or lesser extent, advocate disengagement from the outside world, withdrawal from internationalism or formed alliances, a focus on domestic politics, especially the economy and recognizes the right to military engagement only in a case when its vital national interest are at the stake. The humanitarian or military intervention in a third country of no direct interest or risk to U.S.' is, therefore, of no responsibility to the United States. During the presidency of George H.W. Bush and the first years of Bill Clinton's, the subgroup of 1990s neo-isolationist known as *selective engagers* favored this approach for foreign policy role of the United States.

On the other hand, a strand of internationalist approach to the United States' foreign policy was *multilateral institutionalism* that essentially believed that U.S. as a world's only hyper power was responsible for the creation and establishment of a stable and peaceful international system able to combat diverse and emerging threats. For the sake of shaping this sort of international community, the United States must engage and involve itself into international institution building based on its valued principles of democratic peace, a free market economy and economic prosperity.

The competition of these two mutually exclusive and opposing ideas shaped the United States' foreign policy decision-making in the Bosnian War and allows for the construction of the thesis' main hypothesis.

1.2 General Hypotheses

The general hypotheses of this thesis are assumed as following:

H1: *Dichotomy of two guiding ideas of isolationism (unilateralism) and liberal internationalism in the United States' foreign policy are prevalent in political elites' debates over relationship the United States has with the world in the post-Cold War period.*

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H2: *Without comprehensive post-Cold War strategy for the United States role in the world, these two sets of ideas struggled for domination and implementation on the highest political level resulting in inconsistent, fluctuating and varying foreign policies decisions.*

H3: *The United States' foreign policy decisions range from disengagement, slight engagement and military intervention in relation to the Bosnian War in the period between 1992-1995 were a consequence of the interplay of these two strategic ideas held by the political elite and historically embedded in the American political system.*

This thesis holds that confusion within the political system of the United States reflected in constant and unpredictable shifts in Bosnian foreign policy: initially in disengagement, later in a move to engagement and finally into a full-blown military intervention. The perception of American President George H.W. Bush that Bosnia was not of any great interest for U.S. and recognizing public demands for U.S. withdrawal from international affairs, his administration had not been willing to commit its resources nor attention to solving crises and had eagerly given various European countries the 'green light' in managing the war in the heart of their continent. In the first years of his presidency President Clinton displayed a more engaged, committed actions and determination to solve the brutal conflict, yet never without caution and restraint. Under the watchful eye of the public and an opposed Congress, Clinton was under obligation to fulfill his presidential campaign promises to focus on the economy and not engage U.S. troops where U.S. interest were not being harmed. After the measures against aggressors increased and still failed to end the war or prevent civilian causalities, the United States' reputation of the most powerful state in the world was being damaged. Furthermore, it posed a serious challenge to the United States' role in its trans-Atlantic relationships. It was only then that U.S. decided to intervene and demonstrate its power.

1.3 Methodology and Sources of the Research Material

This thesis focuses its attention on one particular, indeed extensive regional foreign policy, and uses a theoretical context drawn from neoclassical realism, with a special focus on ideas as an intervening variable between foreign policy decision-making and its subsequent outcomes in the international system. Thus, the principal

methodology applied in this work is theoretical and historical, allowing for the evaluation of exact causal mechanisms in the process of creation, progress and implementation of the United States' foreign policy in a certain, single period of time. The causal mechanism corresponds to the neoclassical realist's model of intervening variables (foreign policy ideas) that influence the outcome of the dependent variables (states' foreign policy behavior). Ideas in the field of foreign policy are hard to analyze with quantitive methods as they are immaterial and thus necessity a qualitative research that includes analysis and a systematic interpretation of communication whether in written, numerical and/or oral records. The qualitative analysis explores the very context of communication as ideas commonly find their expression in communication through documents, numerical records and interviews. Thus, in its analysis, the thesis relies heavily on the public and government documents, memories, biographies and speeches written or made by political actors relevant to the case study.

Furthermore, the sources hereby used also include an extensive collection of academic books and articles on American foreign policy creation, America's relationship with the Balkans and Bosnia and literature that deals with the interethnic, interstate relations within the Balkan Peninsula itself. The material utilized additionally includes 300 de-classified official documents published by the CIA was of outmost significance for the chapters that deal with the United States', NATO's and the United Nation's Bosnia policies and, especially military intervention.

The memoires of high-ranking state officials were utilized in this thesis as well, all while keeping a balanced view due to official's tending to have inclinations to justify their actions or due to their downplaying of faults or mistakes in managing the crises. The memoires that recall the settings, actions, opinions and stances in regards to the Bosnian War include those of both Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, the U.S. Ambassador to United Nations Samantha Power, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Hoolbroke, General Colin Powell and the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright were of great assistance. The public diplomatic records, published compilations and articles from various journals attributed to the information subjectivity.

The materials used for the chapter that analyses the origins of the Bosnian War and provides an overview of the historic co-existence of the Bosnian people were certainly numerous and divergent in their vision of the topic of the Bosnian War. For the sake of writing a successful and objective dissertation on the topic of the Bosnian war an extensive research was conducted and includes a broad spectrum of sources and writers from both former Yugoslav countries and foreign writers. Neven Andjelic's *The End of Legacy* was of great contribution as it reflects on the interstate relationships in the history of Yugoslavia.

1.4 Outline of the Thesis

Chapter 2 begins by introducing the theoretical and methodological approach to the thesis. Neoclassical realist theory is explained and justified as the most appropriate theoretical approach for the analysis of the U.S.' foreign policy towards the Bosnian War. However, this interaction is considerably conditioned by the domestic factors (the intervening variable). This chapter puts emphasis on the foreign policy *ideas* as an intervening variable between the system structure and the foreign policy outcomes. Moreover, the first section of the first chapter is dedicated to justifying the selection of this particular theoretical framework, as well as the reasons for the rejection of possible alternative theories. Later parts of the first chapter attempt to establish a common intervening variable – the role of foreign policy ideas – which can describe how the structural pressures of power in the international system are translated into foreign policy outcomes by states.

In line with the theory of neoclassical realism's perspective, the third chapter studies the debate and evolution of American foreign policy and its grand strategy in the decade after the Cold War, taking in consideration ideas as an intervening variable at the domestic level between the system structure and the foreign policy outcomes. In taking this approach, the third chapter endeavors to determine if there were certain ideas, held by the political elite and/or the broader society within the United States, that in combination with the systematic pressures influenced U.S. foreign policy behaviors. The chapter argues that the ideological identity of the United States resulted in oscillation between ambitions to promote its liberal and universal values overseas and the desire to pursue international detachment in favor of safeguarding the pureness of American liberty.

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Chapter 4 begins with brief references to the relatively peaceful coexistence of the diverse ethnic groups in the Balkan Peninsula, challenging the most common Western interpretations of the Bosnian War. The debate over how the West conceptualizes and perceives the Bosnian War tends to take two shapes; either as a product of historically prevailing ethnic hatred and antagonisms or as a product of the power politics of Serbian leaders bent on appropriating the Bosnian territory to theirs. However, this chapter argues that the first conceptualization is fairly mistaken as various religious and ethnic groups residing in the Bosnian territory had enjoyed long periods of peace and religious tolerance that was only disrupted by foreign powers and factors. Although it is undeniable that conflicts had existed between Bosnian's three diverse nations and religions, the origin of those conflicts was strongly influenced by political and economical factors. The chapter argues that the difficult economic situation Yugoslavia found itself in the aftermath of Josip Broz Tito's death was a fertile ground for the rise of nationalism and ethnic animosities, allowing for the advent of the political figures and ideologies of Slobodan Milosevic.

The subsequent part of the fourth chapter focuses on the case study with the aim of investigating the principle factors that shaped U.S foreign policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina from obvious and strict detachment to deep involvement in the war.

The conclusive chapter 5 summarizes the empirical conclusions and evaluates the accuracy of the thesis' general hypotheses and the more detailed arguments developed in the progression of the thesis. Furthermore, the conclusion provides a general answer to the thesis' research questions.

2. THE THEORY OF NEOCLASSICAL REALISM

The second chapter reflects on the theoretical context of the thesis, elucidating on the originating points and creation of neoclassical realist theory by Gideon Rose in 1998. This chapter delivers the principle arguments and assumptions of the neoclassical realist theory, however it primarily puts emphasis on neoclassical realism's focus on the domestic factors as an influential force in one state's foreign policy behavior. Beside Rose, the work of other prominent neoclassical realist proponents will be discussed, such as work of Fareed Zakaria, William Wolford, Thomas Christensen and others. These scholars' contribution and significance for this thesis are based on their input in researching the influence of domestic factors as intervening variables between foreign policy decision-making and foreign policy outcomes. This chapter, thus, dedicates a considerable amount of focus on an examination of intervening variables, as it is imperative to understand the workings of intervening variables within a state and how they get to extract influence onto states' foreign policies.

The subsequent segments of this chapter allow for a selection of one particular intervening variable - *foreign policy ideas*. After defining what ideas are, in which this thesis relies on the extensive work done by Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, the chapter continues to examine the way and conditions under which ideas can affect foreign policy outputs. Utilizing existent literature, the objective of this chapter is to explore more closely the influence of particular ideas in international politics in the interest of creating an all-inclusive theoretical approach for the study of the United States' foreign policy in the Bosnian War.

The first chapter's investigation of ideas' influence in foreign policy decision-making will be beneficial for the fourth chapter's attempt to answer the thesis research question as to is why the United States demonstrated such inconsistent foreign policy towards the Bosnian War.

2.1 Various Approaches to Explain U.S. Foreign Policy

The two contending theoretical approaches for a thesis that studies an individual, although extensive regional foreign policy – the foreign policy of the United States regarding Bosnia in the period between 1992 to 1995- are labeled as *aussenpolitik* and *innenpolitik*.[1] These two International Relations theories are divided on the basis of their reflection on the level of analysis.[2] The advocates of aussenpolitik put emphasis on systematic-level factors, whereas proponents of innenpolitik advocate for the influence of domestic factors and unit-level explanations. However, neither "purely systematic theory, as one of neorealism, nor purely innenpolitik theory as liberalism or democratic peace theory", can justify or reason U.S.' foreign policy decisions in the Balkans in the 1990s.[3] In other words, theories of International Relations that predominantly or entirely put emphasis on systemic factors, such as structural realism, are unsuitable for this research. Systemic factors do have a great impact on the course of American foreign policy; however they are insufficient to explain its specific policy choices. On the other hand, theories that put emphasis on domestic factors while determining particular a nation's foreign policy behavior, such as the approaches of Foreign Policy Analysis would be a more fit choice. Nevertheless, the systemic aspect should not be disregarded in an examination of U.S.' foreign policies during the Bosnian War.

The United States' engagement in the Balkans during early 1990s' was one of the exogenous great powers in the sub-region with its own political dynamics. Put differently, American involvement in the Balkans has simultaneously operated at both a global and regional level. That is why the study based on Foreign Policy Analysis approaches would be unsuccessful in incorporating these aspects in their totality in a theoretically consistent manner as it would chiefly focus on the unit-level or the domestic political factors within the United States.[4] As Robert Putnam indicates, U.S.' policymakers have played 'a two-level game' in the Balkans, having to reconcile both domestic and international requests, which makes integration of the

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[1] Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy" *World Politics*, v. 51, n.1
[2] Ibid., 146.
[3] Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman, Jeffrey Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy*, 1st Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4.
[4] Alex Edwards, *A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of American Dual Containment Policy in the Persian Gulf: 1991-2001*, PhD Thesis, The London School of Economics, 2013, 30.

state-level factors compulsory.[5] That is way we are in need of utilizing a theoretical framework more responsive to national and sub-national factors. Hence, sub-systemic theories of Foreign Policy Analysis or innenpolitik theories, in general, with the predominant focus on the "unit-level' are probably a poor fit for the research of this thesis.

Another theoretical strand that seems to be more suitable and applicable to examine American foreign policy choices in the Bosnian War is Constructivism. Following constructivist thought, the integration of both regional and national factors in analysis of one state's foreign policy results in the acceptance of the function of norms and shared beliefs held by actors.[6] This is clearly correct in relation to the Balkan Peninsula, as the domestic security status of many Balkan regimes was intensely affected by the international links within the region and sub region.[7] A constructivist theoretical framework might be more suitable for the study of this thesis because it surpasses some of the problems of structural theories with its sensitivity to the distinctions and details of national and regional factors. Constructivist theory postulates that a state's foreign policy behavior is not always determined by material factors of power and interest, but rather it can be a consequence of the working of ideational factors such as shared norms, identities and values.[8] As stated before, domestic political factors are of immense significance to the analysis of American foreign policy. Admittedly, a constructivist approach does incorporate important ideational/perceptual factors, however with its attention on the co-constitution of systems and identities; it has little to say about specific policy cases like the American intervention in the Bosnian War.[9] Constructivism theory per se has less to say about how identities and ideas are operationalized within states.[10] This gives room for a constructivist analysis of the process of foreign policy making,

[5] Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games" *International Organization*, v. 42, n. 3 (1988): 427-460.
[6] Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground; Constructivism in the World Politics" *European Journal of International Relations*, v.3, n.3 (1997): 4.
[7] Edwards, *A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of American Dual Containment Policy in the Persian Gulf: 1991-2001*, 31.
[8] Tyler D. Purinton, "Intervention or Inaction? Bridging the Gap Between Realism and Constructivism by Examining American Decision-Making in Humanitarian Crises, UVM *Honors College Senior Theses*, Paper 18 (2014): 8.
[9] Edwards, *A Neoclassical Realist Analysis*, 31.
[10] Amelia Hadfield-Amkhan, "British Foreign Policy, National Identity, and Neoclassical Realism", in *A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of American Dual Containment Policy in the Persian Gulf: 1991-2001* ed. Alex Edwards, PhD Thesis, The London School of Economics, 2013, 32.

but offers no guidance as how this to be accomplished. Putt differently; constructivism is an approach, not a theory.[11] Arguably, this cannot be considered as an important argument in favor of constructivism, given the need of surveying the effects of the domestic institutions and political factors in the formation of one's foreign policy.[12]

Viewed through a constructivist lenses, the ideological underpinning regarding the Bosnian War was clear during George H. W. Bush presidency. His government successfully convinced an American public that the situation in Bosnia was a humanitarian 'nightmare' or a civil war, but not genocide.[13] The Bush administration deliberately avoided the use of the term "genocide" when labeling occurrences in Bosnia, as the use of the "genocide" term would imply U.S. moral responsibility to intervene. Without a doubt, language utilized by particular policymakers clarifies their perceptions and experience of different issues, however it is not sufficient to completely explain policy developments.[14] It is unquestionable that the perceptions and ideological beliefs are significant factors in the formation and implementation of policy, however they differ and often are conditioned by the structure of domestic political institutions and policymaking within states.[15] Thus, a study of the ideational factors alone is insufficient, unless it is supplemented by a study of how these factors are functioning.

The main objective of this chapter was to find an integrative theoretical framework between structural and unit-level theories. As the focus of this thesis is one state's foreign policy functioning on both national and international level, the required theoretical framework will be sensitive to both the dynamics of the international system and to the dynamics within the particular state. In other words, it has to be able to incorporate structural, ideational and institutional qualities in order to explain foreign policy, or even the grand strategy of one state. [16]

[11] Edwards, *A Neoclassical Realist Analysis*, 32.
[12] Ibid., 32.
[13] Anastasia Dolph, "Assessing the Efficacy of International Peacekeeping in Bosnia" *Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship*, v.1, n. 1 (2011):9.
[14] Edwards, *A Neoclassical Realist Analysis,* 32.
[15] Ibid., 33.
[16] Andrew Moravski, "Taking Preferences Seiously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics" *International Organizations*, v. 51, n. 4. (1997): 515.

As the shortcomings and strengths of some of the above-mentioned theoretical approaches have been revised, it can be argued that the theory of neoclassical realism is an important new approach to international relations[17] as it pursues to incorporate both the structures of the international and regional system, and the ideational and unit-level factors that affect foreign policy choices on the domestic and individual level.[18]

Consequently, this thesis will use a neoclassical realist theoretical framework, as it underlines the significance of the systemic level and insight of the Foreign Policy Analysis in the process of determining states' foreign policy decisions.[19] Furthermore, neoclassical realism recognizes the crucial importance of the domestic political factors such as perception of threat and power by statesman, state power defined as ability of leader to extract or mobilize resources for desired policies, the nature of a political institutional apparatus, the financial, political and military capacities, a societal structures and how they feature in the construction of one's foreign policy, while at the same time incorporating perceptual and ideological factors into its theoretical research.[20]

2.2 Assessing the Theory of Neoclassical Realism

To establish neoclassical realism as a distinct theoretical framework and in order to comprehend its main postulations, it is of great urgency to primarily examine NCR's relationships with classical realism and structural realism.[21] Following a discussion of neoclassical realism, a contrast with classical realism and neorealism will identify the continuities and differences between these three approaches. With this aim in mind, it is best to start with the mutual assumptions and similarities between these three theories. Neoclassical realisms' proponents Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman and Jeffrey Taliaferro postulate that the principle similarity of neoclassical realism with other contemporary realist theories is its 'state-*centricity*', advocating that rivalry for power and authority between states in an anarchical international system is the most

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[17] Lobell, Ripsman, Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy*, 1-75.
[18] Nicholas Kitchen, "Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation" *Review of International Studies*, v. 36, n. 1 (2010): 132.
[19] Ibid., 119.
[20] Ibid., 135.
[21] Lobell, Ripsman, Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy*, 5.

important characteristic that defines world politics.[22] Another three core features to realist theories are given in the quote below.

"First, human beings cannot survive as individuals, but rather as members of larger groups that command their loyalty and provide some measure of security from external enemies. Tribalism is an immutable fact of political and social life. Thus all variants of realism are inherently group-centric. Second, politics is a perpetual struggle among self-interested groups under conditions of general scarcity and uncertainty. The scarce commodities in question might be material capabilities, or they might be social resources, such as prestige and status. Groups face pervasive uncertainty about one another's present and future intentions. Third, power is a necessary requirement for any group to secure its goals, whether those goals are universal domination or simply self- preservation."[23]

Gideon Rose created the term 'neoclassical realism', in a 1998 World Politics review article. In Rose's observation, "neoclassical realism argues that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by the country's relative material power. Yet it contends that the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening unit-level variables such as decision-makers' perceptions and state structure.[24] The distribution of power is therefore the "independent variable" of neoclassical realism and it is the principal force behind states' foreign policy, the "dependent variable". Due to neoclassical realisms' reliance on the systematic-level factors in determining foreign policy choices, it has been viewed as a logical extension of neorealism[25], although these two theories very much differ. Nevertheless, in a neoclassical perspective, the systematic factors are indisputable as a distribution of power and a state's position in the international system set the wide borders of states' foreign policy choices. In general, an economically and militarily powerful state has a broader range of available actions and choices than those less powerful ones. Following the realists' security dilemma norm, other states will react to other states power accumulation differently, depending on their power capabilities.

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[22] Ibid., 5.
[23] Ibid., 14-15.
[24] Rose, *Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy*, 146.
[25] Brian Rathburn, "A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism" *Security Studies*, v. 17, n. 2 (2008): 294.

What profoundly separates neoclassical realism from neorealism is its taking into account the unit of the system and the effects they have on the concept of anarchy. As neorealism is a theory of international politics with the aim to explain the nature of the international system[26], neoclassical realism is a theory of foreign policy: it focuses on an individual state and its pursued policies in one particular moment. Accordingly, neoclassical realism uses a multi-level analysis, studying both the state unit and the system it is a part of.[27] Neoclassical realists' conceptions of the state are very distinguished; every state is under the influence of important causal factors that are not necessarily products of the international system the state is embedded in. This is why a state has a wide selection of options available to it, determined by systemic factors, however which specific options its leaders may choose and can be the product of these 'intervening variables' (domestic factors). Simply said, if two different states are against an identical systemic challenge, they can implement very different policies dependent on their different domestic features. However, it is important to note that states do not make foreign policy decisions, rather their leaders do. A state's foreign policy is usually formulated by a small group of senior leaders and officials, often referred to as the 'foreign policy executive branch'. Nonetheless, this executive branch consists of imperfect human beings who are not able to send clear signals to other leaders, so states "must grope their way forward in twilight, interpreting partial and problematic evidence according to subjective rules of thumb"[28] This is where neoclassical realism also diverges from neorealism, as there is a noticeable shift from structural forces towards human agency.[29] However, besides a leader's deliberate decisions to shape or reshape the distribution of power as a matter of a states' foreign policy, it is still its objective material power capabilities that ultimately shape the overall course of foreign policy.

As outlined above, neoclassical realism considerably differs from neorealism, however what makes it different from classical realism should be addressed too. Why is neoclassical realism called "neoclassical" and "Is there anything new in

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[26] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), 121.
[27] Edwards, *A Neoclassical Realist Analysis*, 36.
[28] Gideon, *Neoclassical Realism*, 152.
[29] Kitchen, *Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas*, 124.

neoclassical realism?"[30] Gideon Rose gives an answer to this question as he says that "unfortunately there is no simple, straightforward classical realism".[31] Put differently, classical realism is more of a philosophical tradition, a way of looking at the world, rather than a research program. This should not, in any case be seen as a shortcoming, but rather as different operational model from the one neoclassical realism deals with.[32] Neoclassical realism deals with the very simple model: a model made of differences between independent variables, intervening variables and dependent variables and their specific roles. The relation between the independent and dependent variables is fundamentally set, whilst the intervening variable seeks the most study, mostly through experimental case study. One of the distinct features of neoclassical realism that differs from classical realism is NCR's aspiration for "a greater methodological sophistication."[33] Most importantly, neoclassical realism initially shared the classical realism vision of a state-society relations, the competition for power and its emphasis on foreign policy outcomes rather than the international system. However, under the influence of Waltzian neorealism, it took on the perspective that the international system "structures and constrains the policy choices of the states."[34] Generally, "what makes neoclassical realism 'new' is its ongoing attempt to systematize the wide and varied insights of classical realists within parsimonious theory, or to put in in reverse, to identify the appropriate intervening variables that can imbue realism's structural variant with a greater explanatory richness."[35]

The close relationship between classical and neoclassical realism leads to the question as to why this thesis selected neoclassical realism rather than a theory rooted in classical realism as a theoretical framework for a study of U.S. foreign policy. The perceptions proposed by structural realism are certainly too valuable to disregard: it's useful in explaining certain dynamics in the Balkans sub-region and the nature of global power politics in the post-Cold War era. As mentioned above,

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[30] Ali Abdi Omar, "Is There Anything New in Neoclassical Realism", *E-International Relations Students*, February, 13, 2013, accessed February, 3, 2015 http://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/13/is-there-anything-new-in-neoclassical-realism/
[31] Rose Gideon, "Neoclassical Realism", in *A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of American Dual Containment Policy in the Persian Gulf: 1991-2001* ed. Alex Edwards, PhD Thesis, The London School of Economics, 2013, 37.
[32] Rathburn, *A Rose by Any Other Name,* 296.
[33] Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy*, 19.
[34] Ibid., 19.
[35] Kitchen, *Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas,* 118.

neorealist theory is simply not a completely adequate theory to explain why the U.S. pursued foreign policies of disengagement, engagement and intervention towards the Bosnian War. Neorealism does explain why it was possible for U.S. to do so, but what it does not explain are the reasons why this precise extensive policy was implemented. Neoclassical realism gives a deeper understanding of this issue as it is better established to explain the particular dynamics of the international system, as it allows us to integrate the systemic, the domestic, the material and the ideational, while remaining theoretically coherent and consistent.[36]

Overall, neoclassical realism bridges the need for a theoretical accuracy and access to the confusing aspects of realistic foreign policy choices. It recognizes that there are important structural factors that determined the choices of U.S. foreign policy decisions varying from disengagement, engagement and finally humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, but they also encourage additional examination into the specific factors in at play in American foreign policymaking, factors that were the most likely to be decisive in the adoption of the intervention specifically. Aside from explaining the motives for the intervention itself, insights from neoclassical realism can be utilized in explaining the impact of the domestic variables on the changes that occurred in American foreign policy during the Bosnian War. Strictly speaking, the intervening variables help to explain why did U.S. foreign policy shift from disengagement during President Bush's presidency to increased engagement in President Clinton's initial governance and ultimately a military intervention in the summer of 1995.

As stated above, this thesis primarily endeavors to determine a common intervening variable, the role of foreign policy ideas, in the hope that it will help to explain how the structural pressures of power in the international system are interpreted into foreign policy outcomes. The proceeding subchapter elucidates on the role and workings of intervening variables, as seen through the work of some of the most prominent of NCR's proponents. This segment is written in order to help the reader understand function, nature and influences of ideas in the foreign policy behaviors of states in the international system. The later parts focus mainly on the intervening variable chosen for the explanatory purposes of this thesis: the intervening variable of the strategic ideas.

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[36] Ibid., 118.

2.3 Theorizing Intervening Variables

The crucial feature of a neoclassical realism analysis is intervening variables as they outline a crucial segment of any foreign policy analysis. Theoretically, they fill the gap between theory and policy, and demonstrate how the dynamics of the international system are interpreted into foreign policy. Consequently, the largest part of this chapter is devoted to the theoretical explanation of the nature and functions of intervening variables itself. This examination is of a great significance, as it aids in the search for intervening variable behind U.S. intervention in the Bosnian War. A study of the most prominent neoclassical realism scholars' definition of numerous intervening variables in the course of their own research can be useful for the subject of this thesis, as it might also contribute in the identification of variable behind U.S.' intervention in Bosnia.[37] Hence, this section of the first chapter studies four theories of texts classified by Gideon Rose from his 1998 article.[38] The succeeding discussion shows that the earlier studies used a neoclassical realist theoretical framework while trying to illuminate foreign policies regarding political elites' perceptions, as well as the capability of a government to extract resources from a society in order to pursue its desired policy.

Fareed Zakaria's study of the adjustments in the foreign policy of the United States seems to be an optimal origin point for research on the intervening variables. In his work *From Wealth to Power* Zakaria seeks to understand why wealthy states almost routinely become great powers and how they get to extend their influence overseas.[39] By answering these questions, Zakaria believes he could find the explanation to the strongest reason for the instability in the international system that is an emergence of a new great power. Using the realist approach to the case study of the United States and its foreign policy progressions between 1865 and 1908, Zakaria attempts to understand why did U.S., which was by 1885 already the wealthiest nation in the system, remain strangely disengaged from the outside world and did not seek to increase its military, political nor diplomatic power. Following the classical realism theory of International Relations, Zakaria postulated the hypothesis that nations

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[37] Edwards, *A Neoclassical Realist Analysis*, 39.
[38] Gideon, *Neoclassical Realism*, 156.
[39] Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power; the Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (New York: Princeton University Press, 1998), 16.

extend their political interest abroad when their relative power increases.[40] Furthermore, Zakaria developed a state-centered realism in opposition to Waltz's defensive realism. Thus, "state-centered realism predicts that nations try to expand their political interests abroad when central decision-makers perceive a relative increase in state power."[41] Following this hypothesis, it is easy to observe the attempt of U.S.' presidents to increase U.S.' political influence abroad when they saw an increase in the nation's relative economic power, but were not able to do so due to domestic factors. Another theoretical importance of Zakaria's study is the acknowledgment of the influence of intervening variables or domestic political factors that is in Zakaria's case 'state power'.[42] Zakaria asserts that U.S'. Presidents and their administrations constantly had to restrain their plans to increase political or military power due to the weak central government that was not able to exploit the nation's wealth or economic power in order to pursue foreign policy objectives. "State power is the portion of national power the government can extract for its purposes and reflects the ease with which the central decision-makers can achieve their ends.[43] As Zakaria observes, "the United States was an unusual power- a strong nation with a weak state."[44] It will be only when the power shifts from states to the federal government and from the legislative to the executive branch, that Washington will be able to mobilize state resources for its foreign policy ends.[45]

Zakaria's arguments correspond with those of Thomas Risse-Kappen who also concludes that the United States is an example of a comparatively 'weak' state, one in which the foreign and security policymaking structure is decentralized, with the "federalist structure, the system of checks and balances between the Congress and administration, and the extensive network of interest group representation."[46] "The American state – those institutions that those institutions and roles that are relatively insulated from particularistic pressures and concerned with general goals (primarily the White House and the State Department and to a lesser extent the Treasury and

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[40] Ibid., 61-62.
[41] Ibid., 86.
[42] Ibid., 95.
[43] Ibid., 28.
[44] Ibid., 33.
[45] Ibid., 153.
[46] Harald Müller & Risse-Kappen, "From the Outside In and From the Inside Out: International Relations, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy", in *The Limits of State Autonomy; Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation* ed. David Skidmore and Valerie Hudson (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 51.

Defense Departments) –is weak in relation to it own society."[47] As the power and accountabilities of the American central government increased, as well as the authority of the Presidency over the Congress and the Senate, leaders with ambitious foreign policies such as Presidents McKinley or Theodore Roosevelt, were able to convert national industrial and financial resources into a military power, overseas possessions and international influence. An observed rise in the 'state power' by a leadership unit will consequence in an increase of that state's interests overseas and the implementation of consistent ambitious foreign policies.

Another scholar that introduced and exemplified the influence of intervening variables in international politics is William C. Wohlforth. His work *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War* evaluates the Soviet Union's perception and conception of power in respect to those of American's policymakers.[48] Wohlforth defends realism theories that were repetitively under critics due to their failure to predict the peaceful ending of the Cold War. Then, Wohlforth sustains realist hypothesis that "the change in state behavior as adaption to external constrains condition by changes in relative power."[49] However, what he notices is that realism lacks to detect and explain how and why it works in specific cases. That is why Wohlforth introduces a few key concepts for understanding the particularities of the Cold War, and its peaceful ending. The first one he addresses is *decision-makers' assessment of what power is.*[50] For any realist theory to explain the states' behavior it must take into account many factors that influence the assessment of capabilities as "power is composed out of material and non-material."[51] Thus, he attempted to find a credible definition of power that is valid for all empirical cases without taking into the account involved individuals' perceptions. Wohlforth claims that the definition of a balance of power is never strictly 'objective' which means it can never be fully understood if separated from the case it tried to explain. Realists tend to define power as capabilities (capabilities of force), however Wohlforth

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[47] Stephen Krasner, "Power, the State, and Sovereignty: Essays on International Relations", in *A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of American Dual Containment Policy in the Persian Gulf: 1991-2001* ed. Alex Edwards, PhD Thesis, The London School of Economics, 2013, 51.

[48] William C. Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perception During the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1993), 1.

[49] William Wohlforth, "Realism and The End of the Cold War" *International Security*, v.19, n.3 (1994/95): 96.

[50] Ibid., 97.

[51] Hans Morgenthau, "Politics Among Nations: Struggle for Power and Peace" in *Realism and The End of The Cold War*" ed. William C. Wohlforth, *International Security*, v.19, n.3 (1994/95): 97.

claims, "a relationship of power can never be known until after power has been exercised."[52] Under such definition, it is impossible to distinguish a given relationship of power from the outcome produced or influenced by that relationship, since the former will have to be inferred from the latter."[53]

Beside the distribution of power debate, Wohlforth sought to grasp reasons behind particular policies choices. He believed that a more detailed knowledge of how policymakers perceive their environment must be achieved, as policy directions can in turn be explained by the inherent uncertainties and inaccuracies in the act of perceiving and judging power, which are themselves rooted in human nature: "What "power is" is determined in part by how given material distributions are interpreted."[54] Wolhfort uses the *perception of power* as a chief variable in explaining the end of the Cold War. The Soviets perceived the weakening of the Soviet Union's military and economic power compared to its counterparts. As a result, the Soviets moved away from confrontation and revisionism based foreign policies towards a more "defensive realism" policy. "In the case of the Soviet Union and the Cold War's end, perceived relative decline was a necessary condition for the adoption of perestroika and "a new thinking". This decline was connected to the burdens imposed by the Soviet Union's international position."[55]

As an extension of Wohlforth's thought and to better understand the role of policymaker's perceptions in international politics the work of Randal Schweller is of utmost importance. In his book *Unanswered Threats: Political Constrains on the Balance of Power*[56] he introduces *policymaker's perceptions of threat*, arguing that in an uncertain world one state's response to a threat is greatly conditioned by the leader's perceptions of the nature of the threat itself. Schweller's discussion on the perception of threat revolved around the attempt to clarify the phenomenon of 'under balancing,' which he described as a situation when states fail "to recognize a clear and present danger or, more typically still, have responded in paltry and imprudent ways."[57] Schweller pursues to analyze how pressures and incentives created by the

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[52] Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance*, 4.
[53] Ibid., 4.
[54] Ibid., 303.
[55] Wohlforth, *Realism and the End of the Cold War*, 109.
[56] Randall Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power* (New York: Princeton University Press, 2006), 1.
[57] Ibid., 1.

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international system are construed into states' foreign policies and their policymakers. Similar to other academics of a neoclassical realist theory, Schweller seeks to do this by analyzing the nature of the state unit, precisely its decision-making process and actors. Schweller argues the foreign policy decision-making process is highly affected by what he calls a "state coherence", the capability of a state's policymakers to perform rationally and reliably.[58] 'Under balancing' is more probable when there is an unsatisfactory level of coherence to endorse foreign policies against external danger. Schweller grants, "states respond (or not) to threats and opportunities in ways determined by both internal and external considerations of policy elites, who must reach consensus within an often decentralized and competitive political process."[59] Elite cohesion, elite consensus, government/regime vulnerability and cohesion within society are four sources from which Schweller derives the 'state coherence' model. 'Elite cohesion' refers to the level of polarization or fracture of a state's leadership by internal divisions, whereas 'elite consensus' refers to a state leadership level of agreement that something represents a threat or opportunity, and what policy outcomes are the most appropriate. In Schweller's theory, elite consensus on the existence of a threat constitutes the "proximate causal variable" and without a strong consensus there will be no action.[60] 'Regime vulnerability' outlines to what extent must political leadership must consider domestic dangers while developing foreign policy - will a certain policy endanger the legitimacy or popularity of the regime to such an extent that it will lead to its collapse? Lastly, 'social cohesion' refers to "the relative strength of ties that bind individuals and groups to the core of a given society. Social cohesion does not mean political unanimity or the absence of deep political disagreements within society."[61] It actually refers to the level to which citizens view or feel a state is their rightful representative. The higher these values are the more coherent the state, and with a more coherent state, there is a higher probability for an appropriate response to the transitions in the international system. Thus, a vital influence on a definition of a state's foreign policy is its domestic political systems.

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[58] Randall Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power" *in A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of American Dual Containment Policy in the Persian Gulf: 1991-2001* ed. Alex Edwards, PhD Thesis, The London School of Economics, 2013, 43.
[59] Ibid., 5.
[60] Ibid., 5.
[61] Ibid., 51.

In this segment of presenting and theorizing the role of intervening variables in the international politics, the last one to study is one of *domestic political dynamics*. Thomas Christensen in his book *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization and Sino-American Conflict 1947-1958*[62] offers an extensive study of this intervening variable. As the title of the book suggests, Christensen analyses foreign policy decision making in the relationship between China and U.S. in the initial phases of the Cold War. The crucial arguments of Christensen's work is that the contemporary Sino-America relations were largely influenced by leaders need to consolidate numerous domestic political pressures, as well as to follow desired foreign policies and respond to changes in the international system.[63]

In those aspirations they might have opted for 'overbalancing'. As the first example of the above written claims, Thomas Christensen examines the Truman administration's approach towards the rising People's Republic of China (PRC). Christensen claims President Truman, along with his consultants and administrators wanted to pursue a pacifying approach towards Chairman Mao's regime, and recognize it as the official government of China once the Chinese mainland was secured. Yet, Christensen argues that Truman's foreign policy became a victim of the specific dynamics and logic of the American political system of that period. In order to verify and support its activist foreign policies and donation of the economic and military aid to Europe, Truman's administration used a discourse of national security and the threat of international Communism.[64] However, U.S. could hardly comply with the victory of communism over its wartime allies, Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT in China, while at the same time emphasize the need to contain the communist movement in the rest of the world without looking extremely hypocritical. Furthermore, Truman had to rely on Congress to get necessary sums for his foreign policy and defense programs. Legislators would approve that sort of financial support only if the U.S. took a more aggressive stand towards Communism in Asia. So, Truman continued to provide military aid to the KMT, and declined to recognize the PRC even though privately he believed it was in America's national interests to

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[62] Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict 1947-1958* (New York: Princeton University Press, 1996), 1.
[63] Christensen, "Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict 1947-1958 *in A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of American Dual Containment Policy in the Persian Gulf: 1991-2001* ed. Alex Edwards, PhD Thesis, The London School of Economics, 2013, 46.
[64] Edwards, *A Neoclassical Realist Analysis*, 46.

do so. Unfortunately for Sino-American relations, the relations got complicated with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. "Unfortunately for Sino-American relations, the potential for being accused of hypocrisy was great during an expensive mobilization drive backed by an ideological crusade. To avoid this crippling charge, the administration needed to demonstrate some degree of consistency between rhetoric and practice. Truman could not adopt a hands- off policy toward Taiwan, let alone a conciliatory policy toward Beijing, if he hoped to guarantee support for the Korean War and, more generally, to transform the fervor over Korea into broad popular support for larger security policy budgets."[65]

As for the Chinese government, Christensen claims that Mao felt endangered by the rising power of the Soviet Union in the 1950s, which he feared would marginalize China. He "manufactured" the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis in order to rationalize the profound changes of the 'Great Leap Forward.' In his analysis, it was necessary to increase China's material power capabilities. As China was still a largely rural society and lacked a sophisticated industrial and technological base, it required enormous economic sacrifices and social dislocation to achieve: "Almost every aspect of the Great Leap communization was unprecedented in Chinese history...The Great Leap Forward was nothing short of a social revolution. But it was more than a social oddity; it was an enormous physical and economic burden on the average Chinese citizen."[66] Mao's 1958 order to bomb and block Matsu and Quemoy, KMT-held islands off the coast of China, elevated tensions with both Taiwan and the U.S. As a motive behind this, Christensen contends, was a manufacture of a "siege mentality"[67] among the Chinese civic to enable the mass mobilizations of the 'Great Leap' and rationalize the sacrifices that the citizens of China were asked to make. In the same period, Mao was careful to avoid a further escalation of tensions and ultimately actual outbreak of war, as "Mao did not want war, just conflict Conflict short of war would guarantee popular consensus for his broad economic strategy without wasting the mobilized resources on actual war fighting."[68] From specific cases of the Truman presidency and China's regime, it can be seen that the political elite was not just prevented from its desired actions, but also pressured into acts it did

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[65] Christensen, *Useful Adversaries,* 137.
[66] Ibid., 213-214.
[67] Ibid., 9.
[68] Ibid., 219.

not desire. The characteristics of the American political system joined with the ideological preferences of its elite makes articular policies difficult to implement. Based on this conclusion and Christensen's claims, political systems and internal factors within states are major intervening variables that determine foreign policy, just in the same measure as policymakers' perceptions or a state' material capabilities.

2.4 Importance of Ideas in International Politics

With the beginning of the Cold War bipolarity, the dominant paradigms in International Relations were the rationalist theories that generally prioritize the structural and material factors in explaining states' behaviors and outcomes in international politics. This systematic level of states' behavior analysis stresses the influence of an anarchical international system in defining states' national interests and actions in terms of a relative distribution and balance of power. Another distinctive feature of these orthodox International Relations paradigms is their default disregard for the non-material, ideational factors such as culture, ideology, belief, identity etc. Moreover, ideational factors were considered insignificant and minor, "reduced to the domestic realm, where they remain irrelevant to the workings of the politics on the international level."[69] However, the failure of (all) major theories of International Relations to forecast the end of the Cold War, or even worse its peaceful ending, had revitalized an interest for ideational factors in international politics. Despite the few changes in the capabilities distribution, as supported by Waltz, there had been a rather "important change in ideas as the Soviet Union abandoned its threatening expansionary ideology."[70]

Even though it is possible to claim that recently it has been generally agreed upon that ideas do matter in the international politics, the importance of ideational factors has been systematically neglected due to International Relations theory's "concern with rigor and their dissatisfaction with the 'softness' of historical description, generalization, and explanation, most social scientist have turned away from the

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[69] Yew Meng Lai, *Nationalism and Power Politics in Japan's Relationship with China: A Neoclassical Interpretation*, PhD Thesis, University of Warwick, 2008, 34.
[70] John Mueller, "The Impact of Ideas on Grand Strategy", in *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*, ed. Richard Newton Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 53.

historical movement of ideas."[71] This might be the reason why the very concept of idea still inspires a heated debate among International Relations scholars: the main source of the debate being a lack of coherence on the subject of ideas.[72] Before anything else, no substantial definition of idea or ideational factor such as culture, norms, identity, ideology or values has yet been established.[73] Alas, the basic requirement for a clear definition is either ignored and the assumption of definitional transparency mistakenly made; or the term is confusingly equated and used interchangeably with variously, belief, ideology, theory, models etc.[74] All considering, it is not surprising that there is still no clarity about just what sort of approach an ideational approach is.[75] Furthermore, one of the most highly debated issues is the role of ideas in influencing foreign policy outcomes; there is still no solid answer to question when and where ideas come to matter, or how they come to matter in foreign policy outcomes.[76]

The beginning point of the debate on the concept of ideas is whether ideas should be considered as having a causal power independent of material factors.[77] Materialism, idealism and constructivism, and many theoretical approaches in between, all adopt different positions regarding this question. (See Figure 1.)

Materialism generally disregards the ideational factors as inappropriate to political science and prefers to explain products of international relations as simple behavioral responses to the forces of physics that act on material objects from the outside.[78] In their perspectives' ideas are only consequences or posterior rationalization of material factors.[79] Realism views ideas solely as instruments for prolonging the

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[71] Robert A. Dahl, "Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition", *in Systemic pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist* ed. Nicholas Kitchen, *Review of International Studies*, v. 36, n. 1 (2010): 28.
[72] Benjamin Kienzle, *Ideas, Interests and the Limits of the Collective Foreign Policy Output: The Case of the European Union Non-Proliferation Policy*, PhD Thesis, University Autonoma de Barcelona, 2009, 38.
[73] Daniel Beland and Robert Henry Cox, *Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3.
[74] Kitchen, *Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas*,127.
[75] Andrea Gofas and Colin Hay, *The Role of Ideas In Political Explanation: A Portait of Contemporary Debate* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 3.
[76] Beland and Cox, *Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research*, 25.
[77] Arif Celik, *The Role of Neoconservative Ideas in The Security Policies of the First George W. Bush Administration*, Master's Thesis, Bilkent University, 2005, 8.
[78] Adler, *Seizing the Middle Ground; Constructivism in the World Politics*, 4.
[79] Kienzle, *Ideas, interests and The Limits of The Collective Foreign Policy Output: The Case of The European Union Non-Proliferation Policy*, 43.

interests of the politicians.[80] However, in the recent period, some strands of (neo) liberalism and (neo) realism have showed a slight shift towards accepting a limited-

1 Idealism
Postmodernists; interpretivists; some discourse analysts

IDEAS ────────▶ OUTCOMES

2 Materialism
Marxists (historical materialists); rational choice theorists; realists and neo-realists

IDEAS ─ ─ ─▶ OUTCOMES

MATERIAL FACTORS (interests)

3 Constructivism
Constructivists; critical realists; some historical institionalists; some 'critical' discourse analysts

IDEAS

MATERIAL FACTORS

────▶ OUTCOMES

Figure 1. The role of ideational factors in political explanation

Colin Hay, *Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 206.

-explanatory power of ideas in International Relations. Although seemingly able to admit that outcomes in the political realm could be influenced by ideas policymakers carry about their surroundings, ideas still should not be attributed to any independent causal role as ideas are ultimately shaped by the material conditions, mainly by material interest.[81] The second theoretical strand debating the role of ideas is as an extreme opposition to a materialist's *a prior* rejection of ideas, an approach of

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[80] Ibid., 43.
[81] Celik, *"The Role of Neoconservative Ideas in The Security Policies of The First George W. Bush Administration"*, 11.

ideational determinism.[82] For idealists, the international politics are not merely influenced by ideas; rather they are constituted by language, ideas, beliefs and inter-subjective understandings.[83] The third strand is the one of the constructivist school of thought. The scholars of the constructivist tradition argue that the explanation and comprehension of international politics is not complete without taking into account ideas policymakers have on their surroundings and environment. Constructivism is generally perceived as a middle ground between material-idealism debates as it contends that the political outcomes are not a direct product of the policymakers' desires, motivations and cognitions, but are products of a complex interaction of material and ideational factors.[84] Thus, ideas are not independent factors in causal mechanisms, but rather "elements of constitutive practices and relations"[85]

It is certainly challenging to write on the role of ideas in one states' foreign policy as the field itself, and the discipline of International Relations largely, has been for long period, explained and understood within the framework of the materialist traditions. Due to the recent developments in the idea-based approaches, contemporary IR theories have been more accepting in the acknowledgment of the importance of ideational factors in foreign policymaking. The scientific writings of scholars coming from various theoretical approaches contributed to the study of the foreign policy, while also researching the importance of societal factors, such as public opinion, ethnic or special-interest groups, the media and multinational corporations.[86]

Max Weber is among first political theory scholars to present the idea as a variable in social theory, metaphorically maintaining that "world images" that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamics of interest."[87] Furthermore, the classical realist as Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr emphasized in specific aspects on the significance of ideas in their research, is aware that ideas and culture could have a great influence on

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[82] Karen Smith, *The conceptions of Global Political Transformation: A Critical Exploration of Ideational and Normative Approaches*, PhD Thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 2005, 7-8.

[83] Robert Jackson and George Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, 3rd Edition (Ofxord: Ofxord University Press, 2006), 165.

[84] Celik, *The Role of Neoconservative Ideas*, 12.

[85] Kienzle, *Ideas, interests and the limits of the Collective Foreign Policy Output*, 44.

[86] Celik, *The Role of Neoconservative Ideas,* 12.

[87] Max Weber, "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism", in *The Role of Neoconservative Ideas in The Security Policies of The First George W. Bush Administration*" ed. Arif Celik, Master's Thesis, Bilkent University, 2005, 8.

the strategic behavior of states. At the individual level, Morgenthau recognized ideas to be a source of change, since "when people see things in new light, they might do things in a new way."[88] Furthermore, he was worried by the effect of idealist liberal ideas on American foreign policy. Likewise, E.H. Carr recognized a noteworthy role of "morality" in international politics, claiming that "willingness not to insist on all the prerogatives of power, that morality finds its surest foothold in international politics."[89]

As mentioned above, the theory of ideas has had its only recent reemergence, with the bulk of literature that endeavored to depict how ideas get to influence foreign policy decision-making. For instance, the work of Peter M. Haas and Emanuel Adler on the epistemic communities that allows for world politics to be studied by accounting for the role of reason and ideas, and the work of Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane on the topic of ideas as independent variables that influence foreign policy are considered to have brought upon major developments for idea-based theoretical approaches. Many others, like Colin Hay in *Political Analysis* argued that ideas should be given a vital role in political analysis as "ideas provide the point of mediation between actors and their environment."[90] Colin Hay believes actors act a certain way due to their particular perceptions and opinions of their own political and social setting.

Other empirical writings that have searched for the role of ideas in foreign policymaking are by the likes of Thomas Risse (Risse-Kappen) who maintained that the harmony of ideas of "new thinkers" in transnational network and winning domestic coalitions ultimately influenced the change in Soviet foreign policy in the 1980s.[91] Another author that has contributed to the expansion of the importance of ideational factors in international politics is Colin Dueck in his work *Reluctant Crusaders* where he assesses patterns of change and continuity in American foreign policy strategy by taking into the account the role of power and culture in

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[88] Hans J. Morgenthau, "Science: Servant or Master?" in *Systemic pressures and domestic ideas: a Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation*, ed. Nicholas Kitchen, *Review of International Studies*, v. 36, no.1 (2010), 31.

[89] E. H. Carr, "Twenty Years of Crises" in *Ideas, interests and The Limits of The Collective Foreign Policy Output: The Case of the European Union Non-Proliferation Policy* ed. Benjamin Kienzle, PhD Thesis, University Autonoma de Barcelona, 2009, 41.

[90] Colin Hay, *Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 209-210.

[91] Pinar Ipek, "Ideas and Change in Foreign Policy of The Turkish İnternational Cooperation and Development Agency" *Foreign Policy Analysis*, v. 11, n. 2 (2015): 3.

international politics. Dueck suggests that America's unique history and beliefs, or strategic cultures in American foreign policymaking, were more important in enforcing continuity in America's foreign policy, in spite of the structural changes of international conditions and threat.[92] Furthermore, Andrew Flibbert's article from 2006 *Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War* maintains that ideas, although not the only factor deciding the course of United States' foreign policy, are still vital to explaining what seems to be a confusing administration decisions.[93] Flibbert claims that the U.S. decision to go to Iraq was influenced by the idea of a small group of "policy intellectuals", affecting the process of policymaking in terms of its purpose, threat perception, and appropriate instruments for dealing with the issue.[94]

2.5 Ideas as Independent Variable: Goldstein and Keohane's Assessment

In the attempt to establish ideational factors as operating independent variables, it is crucial to firstly put forward a definition of ideational factors. As mentioned previously, there is not yet a largely established definition of ideational factors, as the very concept includes various elements like culture, norms, beliefs, identity or ideology. Scholars working in the field of idea-based approaches often interpret these elements in dissimilar styles and, as Martha Finnemore asserts, '...one analysts' norm is another' institution and a third's scholars' identity...'[95] Probably the most helpful work done on the purpose of defining ideational factors and giving them status of independent variables is one written by Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane "Ideas and Foreign policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change". This book from 1993 delivers well-organized and substantial arguments, claiming that in order to have a successful theory of international politics, ideas must have their place in it, simply because rationalist arguments are not sufficient. In fact, they maintain that the empirical anomalies in foreign policy decisions and variations in political

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[92] Colin Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy* (New York: Princeton University Press, 2006), 1-8.

[93] Andrew Fillbert, "Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War", *Security Studies*, v.15, no. 2 (2006): 310-352.

[94] Ipck, *Ideas and Change in Foreign Policy of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency*, 3.

[95] Kienzle, *Ideas, interests and the limits of the Collective Foreign Policy Output: The Case of The European Union Non-Proliferation Policy*, 49.

outcomes can be explained accurately only if ideas are taken into the account.[96] However, at the same time, they do sustain that incorporating ideas into the theoretical framework do not, and should not, disregard the use of social sciences' empirical methodologies. Furthermore, Goldstein and Keohane's work shows disapproval for rationalist theories' approaches of foreign policy that gives priority to interest over ideas. Although, the authors do not try to demean the rationalist interpretation of political behavior, they do endeavor to find space for ideas and beliefs within the rationalist decision-making process.

On the question of what ideas are, Robert Keohane and Judith Goldstein claim that ideas are "beliefs held by individuals that affect foreign policy outcomes"[97] and on how ideas get to influence foreign policy, Goldstein and Keohane continue to argue that "...action taken by human beings depend on the substantive quality of available ideas, since such ideas help clarify principles and conceptions of causal relationship, and to coordinate individual behavior."[98] The importance of Goldstein and Keohane's work is that it also offers a useful categorization of three types of ideas: worldviews, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs.[99] The main differentiation between worldviews on one side and causal and principled beliefs on another is that worldviews are more stable and carry stronger influence on political life and state behavior than other two. According to Goldstein and Keohane, ideas "have their broadest impact on human action when they take form of worldviews."[100] Worldviews embrace the most fundamental forms of ideas and tend to undergo slow changes, which usually can take decades or even centauries.[101] Worldviews are ideas enrooted in the culture of the nation and entangled with identity, arousing deep emotions of loyalty and devotion.[102] Still, worldviews should not be considered equivalent to common culture. Culture is actually an extensive notion comprising of various other ideational factors such as norms, values, rules or identity or, as Katzenstein argues, culture is "a broad label that denotes collective models of nation

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[96] Mark Blyth, "Any More Bright Ideas: The Ideational Turn of Comparative Political Economy" *Comparative politics*, v. 29, n.2. (1997): 240.
[97] Judith Goldstein, Robert Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), 3.
[98] Ibid., 5.
[99] Ibid., 8.
[100] Ibid., 8.
[101] Ibid., 8.
[102] Ibid., 3.

state authority or identity, carried by custom or low."[103]

The causal and principled beliefs frequently reinforce each other and, especially in the empirical cases, the distinction between principled and causal beliefs is hard to establish. Principled beliefs or normative ideas comprised of identities, norms, values and principles serve as a medium of perceiving a certain situation in moral terms of right/wrong, just/unjust as they determine "what ought to be" On the contrary, causal beliefs determine "what is' and they help to advise how to accomplish desired objectives in an uncertain and complex world.[104] "If an actor does not know with certainty the consequences of their actions, it is the expected effects of actions that explain them. And under the conditions of uncertainty, expectation depends upon causal beliefs."[105]

Acknowledging the powerful influence of ideas onto the foreign policy outcomes does not provide us with the clear indicators of whose and what sort of ideas influence one state's 'foreign policy, and how and through which processes they get to do that. One of the most discussed issues among International Relations scholars is in fact the location of the ideas, its context, and its causal mechanisms.[106] In the following segment, the very question of discussion is whose and what ideas get to matter the most and the conditions under which ideas gain influence.

2.5.1 Ideas and Foreign Policymaking

Following Goldstein and Keohane's definition - ideas as 'beliefs held by individuals'[107] it is logical to claim that, at the individual level and in the context of international politics, ideas are beliefs held by powerful actors within the state. Likewise, Albert Yee's vision of ideas as 'mental events that entail thought'[108]

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[103] Peter J. Katzenstein, "The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics" in *Ideas, interests and the Limits of the Collective Foreign Policy Output: The Case of The European Union Non-Proliferation Policy* ed. Benjamin Kienzle, PhD Thesis, University Autonoma de Barcelona, 2009, 50.
[104] Kienzle, *Ideas, interests and the limits of the Collective Foreign Policy Output*, 51.
[105] Goldstein, Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change*, 13.
[106] Kienzle, *Ideas, interests and the limits of the Collective Foreign Policy Output*, 55.
[107] Goldstein, Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change*, 3.
[108] Yee S. Albert, "The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies" *International Organization*, v. 50, n.1. (1996): 69.

corresponds to the belief system theory's definition.[109] The scholars of a "belief system" approach support the understanding of ideas carried by individuals, represented in the figures of the chief policy-makers figures like presidents, prime ministers, ministers of foreign affairs, etc. Ole R. Holsti in *Making American Foreign Policy* goes on to say that the relationship between "belief system', perceptions and decision making is a vital one" as decision-maker acts upon his "image" of the situation rather than upon "objective" reality.[110] This is why foreign policy decisions are not only affected by the external security situation, but by ideas and preferences of particular foreign policy statesmen who, ultimately, perceive the external security situation and their material interest.

The belief system approach has gone a step further in locating the ideas beyond an individual level and finding them within larger groups. Idea-based approaches usually focus on political elite's ideas as most important and instrumental in defining foreign policy goals and priorities.[111] In *Transnational Liberalism and U.S. Primacy*, author John M. Owen examines over 200 case studies of violent regime promotion in the course of the last 500 years which lead him to the conclusion that a "state's strategic preferences- the foreign alignments desired by their government- are a function not only of their material power but also of ideology and relative influence of their elites."[112] As a continuation of this statement, David Skidmore similarly argues, "as composition of the ruling coalition changes, foreign policy goals will shift as well."[113] A theory of ideas has the capability to explain why states with similar internal structure might react in dissimilar ways to similar threats by referencing distinctive dominant ideas inside of the state. The state's reaction is comprehended through a prism of ideas responsible for both overreacting and underreacting, as well as for the pursuit of goals unrelated to the notion of threat.[114]

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[109] A belief system is described as "a coherent set of images, conceptions and values that give meaning to the individual's perception of a physical, social and perhaps spiritual world...and provide basis for fairly comprehensive guide for (political) action." David Kinsella, Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr, *World Politics: Menu for Choice* (Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013), 150.

[110] Ole R. Holsti, *Making American Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 2006), 23.

[111] Giorgi Gvalia, David Siroky, "Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign policy of Small States" *Security Studies*, v. 22, n. 98 (2013): 107.

[112] John M. Owen, "Transnational Liberalism and U.S. Primacy" *International Security*, v. 26, n. 3, (2001): 122-123.

[113] David Skidmore, "Introduction: Bringing Social Orders Back In" in *Contested Social Orders and International Politics* (Nashville: Vanderbilt Press, 1997): 6.

[114] Owen, *"Transnational Liberalism and U.S. Primacy"*, 117-52.

Thus, Andrew Moravski's quote is in order as he claims that no government rests on universal or unbiased political representation; every government represents some individuals and groups more fully than others."[115]

This thesis postulates that in the case of the United States of America, political elites are the most important and primarily involved in the creation of the foreign policy objectives and priorities. Political elites may be defined as 'persons who, by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal organizations and movements, are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially"[116] The Constitution of the United States empowers the federal government with the power to make foreign policy.[117] Within the U.S. federal government, the Constitution shares the foreign policy making power between the President of the United States and the Senate. This thesis does not intend to diminish the value of public opinion in the U.S., business lobbies, or the fact that the public's strong views on particular foreign policy issues tend to influence the President and the Congress, restricting and setting the bounds of acceptable foreign policy. Still, this thesis relies on John S. Duffield's belief that "elite attitudes are likely to have much more immediate bearing on state behavior than those of general public."[118] Thus, the analytical focus will be on the ideas of the U.S.' top levels of the foreign and security policy elite: the President and his Executive branch or the National Security Council, the Senate and the Congress.

After determining that the ideas of political elites are the ones' that matter, we continue to address the context of ideas, specifically the correlation between when and which ideas get to influence foreign policy. In this regard, the institutionalization of ideas at the elite level is especially important.[119] How much influence and power particular ideas will extract correlates with the level of ideas' embedment in the institutions of the state. According to Nicholas Kitchen, underlying both individuals and institutions, are the ideas contained in the broader cultural context as ideas that are embedded in social norms, patterns of discourse, and collective identities become accepted, 'instinctual parts of the social world and are experienced as part of a

[115] Moravski, *Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics*, 518.
[116] John Higley, *Elite Theory in Political Sociology* (Austin: University of Texas, 2008), 3.
[117] The Constitution of the United States of America, 1787, Article I, Section 10, availaible at http://constitutioncenter.org/media/files/constitution.pdf
[118] Higley, *Elite Theory in Political Sociology*, 3.
[119] Celik, *The Role of Neoconservative Ideas*, 20.

natural objective reality."[120] This is why ideas implanted within the institutions and individuals have the potential to explain, 'why some states act contrary to the structural imperatives of the international system.'[121]

Ideas tend to have a stronger influence on the foreign policy of the state when the state is in a situation of crisis, historical turmoil, or any other state of affairs that invites 'a questioning of the causal relationships between political strategies and their expected outcomes.'[122] Keohane and Goldstein contend "ideas serve the purpose of guiding behavior under conditions of uncertainty by stipulating causal patterns or providing *compelling* ethical or moral motivations for action."[123] The air of uncertainty after any critical national event tends to build domestic instability and can lead to policymakers feeling forced to disregard 'outmoded conventional political solutions', thus presenting new means of 'both understanding and handling their countries' "new" problems'.[124] Then, they look for fresh visions or new guidelines for the country's problem from other members of the group. These fresh ideas, if they succeed in the policy-making debates of the government, consequently precipitate different foreign and security policies, which then change the social organization of the state within which they are situated. The capability of ideas to constrain and force actors to perform in certain ways is designed by the grade to which actors are loyal to their ideas. In other words, the more devoted actors are to their ideas, the more constrained by - or enslaved to - their ideas are their actions.[125]

2.5.2 Causal Mechanisms of Ideas' Influence on Foreign Policy

After explaining whose and under which conditions ideas influence a nation's foreign policy the most, the focus now turns to the mechanisms of ideas' influence on foreign policy. Let us first define what foreign policy is. The policy itself is described as a deliberate course of action selected among available alternatives to achieve a certain outcome, which is often initiated in response to high-profile incidents. On the other hand, 'foreign' is usually used to define governments'

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[120] Kitchen, *Systemic pressures and Domestic Ideas,* 54.
[121] Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies" in *Systemic pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation* ed. Nicholas Kitchen, *Review of International Studies,* v. 36, n.1. (2010): 132.
[122] Celik, *The Role of Neoconservative Ideas,* 20.
[123] Goldstein, Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change,* 16.
[124] Celik, *The Role of Neoconservative Ideas,* 20.
[125] Ibid., 20.

strategies or actions for interacting with other states. Another important component of Goldstein and Keohane's work is their tripartite identification of *causal pathways* through which ideas can influence foreign policy.

The foreign policy decision-making process begins with the policymaker's basic interests. In order to achieve those interests, policymakers form preferences and, in terms of those, the optimal strategies to pursue them. However, policymakers choose those strategies based on their ideas of an environment. Figure 1. Provides a visual model of policy process influenced by ideas (beliefs).[126]

Figure 1. Ideas and Outcomes

William J. Long, Suzette R. Grillot, "Ideas, Beliefs and Nuclear Policies: The Cases of South Africa and Ukraine" *The Nonproliferation Review*, v.7, n.1 (2000): 27.

In their efforts to describe political outcomes, Goldstein and Keohane put forward "(their) argument that ideas influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide road maps that increase actors' clarity about goals or ends-means relationships, when they affect outcomes of strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium, and when they become embedded in political institutions."[127]

On the first pathway, ideas act as road maps[128] as individuals have to decide on their own preferences or to "understand the causal relationship between their goals and alternative political alternatives by which to reach their goals."[129] The first pathway is based on the hypothesis that policy preferences for particular political outcomes

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[126] William J. Long, Suzette R. Grillot, "Ideas, Beliefs and Nuclear Policies: The Cases of South Africa and Ukraine" *The Nonproliferation Review*, v.7, n.1 (2000): 27.
[127] Goldstein, Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change*, 3.
[128] Ibid., 11.
[129] Ibid., 11.

are acquired, not pre-calculated. An individual's perception of the external world, what is just or unjust, the main ethical values that serve as guidelines to our conducts in daily life are all conditioned by our worldviews or principled beliefs. So, in order to interpret the reasons that define particular policy preferences, it is crucial to recognize what varieties of ideas are available and how policymakers choose among various ideas. In this regard, ideas assist in creating aims and recognizing alternative strategies used to achieve those aims. On the first pathway, ideas gain influence "when actors believe in the causal link they identify or normative principle that they reflect."[130] In the realm of foreign policy, ideas define social reality and outline the approach in which foreign policymakers observe the security atmosphere, the pressure of threats, and the instruments that will be utilized in order to confront those threats. The influence of ideas is pretty clear in two of the following cases. Firstly, in the aftermath of the World War II, many Eastern European nations implemented the Soviet Union's model of economic development, mainly out of the fear of the Soviet Union's retribution. However, in the Chinese case, the power-based description is not suitable as China embraced the same model - not out of the fear of the Soviets, but because they believed in the Soviet ideas. Additionally, the degree of the European states' process of decolonization in the 1950s was not motivated by alterations in interest, but rather by their newly emerged ideas of self-determination.

On the second pathway, ideas have an organizing role between a certain amount of members and their influence is introduced as "helping or hindering joint efforts to attain more efficient outcomes"[131] Ideas can act as a source when there is shortage of information or clear strategy to select from. For instance, ideas or beliefs may extract their influence when it is time for one nation to choose an ally or trade partner over another. This function of an idea is best presented by the case of fabricating the European Community's internal market. Due to the conflicting interests of various nations and companies, the agreed argument was that a cooperative contract in Europe was not probable to develop without nations harmonizing upon a shared set of activities leading up to establishing market interactions in the European Community.

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[130] Ibid., 12.
[131] Ibid., 12.

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The third pathway perceives that the use of ideas over a longer period produce changes in the contemporary rules and standards, which create institutions. Once ideas became embedded in rules and norms, or institutionalized, they constrain public policy and the decision makers' liberty to consider all possible paths of action in order to attain their goals[132]. That is, "ideas embedded in institutions specify policy in the absence of innovation".[133] Once ideas have been adopted and institutionalized, its influence may be longer lasting that its functional efficacy.[134] Legal or military doctrines and political ideologies are types of institutionalized ideas that reflect this line of theorizing.[135]

In the case of both Germany and Japan, Peter K. Katzenstein maintains that these two nations' contemporary politics are predisposed by a complex variety of ideas, which have their origin in institutions from the far past.[136] For example, Germany's position on non-involvement in armed aggressions is an outcome of post-World War II alterations in social norms and the adoption of a new set of ideas on its relationship with the rest of the world. Likewise, because of Japan's political norms and beliefs, there is a Hobbesian view of international politics.[137] This is why Japanese policy makers reveal a unilateralist approach in international matters and admit to their economic and security vulnerabilities in the international system.

2.6 Conclusion

Neoclassical realism theory is a new and encouraging strand of traditional realist International Relations theory. It is encouraging in ways because it allows for integration of unit-level variables into the analysis - breaking with Waltz's structural realism that predominately insists on the competition for power and interest as motifs for a state's behavior. Although acknowledging the importance of power and interest, proponents of neoclassical realism take it a step further and recognize the role of the

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[132] Ibid., 12.

[133] Ibid., 13.

[134] Judith Goldstein, *Ideas, Interests and American Trade Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 256.

[135] Costel Calin, *Hawks versus Doves: The Influence of Political Ideology on the Foreign Policy Behavior of Democratic States* (Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2010), 38.

[136] Peter K. Katzenstein, "Coping with Terrorism: Norms and International Security in Germany and Japan" in *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 265-295.

[137] Calin, *Hawks versus Doves: The Influence of Political Ideology on the Foreign Policy Behavior of Democratic States*, 39.

'intervening variable' between influence and then how that can shape one state's foreign policy behavior. One of the most important intervening variables identified by neoclassical realist is the perception of threat and power by policymakers, state power in terms of policymakers ability to extract national resources, domestic political dynamics, relations between state and public etc.

The objective of this chapter was to elucidate on some principle arguments related to the role of the intervening variables of foreign policy ideas in international politics. By establishing the theoretical context for a more detailed analysis of the role of ideas the thesis task of analyzing U.S. foreign policy outputs in the Bosnian War is, thereby, much easier.

Following Goldstein and Keohane's theory of ideas, they have been described as collective beliefs of rational actors in an uncertain, complex surrounding where a threat is not clear or direct. In this sort of condition, ideas are of significant influence as they provide guidance or a 'road map' to policymakers.

Lastly, this chapter has dealt with the examination of the causal mechanisms and processes of idea influence in foreign policy-making where it has been concluded that ideas have causal, constitutive, and regulative influence.

With established theoretical context, it is now optimal to apply theory to the case of U.S. foreign policy in Bosnian War. However, the thesis primarily examines the background of U.S. foreign policy history and how ideas have influenced its relationship with the world.

3. THE HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF IDEAS' INFLUENCE ON THE UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY TRADITIONS

The third chapter examines the earliest debates over the United States' relationship with the rest of the world. The primary focus is on the foreign policy ideas in the short history of the United States. The review attempts to demonstrate the oscillation of the two strongest foreign policy ideas, ones that are so powerful they continue to influence the contemporary foreign policy decisions and behaviors of the United States. These two foreign policy ideas are labeled as *isolationism* or, as some argue, unilateralism and *liberal internationalism*. The United States' approach to world affairs constantly reflected the influence of these ideas held by political elites' and/or embedded in broader society. The initial segments of the chapter point to the specific periods in which one of these ideas had the dominant status.

Later segments of the chapter maintain that the starting point for the debate over the most suitable U.S. foreign policy or, in a broader sense, grand strategy in the post-Cold War system is a presumption that this system was unilateral with the United States as its leader. In the absence of any pressing threat, the competition between numerous foreign policy ideas within the nation resulted in the United States' pursuit of a foreign policy that selectively incorporated elements of two foreign policy ideas: neo-isolationism channeled thorough strategies proposed by selective engagers and internationalism, supported by multilateral institutionalism. Although each strategic idea intended to optimally manage the international system, diverse sources of competing ideas meant that in policy matters and, in particular, foreign policy the United States was inconsistent and unpredictable. As this thesis has for its objective to detect the reason behind U.S. foreign policy adjustments towards the Bosnian War, the inclination is to believe that there was a lack of vision with regards to the U.S. over its post-Cold War grand strategy ought to be held accountable.

With the hypothesis that the United States lacked an effective grand strategy for the post-Cold War period, this chapter does not ignore the fact that American

policymakers had indeed endeavored to articulate a grand new strategy for the United States. However, the conflicts in the early twenty-first century indicate that they had failed in their attempts. The final segments of the chapter focus on the atmosphere in the foreign policy making of both the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton administration. Many of those foreign policy decisions corresponded to the abiding traditions and historical narratives of the United States.

3.1 The First Century of the United States as a Promised Land[138]

Many historians are inclined to perceive American idealism as the crux of America's interaction with the world. Throughout U.S. history, "the set of ideas and shared values have determined the way Americans viewed themselves and others and how they dealt with other people and responded to and sought to shape the events abroad."[139] All the worth America brought upon the world has its origin in this essential idealism, but all the *evil* could be contributed to the pretentiousness and hypocrisy of American messianism, too.[140] Even before the War of Independence itself, Americans were united in the idea that *Liberty* was genuinely a gift of/from God[141], and he had bestowed that gift upon Americans as a nation more unique and superior than any other in the world. As Walter A. McDougall writes: "Americans were a chosen people delivered from bondage to a Promised Land, and you can't get more exceptional than that."[142] Thus, the American national ideology of Liberty implied two things; that America was unique and that America was exceptional.[143]

In the opinion of the Founding Fathers, clergy, and other leaders of the nation in that time, this uniqueness and, as French ambassador Jules Jusserand noticed, "blessing among nations"[144] is to be traced down to distinctive geographical, demographic, and political features of the United States. The vast continent of North America, fertile and rich, mild in its climate, and purposely isolated from the rest of the world by two

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[138] Title borrowed from Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1997).

[139] George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 2.

[140] McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776*, 16.

[141] Ibid., 16.

[142] Ibid., 18.

[143] Ibid., 18.

[144] Steven Walt, "Taming American Power: The Global Response to American Primacy" in *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776*, ed. George C. Herring (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 6.

great oceans was a testimony enough to perceive its thirteen colonies as "heralds of a *novus ordo seclorum*, of a new world order."[145] It is without a doubt that geography did endowed U.S. with many advantages other nations were short of; lack of any serious threat and minimal disturbance from overseas. What made America even more unique were its citizens. Immigrants from various European societies with different religious and cultural traditions rushed to settle down in the land of opportunities and equality as it was *only* in America where civil and religious values and rights could be realized and sustained. Thus, civil and religious liberties, 'the two greatest concernments that God hath in the world'[146] were the very basics of American '*exceptionalism*'.

It was Tom Paine's revolutionary pamphlet *Common Sense* that primarily invigorated Americans' "impassionate appeals for independence"[147] from the British Empire. Paine argued that if America, a paragon for the New World Order, should resist to England's 'intolerable, evil government'[148] it would serve as an example to the rest of the world, governed by the ruthless, despotic monarchies. Tom Paine famously wrote "We (Americans) have it in our power to begin the world over again."[149] Democracy, once exemplified in Ancient Greece, will have its return to the Western World in the epitome of America, or as Thomas Jefferson called it, 'the empire of liberty.'[150] Thus, the progression and growth of America rested on uniting the citizens in support of ideas stated in the Declaration of Independence: the protest against British rule as a demand for a different, less dictatorial system of government. More significantly, the Declaration of Independence was an edict of the shared idea that "All men are created equal", thus "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" is every citizen's natural right.[151]

From the very beginning of America's existence as a nation, through the Declaration of Independence, as well as other foundational documents like the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or the American Creed, all have depicted liberty and capitalism to be

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[145] Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 3.
[146] Thomas Paine, *Common Sense*, February 14, 1776 accessed December, 18, 2015, available at http://pinkmonkey.com/dl/library1/sense.pdf
[147] Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 11.
[148] Thomas Paine, *Common Sense*, 1776.
[149] Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 12.
[150] McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 18.
[151] The Unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen United States of America, July 1776, accessed January, 1st, 2016, available at http://www.constitution.org/us_doi.pdf

the establishing qualities of American ideology. The influences of both Hegel's and John Lock's philosophes are present; first in the sense that America should not be a nation that rules over its citizens (the European type of government), but rather there should be a government, created by and for its civil society. In such a way, the Constitution is the social contract between the people and their government.[152] Civil and religious liberties are, as both a necessity and an individual right of the freemen, crucial assumptions in the thinking of John Lock. Moreover, Locke acknowledges that individual rights to liberty are based on "the property in his own person."[153] Consequently, individuals are free and consequently create government by a consensus whose principal purpose is protection of an individual's private property as the basis of individual freedom. In understanding that that is a moral imperative of human freedom and is economically imperative as well, political liberalism and capitalism are logically inseparable.[154]

It is without a doubt that the United States' idea of itself as an exceptional and unique nation has had an effect on its foreign policy behaviors. However, according to Walter A. McDougall, the early generation of its Founding Fathers did not have any extraordinary foreign agenda directed to reforming or, even less, dominating the world in the name of self-determination or human rights. "The exceptional calling of the American people was *not to do* anything special in foreign affairs, but to be the light to lighten the world.'[155] The validation for this statement can be found in America's responses to the challenges that arose in the early years of its independence.

The first challenge that forced America to define the nature of its foreign policy was the struggle for independence itself. In the first years of its formation, America was a weak state and extremely vulnerable in a world dominated by the great powers. In the eyes of the Founding Fathers, the prudent foreign policy should focus on the strengthening of its constitutional government, development of its military capabilities, and liberating the continent of North America from European

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152 Daniel Bell, "The 'Hegelian Secret': Civil Society and American Exceptionalism", in *Is America Different? A New Look at American Exceptionalism*, ed. Byron E. Shafer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 61-62.
153 Nicholas Kitchen, *American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America's Search for Purpose between the 'Wars', 1991-2001*, PhD thesis, The London School of Economics, 2009, 77.
154 Ibid., 77.
155 McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 20.

influences. Alexander Hamilton warned in the Federalist *#11* that national weakness could invite "humiliation or even war on the United States"[156] making the U.S. "the instrument of European greatness"[157], whilst a "preservation of safety and peace at home"[158] would make America "superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world".[159] Ideas of unity, aloofness for Europe, exportation of the balance of power and a stress on commercial diplomacy were the clear guidelines of America's early foreign policy. Actually, the United States' conceptions of a detached foreign policy was British in its origin[160]: remaining disengaged from Europe as long as there was a balance of power: exploiting European state rivalries to prevent any other power from dominating Europe or threaten American independence.

In order to protect America from the danger of foreign influences, American officials were in need of a "more perfect union", a government that would endow either U.S. Congress or the Executive branch with a central authority strong enough to provide protection from foreigners without endangering its nations' rights at home. However, American statesmen were not the 'utopian idealists' and were very much aware of the corruptible nature of men and government. 'Would not any federal government powerful enough to stare down France and Brittan ipso facto threaten the freedom of its own constituent states and citizens?'[161] The dispute that took place in Philadelphia in 1790, over the representation and appropriate power to be given to branches of Congress and Executive, and later over the Bill of Rights, can be considered as an originating point for the contemporary dichotomy of Democrats and Republicans. This debate will eventually result in the checks-and-balances system of power framed within the Constitution of 1791.

The first drafts of the Constitution intended to allocate responsibility for foreign affairs between the President and the Congress. The president was to be head of the state, with the authority to appoint and receive ambassadors, to sign treaties and

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[156] John Jay, "Federalist No.3" in *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776* ed. Walter A. McDougall (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 27.

[157] Ibid., 28.

[158] John Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, no.3, November, 3rd 1787, accessed February 3rd 2016, available at http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa03.htm

[159] Alexander Hamilton, *The Federalist Papers*, no. 11, November 22, 1787, accessed February 3rd 2016, available at http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa10.htm

[160] McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 22.

[161] Ibid., 28.

represent the United States overseas. The Congress was to be in charge of the funding and budgeting of the army and navy as well as of declaring war, while the president would actually conduct the decision-making regarding the eventual war. Furthermore, the Congress had the power to control commercial trades and the president had power to discuss treaties that were then subjected to the advice and consent of the Senate, with a two-thirds vote required for approval.[162]

3.1.1 The United States' Great Traditions of Unilateralism: Farewell Address and Monroe's Doctrine

If the first great tradition of the United States was exceptionalism, and if its essence was Liberty *at home*, the second great tradition was Isolationism, and its essential principle was complete Liberty of action.[163] However, the idea that the Founding Fathers were isolationist in view is extensively disputed between certain U.S. diplomatic historians. Historian George C. Herring argues that the term of isolationism itself did 'not become fixed in the American political lexicon until the twentieth century'[164] and that the term developed as an opposition to the progression of internationalism. According to Walter A. McDougall, 'not even the 'isolationists of the 1930s had any use of the term, preferring to call themselves neutralist or nationalist.'[165] The same author continues to claim that "our vaunted tradition of isolationism is no tradition at all, but a dirty word that interventionists, especially after Pearl Harbor, hurl at anyone who questions their policies."[166]While some historians perceive early U.S. foreign policy as of an isolationist nature, guided by the non-intervention principle, others share the belief that these prudent policies of neutrality are to be associated to the privileged circumstances of the 18th and 19th century world politics.[167] Thus, McDougall himself dispenses the term isolationism and substitutes it with the term of Unilateralism, "call it Neutrality or Unilateralism,

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[162] Ibid., 27.
[163] McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 40.
[164] Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 83.
[165] McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 40.
[166] Ibid., 40.
[167] Ibid., 51.

but don't call it Isolationism, a disparaging term of domestic propaganda, not even coined until 1890. "[168]

What the tradition of unilateralism entitled, according to the Founding Fathers, is for the United States to preserve its self-government, avoid permanent foreign entanglements and remains neutral in relation to the European Wars, except for when its Liberty was at risk. The motives for U.S. standoffish foreign policy were not solely moral and idealistic, but pragmatic as well. If the United States were to follow the imperialist and war model of the European counties, it would demand large taxes on its citizens to pay for an army and a navy, eventually damaging its people and their domestic freedom and prosperity. Furthermore, the involvement into the European Wars and affairs meant that the United States had to choose great powers as her allies, which could result in misdirected national interest or, ultimately bring the war upon American land and people. Entering into permanent alliances harms the liberty of its citizens and allows space for corruption, whereas neutrality could only help in the preservation of citizens' rights, freedoms, and national growth.

It was George Washington's Farewell Address, which established some 100 years long rule of American Unilateralism.[169] In the speech, delivered in front of the U.S. Congress in 1796, Washington coined and emphasized the term of "foreign entanglements" or "entangling alliances" that surely had to be avoided. The American ideal of liberty could give its way to slavery if America was to be a slave to foreign powers as 'Europe that has its own set of primary concerns' and that was 'unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics.... Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?' Consequently, "the great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible.'[170] Undeniably, America's foreign policy was to be guided by Washington's Great Rule dictum, as it sustained its unilateralist and neutralist foreign policies for the rest of the century. Even though America did

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[168] Walter A. McDougall, *Constitutional History of the U.S. Foreign Policy: 222 Years of Tension in the Twilight Zone* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2010), 5.
[169] McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 45.
[170]George Washington, *Farewell address*, September 17, 1796 accessed March 13, 2016, available at https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=15

accept the need to enter into temporary alliances and cooperated with the rest of the world through trade, markets, and immigration flows, out of the fear that foreign attachments could erode liberty at home, America did not enter into permanent alliances, as it would restrict her freedom to act unilaterally, unlimited by its ally's thoughts.

Still, for the United States, that was in its formative decade and heavily indebted from the War of Independence, 'there was never a question of isolationism, not only because of American vulnerability at sea, but because of public finance.'[171] The United States had its national growth depending on the trade and capital, whilst its security relied heavily on a balance of power between France and Britain. Its bonds and currency were at the low rate, with its credit raising and falling depending on the strength of its federal revenues, which again depended on the tariff of foreign imports, which were 90% from Britain alone.[172] It was the notorious Treaty of Jay of 1794 that proved obvious unfeasibility of neutralism or unilateralism. For the sake of a peaceful relationship and stable trade with the United Kingdom, the U.S. had not only given up their demands, but also granted British with the additional rights.

Thus, from its earliest origins, U.S. foreign policy carried 'the apparent tension between idealism and realism.' Still, American foreign policy of the 18th century was coherent and internally consistent[173], based both on the interest and value of liberty.[174] A policy based only on interest would do harm to American ideals while a policy based only on ideals would ignore the realities of the world.[175] It was the early experiences in international diplomacy that served as an important lesson to the consequence of limiting its entanglements, 'precisely because it could not isolate itself from the commerce and conflicts on the Atlantic and Europe.'[176]

The impact of the Napoleon Wars onto the European state of affairs and uprising independence movements in Latin America can be taken into account for the adoption by the United States of the third great tradition entitled the Monroe

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[171] McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 43.
[172] Ibid., 43.
[173] Ibid., 42.
[174] Marion Smith, "The Myth of Isolationism, Part I: American Leadership and the Cause of Liberty", *The Heritage Foundation* v. 1, no. 34. (2010): 5-6.
[175] Ibid., 6.
[176] McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 44.

Doctrine or the American system.[177] Washington's dictum was clear: in order for neutrality to survive, the United States had to reject "to go over to Europe"[178], but statesmen of the first half of 19th century had established the more advanced and extensive latitude to this principle. In order to protect its national interests, the United States had to prevent Europe from coming over to America. In the case that Europe did come to her door, U.S. vital national interests would certainly be in peril, and they might be even forced to play a part in Europe's balance of power or, even worst, be tempted to establish a second balance of power system in the Western Hemisphere. This is why the United States was in urgent need of creating a uniquely American international system.[179]

3.1.2 Monroe's Doctrine and U.S.' Predominance in North America

The post-Napoleon Europe was struggling to consolidate its power and build a new, more peaceful order based on pillars of territorial settlement, a balance of power, congressional consultancies, and monarchical legitimacy.[180] Understandably, a unified, strong, and imperial Europe was an obvious threat to America. Ever since the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, both France and the rest of the big European powers focused on maintaining and expanding their colonial holdings around the world, including in the Americas. However, it was no later than the 1820s that Europe once again dissented into conflicts and revolts, unable to overcome mutual suspicions of each other's imperial intentions. American national security and its freedom of trade had been directly threatened, not only by the peril of Franco-Hispanic looming missions to suppress Latin rebellions that intensified in early decades of 19th century, but with Russians imperial claims and advances onto the northern part of American territory. Alexander I, the Russian Tsar, had issued a decree in 1821 that prohibited all foreign trade (predominately British and American) in the waters of the North Pacific Ocean.[181] The decree itself had not only jeopardized the profitable trade of

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[177] Ibid., 59.
[178] Ibid., 59.
[179] Ibid., 59.
[180] Ibid., 60.
[181] McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 61.

these two nations, but it was also an aggressive advance of Russian colonial attempts on territory claimed simultaneously by the United States and the United Kingdom.[182]

This European and Russian threat inspired Secretary of State John Quincy Adams to proclaim what will later be known as the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine, brought forth in December 1823 is "one of the most significant and iconic statements of the principals of the U.S. foreign policy and a ringing affirmation of U.S. preeminence in the Western hemisphere and especially North America."[183] "What right has Russia to any colonial footing on the continent of North America? Has she any that we are bound to recognize? And is it not time for the American nations to inform the sovereign of Europe, that the American continents are no longer open to the settlement of new European colonies?"[184] Similarly, the independence movements that raged over Latin America were another challenge for the United States' foreign policy. President James Monroe perceived these liberation movements as a 'great struggle of the Epoch between liberty and despotism' and as an opportunity for the American people to project and support their ideal and value of liberty abroad. The heated question in the U.S. Congress was whether the U.S. government has the executive power to acknowledge the independence of the new states in rebellion against their sovereign and was it in the national interest to do so? Despite initial attempts to support the cause of the southern states, the delayed policies regarding this issue were a result of Adam's foreign policy based on U.S. national interest. Adam's arguments were grounded on the improbable success of Latin independence movements. Beyond that, there was a fear of offending the Spanish government and thereby losing the swampy, but massive land of Florida that was to be gained by a treaty with Spain 'I have never doubted that their final issue of present struggle will be their entire independence from Spain. It is equally fair that our true policy and duty to take no part in the contest.....I wish well to their cause, but I have not yet seen and do not now see any prospect that (Latinos) will establish free and liberal institutions of government.'[185]

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[182] Ibid., 63.
[183] Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 151.
[184] Ibid., 62.
[185] Ibid., 67.

However, the experience that predisposed the birth of America's great tradition of Unilateralism and that established the pattern of U.S. foreign policy over the next 200 years was the refusal of the United States to enter into an alliance with Great Britain. The fear and the threat of European interference on the American continents had been shared by both the United Kingdom and the United States. The lucrative trade between Great Britain and Latin America would see its deterioration if Spain reclaimed its colonial holdings in Central and South America and if Russia occupied the British territory of Oregon. In 1823, British Foreign Minister George Canning had proposed to the U.S. for the two nations to issue a joint declaration in order to discourage European powers from colonizing this land. Although flattered with proposal from "one nation that can do us the most harm of any one…and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world",[186] Jefferson did fear signing such a declaration. The reason was the declaration's point 4 which stated that both the United States and Great Britain would have to relinquish any future territorial ambitions for themselves. This point of the declaration was to be perceived as a trap meant to contain the expansion of the United States.[187] Instead, the proposal was rejected and the United States went on to issue a declaration of unilateral restriction for all European colonizers, including British, from the American continents. Monroe's famous address restated the principle of American Unilateralism by claiming that "in the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken part, nor does it comport with our policy, so to do".[188] It continues on by demanding Europe to act upon the same rule toward the Western Hemisphere "The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America…We owe it then, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations among existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."[189]

The Monroe Doctrine has been subjected to two different interpretations: the traditional one that perceives the Monroe doctrine as an honorable symbol of defense

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[186] McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 68.
[187] Ibid., 68.
[188] James Monroe, *Seventh Annual Message to Congress*, December 2nd, 1823 accessed March 18, 2016, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29465
[189] McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 70.

of American ideals, security and commerce.[190] The other one is less honorable and places the Monroe Doctrine within U.S. territorial expansion ambitions, particularly with respect to the land which now includes the U.S. states of New Mexico, California, and Texas. According to MacDougall, the Monroe Doctrine is better understood as an obligation to protect whatever vital interests it might identify in the Western Hemisphere and the need for its liberty not to be threatened by European powers. No matter which interpretation is followed, the truth is that the Monroe Doctrine was "a commitment to the extension of the ideology and the institutions of the United States, a key issue throughout much of the mid-1820s."[191]

3.1.3 The Fourth Great Tradition of U.S.' Foreign Policy: Expansionism and Manifest Destiny

American expansionism at the expense of other nations and the tradition of slavery are still topics of passionate polemic in contemporary discourses. The moral dilemma was obvious as expansion represented the clash between America's ideals of liberty and in the very nature of the expansionist process. "The superiority of their institutions and the greatness of their nation"[192] were reasoning for forcible expansion on the territories of Britain, the indigenous people of North and South America, and, in the case of African slaves brought to the U.S., deprivation of basic rights to freedom. In order to provide justification for American territorial expansion, American statesmen fabricated a set of ideas that would feed the ideology of expansionism. Historian Albert K. Weinberg speaks of eight elements that are all, more or less, supported by the natural right for the exceptional nation of America to seek its fortune and prosperity. This sentiment of a special destiny has occasionally spawned arrogance and a sense of cultural superiority.[193] The early generation of American statesmen believed in the right of American territorial expansion, judged by Jefferson's declaration where he imagines the age "when our rapid multiplication will. ...cover the whole northern if not southern continent, with people speaking one language, governed by similar forms and by similar laws."[194] Adams, in a similar

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[190] Ibid., 70.
[191] Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 158.
[192] Ibid, 176.
[193] Ibid., 4-5.
[194] McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 77.

manner, talks about "destiny of divine providence to be peopled by one nation, speaking one language, professing one general system of religious and political principles..."[195]

Manifest Destiny was originally envisioned as a peaceful, natural process that will only result in educating and sharing the blessings of liberty to subordinate people. However, in reality, it led to the U.S. annexation of Mexico. "The 'conquest 'which carries peace into a land of where the sword has always been the sole arbiter... must necessarily is a great blessing to the conquered. It is a work worthy of... a people who are about to regenerate the world by asserting the supremacy of humanity over the accidents of birth and fortune."[196] It is clear that, in the eyes of American leaders, the expansion derived from the primordial and exceptional dedication to liberty. Without freedom to grow, the nation would not be free, as the barriers and restrains on expansion were intolerable assaults on U.S. liberty.[197] The editor of 'Democratic Review', John O'Sullivan, expresses the same feelings when he wrote in 1839 that the United States "*is* the nation of human progress, and who will, what can, set limits to our onward march? We point to the everlasting truth on the first page of our national declaration, and we proclaim to the millions of other lands, that... the nation of many nations is destined to manifest to mankind the excellence of divine principles."[198] Manifest Destiny also preserved the American idea of liberty as an argument for this continental expansion. If America wanted to endure with its unilateral or isolationist politics, it first had to pre-strike foreign claims onto unclaimed lands of the American continent.

Nonetheless, this mixture of national exceptionality, seen by many as even genetic exceptionality, with the desire to territorially expand then combined with growing material resources eventually led to a completely different era in U.S. foreign policy. Following the years after the Civil War, the United States was appealing as land of opportunity and individual liberties (at least to the 'white' race) to many immigrants,

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[195] Ibid., 78.

[196] Bradford Perkins, "The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865", in *American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America's Search for Purpose between the 'Wars', 1991-2001* ed. Nicholas Kitchen, PhD thesis, The London School of Economics, 2009, 86.

[197] Ibid., 78.

[198] John L. O'Sullivan, "The Great Nation of Futurity", in *American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America's Search for Purpose between the 'Wars', 1991-2001* ed. Nicholas Kitchen, PhD thesis, The London School of Economics, 2009, 84.

mainly from Europe, counting up to 400.000 per year.[199] There was no other nation in the world that could have competed with the economic growth of the United States. By the 1990's, U.S. GDP accounted for 18, 9% of world output, making it the strongest industrial nation in the world. [200]

3.2 The Second Century of the United States as a Crusader State[201]

In the late 19th century, the balance of power, political geography, technological developments, and more were changing the world dramatically and swiftly. Great Britain, once unchallenged in her political, financial, and naval power was now in competition with rapidly developing Germany, Russia, and Japan who had been investing largely in industry and constructing modern and larger steel navy fleets. The topography of the world had been altered by the construction of the Suez Canal in 1869, the trans-Indian railroad, and the trans-Siberian railway.[202] The progress reached in the field of technology allowed for the free movement and transition of people, money, and ideas while also 'erasing ignorance and isolationism, eroding away the misunderstanding between people, and facilitated the getting and distribution of the new plenty.'[203] On the other hand, the invention of machine guns, steam ships, locomotives, the telegraph, and railroads had allowed and made easier the process of the colonization of faraway lands in Africa, Asia, and Oceania. The supporting evidence for a nation's need to go forward and struggle and compete for power and wealth was endorsed by Charles Darwin's theory of racial competition and survival of the fittest proclaimed in his famous book *Origin of Species*. 'Nations, like men, will shrink and decline when they fail to grasp firmly the opportunities for success and use them to the utmost.'[204]

With these turbulences in the international system, the United States was under pressure to re-evaluate its basic foreign policy notions. The progress of dangerous

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[199] Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial ed. Washington: Bureau of the Census, 1975 in *American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America's Search for Purpose between the 'Wars', 1991-2001* ed. Nicholas Kitchen, PhD thesis, The London School of Economics, 2009, 84.
[200] Ibid., 84.
[201] Title borrowed from Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1997).
[202] Ibid., 104.
[203] Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 266.
[204] Ibid., 267.

weapons, the advent of the new world powers and quickened imperialist heave all had convinced the American political elite that the United States could no longer take their security and freedom for granted. This was the age when particular members of the deciding elite came forward with the ideas that 'even in the time of peace nation must be prepared for war.' For one military leader, Captain A.T. Mahan, the author of the classic *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, the U.S. should demand a stronger, more modernized, and professional army and navy as American sea lines, and its territories in the Caribbean and the Pacific could not be protected without a strong navy. Furthermore, Mahan, reflecting on the example of Great Britain's long dominance of overseas lands, believed that in order to control the sea and world trade, the United States had to 'abandon its defensive, *continental* strategy based on harbor defense and commerce raiding for a more outward-looking approach.'[205]

The truth of the matter is that in the 1890s', the Americans were aware of their power. After all, as certain senator noticed in 1893, 'we (the United States) are sixty-five million people, the most advanced and powerful on earth. We are a Nation- with the biggest kind of N, a great imperial Republic destined to exercise a controlling influence upon the actions of mankind and to affect the future of the world.'[206] The debate over America's foreign policy was dividing the government in half with the conservative side insisting that the U.S. as a nation must concentrate on its domestic policies and problems. The other rapidly growing side of the debate called for a more activist foreign policy as *exceptional* America had an 'obligation to spread the blessing of their superior institutions to less fortunate people across the world.'[207] Thus, a new foreign policy of *progressive imperialism*[208] was encouraged and justified by both the realization of America's supremacy and vital interest, and by the desire to project universal liberal values worldwide. In support of the annexation and colonization of Cuba, James Harrison Wilson summarized the feelings of many expansionists of that time saying "Let us take this curse because it is noble and just and right, and besides because it will pay. "[209] By the year 1900, the United States had already made its imperial claims in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, Samoa, Hawaii, and Philippines - all in the name of a moral duty to "civilize, educate and look after

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[205] Ibid., 303.
[206] Ibid., 299.
[207] Ibid., 304.
[208] McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 115.
[209] Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 305.

"primitive" peoples, and the anarchy, barbarism and danger that would flourish if the United States did not act."[210]

The controversy over this American imperialist period evoked a lot of questions regarding the harmony and continuity of American foreign policy principals. Walter A. MacDougall does not seem to agree that there was any violation of American diplomatic traditions. "U.S imperialist initiatives", he claims, "did not violate the tradition of George Washington's Unilateralism, nor Monroe's Doctrine nor Manifest Destiny."[211] In fact, the imperialism of 1898-1917 was not a deviation of U.S. diplomatic traditions; it was rather a group of initiatives to protect the *status quo* of U.S. security. In the cases where the U.S. had no vital interests, its safety endangered, or its people threatened, the United States *backed off.*[212] Still, the polemic that surrounds this period is its moral connotations. The war with Spain in 1898 would be the best example. In this case, entering into a war with Spain, unimaginable just 20 years prior was justified by an obligation to free Cuban people from a tyrannical Spanish government. However, American Exceptionalism emphasized and honored by the Founding Fathers and earlier generations of American people meant 'Liberty at home, not crusade to change the world.'[213] Furthermore, the forcible annexation of the colonies gained by the Spanish War was in fact a violation of the U.S. Constitution. Rather than granting these colonies the prospect of statehood, they were proclaimed as American *unincorporated dependencies*, with the U.S. army in control and the Constitution as the highest law, all under the belief that the United States had the mission of projecting American superior civilization and culture. The above listed activities certainly distance the U.S. from its isolationist tradition, however, opposite to predictions of many European states, the U.S. did not 'became a major player in world politics after the war in 1898.... and, although it was a great power, it was not yet a participant in the great-power system.'[214] Due to America's long tradition of disapproval of foreign entanglements and aversion to overstretching and overconsumption of its resources and energy, the U.S. did not enter into alliances common for Europe before World

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[210] David Campbell, *Writing Security: The United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 135.
[211] McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 117.
[212] Ibid., 177.
[213] Ibid., 118.
[214] Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 337.

War I, nor did it made any other strategic advances outside of the Pacific and Latin America.

3.2.1 The Foreign Policy of the United States in the Great Wars

The United States' foreign policy of disengagement began to crack with the events of World War I. The initial phases of the war itself were not enough for the U.S. to make an alteration in its foreign policy. Only with Germany's declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare early in 1917 were U.S. interests directly threatened.[215] This was an opportunity for U.S. President Woodrow Wilson to move towards more international foreign policy.[216] In the time of the First World War, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson strongly believed that the United States was indeed an exceptional nation, whilst "the Great War more than ever exposed the insanity of the European power politics, motivating him to envision the reformed world of politics and economics based on American principles."[217] The foreign policy that promoted peace and prosperity for all people was, in his idea, a policy worth pursuing. As he claimed, it would be very dangerous for the U.S. to "determine its foreign policy in terms of material interest."[218] So, when the U.S. entered the Great War, it was for "the vindication of right, human right, of which we are the only single champion "because" the world must be safe for democracy."[219] The war with Germany was seen as a 'necessary first step in promoting an international order. Woodrow Wilson's famous speech regarding the Great War goes to say that "We are participants, whether we want it or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are the partners with the rest."[220] However, the U.S. was destined to go beyond partnership to leadership as, "the United States is willing to become the partner in any feasible association of nations in order to realize these

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[215] Colin Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders; Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006), 46.
[216] Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 382.
[217] Ibid., 3.
[218] Thomas Andrew Bailey, "A Diplomatic History of the American People" in *American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America's Search for Purpose between the 'Wars', 1991-2001* ed. Nicholas Kitchen, PhD Thesis, The London School of Economics, 2009, 94.
[219] Woodrow Wilson, *Address to Special Session of Congress*, April 2, 1917 accessed March 12, 2016, available at https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=61
[220] McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 123.

objects (peace) and make them safe against violation."[221] Wilson's vision of this international order was expressed and summarized in his *Fourteen Points* speech: peace in the international system can be achieved on the bases of open diplomacy, freedom of the seas, equal access to raw materials, reduction of armaments, colonial rule only in the interests of subject peoples, self-determination, and more.[222]

The foreign policy utilized by the United States during World War I was a starting point for the ever-persisting dichotomy between being internationalist and isolationist in outlook.[223] The old policy of isolationism was considered as a given and natural policy to the very character of America. The dangers of the Great War gave incentive enough for the 'rise to the ideology of isolationism with claims that the best way to safeguard nation and its way of life is by preserving America's long-standing tradition of non-involvement.'[224] After the world descended into the interwar years, the biggest question of 1919 was the U.S. role in the world. Would it retreat to its disengaged role or whether it would continue to extract its influence in Europe and Asia? As it played out, the postwar world remained Eurocentric. Although Western Europe was significantly weaker and less stable in the aftermath of the war, its most dangerous challengers, the United States and Japan, remained concentrated on strengthening their regional hegemony.[225]

The interwar foreign policy of the United States was far more recognizable for its global influence, or what Joseph Nye will later call '*soft power*' which meant that the United States derived its power and influence more through the economic wealth, technological progressiveness, and cultural sway and less through its military power.[226] Indeed, besides Japan, the U.S. was a nation that benefited the most out of the Great War. While Europe was recovering from its war damages, the U.S. was able to achieve the status of the wealthiest and the most productive nation with the highest standard of living in the world.[227] The 1920s was the age of the first multinational companies with the U.S investing in and building factories overseas.[228]

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[221] Ibid. 123.
[222] Ibid. 124.
[223] McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 124: Herring, "*From Colony to Superpower*, 406.
[224] Herring, *From Colony to Superpower,* 406.
[225] Ibid. 437.
[226] Joseph S. Nye Jr., "The paradox of American Power", in *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* ed. George C. Herring (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 439.
[227] Ibid., 439.
[228] Ibid., 447.

The United States replaced Europe as the biggest exporter of mass culture. In the field of foreign policy, the U.S. government was involved in the reconstruction and nation building of the war devastated Europe, as well as promoting stability in East Asia.[229] The intention was to achieve both without foreign entanglements and, in doing so, the U.S. relied largely on its financial means and instruments.[230] It is mostly believed that the United States returned to its isolationist and neutral politics in the postwar period and that it only communicated with the world through international economics and "dollar diplomacy". According to George C. Herring, the U.S. was mostly cautious.[231] The United States, within the limitations imposed by its domestic political paradigms and traditions of non-involvement had actually opened itself up to the external world.[232]

3.2.2 Containment as an Extension of U.S' Influence

Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941 strongly influenced mainstream opinion in terms of foreign political behaviors within the United States. The attack itself had burst the bubble of assumed American safety, which made "many Americans to think aggressively about the need to sustain a permanent equilibrium in Europe and U.S. war aims in terms of the promotion of a broadly liberal international order."[233] The wartime President Franklin Roosevelt had a vision of the United States as a dominant power in Latin America and the Pacific, with steady relationships with both Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The United States would still remain disengaged from European matters, but it would not give up on America's 'worldwide interest in the promotion of certain liberal goals'.[234] The United States' entrance into the Second World War was not about restoring the status quo, nor simply defeating Germany and Japan; it extended to "the imagination of the postwar order that revolved around open markets, a modified gold standard in which the dollar would be the reserve currency, self-determination, collective security

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[229] Ibid., 450.
[230] Ibid., 450.
[231] Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, 482.
[232] Ibid., 482.
[233] Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders; Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy*, 83.
[234] Ibid., 83.

organization, and the dismantling of the European colonial possessions."[235]
Conscious of its superior position in the new world order, U.S. policymakers
envisioned an international order that rested all of its power in the system of
institutions and multilateral membership, but still American in form.[236] Yet, before
Americans even began to institutionalize this new liberal system abroad, an empire
of massive military power and relentlessly opposed to American liberalism had risen
from the ruins of World War II. The very nature of the Soviet Union's communist
ideology, with its expansionist tendencies, was enough to stand as a challenger to
U.S. liberal worldviews. These two ideologically driven superpowers produced a
conflict that was nothing short of a struggle for history, for the very organizing
principles of the entire human population.[237] By 1945, the greatest issue of American
foreign policy was how to deal with the Soviet Union and its leader, Joseph Stalin,
who was not willing to accept his country's secondary status in the American
designed international system.

The Pearl Harbor experience raised U.S. awareness that its liberty at home cannot be
protected if the nation is internationally disengaged; hence the U.S. should stand for
liberty whenever and wherever it is endangered. Indeed, the strategy of containment,
developed from acknowledging the fact that American liberty does not exist in a
vacuum, was intended to uphold and guard the principles of liberty and democracy
(and capitalism) where Soviet's expansion threatened to deprive people of it. In
Colin Dueck's words, containment was a strategy that included 'drawing lines of
resistance around the Soviet bloc, and denying the Soviet Union further gains,
through the provision by the U.S. of economic, political, and military aid to non-
communist countries.'[238] Containment was a massive process that ultimately cost the
United States billions of dollars in order to economically and military support its
allies that occasionally required a place under the security umbrella of the U.S.. The
United States' government held the position that the prospect of economic

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[235] Kitchen,*American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America's Search for Purpose between the 'Wars', 1991-2001*, 85.

[236]John G. Ikenberry, "After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars", in *American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America's Search for Purpose between the 'Wars', 1991-2001* ed. Nicholas Kitchen, PhD Thesis, The London School of Economics, 2009, 100.

[237] Kitchen, *American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America's Search for Purpose between the 'Wars', 1991-2001*, 101

[238] Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders; Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy*, 88.

collaboration, democracy, and sovereignty would look far more appealing to international states than a communist would. With this strategy, states would gather and stabilize a U.S.-led alliance that would ultimately serve U.S. interests.[239] Aside from being a massive project and a somewhat overwhelming strategy, containment itself was an interesting phenomenon as it was a product of the changes in the basic strategy or mentality of U.S. policymakers in the sense of global interests and global ambitions. Two years after Ronald Reagan's 'Tear down this wall' message to Mikhail Gorbachev, the four decades old struggle between democratic capitalism and state authoritarianism had been settled once and for all.[240] With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world entered into the age of unipolarity, an age of American dominance.[241] The American dollar became the international medium of finance; the American language became the language of world business; American culture and American consumer products dominated world media and world markets.[242] The United States might have arrived late to its position of a superpower as a result of its ideological disinclination, but when it did arrive, it did so with an astonishing degree of dominance.[243]

3.2.3 The Lack of a Clear Vision for a New World Order

The euphoria over the final victory, however, was short-lived in the United States. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, American policymakers were experiencing the absence of a principle framework that could guide and outline American foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. The pondering question among foreign political elite, intellectuals, and journalists was how this new 'unipolar' world should be approached, and what America's role in it would and should be.'[244] Roland Steel confirmed, "during the Cold War we had a vocation; now we have none. Once we

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[239] Ibid., 89.

[240] Richard N. Haass, *Foreign Policy Begins at Home; The Case for Putting America's House in Order* (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 11.

[241] Ibid., 11.

[242] Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence; American Foreign Policy and how it Changed the World* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 10.

[243] Davis Reynolds "Power and Superpower: The Impact of Two World Wars on America's International Role" in *American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America's Search for Purpose between the 'Wars', 1991-2001* ed. Nicholas Kitchen (PhD thesis, The London School of Economics, 2009), 100.

[244] Alex Edwards, *"A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of American 'Dual Containment' Policy in the Persian Gulf: 1991- 2001"*, 11.

had a powerful enemy; now it is gone... The world we knew has collapsed around us... Until the Cold War was over we did not appreciate that the conflict, for all its iniquities and dangers, imposed a kind of order on the world. Now even that is gone... Yes, the other side lost. But did we win? And if so, was it because of our superior strength and values? Or did we merely have deeper pockets than our foe? And what does it mean to win? What do we do with our victory? Who wants to be a superpower these days? Who wants to pay the bills? What is the point of being a superpower if there is only one of them?[245] Without a challenge grounded on a rival ideology, military competition and power politics, many agreed that the U.S. no longer had a clear focus for its strategic calculation.[246] Paul Kennedy captured the feelings of these moral and strategic uncertainties in the first years after the end of the Cold War, writing in 1993, "the relief that the Soviet Union is no longer an enemy is overshadowed by uncertainties about U.S.' proper world role.[247] Ronald Asmus further explains the irony. "The paradoxical impact of the end of the Cold War is that it simultaneously vindicated American purpose and past policies and forced a rethinking of the assumptions that guided U.S. foreign policy for nearly half a century. While liberating the United States from its overriding concern with the Soviet threat, the end of the Cold War also compelled Americans to again confront core issues concerning definitions of our national interests and our role in the world."[248]

The post-Cold War international order was under major structural transitions that logically triggered numerous questions that were waiting to be answered. What was going to be the organizing principle of the post-Cold War international system? As a part of that system, what are U.S. objectives and interests going to be? What are the threats to those objectives and interests, and what sort of means should be used to counter those potential threats? Moreover, what will be the nature of American policy and foreign conduct? Finally, what is the new grand strategy of the United

[245] Roland Stele "The Temptations of the Superpower", in *American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America's Search for Purpose between the 'Wars', 1991-2001* ed. Nicholas Kitchen (PhD thesis, The London School of Economics, 2009), 110.
[246] Christopher Layne, "American Hegemony: Without an Enemy", *Foreign Policy*, n. 92 (1993)
[247] Paul M. Kennedy, "Preparing for the Twenty-First Centaury", in *American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America's Search for Purpose between the 'Wars', 1991-2001* ed. Nicholas Kitchen, PhD thesis, The London School of Economics, 2009, 106.
[248] Ronald Asmus, "The New Strategic Debate", in *American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America's Search for Purpose between the 'Wars', 1991-2001* ed. Nicholas Kitchen, PhD thesis, The London School of Economics, 2009, 102.

States? Absent the Soviet Union, the fundamental rationale for American foreign policy had been lost, the importance of foreign policy was in question, and the level of public support for foreign-policy actions uncertain.

The following segment proceeds to analyze the strategic ideas and alternatives in American post-Cold War foreign policies. This portion of the chapter relies fairly strongly on the work of Colin Dueck's *Reluctant Crusaders* and Hal Brands' *America's Search for Purpose in the post-Cold War* which well serves the purpose of explaining and outlining the ideas and alternatives available and prevalent in the post-Cold War American mindset.

3.3 The Ambivalence of Ideas in the American post-Cold War Strategy

During the forty years of the Cold War, the U.S. strategy of containment was both elegant and efficient, with its purpose to "break up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power."[249] Who could have known that the day of victory over the Soviet Union would be the beginning moment for the next twelve-year period that is notable mainly for its lack of diplomatic paradigms? [250] In these 12 years, the relationship the United States fostered with the world was absent of the structured guidelines and missions once characteristic for U.S. dealings with other great powers. This period will always be looked upon "as more remarkable for what it was not (the Cold War) than for what it was (no one was really sure)."[251] Unchallenged in terms of political and economic predominance, the *hyperpower* of the unipolar world, in the first half of post-Cold War period, focused mainly on the problems at home and exerted its immense power reluctantly.

If assumed that lack of objectives and aims are the reason behind the absent grand strategy, Hal Brands would disagree by saying that "aims and ideas were in no short supply during this decade; what was lacking was a strategy that incorporated these interests into a coherent and politically sustainable framework."[252] Actually, the coherent and conceptualized U.S. grand strategy was an imperative for the 1990s as

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[249] Josef Joffe, "Bismarck" or "Britain"? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity", *International Security*, v. 19, n. 4 (1995): 94.
[250] Hal Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad: America's Search for Purpose in the post-Cold War*, (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2008), 1.
[251] Ibid., 1.
[252] Ibid., 2.

the rest of the world looked towards America, the most powerful nation and the leader of the free world, to take part and resolve global crises varying from drugs and arms trade, humanitarian crises, ethnic conflicts, environmental disasters, and more. As mentioned before, U.S. policymakers, primarily the first post-Cold War presidents of the U.S., President George H.W. Bush and President Bill Clinton did go through efforts of articulating a confident and strong post-Cold War grand strategy, but it was generally a lack of consensus within the nation itself on the vision of America's international role in the post-Cold War period that resulted in the absence of one. With no serious threat confronting the U.S. and with interests so numerous and spread throughout every major part of the globe, ideas of an appropriate foreign policy were too diverse and conflicting for either Bush or Clinton to construct a single framework of clear foreign policy. After the Cold War, as the predominant nation in the system, the U.S. had a wide selection of strategy alternatives from which to choose. (See table 1.) However, similar to the historical tradition of the previous periods, there were two standout influential sets of ideas or idea complexes that had predisposition to impact foreign policy decision-making and ultimately foreign policy outcomes. There are many subcategories and variations of the two foreign policy ideas present in U.S. history and in the post-Cold War period. This thesis focuses on the two more influential than others: the foreign policy idea of isolationism (unilateralism) and liberal internationalism that, in 1990s, were reflected through ideas of selective engagers and multilateral institutionalisms. In combination with the systematic pressures arising from the somewhat chaotic post-Cold War system, an overview of the post-Cold War ideas present in the debate over an appropriate grand strategy in first the Bush and, later in the Clinton administration is given.

3.4 Retreat to Neo-isolationism/Unilateralism: The Governance of George H.W. Bush

When George Herbert Walker Bush entered the Office of President in early 1989, the end of the Cold War was on the horizon. George H.W. Bush was a president with an impeccable resume in foreign affairs, formerly serving as an envoy to China and the UN, Director of the Central Intelligence and as a Vice President for the previous administration of President Ronald Reagan. George H. W. Bush had proven his

foreign policy experience in securing a peaceful ending to the Cold War and violently ousting Iraqis from Kuwait in 1990. Yet, all of his administration's success on the foreign policy agenda could not save him from losing the 1992 elections to Democrat Bill Clinton. The reason behind his defeat was the fact that the American nation was turning primarily within as "anti-internationalism" and "foreign policy criticizing" prevailed in both Congress and public.[253] After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the first Persian- Gulf War, and the absence of any serious threat, the nation was ready to hand over the 'burden of world leadership.'[254]

Table 1. Various Foreign Policy Ideas

	Neo-Isolationism	Selective Engagement	Cooperative Security	Primacy
Analytical Anchor	Minimal, defensive realism	Traditional balance of power realism	Liberalism	Maximal realism/ unilateralism
Major Problem of Int'l Politics	Avoiding entanglement in the affairs of others	Peace among the major powers	The indivisibility of peace	The rise of a peer competitor
Preferred World Order	Distant balance of power	Balance of power	Interdependence	Hegemonic
Nuclear Dynamics	Supports status quo	Supports status quo	Supports aggression	Supports aggression
Conception of National Interests	Narrow	Restricted	Transnational	Broad
Regional Priorities	North America	Industrial Eurasia	Global	Industrial Eurasia & the home of any potential peer competitor
Nuclear Proliferation	Not our problem	Discriminate prevention	Indiscriminate prevention	Indiscriminate prevention
NATO	Withdraw	Maintain	Transform & expand	Expand
Regional Conflict	Abstain	Contain; discriminate intervention	Intervene	Contain; discriminate intervention
Ethnic Conflict	Abstain	Contain	Nearly indiscriminate intervention	Contain
Humanitarian Intervention	Abstain	Discriminate intervention	Nearly indiscriminate intervention	Discriminate intervention
Use of Force	Self-defense	Discriminate	Frequent	At will
Force Posture	Minimal self-defense force	Two-MRC force	Reconnaissance strike complex for mutilateral action	A two-power-standard force

Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Startegy, *International Security*, v. 21, n. 3 (1996/97): 4 available at http://www.comw.org/pda/14dec/fulltext/97posen.pdf

The mottos such as "Come home, America", "America first", "It's time to take care of our own" were promoted in both the Republican and Democratic 1992 election campaigns.[255] The most pressing of those domestic issues was an economic

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[253] Kitchen, *"American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America's Search for Purpose between the 'Wars', 1991-2001"*, 105.

[254] Herring, *"From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776"*, 921.

[255] Kitchen, *"American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America's Search for Purpose between the 'Wars', 1991-2001"*, 105.

recession, as a result of the Cold War spending, whilst immigration, changing demographics, and multiculturalism threatened to push the U.S. into a more socially fragmented country.

Although aware that retreating to and sustaining an isolationist position was very difficult in the modern world of constant technological development, globalization, and economic interdependence, in absence of the threat to its safety, Americans still looked for a relief from 'the Cold War over-expenditure', and wanted their government to focus on an overdue domestic problem. Eugene Gholz, one of the most vocal advocates of U.S. strategic disengagement believes that, "the United States itself is in a position of unparalleled strength and security. No threat comparable to Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia looms on the horizon. Economic interdependence and democratization have encouraged a deep and growing peace in most of Europe and much of Asia. International peace and prosperity no longer depend, if they ever did, on a U.S. military presence overseas. "[256] The positioning of U.S. troops and political commitments overseas with no pressing threat was deemed unnecessary and a distraction from domestic concerns for many. "America's Cold War leaders were out of touch", Jerry Brown said, "more interested in the new world order 10,000 miles away than they are in a full employment economy", adding that he "wouldn't give a penny for foreign aid until every small farmer, businessman and family in the United States are taken care of."[257] Sensing the change of national opinion or 'peace dividend', Congress had to cut down on the number of army forces, military spending, budgets for foreign aid, diplomatic representation overseas, etc. arguing that "if our security needs have lessened, our level of military spending should reflect that change."[258]

The strategies proposed by neo-isolationists of the early 1990s "clearly rejected the notion of the United States as a world power, with its troops and alliances scattered around the globe, and who favored a withdrawal from strategic commitments

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[256] Dueck, *"Reluctant Crusaders; Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy "*, 116.
[257] Norman J. Ornstein, "Foreign Policy and the 1992 Elections", in *American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America's Search for Purpose between the 'Wars', 1991-2001"* ed. Nicholas Kitchen, PhD thesis, The London School of Economics, 2009, 105.
[258] Adam Clymer, "Bush's Arms Plan; New Weapons Cuts May Prompt More Than Bush Wants", in *American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America's Search for Purpose between the 'Wars', 1991-2001"* ed. Nicholas Kitchen, PhD thesis, The London School of Economics, 2009, 105.

incurred as a result of the Cold War."[259]The strategies proposed by neo-isolationists all promoted a greater or lesser level of American detachment in the international arena, a return of *all* U.S. political and military troops positioned in Europe and Asia, and breaking off her alliances from the Cold War period. Simply put, it would be a return to the policy of "strategic independence" or "hemispheric defense."[260] Furthermore, they argued that defense spending needs should be reduced by as much as 50% from the Cold War spending budgets.[261] The only army force required would be in charge of defending U.S. vital, national interests in the Western Hemisphere. This neo-isolationist idea, according to Dueck, did not come from the political arena and was not received warmly within the political elite. Although appealing for both Democrats and the right wing of Republican Party, they rather came from a small group of foreign policy commentators like Eric Nordlinger, Christopher Layne, Ted Galen Carpenter, Daryl Press, and Eugene Gholz.[262]

Charles Krauthammer writes, in his now classical article *The Unipolar Moment*, about his great respect for isolationist strategies due to their natural and logical appeal of 'God-given foreign policy for the United States.'[263] Still, he finds issues with isolationists' vague definition of U.S. vital interests and he recognizes the notions of realist thought in isolationists' definition of U.S. interests in a narrow and national manner.[264] For instance, isolationists did not deem vital enough the reason for U.S. political and military commitment in the Persian Gulf War, led with an intention of preventing Saddam Hussein's threat to the U.S. oil-based economy and threat to the safety of U.S. allies in the Middle East. "If the Persian Gulf is not a vital interest, then nothing is. All that is left is preventing an invasion of the Florida Keys. And for that you need a Coast Guard? You do not need a Pentagon."[265] Krauthammer dispenses isolationists preference for the U.S. to "give up the dubious benefits of superpower status, give up the "unusual burdens" of the past, and return to 'normal' times" as quite challenging and perplexing. The possible example of those normal times would be perhaps the 19th century when the U.S. was relatively *left alone* to govern its nation and with no major threat to its safety, however, those times were

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[259] Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders; Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy*, 116.
[260] Ibid., 116.
[261] Ibid., 116.
[262] Ibid., 116.
[263] Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment" *Foreign Affairs*, v. 70, n. 1 (1990/91): 29.
[264] Ibid., 29.
[265] Ibid., 30.

bygone times and, if U.S. wanted to live in peace and stability, it must realize that a stable international system could not be taken as given. "When indeed the stability is achieved", Krauthammer argues, "it is the product of self-conscious action by the great powers, and most particularly of the greatest power, which now and for the foreseeable future is the United States." [266]

The following segment introduces and lays out the main features of the selective engagement strategy as the subdivision of the 1990s neo-isolationists foreign policy idea. This segment firstly specifies the main arguments of the selective engagers' strategy, the differences with neo-isolationism, and its perspective on the Bosnian War.

As an extension of the isolationist foreign policy idea, the selective engagers' strategy is also based on the realist conceptions of the power conflicts between great powers and the protection of national interests. Selective engagers believe that the United States should direct its focus and military capabilities on establishing and preserving peace between (exclusively) the great powers or challengers in Eurasia, Southeast Asia, and in the Middle East.[267] What distances selective engagers from neo-isolationists is their support for mainly military power projection abroad in order to preserve peace in those necessary zones of the world. Although acknowledging the importance of economic, diplomatic, and political instruments in achieving its desire objectives, "power projection is central to an effective American grand strategy."[268]

This use of force, however, is not to be spent on less significant areas of the world. Guiding principles for the selective engagers' strategy is to avoid big military costs outside of vital interests, evasion of costly military actions for secondary interests, and to refrain from interventions.[269] Another important guiding principle of the selective engagers, from the perspective of this thesis in the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is that costly military intervention in humanitarian crises that arise from a civil war should be avoided, unless mass murders have begun or are likely to begin, or if the U.S. can find partners to go in with and pay moderate

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[266] Ibid., 30.
[267] Robert J. Art, *Finding Our Way: Debating American Grand Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 26.
[268] Ibid., 32.
[269] Ibid., 34.

costs.[270] Therefore, the pattern of U.S. foreign policies in the initial phases of the Bosnian War are quite obvious when taken into account the fact that the Bosnian War was indeed of marginal interest to the U.S. and the possible military intervention was high in costs.

3.5 Liberal Internationalism: The Necessity of Multilateral Institutions

Krauthammer's claims, as discussed previously, over the appropriate U.S role is fitting for introducing the second most influential set of ideas that influenced the foreign policy of the U.S.. The strategy proposed by liberal internationalists supports the vision of a new peaceful international order founded on the collective institutions through which the American liberal order of democracy, capitalism, and multilateral management could be implemented.

In the early 1990s, the idea of liberal internationalism was explored and supported by many authors and previous officials of the White House like Graham Allison, David Callahan, John Ikenberry, Joseph Nye, and John Ruggie.[271] Liberal internationalism is a vision of the global system that bestowed its power and *strength* on international institutions, providing the same system with the enlargement of democratic governments and open markets. Furthermore, they support a belief that the collective institutions are far more effective in establishing and sustaining a peaceful and democratic system, from, for example, military or negotiation power. When President George H.W. Bush proclaimed a new world order in the 1990s, it was this exact system he had in mind. "Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order...A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations."[272]

One of the liberal internationalists' arguments was strongly based on the fact that the post-Cold War order was in actual need of multilateralism. With the end of the Cold War and bipolarity, a large number of different, transnational problems reappeared and had challenged the international system. There was a whole new specter of

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[270]Ibid., 34.
[271] Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders; Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy* , 121.
[272] George H.W. Bush, Speech before a Joint Session of Congress, 11/9/1990 in *American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America's Search for Purpose between the 'Wars', 1991-2001"* ed. Nicholas Kitchen, PhD Thesis, The London School of Economics, 2009, 105.

problems more urgent than the old-fashioned balance of power strategy. Krauthammer claims that "the new strategic environment was marked primarily by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction', whilst Colin Dueck includes urging issues of 'the widespread environmental degradation, population growth and migration, international economic development, world poverty, money laundry, ethnic conflicts, human rights and violations, democratization, globalization and terrorism.'[273] For these transnational issues to be addresses and properly confronted, the United States required an international cooperation and collaboration. It would not be recommended to act unilaterally as "the unilateral actions simply cannot produce the right results on what are inherently multilateral issues."[274] Thus, the U.S. had to create its post-Cold War foreign policy based on the approach of inclusiveness "to help shape elements of the system in directions that favor the achievement of greater political and economic development and stability."[275] Also, addressing these issues in multilateral fashion would make American power less alarming to others.[276] If the U.S. went forward with a unilateralist position, it would most probably aggravate balancing- hard or soft- against the United States, eliminate competence gains from the institutional collaboration, and damage the legitimacy of the United States as a leader of the international order. As Stanley Hoffman argued, "nothing is more dangerous for a 'hyperpower' than the temptation of unilateralism."[277]

With the end of the Cold War, a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) carried the most importance in the national security debate and, consequently, arms control was a key element in the liberal internationalist approach to grand strategy.[278] The WMD largely concerned "rouge states" willing to undermine order in the international system by causing regional instability or by their expansionistic aspirations. These "rouge states", governed by cliques opposed to liberal ideals and characterized by violent behaviors, all had aspiration to get a hold

[273] Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders; Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy*, 121.
[274] Ibid., 40.
[275] Ian Lesser, "Multilateral Security: Interdependence and US Strategy", in *Prisms and Policy: U.S. Security Strategy after the Cold War*, ed. Norman D. Levin and United States. Army (California: Rand, 1994), 37-8.
[276] Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders; Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy*, 122.
[277] Stanley Hoffman, "Clash of Globalizations", in *American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America's Search for Purpose between the 'Wars', 1991-2001*" ed. Nicholas Kitchen, PhD thesis, The London School of Economics, 2009, 105.
[278] Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders; Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy* , 122.

of WMD capabilities in the interest of their regime protection or for the purpose of intimidating their neighbors. Besides existing as a threat to the stability and peacefulness of the international system, these "rogue states" were perceived as an origin of terrorism that threatened American interests at home and overseas. Throughout the 1990s, the number of terroristic attacks substantially increased. They varied from state-sponsored, terrorist attacks conducted by organized groups to individual attackers. The increased number of cases of militant Islamic terrorist attacks against the well-being of the West, organized and sponsored by the states of the Middle East, led President Bill Clinton to place the issues of terrorism "at the very top of the world's agenda."[279] In the early 1990s, the process of the debate on the domestic social problems and other issues that required strict political action ranged from threats to the national security in terms of proliferation of WMD or the 'war on drugs' to the physical future of the planet, manifested in the likes of environmental degradation, surging populations, and scarce resources.[280] This extension of the security threats in the 1990s was rhetorical and practical, as policymakers dealt on a day-to-day basis with the risks and difficulties of security in a broader sense: and theoretical, echoing the change from neorealist theory with its focus on the state as the object to be' secured'.[281] The notion of security was expanded to include non-military security threats, as well as intensified in the concern over the security of individuals and groups, rather than simply focusing on the external threats to state. In the United Nation's Human Development Repost, the definition of security was expanded for "the concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people...Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought

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[279] Peter Chalk, "The Evolving Dynamic of Terrorism in the 1990s", in *American Power: For What? Ideas, Unipolarity and America's Search for Purpose between the 'Wars', 1991-2001"* ed. Nicholas Kitchen, PhD thesis, The London School of Economics, 2009, 163.
[280] Robert D. Kaplan, *"The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dream of the Post-Cold War"*, *The Atlantic Monthly*, v. 273, n. 2 (1994): 20.
[281] Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, *"Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods"*, *Mershon International Studies Review*, v. 40, no. 2 (1996): 242

security in their daily lives."[282] For liberal internationalists, the widening of definition of security issues had only reaffirmed the need for a multilateral system of management and collective answers to the security threats in order to decrease the probability of conflict and address the humanitarian crises if those conflicts happen to occur.

Liberal multilaterals supported the preservation and strengthening of the international nonproliferation regimes, and they called for increased transparency in the production, sale and deployment of weapons.[283] These efforts and notions can be summed up in the idea of 'the cooperative security' which integrates the notions that every nation's security is guaranteed in a manner that does not threaten that of other nations.[284]

The distinguishing feature of the liberal internationalism is its internal division based on the debate over the appropriate amount and use of a military power in foreign policies. Some liberals are of belief that in the support of 'American' international order, and her own strategic interests, U.S. military presence in strategic zones is a requirement. Furthermore, they have a positive perspective on the military intervention in third countries. The other side of the dichotomy has a lot in common with the isolationists as they believe the U.S. should withdraw its military forces from overseas, appropriately reduce defense spending and, but only in the cases of extreme need, evade the use of force. Regardless of this contrast of opinions, both sides within the liberal internationalism thought agree that "the soft power is far more important than the traditional balance-of power, isolationism or unilateralist approach to the world."[285]

Ever since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and her allies had, on several instances, deliberated or agreed on armed intervention in third sovereign states to address humanitarian crises such as genocide or ethnic conflicts. Regardless of noble intents and pure humanitarian reasons, regional interventions rarely succeed in the founding

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[282] Sandy A Johnson, *Challenges in Health and Development: From Global to Community Perspective* (Denver: Springer, University of Denver, 2011), 61.
[283] Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders; Power, Culture and Change in American Grand Strategy*, 122.
[284] Ibid., 122.
[285] Ibid., 124.

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of lasting resolutions to conflicts and humanitarian disasters within states.[286] For instance, in 1992 liberal internationalists called for support for U.S. intervention in both Bosnia and Somalia. Bosnia and Herzegovina was in chaos due to ethnic cleansing, whilst Somalia was fighting with widespread starvation. However, Somalia has been a definite case of a failure and Bosnia and Herzegovina can be considered as a mixed success. Although eager to address the crises in the multilateral fashion, and in accordance with UN peacekeeping, liberal multilaterals' restrain in using military force resulted in failed interventions in Somalia and, in the case of Bosnia, a late relief.

3.6 Conclusion

The second chapter has provided a historical background of ideas' influence throughout America's interactions with the world. In the first half of its existence as a young nation, the United States had exercised a strict isolationist foreign policy. The very term 'isolationism' is highly arguable. It has been interpreted that this isolationism was an imperative for the United States who, in its early beginnings, was economically and politically weak, when compared to European countries. In order to keep its people safe and its continent out of war, the avoidance of a transatlantic connection was seen as a wise and prudent foreign policy. Still, even though the United States was a powerful nation, by the time World War I had engulfed Europe, the U.S. was not willing to enter this foreign war and instead focused on its domestic progress and territorial expansions within the American continent. Aside from few exceptions, in the period from 1787 until the 1940s, the foreign policy of the United States was rather isolationist in nature.

World War II would be a turning point for the United States as it redirected its foreign policy to one of permanent overseas engagement and international leadership. The political elites' justification of this newly implemented international engagement policy was based on the imperative for the United States to globally involve itself in order to develop its power and prevent international crises and conflicts from occurring as they also ultimately usually affect U.S. interests.

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[286] Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, Kristin E. Kosek, "Why Humanitarian Interventions Succeed or Fail The Role of Local Participation", *Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association,* v. 40, no. 4 (2005): 363.

Remaining isolationist narratives were to be abruptly and effectively hushed by the threat of the Soviet Union and communist ideology. As this chapter argued, the intense debate between isolationism and internationalism resurfaced with the end of the Cold War. The second chapter also explained the main points and arguments of the foreign policy ideas of isolationism and internationalism and how their competition at the highest political level can and did influence the foreign policy behavior of the United States.

The proceeding chapter applies the theory of neoclassical realism and intervening variables of ideas on the case study of U.S. foreign policy in the Bosnian War.

4. AN EXAMINATION OF IDEAS' INFLUENCE ON THE UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY IN THE BOSNIAN WAR

This chapter turns to the case study of the Bosnian War. First, the chapter refers to two common 'Western' interpretation of the Bosnian War; one of ethnic hatred and religious intolerance as an originating cause for war and one that faults nationalist politics of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. However, the initial part of the fourth chapter disagrees with the first interpretation, and in opposition to it, maintains that religious, ethnic and national tolerance existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina for a relatively long period of time in its history. It furthermore asserts that in those points when violence and ethnic clashes had indeed happened, they were mostly caused by foreign powers' interference in already diverse condition of the Bosnian state.

As for second interpretation, this thesis partly concurs; however, it also asserts that the difficult and unequal economic situation in Yugoslavia in the aftermath of Tito's death was an incentive more for causing the Bosnian War. As it will be presented, economically collapsing Yugoslavia was a fertile ground for the rise and spread of nationalists and xenophobic ideologies.

The middle part of the chapter continues to examine U.S. foreign policy decisions towards, first, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, then to secession movements, and, finally, to first stages of the Bosnian War. It argues that, due to the isolationist atmosphere within the U.S. itself, the Bush administration avoided and ignored occurrences in Bosnia, and was further encouraged by a lack of threat and national interest. The subsequent part examines the Clinton Administration's decisions that varied from hesitant directives and actions to full-blown military intervention. With the starting argument that foreign policy ideas have strong influence onto the foreign-policy decision-making in the United States, thesis constantly tracks the atmosphere within political deciding elite in the United States, and in its broader society in both Bush and Clinton's administration.

4.1. Common Interpretations of the Bosnian War Origin

4.1.1 Debating the Correctness of 'Ethno-Religious" Reasoning of the War

During its duration, the Bosnian War was a subject of excessive attention and interest among Western politicians and the global media. It was, after all, an atrocious civil war unfolding in the heart of Europe, before the eyes of the UN and the United States. Onwards of the conflict breakout, the world media, contemporary historians, politicians, and authors have been presenting the cause of this bloody war within two 'easily-digestive interpretations.' One of those understandings puts blame on the 'history of ethnic hatred' or tribalism in the Balkan Penisula as a reason for the conflict, whereas the other interpretation perceives violence as a consequence of the dictatorial and nationalist elite of the neighbor countries of Serbia and Croatia, mainly Milosevic and Tudjman "who had hijacked and thwarted the promised democratization of politics after 1989".[287]

The arguments that favor Balkan history, 'barbarianism', and its persistent animosity among ethnic groups as a reason for conflict are, without a doubt, pretty common among foreign observers and certain local authors. (See table 2.) However, when authors like Lenard Cohen or Patrick Bishop write that 'the persistence and intensification of a deep-seated animosities among the country's diverse ethnic and religious groups; who lived together rather uneasily in the Balkan region for centuries..."[288] condemning "successive generations to perpetuate them"[289] they rely heavily on the stereotypes that ultimately obstruct clear analysis and conclusions.[290] As a contrast to these views, there stands a group of authors who hold the belief that "so-called ancient ethnic hatred was not in fact widespread in Bosnian society and, therefore, does not have its basis in medieval history."[291] It is undeniable that there were indeed clashes and fighting between different ethnic groups and communities within Bosnia and Herzegovina, "but there was far more coexistence, mutual understanding and tolerance than suppressed hatred or open confrontations."[292]

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[287] Neven Andjelic, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2005), 3.
[288] Ibid., 3-4.
[289] Ibid., 4.
[290] Ibid., 4.
[291] Ibid., 6.
[292] Ibid., 6.

Table 2: Historical Discourses on the Balkans

| | Identity | | |
Discourse	Degrees of Otherness	Temporal identity of 'the Balkans'	Western responsibility
Byronic Balkan	Different and admired	Remain different	Assist in independence
Balkan civilization	Different and underdeveloped	Transformable	Civilizing mission
Balkanization	Radical Other and threatening	Incapable of change	None

Lene Hensen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 94.

According to both Neven Andjelic and Evelyn Farkas, historians of Balkan history, 'the division between various Bosnian communities has been less persistent along the religious and ethnic lines, but more related to the economic issues, high taxes and, importantly, position in society imposed by foreign ruling powers.'[293] When the Ottoman Empire, inspired and sustained by Islam, established its reign in Bosnia in the fifteenth century, it is quite understandable that the Catholic and Orthodox segment of population would have certain complaints against the new empire, although the vision of the Ottoman Empire as a polity tolerant in terms of its subordinate's freedom of religion is widely accepted.[294] Furthermore, the Austrian research on the notorious peasant rebellions in 1870s Ottoman Bosnia has made interesting observations dismissing 'ethnic, religious and even a political basis for the peasants' revolts', arguing their origin as agrarian rather than political.'[295]

In 1878, Bosnia had traded her sovereign from that of the Ottoman Empire to an Austria-Hungarian one. This new Western ruler brought a much-needed urbanization, industrial, and cultural progress to a still largely feudal Bosnia. Besides these developments, the Hapsburgs imperial reign brought a change in the ethnic structure of Bosnia. It is often falsely perceived that after the Ottoman's (at least in

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[293] Evelyn Farkas, *Fracture States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, Ethiopia and Bosnia in the 1990s,* (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2003), 7. : Neven Andjelic, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy", 7.

[294] Karen Barkey, "Islam and Toleration, Studying the Ottoman Imperial Model" *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, v. 19, n. 1/2, (2005): Daniel Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[295] Neven Andjelic, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy*, 9.

empire's latest stages of ruling) unstable government and management of the Bosnian society, Austro-Hungary brought some order to Bosnia.[296] A historian of Europe diplomacy and affairs A.J.P Taylor describes the Austrian government as actually loathed by a majority of its subordinate population, regardless of their ethnical community and as a government that, when finally departed from Bosnia in 1914, had left behind "88 percent of the population illiterate. Fearful of South Slav nationalism, the Hapsburg administrators prevented any element of education or of self-government."[297] Relaying on the definition of nationalism by the same author that 'nationalism is an intellectual concept, impossible without literacy,[298] Neven Andjelic is quite confident in conclusion that still, at this point in Bosnian history, strong nationalist feelings in Bosnia were not dominant and not at all a principal feature of the society's dynamics.[299] The factor that brought Austro-Hungarian rule to its end was not the nationalist movements of many ethnic groups within Bosnia, it was rather the force of South Slavism. In 1914, Southern Slavs under the Hapsburgs wanted control over their nation and a sovereign state as their final goal.[300] However, for the benefit of objective analysis, it is important to stress that the Austrian period had been marked by elitist politics as political interests and organizations of domestic population had only been represented by 'the tiny, and usually the richest, social groups'[301], depriving votes and participation of the broader masses in political, social, and cultural life in Bosnia. With this order of things, it was and still is difficult for historians and politicians to determine the prevalent feelings of wider society in that period.[302]

After World War I, the Balkans saw the creation of the first multi-ethnic common state of Yugoslavia that incorporated the independent Kingdom of Serbia and the regions previously under the reign of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. With the unification of the ethnic elements came the advent of mass politics and, with it, the beginning point of serious tensions among the diverse ethnic communities in Bosnia. Although various national-ethnic sentiments and economic-social interests of these

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[296] Ibid., 10.
[297] A.J.P. Taylor, "The Hapsburg Monarchy", in *Bosnia and Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy* ed. Neven Andjelic (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2005), 10.
[298] Neven Andjelic, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy, 10.*
[299] Ibid., 10.
[300] Ibid., 11.
[301] Ibid., 13.
[302] Ibid., 13.

groups were relatively recognized and acknowledged in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, still this acknowledgement alone 'was never enough to solve the ethnic question and one might even say that the new regime and state actually created, if not helped to develop further, problems.'[303] One of the burning issues of the long overdue agrarian reform brought only new inter-ethnic conflicts as Serbian peasants were forcibly taking lands from their Muslim owners. In the realm of the political interests, all three ethnic groups diverged and differentiated. Serbs in general viewed this new, significantly larger state as their own, as an extended Serbia. Croats and Muslims were united in opposition to a centralized state and Serbian hegemony, first demanding political and territorial autonomy for Croats within Yugoslavia, whereas the Muslims were focused on the preservation of equal ethnic rights in terms of religion, education, and culture. The interwar years were marked by economic crises and repressed politics as King Aleksandra's dictatorship left no space for political activities, furthering the deterioration of already tense inter-ethnical relations. The interwar period also meant the loss of Bosnian historical and provincial character and now existed as *Banovina*, one of nine such large regions named after major rivers in order to eradicate the ethnic character of the territory.[304] The paradox was that in order to retain the existence of the Bosnian nation, the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO), the only political party representing the Muslims of Yugoslavia, actually supported a political division of Bosnia. Throughout the history of post-Ottoman Balkan, both Serbian and Croatian political forces crashed and struggled for an inclusion of Bosnia in their nation states and had viewed Muslims as a part of their own ethnicity, but of a different religion. Since the Muslims of Bosnia were the only ones concerned with the preservation of Bosnia, but political and military too weak to rebel against alien forces, the only other alternative was preservation of 'any kind of Yugoslavia.' The political division of Bosnia was accepted and even positively perceived by Muslims 'in the belief that it would strengthen the Yugoslav state'[305]

The end of the first Yugoslavia came as a logical consequence of the ascending foreign threat, persistent economic crises, malfunctioning of the state government, and strong nationalist feelings. When World War II finally reached Yugoslavian

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[303] Ibid., 13.
[304] Neven Andjelic, *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 15.
[305] Ibid., 15.

territory, it was fought on three fronts. Firstly, with the Axis' occupation of Yugoslavia, a new still notoriously labeled puppet state of Croatia was established, divided between German and Italian zones of interest. Secondly, in the name of the Croatian state, the radical Croatian nationalist group known as the Ustashas had initiated an organized extermination of Yugoslavian Serbs, which later expanded to other ethnic groups and political opponents. German authorities estimated that the Ustashas massacred around 350,000 Serbs, and a significant number of Jewish and Roma communities in Yugoslavia.[306] On the other side, in response to this aggression, the Serb royalists, the Chetniks, engaged in the fighting against both the Axis powers and their local Croatian collaborators, but were much more active in taking revenge on the Muslim population, especially in eastern Bosnia. The brutalities committed against each other, the foreign occupation, and the poor conditions of state in general resulted in the war on the third front, a resistance movement led by communist Partisans and their leader Josip Broz Tito. The communist partisans emerged as the formidable political force opposed to ethnic divisions and hatred, and, in the course of events, had became the only serious resistance movement of that period.[307] Towards the end of World War II, the Partisans enjoyed the support and participation of all major ethnic groups.[308]

The successful resistance and inclusive inter-ethnic political platform resulted in the triumphant communist revolution. With the end of World War II, the second Yugoslavia was established in a form of a federation based on a communist ideology. Although, SFRY (Socialistic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia) was principally a totalitarian state, its ideology of 'brotherhood and unity' among all Yugoslavian ethnic groups was perceived in a more positive and optimistic manner by the people of this new nation. Similar to many other areas, the understanding and agreement among local and foreign authors and historians differs on the matter of the character of Tito's Yugoslavia, and the Bosnian position within it.

For many local authors, historians, and, most importantly, common people, reminiscence of Tito's Yugoslavia is accompanied by deep nostalgia. When compared with the years before his rule and after his death, Tito's rule is being

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[306] Ibid., 16.
[307] Ibid., 16.
[308] David N. Gibbs, *First Do Not Harm, Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2009), 48.

perceived as a golden age by many.[309] A Croatian historian, Tvrtko Jakovina, fondly recalls this era, emphasizing the success of Tito's diplomacy and the importance of Yugoslavia in world politics, "That is probably the only period when my people played some sort of pivotal role in world events. In the light of everything that has happened since then, it seems like science fiction."[310] The great improvements in terms of economic development, industrialization, standard of living, and security had created positive and popular feelings towards the system and especially towards Tito. "Under communist rule schooling flourished for the first time. Health and other public services got amazingly better than anything imaginable before."[311] Yugoslavia had a highly decentralized political system as eight administrative units (six republics and two autonomous provinces) had substantial autonomy from the central government. Each unit had a predominant nationality, with exception of Bosnia, allowing a greater extent of self-governance and securing peaceful, and indeed prosperous, inter-ethnic relations in Yugoslavia.

The most important feature of Yugoslavia was its firm control and supervision of equal inter-ethnical rights as appeals to "national, racial, or religious hatred" were legally prohibited.[312] These equal rights had an enormous weight for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the only federative unit within Yugoslavia that did not that a national predominance; it was rather a 'small Yugoslavia' with three constitutive nations and a vast number of minorities.[313] It was on November 29th, 1943 that Bosnia and Herzegovina was awarded the status of a federative unit in a new state and, by this act Bosnia had, for the first time in its history, achieved statehood in a modern sense of the word. Many critics of Yugoslavia refer to be a fact that Muslims were not recognized as a constitutive people in the Yugoslavian state until the 1972 Constitution. Nevertheless, many others defend this issue, arguing that political leaders in Bosnia Herzegovina were always chosen according to the principle that all three ethnic groups would be represented equally with those politicians never acting

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[309] "Thirty Years After Tito's Death Nostalgia Still Abounds", *Radio Free Europe*, June, 13, 2016, sec. Balkans, accessed February 2, 2016, available at http://www.rferl.org/content/Thirty_Years_After_Titos_Death_Yugoslav_Nostalgia_Abounds_/20318 74.html

[310] Ibid.,

[311] Basil Davidson, "Misunderstanding Yugoslavia" in *First Do Not Harm, Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* ed. David N. Gibbs (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2005), 50.

[312] David N. Gibbs, *First Do Not Harm,* 50.

[313] Neven Andjelic, *Bosnia and Herzegovina,* 18.

in a capacity of an ethnical representative, but as a leaders of the entire Bosnian political nation.[314]

The interpretations that argue ethnic animosities as a motif for the collapse of Yugoslavia and the following violence are confronted with those who argue that regional and economic inequality should be held accountable. The distinctive measures of economic inequality may be very significant in enlightening the outbreak of war in Bosnia and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was an extremely unequal society, according to the inequality in income rates in the particular constituent republics. Higher levels of interregional inequality have tendencies to increase the risk of violent demands for self-determination. If the decade prior to the collapse of Yugoslavia is observed, it is easy to notice that Slovenia and Croatia represented the most developed national economies, due to their relative proximity to Central and Western Europe. Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, situated in the southeast far from industrial centers were underdeveloped. That is why it can be argued that great economic variation, not ethnic and religious differences primarily, could have triggered already tense societies to their rebellions and subsequent war.

In the following section, another common interpretation for the violent collapse Yugoslavia and the war it produced is elucidated. It holds that the rise of popular nationalism was produced by political powers, embodied in the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

4.1.2 Another Interpretation for the War: The Extreme Nationalist Ideologies of Slobodan Milosevic

The well-established myth in Balkans is that Yugoslavia waned on the same day of Tito's death. Ivan Ivekovic writes, "Tito died in 1980 and left behind obtuse apparatchiks with no idea whatsoever and which just strived to keep swimming protected with the charisma of their dead patron."[315] The collapse of the communist system was followed by potential democratic changes throughout Yugoslavia, including Bosnia and Herzegovina. The introduction of democracy and the rise of

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[314] Ibid., 18.
[315] Ivan Ivenkovic, " in *Bosnia and Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy* ed. Neven Andjelic (London: Frank Cass Publisheres, 2005), 21.

domestic political nationalist parties supported by their own ethnic communities of Muslims of Serbs and Croats had set up the conditions for the final disintegration of Yugoslavia.

The combination of poor economic conditions and ethnically mixed population more often than not results in extreme ideologies of nationalism.[316] The Balkans of the 1980s was a perfect cultivating spot for those extreme doctrines. The long oppressed displays of ethnic animosity gave way to the advent of strong, but radical politicians bent on finding those responsible for the economic and political backwardness of the society. The minorities, political or ethnic, were found accountable.[317] Mobilizing an aggravated population on the basis of ethnic appeals, two people were able to secure their personal power and institutionalize nationalism during this period: Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman. "Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic was the first Yugoslav politician to break the *Titoist* taboo on popular mobilization of ethnic consciousness. Milosevic portrayed himself both as the defender of Yugoslavia against the secessionist ambitions of Croatia and Slovenia and as the avenger of the wrongs done to Serbia by that very Yugoslavia."[318] Playing on the card of ethnic identity and unrealistic promises, both Milosevic and Tudjman were able to find new loyalties outside their own republic.[319] The Muslims, on the other hand, were focused on consolidating a separate Bosnian identity and loyalty to the Bosnian state that had been estranging the other two ethnic groups even further. Ivan Ivenkovic describes the situation most clearly, "the loyalty of entire segments of the population shifted towards mutually exclusive ethno-nationalist political projects and in the first pluralist elections the electorate split along ethnic fault-lines supporting nationalist parties. Once in control of various republics these parties used state coercion in order to build institutions which will further consolidate their separate ethnic constituencies now promoted into nation-states."[320]Former U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, explained the nationalistic manipulation directed in Yugoslavia: "The breakup of Yugoslavia is a classic example of nationalism from the top down...a manipulated nationalism in a region where peace has historically prevailed more than war and in which a quarter of the population were in mixed

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[316] Ibid., 20.
[317] Ibid., 20.
[318] Andjelic, *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 98.
[319] Ibid., 21.
[320] Ibid., 20.

marriages. The manipulators condoned and even provoked local ethnic violence in order to engender animosities that could then be magnified by the press, leading to further violence."[321]

After consolidating and centralizing his power, Milosević proceeded to reconstituting the political structure of Yugoslavia and, in April of 1992, he appropriated the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina to Serbia, later joined by the Republic of Montenegro. The new state was named Yugoslavia although it was missing half of its population.[322] This new Yugoslavia was state-run and dominated by only one ethnic group and with Milosevic as its president. Milosevic led an aggressive nationalist policy bent on establishing Great Serbia, which naturally had to include the integration of other former republics, willingly or forcefully. Milosevic's plans for Bosnia were to either keep Bosnia within Yugoslavia, under the rule of Serbia or, if it would secede, it would in fact lead to the war with the aim to forcefully ensure Bosnia's subordination. When civil war started to unfold, Serbia and Milosevic would militarily and financially aid a group of Bosnian Serbs and would establish political associations with the SDS party; primarily Radovan Karadzic, Nikola Koljevic and Biljana Plavsic. All of these political figures would later be known for their ethnic and biological extremisms. Biljana Plavsic held the belief that Muslims were in fact "genetically deformed Serbs, recognizing Serbs a biological right to cleanse Muslims."[323]

4.1.3 Democratic Elections as a Point of No Return for Yugoslavia

The disintegration of Yugoslavia was a gradual process that started with the first democratic elections in November 1990. These clearly demonstrated the population's tendency towards ethnical fragmentation. After nationalist parties in Slovenia and Croatia won the elections, they attempted to alter the Yugoslav system from a federal to a con federal system that would give authority and the federal bodies would function as mutual agencies. These attempts were met with disapproval by Milosevic, who has been striving for a Yugoslavia under Serbian control and his planning to forge a Greater Serbia by annexing portions of Bosnia and Croatia to

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[321] Warren Zimmerman, "The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia," *Foreign Affairs*, v. 74, n. 2 (1995): 2-20.
[322] Gibbs, *First Do Not Harm,* 120.
[323] Ibid., 121.

Serbia-Montenegro.[324] With a Constitution as a legal basis of a federal Yugoslavia being exploited and perverted by Milosevic, the federations started to rebel. Firstly, Slovenia held a referendum on independence in December 1990 with a turnout of over 90% and 89% voted in favor. Soon after, in May of 1991, Croatians followed the example which had 92% votes in favor. June 25, 1991 was the date upon which Croatia and Slovenia declared independence. Whereas Slovenia's territorial defense forces were strong enough to fend off the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), locking in Slovenian independence and its borders, Croatia had to contend with a full-blown war.

Croatia and Slovenia's disintegration was a tragic event for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as it disturbed an "already delicate fabric of relations among its constituent ethnic groups."[325][326] Elections during the 1990 most clearly demonstrated that the Bosnian population's tendency towards ethnical fragmentation "as entire population's votes matched their respective ethicists.[327] Three major nationalist and ethical parties; Bosnian Muslim's SDA, the Croat's HDZ and the Serbian's SDS received over 80% of the parliamentary seats.[328] For Bosnia and Macedonia, ethnically heterogeneous when compared to the other four republics, the case of their independence was very difficult. The Izetbegović government did not initially favor secession for Bosnia and attempts were made to establish an ethnical consensus.[329] Soon after the elections of 1990, a government of national unity was formed within which three ethnic groups shared key positions: Alija Izetbegović held a position of president, a Croat Jure Pelivan was prime minister and a Serb Momcilo Krajisnik became the speaker of the parliament.[330] However, due to the tense ethnical relations and the events of disintegration that took place, this coalition government had little chance to endure. When Slovenia and Croatia's separation from Yugoslavia became a reality, Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic worried these secessions would

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[324] Andjelic, *Bosnia and Herzegovina,* 21.

[325] Gibbs, *First Do Not Harm,* 106.

[326] The three major ethnicities in Bosnia and Herzegovina were based on the 1991 census: Bosnian Muslims (43.7 percent or 1.9 million people), Bosnian Serbs (31.3 percent or 1.3 million people) and the Bosnian Croats (17.3 percent or 753.000 people). The remaining 8.7 percent comprised other groups; Montenegrins, Gypsies, Albanians and Yugoslavs. See Tone Bringa, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village* (Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 26.

[327] Gibbs, *First Do Not Harm,* 117.

[328] Ibid., 117.

[329] Ibid., 118.

[330] Ibid., 118.

destabilize the Yugoslav Federation by increasing the relative weight of Serbia.[331] Furthermore, he worried of the Serbian attempt to establish Bosnia (and Macedonia) as the provinces within the Greater Serbia, which was unacceptable to the leadership of both republics. As a matter of fact, already in 1990 Bosnian Serb nationalists, headed by Radovan Karadzic, were agitating for a union of the Bosnian territories populated by Serbs with their neighbor Serbia. Unwilling to remain within a Yugoslavia governed by hostile Milosevic, the demand of Bosnia's Muslim and Croat leaders to separate became resolute. By the end of 1991, a vote for a pro-independence motion was proposed and was passed by a majority unanimously, even against an almost unanimous opposition from Serb delegates.[332] After the motion passed, the Serb nationalists abandoned an already fragile national coalition, motivating the remaining representatives to vote for the option of a Bosnian referendum.

The Bosnian government held a referendum for independence on March 1, 1992. The turnout was 64% of population resulting in acceptance of a multiethnic independent state by a 99% majority of Muslim and Croat voters.[333] Again, the Serbs had boycotted the referendum. On March 3, 1992, President Izetbegovic proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On April 6, 1992, the European Community recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign state. The recognition of United States followed the next day. The following month, Serbian paramilitary troops invaded Bosnia, augmenting the military effort already initiated by Bosnian Serbs and JNA soldiers.

4.2 President Bush Administration's Post-Cold War Balkan Policies: Maintaining Integrated Yugoslavia, But Not at a U.S. Cost[334]

As argued previously in this thesis, the end of the twentieth century was a period of impasse for the United States' grand strategy.[335] Post-Cold War U.S. Presidents and administrations had indeed struggled to articulate a new venerable role for the U.S. However, they failed to reach a domestic political consensus in support of a single

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[331] Diana Johnston, *Fools Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions*, (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 42.

[332] Gibbs, *First Do Not Harm*, 119.

[333] Andjelic, *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 75.

[334] Title borrowed from Dejan Marolov, "The Policy of USA and EU Towards the Disintegration of Yugoslavia" *International Journal of Social Science Tomorrow*, v. 1, n. 2 (2002)

[335] Micheal Minkenberg, *The American Impasse: U.S. Domestic and Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996)

grand strategy, allowing for U.S. day-to-day foreign policies to be influenced by arguments from both strategic alternatives, resulting in often inconsistent, incoherent and negligent responses to world crises. This thesis is interested in depicting the foreign policy of U.S. towards Bosnian war, and how and under what conditions did those policies get adopted within the U.S. administration. In the following segment, the U.S. response to the collapse of its long Cold War ally Yugoslavia is presented, as is the belief that U.S. the policy towards the Bosnian War, at least in its initial phases, is reflected in the overall U.S. policy towards the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation.[336]

During the Cold War's strict division on the spheres of influence, Yugoslavia was a unique example in Europe, as it did not belong to either of the two military-political blocs. As an Eastern European country, it was predicted that it would be under the Stalin's influence, however, Yugoslavia was an independent nation and thus a country of great strategic importance for the U.S.[337] Yugoslavia was envisioned as a buffer zone between NATO and the Warsaw Pact alliance, as well as an obstacle for the access of the Soviet Union to the Mediterranean via the Adriatic.[338] Aside from the geopolitical gains and benefits, Yugoslavia served as an example for other countries under the Soviet influence, suggesting that a country that would dare to oppose Stalin would be able to rely on U.S. support.[339] Despite an internal communist model, the violation of human rights, and a disregard for democracy, Yugoslavia enjoyed great financial aid, political support, and limited, but still sufficient, military backing from the United States. Thus, "during the period of 191949-90, the U.S. government rarely mentioned concerns over human rights violations in Yugoslavia and carefully avoided any comments that might destabilize President Josip Tito's the rule."[340]

With the end of the Cold War and the policy of containment, Yugoslavia lost much of its previous importance for the U.S.. Contrary to the general opinion that it was

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[336] Dejan Marolov, "The Policy of USA and EU Towards the Disintegration of Yugoslavia" *International Journal of Social Science Tomorrow*, v. 1, n. 2 (2002): 11-12.
[337] Ibid., 8.
[338] Ibid., 8.
[339] Lorraine M Lees, "The America Decision to Assist Tito, 1948-1990", *Oxford Journal*, v. 2, n. 4 (1978)
[340] Lukic and Lynch, "Europe From the Balkans to the Urals, The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union", in *The Policy of USA and EU Towards the Disintegration of Yugoslavia* ed. Dejan Marolov, *International Journal of Social Science Tomorrow*, v. 1, n. 2 (2002): 8.

expected that the U.S., in its dealing with eastern European countries, would favor the democratic movements and free-elected governments, the U.S. government, nonetheless, continued to collaborate with the communist leadership of Yugoslavia. Dejan Marolov in his essay "U.S. Policy towards Disintegration of Yugoslavia" introduces factors that had, in his opinion, influenced this sort of U.S. foreign policy towards Yugoslavia after the Cold War. Firstly, out of fear as to how to manage the new security vacuum in Eastern Europe, and in the absence of any newly created polices, the U.S. opted for the continuation of the Cold War policies. [341] As a second factor, Marolov considers a CIA's report from November, 1990 that gives a very precise and horrific warning predicting that "the Yugoslav experiment has failed, that the country will break up" and that "this is likely to be accomplished by ethnic violence and unrest which could lead to civil war."[342] One of the most appraised Cold War strategists George Kennan's statements to U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann agrees with this prediction saying, "Today, with the Cold War ending, people think Yugoslavia isn't in the position to do any damage. I think they are wrong. There's a fault line of instability running through the Balkans. I think events in Yugoslavia are going to turn violent and to confront the Western countries, especially United States, with one of their biggest foreign policy problems of the next few years."[343] The violent breakup of Yugoslavia that would most definitively disturb the status quo in the Balkans was not regarded as a situation that the U.S. would or could want to confront in that moment.

Thus, the first officially proclaimed statement regarding the foreign policy towards Yugoslavia in 1990 was that the United States would continue to support "democracy, dialogue, human rights, market reforms, and unity."[344] Unity seems to be the key word, as the U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia Zimmermann proclaimed that the U.S. would condemn preparations for the unilateral declaration of independence as in the case of Slovenia.[345] The U.S. supported this statement with its continued "cooperation and favoring with the Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic, instead

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[341] Ibid., 9.

[342] Ibid., 9.

[343] "George Kennan to the last Ambassador Zimmerman, Summer 1989. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB171/ch01.pdf Accessed 10.3.2016

[344] Lukic and Lynch, "Europe From the Balkans to the Urals, The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union", in *The Policy of USA and EU towards the Disintegration of Yugoslavia* ed. Dejan Marolov, *International Journal of Social Science Tomorrow*, v. 1, n. 2 (2002): 11.

[345] Marolov, *The Policy of USA and EU Towards the Disintegration of Yugoslavia*, 10.

of democratically elected governments in Slovenia and Croatia."[346] It is hereby suggested that the U.S. foreign policy towards Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s, was oriented towards the preservation of Yugoslavia as a state and support for the principle of unity.[347]

Was United States willing and ready to secure the survival of Yugoslavia at any price? Dejan Marolov endeavors to answer this question in his article "The Policy of the USA and EU towards the Disintegration of Yugoslavia". He claims that although the existence of Yugoslavia was surely a wanted and preferable outcome for the United States, this was true only if it meant that the U.S. did not have to engage militarily to secure it. As stated in Zimmerman's memories, the United States was hoping that "no constituent unit of Yugoslavia will seriously consider separation, just as we hope that no consideration will be given to using force to preserve unity."[348] The use of military force was not an option for securing the unity of Yugoslavia, as it was conscious that in the case where the integrity of Yugoslavia comes to be secured by use of force, it would most certainly result in the beginning of a bigger military conflict that ultimately would entail some sort of U.S. military participation. As it was already involved in the fight in the Persian Gulf, this probability was too high in terms of costs and estimated profits. Dejan Morolov concludes that the policy adopted by the U.S towards Yugoslavia after the Cold War which endured until the outbreak of violence was "maintaining Yugoslavia but not by all means" policy: a policy that favorite integrated Yugoslavia, but was not procuring military engagement in order to achieve it.

With the separation of Slovenia and Croatia and the eruption of violence, the desired principle of Yugoslavian unity was rationally dead. The new policy of the United States, the policy that could firmly respond to the reality of the civil war in Yugoslavia, had to be adopted. This policy was "wait and see" and, although considered as a new policy-approach with different guiding principles, many authors perceive it as a furtherance of the former policy of the U.S., the above mentioned "maintaining Yugoslavia, but not at any price". This assertion relies on the fact that the "wait and see" policy had not entitled any sort of distinct efforts or actions, nor

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[346] Ibid., 10.
[347] Ibid., 10.
[348] Warren Zimmermann in *The Policy of USA and EU towards the Disintegration of Yugoslavia* ed. Dejan Marolov, *International Journal of Social Science Tomorrow*, v. 1, n. 2 (2002): 11.

were there more determine engagements that would bring change for Yugoslavia's disorder. Dejan Marolov suggests that it is hard to differentiate between the two policies as both are characterized by the lack of some noticeable and momentous actions from the American diplomacy.[349] What is certain is that the United States, "uncertain over the future direction of events" had left the management of the problem to the Europeans and was "content to follow rather than lead on the issue of regional instability in south-eastern Europe."[350]

4.3 The Bosnian War and U.S.' Disengagement: No National Interest, No Military Intervention

The basic factor of U.S. policy in President George H.W. Bush's administration towards the Bosnian war was that the European Community should be trusted with the main accountability for the management of the crisis. The disintegration of the Soviet Union after the coup against Gorbachev in August of 1991 and the Gulf War were burden enough for the electoral campaigning of George H.W. Bush, without having to deal with the complex Yugoslav conflict. Probably the most accurate assertion from the Bush administration was that "our domestic problems are myriad and cry out for attention. We want somebody-anybody-to take over the load overseas."[351] On May 24th, 1992, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker pressed for the European Community to be more dynamic in resolving the war "as it was time to make the Europeans step up to the plate and show they could act as a unified power."[352] Meanwhile, the European Community was already pushing for the establishment of a new foreign policy independent from U.S. and NATO and the case of the Bosnian War was perceived as a perfect opportunity for Europeans to display this new foreign policy.[353] Europeans insisted that the Bosnian War should be theirs to manage and that the "hour of Europe had dawned",[354] as famously stated by Luxemburg's foreign minister and the member of the troika leading the European Community, Jacques Poos. On the other hand, the Bush administration was relieved

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[349] Marolov, *The Policy of USA and EU towards the Disintegration of Yugoslavia*, 11.

[350] Lukic and Lynch, "Europe From the Balkans to the Urals, The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union", in *The Policy of USA and EU towards the Disintegration of Yugoslavia* ed. Dejan Marolov, (International Journal of Social Science Tomorrow, v. 1, n. 2 (2002): 12.

[351] Farkas, *Fracture States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, Ethiopia and Bosnia in the 1990s*, 81.

[352] Steven Berg and Paul Shop, *"The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention"*, 21.

[353] Farkas, *Fracture States and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 81.

[354] Ibid., 80.

to consider this conflict as European, leaving the Balkan scene largely to the Europeans.

The violence in Bosnia broke out in April of 1992, only two days after the international community recognized Bosnia as a sovereign state. Among the initial responses from the UN Security Council was imposition of economic sanctions against Serbia in May, 1992. However, the summer period would only witness the escalation of a humanitarian crisis as the UN weapons embargo on the entire Yugoslavia, in strength from September of 1991, had left Bosnian soldiers at a large disadvantage against JNA, Yugoslavia's national army, now under a Serbian monopoly. It had been as early as June that 1.1 million people had been displaced, and the end of 1992 marked 2 million people as refugees.[355] In mid-September, the UN deployed peacekeepers in the context of a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). UNPROFOR would become the largest peacekeeping operation ever undertaken by the UN, growing into 40,000 men and women by the end of 1994 and drawing troops from 40 countries, still primarily from West European NATO-members, with France and Britain as the biggest contributors.[356] Although deployed in a war zone, soldiers were not to be engaged in military fighting, but rather to 'ensure a peaceful political settlement' facilitating humanitarian aid convoys, as well as humanitarian relief flights into the Sarajevo airport.[357] With all its efforts and reasonably successful delivery of the relief and humanitarian aid, the UN and its UNPROFOR peacekeepers were not enough, as it did not obtain nearly enough authority or the resources that would have been essential to end the hostility.[358] It can be argued that UNPROFOR's principal function was political, in terms that it had pleased an extensive international pressure that the great powers needed to "do something" in Bosnia.[359] President George Bush and his administration refrained from any direct or determined action, perceiving the Bosnian problem entirely European and as such, as

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[355] Carl Dahlman, Gearo´id O´ Tuathail, "Broken Bosnia: The Localized Geopolitics of Displaced and Return in Two Bosnian Places", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, v. 95, n. 3 (2005): 645.

[356] Jon Western, "The Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia." *International Security*, v. 26, n. 4, (2002): 12.

[357] Vincent Rigby, "Bosnia and Herzegovina; An International Response", *Political and Social Affairs Division*,1994, accessed March 18, 2016., available at http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp374-e.htm#

[358] Western, *The Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia*, 15.

[359] Ibid., 15.

a burden and cost for European powers. However, the question this thesis asks is what factors influenced such perspective and ideas in the Bush administration? Why did President George H.W. Bush and his closest advisers deny the possibility of the deployment of the U.S. military forces in Bosnia?

4.3.1 Selective Engagers in the Bush Administration

The argument given proposes that the restraint and the lack of a clear, direct action in Bosnia was a consequence of the political interplay of the conflicting foreign policy elites' ideas about the appropriateness of U.S. intervention in Bosnia. The 1900s' witnessed the return of the neo-isolationists ideas in American high policies and in the wider public. Neo-isolationists such as Pat Buchanan, an American political analyst and other analysts at the Cato Institute, opposed U.S. involvement in the world, and especially to military interventionism, based on the national power calculations. They stressed that U.S. is the most secure country in the world, separated from rest of the world by two oceans, absent of any direct threats to its territorial sovereignty.[360] Isolationists of post-Cold War were aware that pure and all-embracing isolationism is not a possible reality for a new, interrelated system, and were out-voiced by proponents like the selective engagers, a strand of somewhat moderated isolationism which dominated the first post-Cold War years. Supporters of selective engagement describe American security in terms of certain "strategic areas," although the criteria to define those regions are not always clear.

The prevalent ideas in the Bush administration were the ideas of selective engagers and the high-ranking military officer corps who held the belief that U.S. military intervention is required only in the cases where U.S. strategic vital or material interests are under direct threat. With the end of the Cold War, the Balkans and the Horn of Africa had radically lost their strategic importance to the United States. Thus, in the period of 1991 and 1992, in the absence of any sort of U.S. military commitment, Bosnia, Somalia, and other conflicts were results of the dominant ides held by selective engagers. Within the governing administration, the opposition to selective engagers was a group of liberal humanitarians who had been endorsing the military interventions to nations in distress in order to deliver humanitarian aid and to

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[360] Daryl G. Press and Eugene Goltz, "Searching for That 'Vision' Thing: America's Foreign Policy Choices" *Breakthroughs,* v.1, n.1 (1996): 4.

protect and prevent violations of human rights. However, these few members of Congress coming from a liberal humanitarian division, despite their interest and understanding of the events unfolding in former Yugoslavia, lacked a convincing administrative and political base on which to mobilize public and political opposition to the Bush administration's policies on Bosnia.[361] On the other hand, selective engagers, with their asymmetric hold on information and executive branch political resource mobilization, were able to dominate political discourse on U.S. policies in Bosnia.

Initially, the condition that influenced selective engagers and their non-intervention ideas to prevail in Congress and the American public was their successful portrayal of Bosnia as "a land steeped in ethnic hatreds dating back hundreds of years" about which the United States could do little.[362] Based on this analysis of the conflict, the administration argued publicly that the prudent policy was to refrain from involvement in a situation that could only lead to a Vietnam-style quagmire for the United States.[363] In the administration's effort to distract possible public demands for intervention, Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger in 1992 claimed, "this war is not rational. There is no rationality at all about ethnic conflict. It is gut; it is hatred; it's not for any common set of values or purposes; it just goes on."[364] Therefore, a large segment of American public had come to view the Bosnian War as a absolutely tragic, but expectable revival of ancient hatreds and had agreed with the administration's limited policies of sending humanitarian relief and, in the interest of U.S.' vital interests, containing the conflict from spreading to areas of Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria.[365]

4.3.2 The Powell Doctrine

The support and endorsement for the non-interventionist and disengaged Bosnian policy came from the military strategy department. During the Bush presidency, the most influential view on military strategy was summarized in what will later be known as the Powell Doctrine. It was named after General Colin Powell, the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and one of the high-ranking

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[361] Western, *The Sources of Humanitarian Intervention,* 19.
[362] Ibid., 19
[363] Ibid., 20.
[364] Purinton, *Intervention or Inaction,* 29.
[365] Western, *The Sources of Humanitarian Intervention,* 20.

commanders in the Vietnam War. In his article "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead" Powell précised when and how U.S. military should be exercising its deployment: "When the political objective is important, clearly defined and understood, when the risks are acceptable, and when the use of force can be effectively combined with diplomatic and economic policies, then clear and unambiguous objectives must be given to the armed forces. These objectives must be firmly linked with the political objectives."[366] Basically, the Powell Doctrine proscribes that "any war involving the United States should be fought with overwhelming force against the enemy to minimize American casualties and ensure a decisive victory."[367] The Bush administration was quick to put the Powell strategy to work in the case of the Bosnian War and it would have a great part in shaping the U.S. foreign policy in Bosnia. Powell was strongly opposed to the possibility of military intervention in Bosnia, as in Bosnia, U.S. troops had neither clear objectives nor an exit strategy.[368] In his memoir, *My American Journey*, Powell recalls how, during his debate with U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright over U.S. troop commitment to Bosnia, she angrily asked, "What is the point of having this superb military that you're [Powell] always talking about, if we can't use it?" Powell's answer was equally angry, "American GIs were not toy soldiers to be moved around on some sort of global game board."[369] He proceeded to show Albright a fascinating statistic of U.S. military troops commitment to "more than two dozen times in the preceding three years" for war and humanitarian missions.[370] It is only because they had a clear objective and target before they were sent.[371] There were to be no more vague, endless commitments as in Vietnam.[372]

Experienced by the Vietnam War, Powell feared that even a limited U.S. intervention in Bosnia would result in a Vietnam-style quagmire.[373] Furthermore, even the limited military intervention would carry heavy costs for the U.S. When discussion over the option of an emergency humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo took place in June of 1992,

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[366] Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead", *Foreign Affairs*, v. 72, n. 5 (1992-93): 38.
[367] Purinton, *Intervention or Inaction*, 30.
[368] Måseidvåg, *Presidential Decision Making in the Clinton Administrations' Foreign Policy*, 21.
[369] Powell, *My American Journey*, 303.
[370] Ibid., 303.
[371] Anna Kasten Nelson, *The Policy Makers: Shaping American Foreign Policy Since 1947 to the Present*, (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 160.
[372] Ibid., 160.
[373] Purinton, *Intervention or Inaction*, 29.

senior military officers informed U.S. Congress that even this sort of partial action, definitively cheaper and sustainable that a complete military intervention, would "entail the deployment of more than 50.000 American troops to secure a perimeter of 30 miles around the Sarajevo airport."[374] As to a guaranty of liberating a besieged Sarajevo and to ensure a full cease of fire, the Joint Chief of Staff informed Congress in August 1992 "a whopping 400,000 troops would be needed."[375] According to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, the Joint Chiefs had often, and particularly in this case, "inflated the estimates of what it would take to accomplish some of these limited objectives, but once you have the Joint Chiefs making their estimates, it's pretty hard for armchair strategists to challenge them and say they are wrong."[376]Another reason Powell greatly feared was the risk of a guerrilla war, as Yugoslavians were certainly experienced in guerilla warfare from World War II, and were familiar with the mountainous terrain of Bosnia, whereas the U.S Army had just fought in the very different environment of the Persian Gulf. He noted concisely: "We (in the army) do deserts, we don't do mountains."[377]

Although Powell's restrained policy was the prevailing one within the Bush administration, it is important to reflect on the opposing side during the Bush presidency that believed in the option of a military intervention. Aside from Congress members, the support for the military intervention was largely given by analysts and writers in the media who had used strong and often dramatic tone and language in demands for U.S. actions. One of the most influential U.S. journalists and intellectuals, Anthony Lewis wrote that "American action is crucial now, immediately, before cold and hunger complete the work of guns and knives in Bosnia. I still believe that President Bush can be moved to act. The alternative is to be remembered as are those who closed their eyes to Nazi persecution and murder."[378] Within the U.S. army management, Gen. Merrill McPeak opted for a military intervention, in the form of an air strikes, arguing that the Air Force would not be damaged as the Army could. Another prominent supporter for U.S. military intervention was Senate Republican Bob Dole. Dole had often advocated for

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[374] Ibid., 30.
[375] Ibid., 30.
[376] John M. McCormick, *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence* (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 403.
[377] Gibbs, *First Do Not Harm*, 130.
[378] Western, *The Sources of Humanitarian Intervention*, 68.

President Bush to exert more leadership in management of Bosnian war as it would "increase the chances for a just settlement of the crisis."[379]

Still, pro-interventionists arguments were overruled, as President Bush himself was unwilling to militarily engage in Bosnia. President Bush's opinion was shared with Dick Cheney, who held the position of the Secretary of Defense and was only second to President when it comes to control of U.S. military power. In clarifying his refusal to send U.S. soldiers to Bosnia, Cheney evoked the fact that the U.S. had neither strong nor clear purposes in doing so, stressing "if I had 500,000 troops on the ground in Bosnia tomorrow, what would I tell them to do? Who is the adversary? What are the rules of engagement? How many Yugoslavs should we kill to keep Yugoslavs from killing other Yugoslavs? How do we get out? What do I define as victory?"[380] Cheney's vision was seconded by the Secretary of State, James Baker. "If the United States had intervened, Baker suspected, "the casualties would have been staggering."[381]

When debating on the reasons for the absence of military intervention, or even any determined U.S. action in the initial phases of the war in Bosnia, it is certainly easy to trace the selective engager's ideas of "region selective" in the Bush administration's foreign policy decisions. Bosnia was not in a zone of U.S. vital national interest nor did a conflict threaten U.S. status in Europe. The statement declared by Hutchings, a U.S. policy officer clearly summarizes this claim. "We never decided whether Yugoslavia mattered enough to invest considerable American leadership and, if need be to place substantial numbers of American men and women in harm's way to halt or at least contain the conflict."[382] Secretary of State James Baker corresponds to Hutchings with his statement that "our (U.S.') vital interests were not at stake. The Yugoslav conflict had the potential to be intractable, but it was nonetheless a regional dispute."[383] Thus, the reasons behind the United States' selective and hesitant policies were that "clearly and correctly American leaders did

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[379] "Sen. Bob Dole Again Urges the President to Send a Special Envoy to Yugoslavia to Provide American Leadership in Mediation Efforts to Settle the Crisis in Yugoslavia" Bush Presidential Records, September 16, 1991, WHORM Subject File, General, Scanned Records, CO 176 [269969], George H. W. Bush Presidential Library.
[380] Western, *The Sources of Humanitarian Intervention*, 23.
[381] Ibid., 23.
[382] Berg Soup, *The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 200.
[383] Ibid., 201.

not see "vital" national interest imperiled by the Yugoslav conflict."[384]

4.4 Candidate Clinton Promises Engagement, President Clinton Backs Out

With the discovery of four concentration camps - Omarska, Trnopolje, Manjace and
Keraterm in the summer of 1992, the civil war in Bosnia received enormous
coverage by international media. The efforts of the selective engagers in the Bush
Administration to frame the Bosnia conflict as unsolvable and driven by ancient
ethnic animosities was now met with suspicion by outraged western media and
public. *The New York Times* and *Washington Post* had, among many other
newspapers prone to intervention in Bosnia, accused the Bush Administration for the
lack of response, contending that American taxpayers should expect "more for their
money than no-can-do."[385] Furthermore, the sheer media coverage and availability to
the information and knowledge available to wider public in United States of the
atrocities committed in Bosnia, high political officers and NGOs were able to
intensify their support for intervention and mobilize political pressure on the Bush
Administration. Instead of using the selective engagers' explanation, NGOs
collaborated with members of the Senate Intelligence Committee to establish correct
information if Milosevic's military forces were indeed committing genocide, decided
on exposing a new perspective of the conflict as one "of sinister elite manipulation in
which the violence against civilians was part of highly coordinated campaigns to
advance narrow political ambitions of ruthless elites."[386] Based on this sort of
Bosnian conflict portrayal, pro-interventionists believed that a U.S. military
intervention aimed at those political elites could swiftly end the humanitarian
disasters.

While campaigning for the position of 42nd U.S. President, Governor William
Jefferson Clinton harshly criticized President Bush for his extensive focus on foreign
affairs, promising to the American people, if elected, that he would not be "the
foreign policy president" and would rather focus on the overdue domestic concerns.
Paradoxically, it will be Bush's reluctant policy towards Bosnia "that provided a

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[384] Ibid., 200-201.
[385] Jon Western, *The Sources of Humanitarian Intervention*, 25.
[386] Ibid., 25.

foreign policy platform for Clinton to attack Bush."[387] On July 26th, 1992, Candidate Clinton delivered a statement as a reaction to intelligence reports coming from Bosnian concentration camps arguing, "The United States should take the lead in seeking UN Security Council authorization for airstrikes against those who are attacking the relief effort."[388] Clinton believed that Bush administration's efforts to deliver humanitarian relief and mild diplomatic pressure were not sufficient to end ethnic cleansing, and that using force was the only option. On another note, in August of the same year, the New York Times praised Clinton's stance towards the Bosnian issue, quoting his words that "the United States should consider using military force to open Serbian detention camps and should lift the arms embargo on the former Yugoslav republics of Bosnia and Croatia."[389] President Bush himself was against lifting the arms embargo, as he feared that it would only result in an escalation of violence.[390] However, it is important to note that even Clinton was careful when proposing the use of the U.S. military force. During the first presidential debate on October 11, 1992, on the question of the U.S. response to what seemed to be ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, Clinton agreed with Bush's reluctance to commit ground troops, saying "I agree that we cannot commit ground forces to become involved in the quagmire of Bosnia."[391] He instead approved the Bush's administration decision to establish 'a no-fly zone' over Bosnia and continued to advocate the lifting of the embargo and use of airstrikes. Still, Clinton was careful to express "he did not have the immediate intention of committing U.S. ground troops to Bosnia."[392]

With an easy victory, William Jefferson Clinton was elected as the 42nd President of the United States in November, 1992. As soon as January of 1993, President Clinton gathered his newly comprised National Security Team to discuss and review U.S. options towards Bosnia according to information supplied by the State Department and the Central Intelligence agency. According to Ivo Daadler, among the foreign policy options, these five were primarily considered: using airpower to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina, engaging in air strikes against Serb

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[387]Natalie Pierce, "The Clinton Years: Assessing Success in the Bosnian Genocide Intervention." *Global Tides*, v. 5, n. 3 (2011): 5.
[388]Ibid., 5.
[389]Ibid., 5.
[390] Jon Western, *The Sources of Humanitarian Intervention, 25.*
[391] Pierce, *The Clinton Years: Assessing Success in the Bosnian Genocide Intervention, 6.*
[392] Ibid., 6.

artillery positions and airfields, altering the UN arms embargo to allow the Bosnian Muslims to obtain more weapons, establishing UN peacekeeping operation in Kosovo and Macedonia to prevent further spread of conflict in the region, and creating an international war commission to investigate reports of war atrocities. It is clear that none of these options contained the option of American "boots on the ground" in Bosnia.[393] With his arrival in the Office and under the scrutiny of the opposition and public, President Clinton looked for ways to expand U.S. engagement in Bosnia without placing American lives at risk.

Although, it is possible to assume that President Clinton originally deliberated a more aggressive stance in U.S. policy towards the Bosnian War, once in Office, Clinton was under pressure to limit proposals that involved deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia, both domestically and internationally. Within his administration the opinion on the Bosnian strategy was far from consensus. When debating on an airstrikes strategy alone, the division was clear. Those in support of the President's suggestion were Vice President Al Gore, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, while the main opposition came from Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin who had mostly supported a diplomatic solution to the war, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, for whom suggested airstrikes should to be carried out only if combined with ground troops (opposed by a majority of members and Clinton himself) and a thorough exit strategy.[394] Ivo Daalder observes, "In the absence of a consensus among his advisers – or even majority support for a single option – Clinton deferred a final decision on what to do."[395] The conclusion of a first review in February, 1993 on U.S. Balkan policy was that U.S. ground troops would not be deployed to Bosnia under any circumstances. Internationally, U.S. European allies still struggled to reach a suitable measure and policy and to deal with the violence in Bosnia with "an ineffective peacekeeping force on the ground." However, without permission to send troops to Bosnia, President Clinton had very little real influence on U.S. allies, except for trying to persuade European allies to

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[393] Maseidvag, *Presidential Decision Making in the Clinton Administrations' Foreign Policy*, 41.
[394] Sébastien Barthe, Charles-Philippe David, "Foreign Policy Making in the Clinton Administration: Reassessing Bosnia and the Turning Point of 1995", *Occasional Papers*, n.2 (2004): 8.
[395] Ibid., 8.

influence the outcome on the ground in Bosnia.[396] The French and British governments both rejected the U.S. proposed "lift and strike" policy for two reasons; firstly, partially lifting the arms embargo would only lead to an escalation of violence and prolongation of the war, whereas air strikes would endanger Europe's soldiers already in Bosnia. The stance of the Europeans was pretty clear: that as long as the U.S. was not ready to send its ground troops to secure the success of its proposed military actions, the agreement on lifting the arms embargo could not be reached.

The most notable success of the joint U.S. and UN actions was Operation Deny Flight on March 31 1993 which prohibited all unauthorized flights over Bosnian airspace, frequently violated despite enforcing it in October 1992 and had permitted UN force to take all necessary measures...to ensure compliance with no-fly zone restrictions. Furthermore, on April 16, 1993 the UN had, on President Clinton's recommendation, declared 'a safe area' around Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia where killing and ethnic cleansing was particularly offensive.[397] In May of 1993, the UN extended the status of 'a safe zone' to the cities of Sarajevo, Zepa, Goradze, Tuzla and Bihac under UN (and NATO) protection. President Clinton was aware that "these were good things to do, but it didn't slow the killing much" and in the end of the traditional 'first one hundred days' in Office, "we were nowhere near a satisfactory solution to the Bosnian crisis."[398]

The first assessment of Clinton's presidency and policy decision undertaken by his administration, and especially in the case of Bosnia, included both praises and critics. While *USA Today* viewed that Clinton "has struggled to find an effective way to end the carnage in Bosnia-Herzegovina,"[399] others had perceived Clinton's efforts in Bosnia as a stalemate, at best as episodic.[400] Still, there are other critics of the Clinton administration and a most vocal one was William Hyland who argued that President Clinton "had no strong conviction about what the American foreign policy should accomplish except to please voters. Clinton wanted to be informed, but his

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[396] Maseidvag, *Presidential Decision Making in the Clinton Administrations' Foreign Policy*, 41.

[397] Pierce, *The Clinton Years: Assessing Success in the Bosnian Genocide Intervention*, 8.

[398] "Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency; The Role of Intelligence and Presidency in Ending the Bosnian War" *William J. Clinton Presidential Library Little Rock*, Arkansas, 1 October 2013, 9.

[399] Pierce, *The Clinton Years: Assessing Success in the Bosnian Genocide Intervention*, 8.

[400] Ibid., 8.

aides were warned not to take too much of the President's time."[401] As President Clinton and his administration came to believe that "Bosnia could put Clinton on dangerous political terrain domestically," they also viewed that devoting too much time to international affairs would understandably unfulfill his campaign promises on the U.S. economy, thus if there were no prospect of a quick and easy victory, Bosnia would certainly become a liability to the President.[402] Listening to his consultants, Clinton kept his distance from Bosnia or any other foreign matter in general, wary of repeating Lyndon Johnson's mistake and becoming entangled in a foreign war that would hamper his ability to push forward his domestic agenda."[403]

The truth is that both external and internal factors converged and outlined the U.S. approach to the Bosnian War. As mentioned above, one of those was the U.S. failed attempt to persuade its European allies to reason and comply with the U.S. proposed strategies. Another was of more internal nature deriving from the President's sporadic focus on the international issue of Bosnia, extending to the lack of consensus within the U.S. political elite on what is an effective strategy for the Bosnian quagmire, without having to commit U.S. military force and deal with public backlash in case of danger to its soldiers. For the first one and a half years, "vagueness and indecisiveness were the hallmark of Clinton's Bosnia policy, giving it the appearance of an ongoing damage control operation."[404]

4.5 The Change to Hesitant U.S. Engagement in Bosnia

While Clinton and his advisers were deliberating on the solution of the Bosnian crisis, the situation worsened dramatically. Although still in force, the arms embargo was successfully violated by both Muslim and Croats. In mid-1993, the Muslims and Croats began fighting amongst themselves, creating a smokescreen of a civil war that covered up the continued violence and ethnic cleansing of Muslims by Serbs. So while on one side, Sarajevo was under siege and attack from Bosnian Serbs, Mostar, the city in southern Bosnia was under bombardment by Croats. However, what had appalled and revolted the international community were images and reports coming

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[401] Maseidvag, *Presidentall Decision Making in the Clinton Administrations' Foreign Policy*, 43.
[402] Barthe, David, *Foreign Policy Making in the Clinton Administration: Reassessing Bosnia and the Turning Point of 1995*, 7.
[403] Ibid., 7.
[404] Ibid., 7.

after Serbs had attacked and conducted massive killings in NATO protected 'safe havens' in June of 1993. In July, 1993 Clinton had promptly invited the UN into negotiations and discussions for a new Bosnia approach that should understand and include all possible options, even if it required the commitment of U.S. troops. Indeed, on July 11th, the U.S. deployed 300 of its peacekeeping troops to Republic of Macedonia "to help contain the Bosnian war."[405] Still managing the domestic debate to intervention, Clinton argued, "The troops were not there to engage in combat but were simply there to protect the safe havens." According to The New York Times, "the deployment of infantry soldiers and logistical-support troops is not intended to roll back Serbian gains or to stop the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but to signal that the United States wants to insure that the fighting does not spread to neighboring countries."[406] Meanwhile, the U.S. had also decided to contribute aircraft to NATO, along with France, Britain, the Netherlands, and Turkey that would be used in airstrikes to protect the UN safe havens and no-fly zone. However, reaching an agreement proved very difficult.

In August of 1993, at the urgency of Clinton's staff member Warren Christopher, the positive British and French responses to NATO airstrikes in Bosnia were secured, however such military action would be taken only under the condition that both NATO and the UN would give is approval. Thus, the UN Secretary General and NATO's SACEUR each held one of two keys needed for an agreement, a so called 'dual key approach'.[407] This 'dual key' agreement on airstrikes was not reached as Russia vetoed it in the UN Security Council and even with dominant French and British roles in UNPROFOR, air strikes by NATO were vetoed to avoid Bosnian Serb repercussions. The preferred approach of the Clinton Administration could not be executed as long as UNPROFOR troops were vulnerable to being taken hostage. So, the 'dual key system' demonstrated to be "a frustrating impediment to protecting the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats."[408]

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[405] Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Says It Will Send 300 Troops To Balkan Republic to Limit Strife", *The New York Times*, June 11, 1993, sec. World, accessed May, 15 2016, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/11/world/us-says-it-will-send-300-troops-to-balkan-republic-to-limit-strife.html?pagewanted=all

[406] Ibid.

[407] "Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency; The Role of Intelligence and Presidency in Ending the Bosnian War" *William J. Clinton Presidential Library Little Rock*, 10.

[408] Ibid., 10.

Despite President Clinton's still obvious reluctance to commit U.S. troops to Bosnia, by the end of the 1993, deviations from the previous stagnant policies are visible. The condition that contributed to this was, first off all, the departure of Colin Powell from his position of the Head of the Joint Staff in September of 1993. His successor was Gen. John Shalikashvili, who was a lot more willing to consider military intervention. A second condition was U.S. credibility within NATO. NATO's active involvement in the securing of the no-fly zones over Bosnia and 'safe havens' had to be successful in order to prove NATO's relevance.[409]

The new, dynamic U.S. strategies in early 1994 were influenced by the above mentioned factors, as well as the events on the ground. The bombing of a market in the center of Sarajevo, Markale, on the 5th of February, 1994 would influence an establishment of a modified strategy for the Bosnian conflict. This new strategy would include a more aggressive approach in exercising threats against the Serbs, increased U.S. involvement in the peace and diplomatic negotiations, and applying pressure on NATO's readiness to conduct airstrikes. Indeed, two weeks after the brutal attack on the Sarajevo civilians, NATO voted, with the approval coming from the UN Secretary-General to conduct airstrikes against the Serbs if they didn't move their heavy guns more than a dozen miles away from the city.[410] The determination and a result of the NATO threat were evident: not just had 20 kilometers of exclusion around Sarajevo been established, but on February 28th, NATO fighters had shot down four Serbian planes in violation of the no-fly zone, "the first military action in the forty-four-year history of the alliance."[411] The U.S. continued on its diplomatic efforts as President Clinton called for an alliance between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims in order to increase the military balance between the parties on the ground in Bosnia. On March 18th, 1994, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman visited the White House to sign a Washington Agreement to guarantee a cease-fire between Croats and Muslims. As Clinton noticed, "The fighting between Muslims and Croatians had not been as severe as that in which both sides had engaged with the Bosnian Serbs." He noted, "the agreement

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[409] Gibbs, *First Do Not Harm*, 155.
[410] "Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency; The Role of Intelligence and Presidency in Ending the Bosnian War" *William J. Clinton Presidential Library Little Rock*, 11.
[411] Ibid., 11.

was still an important step toward peace."[412] Another motif behind this strategy was to "alter the balance of power on the ground by encouraging Muslims and Croats to stop quarreling and unite against the Serbs."[413]

In the beginning of April, Bosnian Serb forces engaged in an offensive against Gorazde, a city in eastern Bosnia, additionally killing an UNPROFOR soldier. In response, NATO launched an air strike against Serbian forces, and as to protect from repeated airstrikes, Ratko Mladic, the Commander of Bosnian Serb forces enclosed a contingent of UNPROFOR soldiers, threatening their executions. These occurrences will prompt the United States and European nations to form a Contact Group, a negotiating forum comprised out of five nations; U.S., Britain, France, Germany, and Russia. Russia was certainly a greeted as a new member due to its leverage and influence over the Serbs. Furthermore, for President Clinton, this group was envisioned to serve to better international unity and harmony, surpassing the problematic 'dual key' UN system. (Clinton wanted the UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali completely eliminated from the chain of command.)[414] As a consequence, NATO and UN cooperation would be at a standstill until the 1995 Srebrenica genocide. The Contact Group had "decided on a set of principles for any peace settlement." They had agreed to a map of Bosnia: it would remain a single state, comprised of the Muslim-Croat federation which would control 51% of the territory and 49% of a Serb entity, and these entities would be linked by constitutionally-agreed principles."[415] Bosnian Serbs would reject the plan, but they would find themselves in a relatively equal situation with Bosnian Muslims and Croatian forces, in terms of military supply as Serbia had decided to stop its support to Bosnian Serbs and later had found ways to surpass the arms embargo. On June 24, 1994, there was an article published in The Washington Times 'Iranian weapons sent via Croatia Aid to Muslims gets U.S. wink' which argued that Iranian weapons had been sent to the Bosnian military. [416]

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[412] Ibid., 11.

[413] The Economists in *First Do Not Harm, Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* ed. David N. Gibbs (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2009), 155.

[414] Maseidvag, *Presidential Decision Making in the Clinton Administrations' Foreign Policy*, 47.

[415] Farkas, *Fracture States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, Ethiopia and Bosnia in the 1990s*, 77.

[416] Michael Gordon, "Iran said to send arms to Bosnia", *The New York Times*, September 10, 1992, accessed March 11, 2016, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/10/world/iran-said-to-send-arms-to-bosnians.html

In the 1994 November mid-term election, the Democrats had lost both houses of Congress to the Republicans who had been long cheering for an arms embargo lift in Bosnia, unilaterally even. Thus, in November of 1994, Clinton was forced to declare that the U.S. could no longer enforce the arms embargo in Bosnia.[417] However, this act was met with great disapproval from NATO, "How could he, who did not share the risk of having troops in Bosnia, unilaterally lift the arms embargo?"[418] European allies with troops in UNPROFOR even started to consider withdrawal of their forces from Bosnia. In order to repair the rift with its allies, in December of 1994 President Clinton announced that due to a necessary extradition of UNPROFOR, the U.S. would send 25.000 U.S. troops. President Clinton reasserted his readiness to commit U.S. troops in his speech at the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, saying, "We believe still that a strengthened United Nations operation is the best insurance against an even worse humanitarian disaster should they leave. We have a longstanding commitment to help our NATO allies....and after consultation with Congress, I believe we should be prepared to assist NATO if it decides to meet a request from the United Nations troops for help in a withdrawal or a reconfiguration and a strengthening of its forces."[419]

4. 6 The United States Move to a Policy of Military Engagement

4.6.1 A Betrayal in Srebrenica

President Clinton's promises and his best intentions would not be enough to counter events in the summer of 1995 on the ground in Bosnia. Zepa, Goradze and Srebrenica, cities with predominant Muslim populations, and 'safe heavens' protected by the UN and Dutch soldiers were encircled by Bosnian Serbs. Unable to resist well-armed Serbs, all three cities surrendered. Between 6-11th of July, Bosnian Serbs attacked and overran the city of Srebrenica, imprisoning 600 Dutch peacekeepers and killing around 7.000 Muslims.[420] The Srebrenica Genocide in July of 1995 became the turning point for U.S. policies in Bosnia.[421]   As Richard

[417] "Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency; The Role of Intelligence and Presidency in Ending the Bosnian War" *William J. Clinton Presidential Library Little Rock*, 12.
[418] Maseidvag, *Presidential Decision Making in the Clinton Administrations' Foreign Policy*, 48.
[419] Ibid., 50.
[420]Pierce, *The Clinton Years: Assessing Success in the Bosnian Genocide Intervention*, 9.
[421] Barthe, David, *Foreign Policy Making in the Clinton Administration: Reassessing Bosnia and the Turning Point of 1995*, 7.

Holbrooke recalls, "the Srebrenica massacre was the worst of war crimes in Europe since the World War II while the West did nothing."[422] Even though the attack on Srebrenica was not the first Bosnian Serb attack on UN safe havens, the reported crimes had strongly violated international peace agreements and codes of conduct.

As Holbrooke asserts, the urgency for the U.S. to take definite measures in Bosnia after Srebrenica Genocide was stronger than ever before. After all, Srebrenica meant a failure of UN peacekeeping troops. Demands for the UN to withdraw from Bosnia were 'inevitable' and came largely from those European countries that had their troops deployed in Bosnia. French President Jacques Chirac declared that it was better for UN forces to withdraw, rather than stay and observe, which would make them accomplices in the situation.[423]

The following factors challenged President Clinton's strategy towards Bosnia: his previous commitment to deploy U.S. troops to a *worst case* UNPROFOR extraction, his unwillingness to actually commit forces to Bosnia, a disagreeing Congress, and the demand for solving Bosnian atrocious war. Furthermore, with a pending UN withdrawal from Bosnia and pictures of a starved Muslim population, the atrocities of Bosnian Serbs, and generally weak U.S. actions to solve the crisis influenced decreased general popularity for President Clinton's foreign policy, all before the approaching 1996 presidential elections.[424] The news media, most famously CNN and journalist Christiane Amanpour's reporting on Bosnia had a powerfully effect on perceptions of the Bosnian situation and had backed the public's consensus for action. Richard Sobel recalls that 58% of the American public believed that the U.S. had an obligation to use military force if there were no other solutions to deliver humanitarian aid to the Bosnians, and prevent the practice of atrocities.[425] It is definite that the Srebrenica Genocide in the summer of 1995 put both domestic and foreign pressures on the Clinton administration. The future of Bosnia and the credibility of Clinton's foreign policy record and bid for 4 more years in Office were

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[422] Richard Holbrooke, *To End the War* (The United States: Random House, 1998), 69.
[423] Ibid., 71.
[424] Samantha Power, *Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (The United States of America: Basic Books, 2002), 427.
[425] Richard Sobel, "Trends: United States Intervention in Bosnia" in *A Case Study on the US Policy in Humanitarian Intervention: The Bosnian War 1992-1995 ed.* Amira Metidji, A PhD Thesis, University of Oran, 2012.

inextricably linked.[426]

In light of these events, the Clinton administration finally moved to a more aggressive strategy. President Clinton recognized that the U.S. could no longer persist with merely containing the violence, but rather to accept the reality on the ground in Bosnia and militarily engage. "We need to get the policy straight or we're just going to be kicking the can down the road again. Right now we've got a situation; we've got no clear mission, no one's in control of events."[427] In the summer of 1995, the U.S. led process of an "Endgame Strategy" began. This new strategy entitled a negotiation plan whose agreed upon points were as follows: an all-inclusive peace resolution constructed on the main values of the previously stated Contact Group plan, attention to possible territorial changes in the Bosnian map, as envisioned by the Contact Group, sanctions relief for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and a sound plan for regional economic integration. In the case that the negotiation plan fell through, the approach undertaken by the U.S. would be to propose the lift of the arms embargo multilaterally, supply arms, training and support to the Bosnian Muslims as to support a military balance on the ground, enforce the no-fly zone and conduct air-strikes for a nine month transition period in case the Bosnian Serbs attacked, and encourage the presence of a multinational force to assist the Bosnian Muslims in defending their territory.[428] Also, the Clinton administration assigned Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke as a negotiator with the divided parties in the Balkans.

As it would follow, in August of 1995, Bosnian Serbs had, for a second time, bombed Markale, an open market in Sarajevo, effectively rejecting the negotiation plans. Before the NATO bombing to be launched on August 30th, U.S. officers met with the Europeans to finalize the U.S. plan of the NATO air mission. Derek Chollet recalls that the meeting had a more formal atmosphere as the U.S. did not ask for permission or European opinion on the appropriateness of airstrikes, saying that "The Americans would go to explain what they were doing, not ask for permission. The

[426] Maseidvag, *Presidental Decision Making in the Clinton Administrations' Foreign Policy*, 51.
[427] Ibid., 51.
[428] Ibid., 52.

message would be 'part invitation, part ultimatum.'"[429] NATO would agree with the U.S. air strike plans, although unwillingly, as it meant that the U.S. would have the leadership in it and would be "a showcase for U.S. hegemony."[430]

4.6.2 Operation Deliberate Force and the Dayton Peace Agreement

The U.S. led NATO strikes would indeed have an impression of a U.S. military and political power show-off.[431] Operation Deliberate Force was launched on August 30th and lasted for more than 2 weeks. Compared to the previous NATO airstrikes, Operation Deliberate Force was "large in scale, involving scores of planes flying from land bases in Europe and Turkey, as well as from aircraft carriers. More than 3.500 separate sorties were flown"[432] attacking Bosnian Serbs' military targets, ammunition bunkers and communication centers throughout Bosnia. Although undertaken multilaterally by 8 member countries of NATO, the United States was bent on restoring its credibility, and conducted 65 percent of total airstrikes, "leaving little doubt about who was really in charge of the bombing campaign.[433] With airstrikes the U.S. had verified its military capacity and leadership abilities, whereas its political superiority was demonstrated in Dayton, Ohio during the peace agreements.

The airstrikes resulted in vast damage to Serbian positions and in the achievement of Clinton's main goal, an establishment of international negotiations to bring reconciliation and create a political solution to the region. Indeed, in November Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian presidents, along with the leaders of NATO, met at a United States Air Force base near Dayton, Ohio. After comprehensive negotiations, a peace agreement struck, today known as "The Dayton Accords." Still, it would be officially signed in Paris on the 14th of December, 199The terms of The Dayton Accords included: partitioning the land among the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, establishing an Implementation Force (IFOR) of military ground troops, protecting the rights of refugees to return home, upholding the ceasefire, and investigating the

[429]Amira Metidji, *A Case Study on the US Policy in Humanitarian Intervention: The Bosnian War 1992-1995,* A PhD Thesis, Univerity of Oran, 2012.
[430] Derek Chollet, *The Road To the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 68.
[431] Gibbs, *First Do Not Harm,* 167.
[432] Ibid., 166.
[433] Ibid., 166.

human rights violations involving ethnic cleansing.[434] As a clause of the agreement, the U.S. would commit 20.000 troops to partake in IFOR and protect the peace agreement. The international community praised Clinton's backing of NATO and IFOR: "Within a few years after Dayton, Clinton's vision of a Europe that is undivided, peaceful, and democratic was well on the way to becoming a reality."[435] Although, U.S. troops were to stay one year in Bosnia, as a part of IFOR, they remained in Bosnia, as Clinton believed that the presence of military force was still necessary in the case of further unrest. Certainly enough, Milosevic's army and rebel fighters in Kosovo engaged in a guerilla war, prompting NATO to intervene in the region once again. In 1999, NATO recommenced to shell Serbian positions and successfully forced Milosevic to surrender. In 2001, Milosevic was arrested and placed in the custody of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague. Since 1996, the Tribunal had been collecting evidence that linked Milosevic to the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Milosevic died in custody still awaiting the verdict of his trial in 2006.

4.7 Conclusion

The initial parts of this chapter argued the predominant interpretations for the Bosnian War such as ethnic hatred and intolerance. The chapter asserted that in the Bosnian reality of various ethnic and religious groups, nationalism and animosity was not a prevalent feeling among the Bosnian population. Only with arrival of the figure of Slobodan Milosevic and a difficult economic situation in post –Tito Yugoslavia, will nationalist sentiment arise.

The conclusion made on the case of American policies in the Bosnian War and the answer to the thesis research question is given in the general conclusion that follows.

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[434] Pierce, *The Clinton Years: Assessing Success in the Bosnian Genocide Intervention*, 10.
[435] Ibid., 11.

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5. CONCLUSION

As argued in the second chapter, the end of the Cold War was a challenging period for the grand strategy of the United States. Although as a Cold War winner the United States was the world's greatest power, the post-Cold War international system was still brimming with many challenges and threats to U.S. interests and objectives. It was a period when the U.S. was in need of a coherent, well-defined grand strategy to cope and defend itself from those numerous threats. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, after the coup against Gorbachev in August of 1991, the battlefields in the Persian Gulf, increasing nuclear proliferation, a stagnant U.S. economy faced with the developing economies of Japan and China, and ethnic conflicts throughout the world were just some of the heated topics in the U.S. public discourse. Which of these threats required urgency and attention of the U.S. and, if it was the case of the U.S. moving forward to manage the issue, what strategic instruments and responses were deemed fitting? In answering and finding solutions to these issues, U.S. political discourse was a competition between two extreme strategic alternatives and visions of U.S. post-Cold War foreign policy.

The first one is labeled as neo-isolationism or, as argued in the second chapter, Unilateralism, although with many variations within it, that all, in a greater or lesser extent, demanded for the U.S. a withdrawal from affairs in the international sphere. The second one was multilateral liberalism that argued the necessity for the United States to engage in the post-Cold War's diverse and dangerous security environment in favor of an operative and peaceful international system.

In the first chapter of the thesis, a particular theoretical framework was established that could offer an answer to this thesis' central question. The research question of the thesis is interested in the reasons and factors that influenced the U.S. obviously inconsistent and fluctuating foreign policy decisions in the Bosnian War that respectively changed from a policy of disengagement in President Bush's administration to slight and hesitant engagement in the first year of the Clinton administration to the intense military intervention in 1995. This thesis believes that

the hereby-utilized neoclassical realism theory is the best theoretical framework to provide the answer, due to its one particular feature that is neoclassical realism's argument that the structural relations of material capabilities do not exclusively govern international politics; rather ideational factors have a significant role as well. This thesis focused on one particular ideational factor, an intervening variable of foreign policy ideas. Thus, another starting point of this thesis is that foreign policy ideas have a significant impact on one nation's foreign policy.

As perceived by Goldstein and Keohane, prominent scholars and researchers on the role of ideas on foreign policy decision-making, ideas are often important determinants of government's policies. They do not exclude the importance of rational and structural realism's arguments of interests as a motif for a state's action in a world, rather they argue that ideas, along with interests have causal importance in explaining the actions of statesmen. Thus, Goldstein and Keohane define ideas as collective beliefs that assist international actors to make sense of the world they perceive and guide them in their actions, particularly in conditions of great ambiguity and complexity as in the post-Cold War period.

The study then borrows Goldstein and Keohane's support for ideas and their influence on foreign policy to argue the influence of ideas on U.S. foreign policy decisions in the Bosnian War. In an attempt to more clearly comprehend how ideas had affected U.S. foreign policy decisions in the post-Cold War era and in the Bosnian War, the thesis had first conducted the observation on the nature and substance of ideas existing and conflicting throughout the history of the United States, the oscillation between two extreme foreign policy ideas was constant: liberal internationalism whose goal is protection of values such as liberty that ultimately defines the United States and isolationism that also had for its goal the protection of U.S. liberty, but rather, through disengagement and retreat from the world outside of the American continent.

In the 1990s the U.S. had no single, clear enemy, rather threats were more diffused and scattered around the world, and generally lacked in urgency. Without a serious threat, constructing and shaping of a single comprehensive grand strategy was difficult for American leaders, especially in the context of internal confusion and division over what the global role of the United States should be. After examining and applying the theory of neoclassical realism and the role of ideas in a state's

foreign policy decisions, this thesis came to the conclusion that the very clash and contrast of the foreign policy ideas of isolationism and internationalism was responsible for the U.S. foreign policy adjustments in the Bosnian War.

To understand the factors that inspired U.S. foreign policy responses in Bosnia, it is important to recognize the connection between the decision-making process and the influence of political elites' ideas. President Bush and President Clinton's foreign policy toward Bosnia was obliged to follow its elites' narrow understanding of the U.S. role and vital interests in the international system. The persistent conflict within the two ends of the ideas, of isolationism and multilateralism, had further contributed to hesitant and indecisive foreign policies in Bosnia. The justification behind the disengagement policy of the Bush administration stems from the dominance and prevalence of selective engagers (a sub-strand of isolationist division) ideas in Congress and the broader public. Selective engagers perceived the post-Cold War Balkan region, and thus Bosnia, as a region of marginal and almost non-existing interest to the United States. As long as the dominant opinion within the administration was that U.S. did not have a sustainable or comprehensive interest in Bosnia, no direct or determine actions followed, making presidential decisions uncertain, cautious, and uncommitted. Strong military opposition to any military deployment overshadowed those votes and voices of internationalists and interventionists that proposed U.S. action in Bosnia. Reflecting on the origin of the war, an absence of a clear objective and exit strategy, the U.S. military, with General Colin Powell at its head, believed that U.S. military intervention would induce Vietnam-like quagmires. In order to fend off any requests for U.S. military action, the Bush administration reasoned its detached policy by referring to ethnic and religious origins of the Bosnian war, of which the U.S. could not do much. The main lead to solving the crisis was given to eager Europeans. However, European actions were weak and lacking strength which allowed, if not encouraged, the escalation of the Bosnian War.

Throughout 1993-1994, President Bush's successor, President Clinton, led a similarly disengaged policy towards Bosnia that corresponded to this lack of a conceptualized interest in Bosnia and, hence, the absence of an effective military mission in Bosnia. However, due to the discovery of human rights violations in Bosnia by media reports, public demand for Clinton to take a firmer stand followed. Undertaken

actions included the use of air power, increased financial aid, and deployed military troops. It was only in the summer of 1995, with the horrid of Srebrenica, that the shift in U.S. foreign policy from disengagement to military intervention finally took place. This shift steamed from a fear of damaging U.S. status in Europe as a superpower. With failed attempts to end the war and Bosnian Serbs challenging its credibility, a shift in the dominance of certain ideas occurred at home. In order to protect the U.S. status and position as the world's strongest power, to protect its national security and economic interests, and to restore the effectiveness of NATO, liberal internationalists' voices overshadowed those of neo-isolationists. It was easy to perceive that when the atmosphere toward intervention changed, encouraged by media reports and public and political demands, and damage to U.S. credibility in the world, 1995 was a year when President Clinton decided to commit with full force to the Bosnian ground troops.

Alongside answering the central question, this thesis has proved the validity of its three main hypotheses that argued the dichotomy of ideas in post-Cold War era as the cause to inconsistent U.S. foreign policy regarding the Bosnian War.

The primary goal of this thesis was to explain and understand the adjustment of one of the most, if not THE most powerful state's foreign policy in relation to another, less powerful. The thesis did not aim to explain the interrelations of the two in terms of the realist's concepts of power and interest, but rather try an alternative approach; one that focuses on ideational factors of political elite's ideas. Thus, this thesis attempted to challenge rigorous reflectivist points that argue an unspecified nature of ideas and their intersubjective, verbally defined qualities. It will be interesting if similar research is undertaken on other case studies and if the interstate relations are or can be examined outside of traditional conceptions of state behavior.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Bosnian War Death Toll/ Demographic Unit AT ICTY

Total 104,733	Bosniaks	c. 68,101
	Serbs	c. 22,779
	Croats	c. 8,858
	Others	c. 4,995
Total civilians 36,703	Bosniaks	25,609
	Serbs	7,481
	Croats	1,676
	Others	1,937
Total soldiers 68,030	Bosniaks	42,492
	Serbs	15,298
	Croats	7,182
	Others	3,058

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Appendix 2: Operation Deliberate Force Summary Data

OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE: ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE

Type	Number Expended	Employing Aircraft
Precision Munitions		
LASER GUIDED BOMBS		
GBU-10 (2,000lb)	303	F-16C, F-15E, F/A-18C/D/EF-18A+
GBU-12 (500lb)	125	F-16C, F-15E, F/A-18/C/D/EF-18A+Jaguar (FR)
GBU-16 (1,000lb)	215	F/A-18C,EF-18A+/Harrier GR.7/Jaguar(FR)
GBU-24 (2,000lb)	6	F/A-18C/F-14
(penetrating warhead)		
AS-30L	4	Mirage 2000
ELECTRO-OPTICAL/INFRA-RED GUIDED MISSILE		
AGM-84 SLAM	10	F/A-18C
GBU-15 (2,000lb)	9	F-15E
AGM-63 Maverick	23	A-10A/F/A-18C
Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles	13	USS *Normandy*
Non-Precision Munitions		
BOMBS		
Mk 82 (500lb)	175	F-16A/A-10A/various
Mk 83 (1,000lb)	99	F-16A/Sea Harrier/various
Mk 84 (2,000lb)	42	F-16A/various
CBU-87 cluster bombs	2	
OTHER MUNITIONS		
30mm cannon	10,086	A-10A
40mm cannon	50	AC-130H
105mm cannon	350	AC-130H
2.75in rockets	20	A-10A
AGM-88 HARM	56	EA-6B/F-16C/FA-18A+/C/D

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Appendix 3: Media Coverage of the Bosnian War

New York Times Stories Covering Bosnia	1994	1995	1996
January	121	74	143
February	201	68	111
March	106	79	106
April	156	93	95
May	96	101	78
June	71	177	97
July	79	168	93
August	81	130	84
September	93	153	90
October	78	161	82
November	108	141	87
December	161	234	85

Washington Post	1994	1995	1996
January	144	110	201
February	235	80	144
March	167	60	151
April	197	88	191
May	156	78	116
June	133	229	121
July	113	180	129
August	78	183	135
September	88	150	154
October	55	187	122
November	107	232	130
December	161	371	124

James E. Covington III, *Visionary Policy: Bill Clinton, The Bosnian War and American Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War 1992-1995* (University of North Carolina: Chapel Hill, 2015), 103.

CIRRICULUM VITAE

Dzenet Mujezinovic was born in Zenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1990. After she graduated from Sarajevo University's Department of Political Sciences, she was awarded with the scholarship by the government of Republic of Turkey. In 2012 she was awarded with the diploma for proficiency in Turkish language after which she started her graduate studies at Yildiz Technical University in Istanbul at the Department of International Relations.